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ABSTRAc'r 
The major portion of the thesis is concerned to examine 
the interplay between the philosophy of the Stoa and Horace's 
poetic skills in the composi"tion of that poet IS Sa tires. It 
is shown that Horace had an intricate knowledge of the 
terminology of Stoic ethics in particular, and that this 
knowledge was exploited as a means to imposing a more than 
immediately apparent formal structure on certain of these conver-
sational pieces. Examples of this type of exploitation in poems 
which do not have an overall Stoic bias may be seen in Chapters 
One and Two, while Chapter Three is an in-depth study of the 
specifically Stoic Satires 2.3. 
A problem which naturally arises in a study of this kind 
is that of Horace's attitude to the validity of Stoic ethics 
full in Chapter Three on satires 2.3 and in Chapter Four on 
satires 2.7. However, the discussion here necessarily embraces 
the attitude of Horace to other rival schools and to ethical 
"systems" based on no formal school, notably that of Of ell us 
in Satires 2.2, while the conclusion is ultimately reached that 
Horace's own moderate and truly eclectic views are to be found 
stated in his most sympathetic satire, namely Satires 2.6. 
This suggestion is discussed in the final chapter. In the 
critical analyses of the various selected poems the discussion 
ranges freely over other topics and influences, especially the 
influence of Roman Comedy on Horace's Satires and, to a lesser 
extent, the influence of Plato and many other authors not 
necessarily recognised as sources. 
It is hoped that the thesis makes some material 
contribution to the more accurate placing of Horace's Satires 
in their total li·terary context, since that should embrace 
the philosophical content which Horace expected his 
contemporaries to recognise and enjoy. 
i 
STOIC INFLUENCE ON SELECTED SATIRES OF HORACE 
INTRODUCTION 
The aim of this thesis is -to examine in some detail the 
effects of Stoicism upon the form and content of a group of 
Horatian satires, namely Satires l.li 1.2; 1.3; 2.2; 2.3; 2.6 
and 2.7. What these particular poems have in common is a certain 
moral didacticism which is often expressed in the language of 
philosophical commonplace and, of course, enlivened by Horace's 
ready and often ironical wit. In the composition of these poems 
Horace draws on an intimate knowledge of Greek philosophy of all 
periods, from that of the pre-Socratics to that of the Stoics and 
Epicureans, and an equally intimate awareness of Italian and 
Roman moral prejudices, derived in part, no doubt, from that 
immensely influential father and also from his own contact with 
the Italian class of whom Of ell us in Satires 2.2 is a representative. 
For this reason the thesis cannot properly be limited to the 
influence of the Stoics on Horace and his work, nor to Horace's 
own exploitation of Stoic ideas for his own ethical and literary 
ends. Where necessary or relevant the influence of Plato and 
others, especially Epicureans, as in the discussion of Satires 
2.6, has been discussed as well, while in Satires 2.2 and the 
discussion on that poem close attention has been paid to the 
Italian prejudices voiced by Of ell us. A concomitant of studying 
those poems in which Horace presents a dialogue or a miniature 
comic drama, as in Satires 2.7, has been the necessity to examine 
Horace's attitude to the characters in whose mouths much of the 
moralising has been placed. Such discussions take place in the 
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context of the thesis whenever relevant, especially at the close 
of the discussion of Satires 2.3. It may be seen, therefore, 
from these preliminary comments that the following chapters on 
selected Horation satires do occasionally transgress the boundaries 
of exposition which are suggested by the title. However, I would 
stress at this early stage that one of the major, if more nebulous, 
intentions of the thesis is to demonstrate the artificiality of 
the barriers, which have not so much been erected between the 
fields of literary criticism and the study of philosophy and its 
effects, but have been allowed to grow, as it were, by default. 
My more particular aim is to show that a detailed, if 
not necessarily philosophically sophisticated, knowledge of the 
ethics of the Stoa and of Stoic terminology in general can, on 
occasion, illuminate vexed problems of structure and of inter-
pretation. This will be shown to be true both of those poems 
which deal quite specifically with Stoic themes, such as Satires 
2.3 and 2.7, and also of poems, the philosophical significance 
of which is more general, more commonplace. Examples of this 
type are Satires 1.1 and 2.2. A knowledge of Stoic terminology 
is of use in the diagnosis of poetical structure, since Horace 
employs words with certain or possible Stoic connotations to form, 
or to help to form, the skeletal substructure of the poem. By 
repeating such key words at crucial structural points throughout 
the poem, or by employing words of associated, but slightly 
different, meaning, as for example culpa and vitium in Satires 2.2, 
Horace ensures that structural and thematic unity are 
maintained. 
Form and content are as inextricably linked in Horace's 
Satires as they are in the other masterworks of antiquity and, 
although one cannot overemphasise the value of knowledqe of the 
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Stoa as a tool to substantiate theories regarding the structure 
of these poems, nevertheless it is the content of Horace's moral 
and didactic poems which is of major importance. One should add 
that the content of Satires 2.3 depends to a certain extent upon 
Horace's desire to accommodate within the indigenous satiric genre 
a poetical treatment of the essentially Hellenistic diatribes of 
the Stoics. What is perhaps of somewhat greater interest is the 
need to assess by detailed analysis the influence of Stoic ethics 
upon the moral advice which it is part of Horace's overall 
intention in the Satires to offer to his readers. Of equal 
importance is the need to assess the influence of Horace's own 
individual beliefs and also of his literary designs upon his 
specific treatment of Stoic topics and persons in Satires 2.3 and 
2.7. In fact the tension, which becomes evident between Stoic 
influence on Horace and Horatian influence upon Stoic thought, 
emerges as one of the formative elements in the composition of 
these poems, mirroring that larger and equally fruitful tension 
between things Greek and things Roman, the influence of which was 
felt in fields as disparate as poetic and architectural endeavour. 
It will become apparent from what follows that Horace is himself 
keenly aware of this tension, which is indeed productive of much 
of the wit that enlivens Satires 2.2, and Horace's ironical attack 
upon the rabid nationalism of Of ell us. For it is not only the 
Stoics who come under fire because of their extremism, their means 
of expression and their belief in the exclusive rectitude of their 
own ideas. Horace demonstrates, perhaps implies is a more 
accurate term, that both parties, Greeks and Romans have much in 
common and much of value to offer in the search for an ars vivendi 
in the troubled years that followed the civil wars. What 
emerges is Horace's belief that the new complexity of existence, 
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especially of the educated Roman, demands a critical eclecticism 
in ethics. Only by matching consistently one's behaviour with 
the demands of the various environments in which it has become 
necessary to operate can one maintain any kind of happiness or 
sanity. Horace would be the first to admit that some environments 
and, accordingly, some life styles are more desirable per se than 
others, as, in fact, he admits in Satires 2.6. However, the 
Epicurean case of a life of rustic withdrawal is no longer 
permanently possible; the more urgent demands of urban life must 
also be met. Here the ethics of the Stoa and the reasoning which 
lay behind them could provide, if treated with discrimination born 
of common sense, an intellectual basis for the traditional values 
of Roman society with which they were in tune. The Stoic view 
also was able to supplement those Roman values which themselves 
were essentially the values of a rustic society adapted to service 
in the city. That the Roman values were born of a rustic back-
ground is, I think, made clear from the comments of Of ell us in 
Satires 2.2, while Virgil's comments in the Georgics 1.121-128, 
although of more universal application, would also tend to 
substantiate this view. What is certain is that the ethics of 
the Stoics were formulated to meet the needs of people whose normal 
habitat was the city state. What is not so certain is that these 
Stoic ethical values were as much in tune with Roman or Italian 
ideals as has so often been stressed. 
My initial concern, therefore, will be to attempt to 
document this similarity using -the comedies of Plautus as my 
Roman source. My choice of Plautus is governed by several 
factors: not only was he active at a crucial period during the 
insemination of the Roman intellect by the Greek genius, but he 
also was writing for an audience which was not exclusively 
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aristocratic. His writings are not likely, therefore, to be 
politically or philosophically tendentious. We also know that 
Horace was influenced by comic authors, and not only the Greek 
authors listed at the beginning of Satires 1.4, but also by Plautus 
and Terence. This point will be developed further in the context 
of the discussion of Satires 2.7. 
In one sense, therefore, Plautus provides a useful 
starting point for a discussion of the influence of the Stoic 
philosophy upon Horace and of the relationship also between 
traditional Roman views and the ethics of the Stoics, since that 
relationship must figure largely in any discussion of the moral 
and didactic element in the Sa'tires of Horace. Plautus is an . 
ideal source: he is a writer with no political, philosophical 
or moral axe to grind. His work is not aimed exclusively at the 
aristocracy, but appealed to and reflected the attitudes of all 
strata of society. It is sad that his plays have been neglected 
as evidence for the history of ideas, although Earl's work on 
the political implications of Plautine vocabulary is a valuable 
t . 1 excep lone The fact that Plautus worked from Greek originals 
naturally presents some problems; how much of the moral comment 
is Greek, for example, and how much Roman? 
It would be as well initially to attempt to clarify in 
our minds what is meant by the traditional Roman moral values. 
Terms such as severitas, gravitas, fides and, of course, pietas 
come to mind; the reverse side of the coin is represented by such 
words as desidia or dedecus. A little further thought usually 
brings to the surface some familiar, not to say threadbare, 
quotations: one thinks of for example: 
1 D.C. Earl, "Political Terminology in Plautus", Historia IX 




moribus antiquis res stat Romana virisque. 2 
3 tu regere imperio populos, Romane, memento. 
dulce et decorum es-t pro patria mori. 4 
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However, we are not much wiser about the real nature of those 
mores antiqui mentioned with such emphasis by Ennius and, accord-
ingly, any credence which we give to the idea that in Stoicism 
Horace found a ready and rational supplement, or complement, to 
Italian ethical values is necessarily uncritical in the extreme. 
We can learn something more specific from Ennius. However, we 
must bear in mind that Ennius, especially in the Annales, is 
concerned with the glorification of Rome. He was not an objective 
reporter. 
On the other hand, Ennius was writing at that same 
crucial stage in the development of European thought, roughly 
speaking, as was Plautus. Also important is the fact -that Ennius 
was for some time connected with Cato the Elder who, despite his 
studied opposition to Hellenic influence in Rome, was post-
1 d · . f .. 5 humous y escr1bed by C1cero as per ectus mea sentent1a St01CUS. 
Enni us, then, was -~~~~3:~c conversant wi th JZj·l"~ct"£'l" the infil tra ting 
Hellenic culture' was also intensely aware of the archetypal 
Roman virtues supposedly exemplified by the person of Cato. A 
pertinent question to put at this point is whether Ennius was, in 
fact, the "mythmaker" , and so responsible for the developing 
belief that Roman ethics were closely paralleled by Stoic ethical 
doctrine. It is more likely that Ennius had a formative influence 
on the crystallisation of these Roman ideals, but that they pre-
2 A fragment from the Annales of Ennius quoted by Cic. Rep. 5.1. 
3 Virgil, Aeneid 6.851. 
4 Horace, Odes 3.2.13. 
5 Cicero, Paradoxa Stoicorum 2. 
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existed the time of his literary output. If this is so, then 
we may reasonably expect to find traces of the traditional Roman 
ethic in the comedies of Plautus. As will be seen, it is possible 
to deduce from the fragments of Ennius' work which are extant 
exac·tly what he meant by mores antiqui. We shall see later that 
they parallel, to a 6ertain extent, the ideology expressed by 
Of ell us in Horace, Satires 2.2. It is, however, impossible to 
ascertain whether any particular Greek doctrine influenced Ennius' 
work, since there does not seem to be an adherence to any particular 
school, despite Warmington's comment that "Ennius had shown himself 
something of an Epicurean. ,,6 The authority for this seems nut 
only to have been the rumour that he was "of a convivial nature.,,7 
Neither does the alleged self-portrait of Ennius, quoted by 
Aulus Gellius at Noctes Atticae 12.4.4, suggest any particular 
philosophical attachment, so much as a sound respect for tradition 
tempered by an awareness of the value of some of the new 
influences. In this respect he sounds like a prototype of Horace. 
For purposes of studying the fragments I divide them into 
two categories: there are those which deal with martial virtues 
and those which illustrate the virtues of peace. 
MARTIAL VIRTUE 
Apart from being conventionally skilled in the use of 
his weapons8 and courageous in the face of his enemy,9 the Roman 
6 E.H. Warmington, Remains of Old Latin (Loeb. 1935) Vol.l, p.xxi: 
... it is interesting that, according to Warmington (p.xxi) 
Ennius "was expressing opinions which Cato believed to be 
subversive of Roman religion and manners", this in the 
Epicharmus and Euhemerus. In the footnotes which follow, 
references to Ennian fragments will be identified by their fro 
number and section in Warmington; e.g. W. Ann. 271. 
7 Ibid., p.xix; references to Warmington will subsequently read 
R.O.L. etc. 
8 W. Ann. 271. 
9 W. Ann. 198-9. 
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must be totally dedicated to the defence of the state before the 
salvation of which all else pales into insignificance. All else 
includes not only one's own life, but also that of one's relatives 
and friends. A famous example of such devotion is Decimus Mus 
who, according to Ennius, devoted himself to the gods of the 
underworld with the following words: 
:1 
divi hoc audite parumper: 
ut pro Romano populo prognariter armis 
certando prudens animam de corpore mitto. 10 
This sort of attitude prompts many expressions of patriotic 
enthusiasm from Ennius: another hero is commemorated in a famous 
line: 
unus homo nobis cunctando restituit rem. 
noenum rumores ponebat ante salutemj 
. . . . . 11 
ergo postque maglsque Vlrl nunc glorla claret 
The hero in question here, of course, is Q. Fabius Maximus 
Cunctator, whose praises were subsequently sung by Cicero, 
Polybius, Virgil, Livy, Ovid, Suetonius and Silius Italicus -
among others. 12 It is clear that in this case Ennius stands at 
the beginning of a literary tradition and that his verses give 
literary expression to an idea, the significance of military 
success, which was to appeal to subsequent generations of Romans. 
The passages which have been cited or quoted so far are 
all drawn from the Annales. Certain passages which survive from 
the tragedies of Ennius also throw light on the nature of military 
virtue. However, the tragedies pose a problem which is similar 
to that posed by the use of Plautus' plays as evidence for Roman 
10 w. Ann. 200-2. 
11 W. Ann. 360-62. 
12 Warmington gives a full list of these references in his 
subscript to this passage at R.O.L. 1, p.132. 
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ethical beliefs. It is necessary to come to some conclusion 
concerning the extent to which the sentiments expressed by Ennius 
were indebted to his Greek originals. I would suggest that the 
plays of Ennius, and also of Plautus, were first selected and 
then adapted with close attention paid to the sensibilities of 
the Roman audience. 
For example, in the Achilles of Ennius the embassy to the 
reluctant hero gives the poet the opportunity to commend patriotic 
13 
virtue and duty. The language and the emphasis are clearly 
suited to a Roman audience. 
The theme of the total sacrifice of things held dear for 
the sake of the state occurs in the Erechtheus, where the 
sacrifice of the hero's children is in keeping with the Roman 
belief in the supreme claim of the state. Ennius employs the 
same idea, or similar, of children done to death in war in the 
Telamon: 
ego cum genui morituros scivi et ei rei sustuli: 
praeterea ad Troiam cum misi ob defendendam Graeciam, 
scibam me in mortiferum bellum non in epulos mittere. 14 
Here we see the ultimate subservience to the state. Children 
are produced as potential troops. 
In conclusion to this discussion of martial virtue one 
should perhaps add that the beginnings of the idea of clemency 
to the defeated are to be found in a speech put into the mouth 
of Pyrrhus of Epirus. There may be a suggestion that the more 
humanitarian concepts of the Stoics on the nature of man and 
universal brotherhood are an influence on Pyrrhus' thinking, 
although the calculated clemency of Odysseus in the Ajax of 
13 w. Trag. 6. 
14 W. Tra0, 319~22. 
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Sophocles is perhaps a more apposite parallel. 
PEACEFUL VIRTUE 
We know that in the time of Augustus and of the "rest-
itution of the republic" the propagandists extolled the virtue 
of meticulously fulfilling one's duty to the gods, the state and 
to the family; this concept of ietas can be traced back to the 
time of Ennius and beyond. For in that dream in which Ennius 
records he was spurred on by Homer to produce the Annales the 
shade of Homer appealed to Ennius' sense of patriotic duty with 
th d . . . 15 e war S, 0 pletas anlml. Ennius' means of repaying the debt 
he owed to his city was singing its praises in poetry. Much later 
Horace, as is made clear in Satires 2.6 repays his debt to his 
patron Maecenas by service in the city and the composition of 
poems. At the beginning of his epic Ennius discusses the origins 
of the Roman race and, in describing the founding fathers, he 
t h ·· t 16 s resses t elr ple as. For this was the particular virtue of 
Anchises, "Assaracu natus Capys optimus isque pium ex se Anchisen 
generat." The essence of pietas is that the relationship between 
the individual and the gods should be without blemish. If the 
leaders or, better still, the found~rs of a state are in this 
position, so much the better for that state. Filial obedience 
and responsibility is another aspect of pietas which is illustrated 
17 by a surviving fragment. Although strictly a matter of private 
ethics, obedience to one's parents is essential to the health of 
the community, so essential that it is perhaps misguided to 
attempt to distinguish between private and public ethics at Rome. 
15 W. Ann. 6. 
16 W. Ann. l6~17. 
17 W. Ann, 22-3, 
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For the family was considered the nucleus of the state and 
obedience and loyalty within that nucleus was an ideal safeguard 
for the future strength and security of the state. In the context 
of social and family relationships Ennius also praises the concepts 
f f · d 18 ... 19 d . t . 20 1 th 1 f 1 o . l es, ~ an saplen la, a so e ru e 0 aw: 
pellitur e medio sapientia, vi geritur res, 
spernitur orator bonus, horridus miles amatur; 
haud doctis dictis certantes, sed maledictis 
miscent inter sese inimicitiam agitantes; 
non ex iure manum consertum, sed magis ferro 
rem repetunt regnumque petunt, vadunt solida vi.21 
Two further fragments of Ennius, one quoted with warm approval 
by Cicero at De Oratore 1.45.199, sum up the whole concept of 
peaceful virtue as it was understood by this poet: 
unde sibi populi et reges consilium expetunt 
suarum rerum incerti quos ego ope mea 
ex incertis certos compotesque consili 
dimitto, ut ne res temere tractent turbidas. 22 
Here an old man is the source of wisdom for his state after a 
lifetime of service in which presumably his wisdom has been 
exercised for the greater practical good of his people. For "qui 
ipse si sapiens prodesse non quit nequiquam sapit",23 while Cicero 
records Ennius' praise of the wisdom of Aelius Sextus at De 
Republica 1.18.30, "non quod ea quaerebat quae numquam inveniret, 
sed quod ea respondebat quae eos qui quaesissent et cura et negotio 
solverent.,,24 
18 w. Ann. 78; cf. Ann. 330-l. 
19 w. Trag. 216. 
20 W. Ann. 262-8. 
21 Ibid. 
22 W. Trag. 150-53. 
23 W. Trag. 269-70. 
24 W. Ann. ..,,, r J'::O. 
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To sum up the Ennian version of civic virtue: it 
embraced a) duty to the gods through the state religion and the 
completion of all necessary rituals in respect of the state 
religion, b) duty to the state with an attendant respect for the 
rule of law and c) the duty of any gifted individual to make his 
skill available for the benefit of the state. We shall see in the 
discussion of Horace,Satires 2.6 that this ideal of duty was not 
entirely compatible with the personal aspirations of the poet. 
It is more difficult to assess how Ennius conceived of 
the way in which a Roman should organise his private or family 
life. The necessity for filial obedience and paternal responsibility 
has alre~dy been mentioned. There are also attacks on the 
shamelessness of contemporary womanhood which no doubt reflect 
the influence of Cato Maior,25 as do the attacks on the moral 
laxity of the Greeks. 
It can, therefore, be said with some justification that 
Ennius, writing as he did close to the contact period between 
Greek and Italian culture, was largely responsible for initiating 
the literary tradition of expounding the Roman moral ideals. 
However, it may be suspected that Ennius' sympathies lie too 
nearly with the aristocracy for his work to be a valid source of 
information regarding the true feelings of tota Italia on these 
topics. Such an author as Ennius may be suspected of originating 
even, and certainly propagating a political and moral ideal 
suited to the life-style of his patron. With Plautus the case is 
different. Writing before Rome was flooded with Greek philosoph-
ical ideals, if Plautus seems to lay stress on a particular moral 
25 See Malcovati, ~R,F. 1, p.14 for comment on the authenticity 
of the Catonic speeches in Livy against, e.g. the extrav-
agance of women, esp. the speech ~Epia at Livy, 
34.1. 
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concept in one of his comedies, then that would be because it 
appealed to existing Roman ideas rather than because it seemed 
good to him to introduce alien ideas. Furthermore, Plautus was 
hardly a member of the "es"tablishment" and, although it is 
dangerous to underestimate the general level of intelligence of 
his audience,26 one can nevertheless assume that his audience 
would not have accepted blatantly propagandist sentiments aimed 
at securing the position of the senatorial class. Any intimations 
which we may receive from "the plays of Plautus about Roman moral 
standards must, therefore, be considered valuable, especially if 
our further aim is to consider those moral standards as they are 
reflected in another genre which has relatively humble pretensions, 
namely satire and particularly the Satires of Horace. It must 
never be forgotten that the chief aim of Plautus was to amuse his 
audience. As a result solemn sentiments in farcical settings 
abound. One must always take care in interpreting what Plautus 
appears to be saying, take care to see what comic effect, if any, 
is intended and what sort of comic effect it is. Also, if it can 
ever be established that Plautus is speaking in all seriousness, 
which is as difficult a task as it is in dealing with Horace's 
Satires, because of the intervening mask of the comic character 
or medium, then what he is saying in this manner immediately 
becomes more striking by reason of the contrast with the farce with 
which it is surrounded. After discussing various passages drawn 
from the comedies of Plautus, I will briefly compare my findings 
based upon those passages with the findings derived from the study 
of Ennius. We will then see that, apparently, the values hallowed 
26 On this topic, see W.R. Chalmers, "Plautus and his Audience" 
in Roman Drama ed. by D.R. Dudley and T.A. Dorey (London, 
1965), pp.2l-50. 
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in Roman literature by Ennius, and such dignified followers as 
Virgil, Livy and Horace, in the Odes especially, but also in 
Satires 2.2, were in reality firmly founded on genuine Roman and 
Italian preoccupations. It can then be shown that these pre-
occupations parallel, to a certain extent, the ethical doctrines 
of the Stoics as they were known, for example, to Horace at the 
time he was composing ·the Satires. 
MILITARY VIRTUE IN PLAUTUS 
In the Amphitruo Sosia, the slave of Amphitruo, rehearses 
the tale of his master's valour as commander-in-chief of the 
Theban forces, the tale with which he intends to delight Alcmena, 
his master's wife. In a long speech at vVol86-247 and at vv. 
250-283 the slave describes Amphitruo as a paragon of military 
virtue, skilled with arms, brave and possessed of admirable 
and also knew the precise moment at which to throw his cavalry into 
the battle. Sosia also admires the enemy for their devotion to 
duty, even in the face of death. All of this could come from the 
Annales of Ennius; the traits deemed wor-thy of praise by both 
authors are identical, although the effect of Sosia's speech is 
ultimately comic, since he declares that the only reason he knew 
that the battle lasted all day was the fact that he missed his 
lunch. 
Ironically it was Amphitruo's devotion to duty that gave 
Jupiter the opportunity to seduce Alcmena; for Jupiter takes 
advantage of Amphitruo's genuine concern for his troops to continue 
hia liaison with Alcmena, after Amphitruo has returned to Thebes. 
Plautus exploits the irony of this situation to ·the full by making 
Jupiter declare, as he leaves Alcmena, that he must return to his 
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legions before he is missed. He stole away in the night and: 
nunc ne legio persentiscat clam illuc redeundum 
est mihi 
t ' d' t bl' 27 ne me uxorem praevor 1sse 1can prae re pu 1ca. 
The Roman audience would fully have appreciated the humour of the 
situation, being aware of a general's proper duty to his men and 
to the state. 
There is some debate as to the exact tone of the famous 
soliloquy which is put into the mouth of Alcmena at vv.633-653. 
Sedgwick is in no doubt: 
Whenever Alcmena appears, Plautus forgets his clowning 
and the tone changes to something not unworthy of 
tragedy, a high seriousness which would befit a Roman 
matron. Plautus makes free with the gods and the 
general, but is overawed by the ideal wife and mother. 28 
One should, however, consider the effect of the setting upon the 
jewel, as it were: Horace, who learned a good deal of his com~c 
is 
value of a statement by surrounding it with expressions, which 
are clearly humorous, or by placing them in the mouth of a 
character, who is himself ludicrous. This is the technique which 
he employs against the Stoics in Satires 2.3 and 2.7. It seems 
to me that, in this passage from the Amphitruo, we have a perfect 
prototype of this Horatian technique. Alcmena's expressions of 
virtue are spoken immediately after she has been taken advantage 
of by Jupiter and immediately before she is accused by her husband 
of adultery. Her words, therefore, "virtus omnia in sese habet, 
, d t b 'II 2 9 1 b ' h omn1a a sun" ona quem penest v1rtus, can on y e met W1t 
27 Amphitruo, 527-528. 
28 W.B. Sedgwick, Plautus itruo (Manchester, 1960), p.103. 
------~~~~-------
29 Amphitruo, 653~654. 
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laughter, although an element in that response will be the fact 
that Plautus' humour is being consciously iconoclastic. Plautus 
exploits the conditioned reflexes of his audience towards military' 
valour and expertise by making jokes at the expense of the concept 
th . 30 on 0 er occaSlons. The character of the braggart soldier is 
perhaps the logical Culmination of this type of Plautine humour, 
especially in the characterisation of Pyrgopolynices in the Miles 
Gloriosus: such parody of military valour would have lacked a 
certain amount of point were it not that such qualities were 
lionised, such braggadocio over military achievement common. 
Finally, although it may be true that the miles loriosus of New 
Comedy was a product of the incessant struggles between the 
successors of Alexander, the type would be common enough in Rome 
- as a result of the Punic War. 
In summing up this section, therefore, we may say that 
the plays of Plautus confirm that a good deal of importance was 
attributed to military prowess by his audience. The very nature of 
that military virtue is identical with that praised in the works 
of Ennius. If the objection is made that the Greek originals of 
the Plautine plays were parodying outmoded or "Spartan" military 
ideals at a time when the mercenary was the backbone of the 
Hellenistic armies, one could answer that the "received" military 
virtue of Rome was rather "Spartan" and based on a similar 
discipline. This is later made clear by Horace, through Of ell us, 
at Satires 2.2.10-13. 
30 Take as examples i) the joke at Epidicus 29-32, where 
Epidicus' horror that Stratippocles abandoned his arms in 
the face of the enemy reflects a genuine attitude, and 
ii) the dissimulation of Curculio at Cure. 394-397. 
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PEACEFUL VIRTUE IN PLAUTUS 
There is relatively little evidence in the comedies of 
Plautus on what was discussed in the context of Ennius' work under 
the heading of civic or political virtue. Plautus is chiefly 
concerned with the ethics of inter-personal relationships. 
However, certain passages are helpful. 
For example the daughter of Sagaristio in the Persa 
impresses the pimp Dordalus with her good sensei she declares 
that citizens should be trusty and loyal, thrifty and generous, 
open and truthful and moderate. 31 It almost sounds as if Plautus 
is parodying the patter of politicians, or such ethical treatises 
as were produced to propagate the doctrines of the Hellenistic 
schools. Horace attacks such diatribes in a similar fashion in 
Satires 2.3. Such a parody would certainly be effective coming 
from the mouth of a young woman about to be sold as a meretrix. 
T_ 'c __ .L. 
-L.U. .L. o.\"". '- , regarding civic duty, there is more sarcasm 
than direct comment, as is perhaps natural in comedy and also 
proper when one traces the origins of the genre back to Aristo-
phanes. We have yet another reason why the study of Plautus is 
also relevant to the study of Horace in the Satires. On the other 
hand, the occasional senex such as Hegio in the more serious 
Captivi declares that nothing is so sweet as serving the public 
good. 32 His sentiments anticipate those of Ennius recorded above. 33 
It is made clear that the expenses incurred in serving the public 
good are more than compensated by the good report and reputation 
produced by such action. The impulse to serve the state in peace-
time, as well as in time of war, is selfish rather than selfless. 
31 Persa, 554-560. 
32 Captivi, 498-501. 
33 See above p.xi. 
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One should compare the reasons why good men should be compelled 
to govern as given by Plato in the Republic. The fear of being 
subjected to the government of men worse than themselves is their 
, , 1 t I' t' 1 t' 34 Pl t h d 1 prlme lmpu se 0 po 1 lca ac 10n. au us, owever, ec ares 
that these pillars of society are not always what they seem to 
be. Cleostrata, wronged by her husband Lysidamus in the Casina, 
fulminates against her husband's friend Alcesimus, who, "senati 
columen" and "praesidium popli,,35 though he may appear to be, has 
abetted Lysidamus in an adultery. There is a similar irony in 
the Menaechmi, where Peniculus complains that politics are a waste 
of time for "honest" men like himself. 36 Just as Plautus was able 
to exploit apparently cherished beliefs regarding military 
excellence for humorous effect, so civic duty is a source of 
similar amusement. 
There is more emphasis, however, in the Plautine comedies 
on the duties and ties of loyalty as they operate on the level 
of the family. A scene from the Miles Gloriosus 37 shows also 
that Plautus was well aware of the clos~ relationship in kind 
between the virtues which supported the family and those, the 
same only on a larger scale, which sustain the state. It is 
interesting that one of the ways in which Augustus intended to 
restore the republic and its virtues was to reward those individuals 
whose duty to the state was fulfilled through their duty to a 
family and the production of children. This, of course, was one 
of the duties which both Horace and Virgil were unwilling to 
fulfil. However that may be, the charact~rs involved in the scene 
34 Plato, Re~ 347. 
35 Casina, 534-536. 
36 Menaechmi, 446-459. 
37 Miles Gloriosus, 596-812. 
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from the Miles Gloriosus are Pleusicles, the adulescens, and 
Periplectomenos, a good-natured, if rather self-satisfied, senex, 
who helps Pleusicles to fool his rival, the braggart soldier 
Pyrgopolynices. Palaestrio, the slave, is present to give comic 
asides. For example, when Pleusicles, a thoughtful and consider-
ate young man, expresses concern that he may be causing embarrass-
ment to Periplectomenos or inconvenience, as he seeks his heart's 
desire, Palaestrio is shocked. 38 That a lover should think of 
anyone but himself is a contradiction of the comic convention 
which the slave, as an example of another comic convention, can 
scarcely endure. The conventions are reversed again, to good 
humorous effect, a little later in the scene. 39 It is here that 
we learn something about received moral standards, if in a rather 
surprising manner. So far as Periplectomenos is concerned, 
seemliness is the criterion of the behaviour of a gentleman and 
this is a statement which would have held true either in Rome or 
Athens. However, the moral positions of the two men are diamet-
rically opposed when they come to discuss the advantages, 
disadvantages and duties of marriage. Periplectomenos, never 
married, values his liberty to enjoy himself. Pleusicles, supported 
by Palaestrio l insists that marriage and the getting of children 
are pleasures and simultaneously duties. Compare the conflicting 
attitudes of the two men: 
Pl. at illa laus est, magno in genere et in divitiis 
maxumis 
liberos hominem educare, generi monumentum et sibi. 
Pee quando habeo multos cognatos, quid opus sit mihi 
liberis?40 
38 Miles Gloriosus, 616-623. 
39 Ibid., 644ff. 
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and also: 
Pee pol si habuisse, satis cepissem miserarium e liberis: 
continuo excruciarer animi: si ei forte fuisset febris 
censerem emori; cecidissetve ebrius aut de equo uspiam, 
metuerem ne ibi diffregisset crura aut cervices sibi. 41 
It is interesting that it is Pleusicles who puts forward the 
traditional point of view regarding the nobility of the married 
42 
state. The youthful idealism of Pleusicles contrasts sharply with 
the seasoned cynicism of Periplectomenos. The debate would lack 
point, if it did not reflect a contemporary rift of opinion along 
the same lines in Rome, or, although this does not exclude the 
idea of the debate at Rome, a rift of opinion between the Epicurean 
at Athens, who wishes to escape civic and family responsibilities, 
and the adherent of a more traditional attitude to the family and 
the state, an attitude supported by the Stoics~ Another side of 
this conflict is recorded by Horace in satires 2.6, which suggests 
that this was a continuing debate at Rome also. 
Pleusicles, however, is something of an exception, though 
not such a rare one as may be supposed. For the frank confessions 
of Charinus at the beginning of the Mercator tell us what a 
dutiful son should and should not do. Charinus confesses that he 
is typical of the dissipated offspring, while his father had been 
hard-working and loyal as a young man. 43 Even though the trappings 
of this passage are evidently Greek and it may well follow the 
44 
original text of Philemon quite closely, it is nevertheless an 
example of Plautus passing on a message which his Roman audience 
41 Ibid. 7l9~722. 
42 On the idealism of some comic adulescentes, see Gordon Williams, 
"Some Aspects of Roman Marriage Ceremonies and Ideals", J.R.S., 
XLVIII (1958), pp.16-29. 
43 ~rcator, 40-48 and 60-70. 
44 E.g. v.61; ex ephebis and v,67; nt. srect~set p~plum. 
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would understand and appreciate. This is especially so, because 
of the fact that the ideal of rural work and of the profit and 
honourable satisfaction to be gained by it is also stres~ed in 
this passage and it thereby anticipates similar comment in Cato's· 
De Agri Cultura, Virgil's Georgics and especially in the Satires 
of Horace, 2.2 for example, and Satires 3 and 11 of Juvenal. As 
the Mercator develops we are made to question the validity of a 
harsh upbringing as a training for later life, since Charinus' 
father falls head over heels in love with his son's mistress. 
Another example of Plautine irony at work is in the 
Bacchides. Although the sententious p~:o:gegue Lydus praises 
Pistoclerus' friend Mnesilochus as a dutiful son45 in order to 
put Pistoclerus to shame, Mnesilochus too has succumbed to the 
arts of the two Bacchises. It is possible that on such occasions 
as these Plautus has some serious satiric purpose in mind. 
Plautine irony of this type anticipates Horace's comment at satires 
1.10 .14f., "ridiculum acri / forti us et melius magnas plerumque 
secat res." For beneath the general atmosphere of jollity, and 
that air of lively debauch, which characterises the Bacchides, 
there is a rather sombre feel. The object of the play is to 
ridicule hypocrisy. The theme is that age is not automatically 
any wiser than the youth for the "benefit" of whom i'e so often 
pontificates. 
Plautus often makes his point best when at his funniest; 
this is often when he is at his most ironical. In the Amphitruo 
991-996 Mercury declares, without any trace of guilt, that he is 
aiding Jupiter in his designs a.ga.inst Alcmena; Mercury is ius 
in the extreme: 
45 ~, 453~462. 
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Me. pater vocat me, eum sequor, eius dicto, imperio sum 
audiens; 
ut filium bonum patri esse oportet, itidem ego sum 
patrie 
amanti subparasitor, hortor, adsto, admoneo, suadeo; 
si quid patri volupest, voluptas ea mihi multo maxumust. 
Were it not for the fact that pieta~ was an established mos 
antiquus, as it were, the more subtle aspects of the humour of 
this passage would be lost. An interesting ethical question is 
also raised which is exploited on the human level in other plays: 
does one's duty to be obedient to one's parents overrule one's own 
feelings of what is righ-t and wrong? The same conflict between 
duty to parent and to personal ethical standards occurs in the 
Asinaria. Philaenium objects to the prospect of working as a 
meretrix in order to keep her mother. The latter, Cleaereta, 
raises the spectre of filial duty. Philaenium, however, makes it 
clear that the obligation is reciprocal and that a demand of the 
type made of her by Cleaereta forfeits, necessarily, that respect 
and duty which should properly be owed: 
Cl. hoccine est pietatem colere, matris imperium minuere? 
Ph. neque quae recte faciunt culpo, neque quae delinquont 
46 
amo. 
Eventually Philaenium does succumb, while a similar kind of pressure 
for a different, but equally dishonourable, motive is put upon the 
adulescens Argyrippus by his father Demaenetus. 47 Similar abuses 
of pietas occur also in the Cistellaria 40-46 and Persa 344ff. 
On the other hand, pietas often does receive its proper 
reward. Neither is pietas restricted to duty between parents and 
children. The whole plot of the Menaechmi turns on the search 
46 Asinaria, 509-510. 
47 Ibid., 829-831. 
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for and discovery of one brother by another. In the Au1u1aria 
Eunomia's genuine affection for her brother is well brought out, 
when she counsels him to marry in a sympathetic and touching scene. 
In the Curcu1io pietas is rewarded when P1an~sium discovers the 
identity of Therapontigonus. 48 Similarly the sustained and 
conscious pietas of Hanno in the Poenu1us is depicted both before 
and after the discovery of his long-lost children. On his arrival 
in Ca1ydon, Hanno offers a devout prayer to the gods. 49 This 
prayer is answered. Hanno thanks the gods and also recognises 
that they have rewarded his virtue. 50 
Another play which deals specifically with the idea of 
virtue and its reward is the Rudens. It also raises problems 
regarding the selfish basis of both Greek and Roman virtue. The 
very idea of just reward for virtue and punishment for vice is 
,:~ 
given prominence in the Prologue, spoken by Aj;'Jrctl.'lrU&, who declares 
that Jupiter keeps a weather eye on human affairs and makes sure 
that men get what they deserve. 51 P1autus develops these ideas 
during the course of the play in which Daemones is ultimately 
reunited with a daughter and the villains suffer proper retribution. 
The three-cornered conversation between Daemones, 
P1esidippus and Sceparnio in vv.89-184 shows to advantage ·the 
modest and correct demeanor of Plesidippus to his senior Daemon~s. 
Daemones' grief for ·the loss of his daughter long ago is also 
emphasised. This is itself a mark of pietas. It is perhaps 
difficult to reconcile Daemones' apparent pietas with his indiff-
erence to the plight of the shipwrecked girls,52 while his 
48 Curculio, 637-641. 
49 Poenulus, 950-953. 
50 Ibid., 1187-1190. 
51 Rudens, 9-12 and 26-30. 
52 Ibid., 179-184. 
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solicitude for them when they take shelter at the shrine of Venus 
is incompatible with the earlier callousness. By contrast 
Sceparnio was all solicitude, even before the girls meant anything 
personally to himself or to his master. It is clear that Daemones 
is motivated by selfishness: the girls only concern him when 
they are, as it were, his dependents and it is his duty to defend 
the shrine and their rights of sanctuary. To allow the girls to 
suffer hurt or injustice then would adversely affect his own 
reputation. When he discovers that one of the girls is his 
daughter he is overjoyed, but his satisfaction seems to spring 
as much from the belief that the gods have acted properly as from 
any true affection for Palaestra. The words of Arcturus in the 
prologue are echoed by those of Daemones at vv.1191-1194 and, a 
little wryly, by Trachalio at v.1176. 
It does not seem significant at the denoument that 
Daemones would have at one stage let them drown, falloff a cliff, 
that he would have taken sexual advantage of one or both of them. 
Is Plautus criticising such actions and the motives which prompt 
them, reflecting them without comment, mirroring a contemporary 
debate on the nature of virtue and pietas - as Horace does in so 
many of his poems? It may be that Plautus has produced an 
unsatisfactorily inconsistent character, because of two different 
claims upon his talent: one, the desire to make his audience 
laugh at this lecherous oldman and, two, the desire to gain 
soleITill approbation for the well-earned happiness of the dutiful 
senex who has been reunited with his daughter. All these elements 
are present: however, Plautus lacks the artistry, does not 
accept or recognise any necessity completely to smooth over the 
flaws which these disparate motives create in his work. It is a 
mark of Horace's special genius that he can reflect contemporary 
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debate and also make his own comment, within the smaller context 
of his miniature dramas and diatribes, without straining the 
artistic and poetic unity and integrity of his work. It is not 
fair perhaps to talk of Horace improving upon Plautus in the same 
way that he improved upon Lucilius, as he claims he did himself,S3 
since the aims of the comic writer were rather different from his 
own. However, it will be interesting to note how Horace exploits 
many of Plautus' techniques of ironical humour and characterisation 
and dialogue in the Satires, but in a manner which ensures that 
brevity and even compression take over from diffuseness and 
repetition. It will also· become clear, as the Satires are 
subjected to detailed scrutiny, that the traditional values, which 
Octavian was in the process of attempting to resurrect, were, in 
Horace's time, not greatly different in conception from those 
given literary form by Ennius and which, if Plautus is an accurate 
source, were at least recognised as existent by large sections of 
the Roman populace. 
The further question, which has already been foreshadoweq 
as being of importance, relating to the compatibility between 
Roman values, as now established, and Stoic ethical values can 
now be faced with better preparation. 
War seems to have received but little discussion among 
the early Stoics, although they recognised it as a proof of the 
existence of evil in the world. It was, however, stressed that 
the wise man was under an obligation, by virtue of his capabilities, 
to serve the state. This may have included the military sphere as 
well as the civic, if and when necessary. The devotion of the 
Stoic to government despite personal inclination was ultimately 
53 Horace, Satires 1.4; 1.10 and 2.1 (passim). 
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epitomised by the figure of Marcus Aurelius. Long before then 
Cicero was attracted by the notion of practical virtue being 
employed in the political field, also by the reputation which 
54 
could thereby be won. There seems to have been a good deal of 
compatibility between the idea of service to the state as approved 
by the Stoics and as practised by the Romans. Much the same can 
be said about the notions of the stoics regarding the nature of 
the gods. The Stoics attempted to rationalise the existing ideas 
in the light of their own version of the truth and the logos, but 
the forms of worship did not need to change. 
In so far as family responsibilities were concerned the 
Stoic, like the Roman, was expected to procreate. The Stoic 
precepts on family life are collected by E.V. Arnold and Edelstein,55 
among others. They were presented for the Roman reader by Cicero 
in the De Officiis. It was the duty of the father to maintain the 
rem familiarem. It was the duty of the child to be loyal and 
obedient, so long as the wishes of the parent were reasonable. 
The Stoics aimed at a harmony within the family that should parallel 
and help to effect that requisite harmony in the state which itself 
should parallel the cosmic harmony maintained by the deity. It 
may be that this basic likeness, which, of course, does not extend 
to all details, between Roman ethics, as mirrored by Ennius, 
Plautus and others, and the ethics of the Stoa, as adapted by 
54 Detailed documentation at this stage would be tedious and 
unnecessary. Such documentation is provided in the body of 
the thesis, where it is necessary and where relevant. 
55 E.V. Arnold's Roman Stoicism (London, 1911 rep. 1958) is still 
an extremely use source, which has not been totally 
superseded by later and more philosophically mature Qiscussions, 
e.g. those of Rist and Long. Edelstein's, The Meaning of 
Stoicism (Carob. Mass. 1966) is also a work of great value for 
those interested in the influence of Stoicism on the history 
of ideas. 
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Panaetius, was merely the result of the aristocratic pretensions 
of stoicism matching the plainly aristocra'tic basis of Roman moral 
theory and practice. This point is made by Syme and is commented 
upon in the discussion of Satires 2.2. However, the similarity 
was there and had, of necessity, to be taken account of by any 
person who, like Horace, was intent on subjecting the behaviour 
of his contemporaries to a thorough and ironical scrutiny and who 
was willing to make positive submissions as to how the behaviour 
of his contemporaries could be improved. 
1 
CHAPTER ONE 
STOIC INFLUENCE ON HORACE SATIRES 1.1 AND 1. 2 
A 
Thanks to the work of Eduard Fraenkel the structural 
difficulties which were felt to exist in relation to the problem-
atical unity of this poem have now been satisfactorily resolvedi l 
it was clear that ~E~~L~oLPLa (dissatisfaction with one's lot) 
was the main concern of the poem's beginning, and that Horace 
2 
returned to this topic, perhaps in a rather clumsy manner, 
towards the end of the poem. ~ihat was not immediately clear was 
how the portion dealing with ~E~~L~oLPLa related to the central 
and longest portion of the poem, the main concern of which was 
~LAOTIAOU~La (avarice, or love of money for its own sake). 
Fraenkel declared that Horace achieved unity in the poem by making 
TIAEOVEELa (the spirit of competitive self-enrichment) 3 the 
ultimate source from which sprang ~E~~L~oLPLa and ~LAOTIAOU~La. 
The transitions from section to section were also eased by the 
conversational freedom which is typical of satire and, perhaps, 
which was inherited as a feature from the work of Lucilius. 
Furthermore, Fraenkel's discussion of the Greek source material, 
upon which Horace drew for the composition of this poem,4 shows 
---------
1 Fraenkel, Horace (Oxford, 1957), pp.90-101. H. Herter has a 
full bibliography on -this satire in Rh. Mus. XLIV, 1951, Iff. 
2 E.g., Heinze assumed this in his introduction to this satire 
in his edition of 1921, believing that Horace contaminated 
materials drawn from two different Greek sources. 
3 Perhaps the most vivid description of a man consumed, 
allegedly, by TIAEOVsELa is Demosthenes' picture of Philip of 
Macedon in such speeches as the De Corona and the Philil2..12ic.~. 
4 Horace, pp,92-94. 
2 
that Horace's treatment of the causal links between ~E~~L~oLPLa 
~L~on~oUTLa and n~EovEELa was in keeping with an established 
pattern within the diatribe tradition. It may be added that it 
would be out of keeping with the artistic integrity of Horace to 
employ a structurally flawed composition as an introduction to 
his first book of satires. 
Unfortunately Fraenkel, whose work is so admirable in 
other respects, seems constitutionally unable to discuss the 
influence of the Hellenistic schools of philosophy upon Horace's 
poems. Although he does mention the diatribe TIEPL aUTapxELa~ 
(on self-sufficiency) of Teles, which itself derived from the 
diatribes of Bion of Borysthenes, and which is one of the 
sources of Horace Satires 1.1, Fraenkel does not think it 
necessary to say that Teles was an adherent of the Cynic school. 
As a result Fraenkel fails to make any connection between the 
Cynic concept of aUT&pxELa and the closely related doctrine of 
the Stoics. 5 Rudd, who improves upon Fraenkel's work in this 
respect, is aware of the philosophical influence at work upon 
6 Horace's poetrYi even so Rudd does little more than point out 
that the blurring of distinctions between the doctrines of the 
various schools, "which took place from about (sic) 39 B.C." 
onwards, suited the happy eclecticism of Horace. 7 It ought to be 
pointed out, however, that, rather than talk of a "blurring of 
5 Cf. "The early Stoics, Sceptics and Epicureans were supremely 
confident that a man's inner resources, his rationality, can 
provide the only firm basis for a happy and tranquil life." 
A.A. Long, Hellenistic Philos (London, 1974) p.4. In 
other words, a man s own reason was sufficient to procure 
Eu6aL~ov(a. Cf., Diogenes Laertius 7.127, aUTapXn TE EtvaL 
aUTnV (scil. TnV aPETnV) npoG Eu6aL~ovLav, xa3& ~naL Znvwv. 
6 N. Rudd, The Satires of Horace (Cambridge, 1966) pp.16-35. 
7 Rudd, p.19. I cannot explain why Rudd chooses this particular 
date of 39 B.C. I would have thought that any such blurring 
would have been as a result of Panaetius' 00rk in the second 
century. 
3 
distinctions", one should think in terms of an already existent 
large area of common ground in the field of ethics, which was 
shared by the different schools. This ground was also common 
to what one may describe as the "homespun" philosophy of the 
mores maiorum. All the schools in company with the mores 
maiorum, (and their written expression in law) were concerned to 
provide a modus vivendi, especially at Rome, where philosophy 
....... "". 8 
was nothing if not a practical art. What always remained 
distinct, within the doctrines of the different schools, were 
the technical doctrines, aimed nevertheless at achieving a 
roughly comparable end, and the physical theories with which 
the .ethical systems were inextricably linked. 9 The dangers, 
inherent in such general statements as those made by Rudd and 
in the apparent unconcern of Fraenkel for philosophical niceties 
in discussing the Satires of Horace, are that the attitudes 
which are thus fostered discourage a proper examination of 
what traces of particular doctrines of particular schools are 
used by Horace and with what particular purpose in mind. 
Horace's Satires 1.1 for example, provides a rich quarry 
within which one may unearth pointers towards Horace's own moral 
outlook and towards his attitude to others who are possessed of 
more doctrinaire views than he was himself. Even if our sole 
achievement from investigating the influence of philosophy upon 
8 E.g. "hos aliosque talis argutae delectabilisque desidiae 
aculeos cum audiremus vel lectitaremus neque in his scrupulis 
aut emolumentum aliquod solidum ad rationem vitae pertinens 
aut finem ullum quaerendi videremus, Ennianum Neoptolemum 
probamus, qui profecto ait: 
philosophandum est paucis; nam omnino haud placet." 
Here Gellius, N.A. 5.15 has previously beendiscussing the 
ultimately futile debate on the nature of voice; cf. also 
Cicero, Fin. 3.4 and Tusc. 1.5. 
9 I mean the continuum theory of the Stoics and the atomic 
theory of the Epicureans. 
4 
form in Satires 1.1 is to fortify Fraenkel's already impressive 
position, that will be worthwhile. It will also be possible to 
question more closely the plausible comment of Lejay that Horace 
employs the language of all the world, without regard for 
philosophical profundity. 10 
B 
THE STRUCTURE OF THE POEM 
1-22 An attack upon ~E~~L~oLpCa. 
23-27 An interlude upon the "spoonful of sugar" which makes 
the didactic process more acceptable. This interlude 
eases the transition from the direct discussion of 
~E~~L~oLPLa into the treatment of that fault which 
cites TIAEOVEELa as its cause. 
28-105 The longest section of the poem which is liberally 
sprinkled with the kind of anecdote mentioned in 
23-27. The dangers of competitive CPLAOTIAOULLa. 
106 107 A b 'f t t' 11 h' h' f 1 I'd' h h - rle sen en la w lC lS 0 equa va l lty w et er 
it is taken to refer either to ~E~~L~oLPCa or 
~LAOTIAouLCa;it is, accordingly, an ideal bridge 
passage. 
108-121 Horace returns to ~E~~L~oLpCa by an easy conversational 
12 twist, which has been well prepared for. 
10 Lejay, Horace, Satires (Paris, 1911) p.7, "Horace parle 
comme tout Ie monde, sans recherche de profondeur 
philosophique." 
11 est modus in re9us, sunt certi denique fines, 
quos ultra citreque nequit consistere rectum. 
, 
12 For a useful discussion of the formula "illinc unde abii 
redeo", (v.108) see Fraenkel, pp.97-98. 
5 
C 
STOIC AND OTHER PHILOSOPHICAL ALLUSIONS 
WITHIN THE POEM 
The tone of commonplace moralising, which is to continue 
through this and the immediately following satires,13 is set by 
the second verse: 
2 seu ratio dederit seu fors obiecerit ... 
There are deeper implications in Horace's choice of the words 
ratio and fors than may at first sight appear. On one level 
of interpretation, Horace intends to draw a distinction between 
styles of life, which are the result of a conscious choice, and 
those, which come about as the result of circumstances which are 
beyond any individual's control. To complain about the former 
type implies an error of judgement and the necessary acceptance 
of b")t.;:d rp~non~ihi 1 it:v hv thp i.niliviill1Fll. fnr t:l:v'lt: .A1:rOr of illilrre-
~ ~ ~ - -
mente A life dictated by for~ however, is obviously beyond the 
individual's control and can be complained about with a clear 
conscience, even though the way the individual faces up to such 
a challenge is within his control. However, there is another, 
less obvious, distinction which is implied by Horace's choice of 
the words ratio and fors: this is the distinction between the 
predetermined life of a man which must be lived according to the 
guiding influence of divine Providence, the AOYOs or ratio of 
the Stol'cs,14 for 1 d h t k' d f l'f h' h ' examp e, an t a 1n O e w 1C 1S a prey 
13 Satires 1.2 and 1,3. 
14 E.g. "Zeno naturalem legem divinam esse censet eamque vim 
obtinere recta imperantem prohibentemque contraria." Cicero, 
N.D. 1. 36; cL also, "rationem quandam per omnem naturam 
rerum pertinentem vi divina esse affectam putat (Zeno) ,II 
ibid. and "lex est ratio summa, insita in natura, quae iubet 
ea quae facienda sunt prohibetque contraria", Cicero, 
1.6.18. 
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to the vagaries of chance or fors,as chance was understood by 
the followers of Epicurus. 15 By means of this initial and 
intentional ambigui-ty Horace prompts the reader to consider this 
and subsequent poems with full regard for the use Horace makes 
both of commonplaces and shared doctrines and also of those 
doctrines which may accurately be attributed to particular 
philosophical schools. 
It is also interesting that, if this conscious ambiguity 
in the use of ratio and fors is actually present, Horace 
recognises a basic duality in the philosophical influence of 
Greece at Rome. Distinctions are not so much to be drawn between 
the plethora of different persuasions, among whom may be numbered 
Sceptics, Cynics, Academicians and Peripatetics, but between the 
determinists, who are exemplified by the Stoics, and the 
champions of Fortuna and free-will, namely the Epicureans. It 
comes, therefore, as no surprise to discover that the doctrines 
with which Horace is most concerned are those which were the 
property of the followers of Zeno and Epicurusi these were the 
schools which exercised most influence at Rome. That both the 
Stoics and Epicureans were themselves deeply influenced by Arist-
otle and the practical bent, which he gave to ethical speculation 
in the Ethica Nicomachaea,16 explains, furthermore, why the doctrine of 
15 E.g. sed tamen effabor. dictis dabit ipsa fidem res 
forsitan et graviter terrarum motibus ortis 
omnia conquassari in parvo tempore cernes. 
quod pro cuI a nobis flectat fortuna gubernans. 
Lucretius, 5.104-107 
16 E.g. "As in all other cases, we must posit '-ra. cpaL.voUEva'and, 
after first discussing all the difficulties, go on to prove, 
if possible, all the common views 'EvooEu', ... or, failing 
that, most of them and the most authoritative ones." E.N. 
ll45b2. It is clear that Aristotle placed great importance 
upon the traditional ethical beliefs of his contemporaries, 
e.g. 6vojJ,a-rL. UEV ODV OXEOOV uno -rwv ni\.Elo-rwV 0UOA,oYEL-raL.· 
-r~v ya.p E60aL.uov~av Kat ot noi\.i\.ot Kat ot xap~Ev-rEG i\.tyoUOL.V, 
-ro 0' ED ~nv KaL -ro ED npa-r-rEL.V -ra6-rov unoi\.aUSavouoL. -rQ 
EUOaL.UOVELV, ibid. 1095a14-20. 
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"nothing in excess" occurs so regularly in Horace's work. 17 
This does not preclude the Peripatetic idea from having its own 
attraction for Horace; its inherent common sense, as a doctrine 
which was in essence a systematisation of accepted norms of 
behaviour, would clearly have appealed to Horace in the light of 
the values with which he had been imbued by his father. 1S These 
observations may also induce us, when faced with the "happy 
eclecticism" of Horace, to look particularly to the Stoics and 
Epicureans and, perhaps to a lesser extent, to the Peripatetics, 
when we are attempting to trace the origins of an initially 
unspecific and unattributable philosophising statement. 
It comes as no surprise, therefore, that the first 
philosopher mentioned by name in the Satires is a Stoic: 
13-14 cetera de generehoc, adeo sunt multa, loquacem 
delassare valent Fabium. 
19 According to Porphyry, one Fabius Maximus, "aliquot libros ad 
Stoicam philosophiam pertinentes conscripsit." How much importance 
should be attached to an example of 6vo~aa~t is perhaps 
open to question, especially if Horace is employing the Stoic in 
a rather ambivalent manner by putting forward the ideas, with 
which he was himself in sympathy, of the philosopher, but simul-
20 taneously attacking the manner in which he expressed them. 
Horace may also be raising a smile by the onomatopoeic use of 
loquacem (13) which indicates the "quacking" of Fabius verbosity. 
That the reference to Fabius should not be dismissed too lightly, 
however, is made clear by the fact that, at vv.120-l2l, Horace 
17 On the influence of the Peripatetic "mean" on Horace, see W.J. 
Oates, "Horace and the Doctrine of the Mean", (Class. Studies 
presented to Edward CaRP) pp.260-26S. 
18 Cf. Horace, Satires 1.6 passim, but esp. vv.8l-92. 
19 Porphyry,~. 1.1.13. 
20 This technique is much in evidence in ~ne ~a~er poems, Satires 
2.3 and 2.7; it will be dealt with in more detail in ·the-separatE 
discussions upon those poems. 
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refers in a similarly scathing and personal manner to another 
Stoic, one Crispinus: 
120-121 iam satis est. ne me Crispini scrinia lippi 
compilasse putes, verbum non amplius addam. 
Horace once more emphasises the tiresome verbosity of the Stoics. 
He plays another humorous, audible, trick in the play on words in 
Crispini scrinia (120) which is parallel to the effect achieved 
by loquacem in v.13: also the proliferation of "p" and "1" 
from lippi (120) to amplius has a particularly scornful ring. 
Horace hopes that he will not be confused with any philosophic 
prattler or scribbler, even though he may share a physical defect 
w1.'th one of them. 21 M ' 't h 'th t H b h' Y ma1.n p01.n ere 1.S a orace, y 1.S 
references to Fabius and Crispinus, links his treatment of 
UEU~LuoLPCa at the beginning of the poem more closely to the 
return of the topic at the poem's close, when "dissatisfaction" 
and "avarice" have been shown to be closely associated by reason 
of their joint origins in n~EovEECa. Thus, although it would 
be foolish to suggest that the ethical import of this poem is 
22 derived from the Stoa, the fact nevertheless remains that 
Horace uses two Stoic names to help with both the humour and the 
structure of this satire. There are also other Stoicising 
references within the poem and this further emphasises that a 
full understanding of the poem must depend to a certain extent 
upon a full appreciation of all the philosophical nuances which 
it may contain. 
21 Cf., non possis oculo quantum contendere Lynceus, 
non tamen idcirco contemnas lippus inungi. 
Horace, Epist. 1.1.28-29 
22 Especially in view of the Peripatetic tone of vv.l06-107. 
However, the concept of "nothing in excess" was such common 
philosophical and moral property that this bridge couplet 
should not prevent us from examining the poem for other 
philosophical references. 
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For example, the phrase "intra naturae finis" of vv. 
49-50 is almost an exact translation of the essential meaning of 
the Stoic tag 6~OAOYOU~EVW~ Lfj ~uaEL, which, when coupled with 
'nv, provided the basic tenet of Stoic ethical doctrine~23 In 
the ethical situation, which is here being described by Horace, 
it is difficult to ~scape from the conclusion that the poet 
employs a consciously Stoicising phrase in order to emphasise, 
in a specific and by no means commonplace manner, the significance 
for the understanding of his poem of an understanding of 
contemporary philosophical ideas and philosophical diction. 
78-79 
More important are the questions which are raised by: 
horum 
semper ego optarem pauperrimus esse bonorum. 
The jingle "horum 24 bonorum" suggests that an unduly ironical 
emphasis is being placed upon these familiar \V'ords for bonorum 
to be understood as a direct reference to material "goods". It 
is more likely that, in a context where an ethical choice is 
indicated (optarem, v.79), Horace is making a covert reference to 
the Stoic doctrine which held that material wealth was not a true 
"good", but a thing "indifferent".25 For, as Horace points out 
23 The Greek tag is well illustrated, along with its Latin coun-
terpart a-t Commenta Lucani, 2.380 f p. 73 , II His versibus 
declaravit Stoicum Catonem fuisse: cuius philosophiae finis 
secundum Chrysippum ille est O~OAOYOU~EVW~ Lfj ~uaEL ~nv, hoc 
es-t: congruenter naturae vivere." For a man "to live in 
accord with nature" he must obey the dictates of "reason", which 
is that part of his nature that partakes of the divine A6yo~, 
but which is essentially and peculiarly his: cf. Horace, 
E..Eist. 1.10.12: "vivere naturae si convenienter oportet." 
24 Cf., the jingle at Horace, A.P. 99~100: 
-crlilcia sunto, 
et quocumque volent animum auditoris agunto, 
where the intention is unclear. 
25 For an informative list of "indifferents" see Diogenes 
Laertius, 7.102 and 104; cf., Cicero, Fin.3.50-li Sextus 
Empiricus, Adv. Math. 11.62, also Stobaeus,pp.l14 and 156. 
For a discussIon o~f the difficulties involved in the different 
interpretations and statements concerning the "indifferents", 
see Madvig1s note on Fin. 3.50-51. 
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here the amassing of these questionable "goods" is not conducive 
. .. f h' 26 to the acqulsltlon 0 applness; the reverse is the case. 
Horace, therefore, employs bonorum in an ambiguous way, in a way 
which is far more complex than is at first apparent. This 
argument is further strengthened if one accepts that there is a 
similarly conscious ambiguity in Horace's use of ratio in the 
second verse of this satire, where the question of an ethical 
choice is also implied. 
It may also be argued that the discussion which Horace 
introduces with regard to the need for family and friends in the 
cases of illness and advancing senescence 27 is simply an example 
of selfish common-sense. On the other hand, the Stoics were 
concerned to point out the duties of family and friends in exactly 
such situations. 28 They were not alone among the philosophers in 
doing this, although the Epicureans, whose disapproval of close 
family ties: since they put at risk the desired ~~aoaECa of 
the sapiens 29 can be discounted as a philosophical influence 
at this juncture. The breakdown of family life among the 
aristocracy, with its consequently deleterious effect upon the 
26 At this point Horace is in perfect accord with the Stoics; 
"ne illud quidem est consentaneum, ut si cum tria genera 
bonorum sint, quae sententia est Peripateticorum, eo beatior 
quisque sit, quo sit corporis aut externis bonis plenior, ut 
hoc idem approbandum sit nobis, ut qui plura habeat ea quae 
in corpore magni aestimantur sit beatior." Cicero, Fin. 3.43. 
27 Vv. 80-9L 
28 Although the naturalness of human society and friendship is 
stressed by the Stoics (e.g. in Cicero, Fin. 3.62) and they 
recognised the benefits which sprang from kinship and friend-
ship, yet they stressed that IInec iustitia nec amicitia esse 
omnino poterunt, nisi ipsae per se expetuntur", ibid. 3.70. 
29 On the other hand the Epicureans did value friendship, ~ 
~LALa n~pLxop~U~L ~nv otuou~Evnv unpu~~ouoa on nUOLV n~tv 
~Y~Lp~o8aL tnt ~av ~auopLo~6v, Epicurus,K.L. 52; at times, 
however, Epicurus also seems to have been-8wayed by expediency, 




structure of the Roman society, was something deplored by Augustus 
and the later satirists. 3l It is, therefore, fair to say that 
any rational or philosophical backing for the concept of what 
family duties involved would have been gratefully received. The 
ethics of the Stoics did provide or were capable of providing 
such rational backing and here we have a prime example of that 
compatibility be"tween the Roman concept of pietas and the Stoic 
concept of "duty ll.32 
It is when a relatively large number of such "coincid-
ences" as these Stoic references occur within a single poem that 
the shortcomings of a critical approach, which does not take 
adequate account of philosophical influences, become evident. 
It is sufficient to realise in reading Horace's first satire, as 
published, that the author wishes his audience to understand in 
what ways a knowledge of philosophy will contribute to a proper 
understanding of his work. 33 Later poems show more detailed 
treatments of specifically Stoic themes, but the programmatic 
satire of the whole collection not only indicates the general 
influence wielded over the poet by Hellenistic philosophical ideas, 
but also indicates in what spirit the poet will deal with the 
Stoics in particular. We may expect, therefore, that Horace will 
deal more harshly with the more ludicrous Stoic practitioners, 
even though he may give assent, perhaps grudgingly, to certain of 





As exemplified by the "leges de maritandis ordinibus" of B.C. 
Juvenal's attack upon women in Satires 6 is largely motivated 
by the breakdown of Roman familylife-which resulted from the 
wider interests of the women of imperial Rome. 
See my article, "Aeneas and the Cardinal Virtues", Prudentia 
6.2 (Nov. 1974). 
E.g. Satires 2.3 and 2.7. 
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extremes to which these ideas were taken by the Stoics and to the 
language in which they were couched, Horace recognised the efficacy 
of the diatribe as a means of persuasion. 34 It is also clear 
from this programmatic satire that Horace was willing to utilise 
philosophical references within a poem to help the unity and 
structure of the poe~. An analysis of Satires 1.2 will show that 
this is the case. 
STOIC INFLUENCE ON THE STRUCTURE 
AND MEANING OF HORACE, SATIRES 1.2 
A 
Although the subject matter of this satire has tended 
35 to lead to its being neglected by scholars, the difficulties 
d ' 't t h b 'd b ,36 k 1 37 regar lng 1 s s ructure ave een examlne y LeJay, Fraen e 
and Rudd. 38 Fraenkel's discussion of the structure is most useful, 
Rudd's is marginally helpful, while Lejay and Fraenkel are at 
their best when discussing the themes of the poem. However, the. 
34 This will be made clear in the discussion e.g. of Satires 2.2. 
35 Palmer's comment in his The Satires of Horace (London, 1888), 
p.32, is typical, "Men are either too generous or too stingy, 
too dainty or too rude; some given to the coarser or lower 
forms of vice, others to high and dangerous intrigues. The 
latter subject occupies the greater part of the satire ... 
but the method Horace has selected for its treatment makes it 
scarcely profitable reading." 
36 Horace, Satires (Paris,19ll). 
37 Horace, pp.76~86. 
38 The Satires of pp.9-12. 
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only discussion of any philosophical influence upon the poem 
comes from Lejay (p.30) who considers (a)thepossibility that the 
frankness of the poem's expression has a stoic origin 39 and (b) 
dismisses any idea of Stoic influence on Horace by maintaining 
that the Stoics considered intercourse with any woman outside 
marriage to be wrong, citing Cicero, Paradoxa Stoicorum 3.20. 
However, the statement of the Stoic view in the Paradoxa is in 
keeping with the extreme position necessitated by the tone of that 
work, and the fact remains that. intercourse with a woman of ignoble 
status does less damage than intercourse with a virgin, or a woman 
of noble birth, "lapsa est istius lubido in muliere ignota: dolor 
ad pauciores pertinet quam si petulans fuisset in aliqua generosa 
ac nobile virgine; peccavit nihilo minus." The implication of 
this passage of the Paradoxa is in fact consonant with that plea 
for moderation,which is the major theme of Satires 1.2. The 
Roman Stoics were well aware of the difficulties caused by too 
strict an adherence, in the sphere of everyday life, to the ideals 
of the Stoic ethic. This realisation tempted Cicero into a logical 
blunder in De Officiis 1.152 and following,where he attempts to 
give primacy in virtue to the "social" virtues of iustitia and 
temperantia over sapientia, because of his desire to stress 
h . 1 f . 40 h f 1 h h . t e practlca nature 0 true vlrtue. T ere-ore, a t oug LeJay 
may be correct in declaring that the Stoics ideally disapproved 
of extra-marital intercourse, one should remember the gulf between 
rn~+n"r<irt::::LJ::::CC"and practice in Stoic ethics I a gulf recognised by Cicero 
39 Lejay refers to M. Gemoll, Die Realien bei Horaz, 3, p.17 
(Berlin, 1895), lise fondant sur un remarque de Zeller, a 
trouve dans cette liberte d'expression l'influence du 
stoicisme." 
40 See Miller's note, ad loco in the Loeb edition (Harvard, 
1913) . 
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and epitomised by his different treatments of Stoic ethics in the 
De Officiis and the De Finibus. However, even if one were to 
accept that the exclusive nature of Stoic ethics ruled out a 
direct influence upon Horace's plea for moderation in this poem, 
nevertheless, certain of the structural difficulties are eased, 
if due consideration is given to the Stoic ideas on usury and 
adultery. For the Stoic attitudes towards usury and adultery 
provide a clue to the underlying unity of the poem. The Stoics 
looked upon adultery and usury as being closely parallel vices. 
On the one hand usury was considered to be a variant of theft, 
while adultery, being the taking and enjoyment of another's wife, 
was itself a variant of theft: 
EXxACvoua~ LO ~o~xE6E~V ot LOU K~L~EW~ Znvwvo~ 
~~Aoao~oOvLE~ ... 5~a LO 'U~I xo~vwv~xov xat napa ~6a~v 
Erva~ LQ AOYLXQ ~~~ voeE6E~V L~V 6no L~V v6uwv tLEP~ 
npouaLaAE~~eELaav yuvaLxa xat ~eECpE~V LOV aAAOU avep~nou 
orxov.
41 
This makes it clear that to transgress the human laws, which are 
an expression of the divine A6yo~,42 regarding adultery is 
incompatible with a life ordered secundum naturam. Also the 
act of adultery damages (~eECpE~V) the property of another, and 
implies the removal of something which belongs to another and has 
done so for some time (npouaLaAE ~(peE Laav) . 
In the following passage from Stobaeus 43 adultery is 
listed alongside theft: 
YLYVEaea~ 58 E6EunLwaLa~ xat Et~ aAAa spya L~V napa 
~6a~v, oZov Et~ XAOna~ Kat ~oLXECa~ xat 6~PE~~, xae' a~ 
KAEnLaL LE Kat UOLxot Kat 6~pLaLat AEyoVLa~. 
41 Origenes, Contra Celsum 7.63 (S.V.F. 3, p.183). 
42 Cf. Cicero, ~eg. 1.6.18 (n.14 above). 
43 Stobaeus, Ecl. 2.93.1 (S.V.F. 3, p.102). 
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Although it is obvious that, in such a list where different types 
of criminal or evil inclinations are being indicated, there is 
no identification of adultery as a species of theft, nevertheless, 
their close association in the list is suggestive of a more than 
coincidental connection. This apparently close relationship is 
also underlined by the following passage from Plutarch: 44 
06 yap lJ,OVOV l:"a na.{Jn EOl:" L vaL o{Jn l:"a ouv l:"0 L s E t/6EO LV, 
OCOV Aunn Hat ~o~os Hat l:"a napanAnOLa, UAAa Hat HAonns 
Hat lJ,OLXEtas Hat l:"WV OlJ,OLWV EOl:"LV aLo{JEo{JaL. 
Here HAonn and lJ,OiXECa are surely related by being included in a 
group, the unnamed members of which can be classified by the use 
of "l:"WV OlJ,O (,wv" • 
Usury is also considered by the Stoics to be a type of 
theft: 
video istic diplomata et syngraphas et cautiones, vacua 
habendi simulacra, umbracula avaritiae quae dam laborantis, 
per quae decipiat animum inanium opinione gaudentem; 
quid enim ista sunt? quid fenus et kalendarium et usura 
misi humanae cupiditatis extra naturam quaesita nomina?45 
B 
Does this relationship between the essential natures of 
usury and adultery as different types of theft appear in Horace, 
Satires 1.2? Is there anything else to suggest that Horace had the 
44 Plutarch, St. Repugn. 19 (S.V.F. 3, p.2l). 
45 Seneca, Ben. 7.10.3; note that usura is extra naturam 
as is HAOTtll napa CPUOLV in the Stobaeus, Ec1.2.93.l quoted above. 
The condemnation of usury as an unnatural means of acquiring 
an unnecessary end, extreme wealth, is continued in 7.10.4-6 
of the De Beneficiis. Cicero, Off. 3.22 declares that to 
enrich oneself at the expense orothers is contrary to the 
laws of nature and of communities, although no specific mention 
of usury is made. 
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Stoics in mind when he was composing this poem? 
The main charge which is brought against Fufidius is 
that of miserliness and of inhumanity in the pursuit of what 
is owed to him: 
14-17 atque 
quanto perditior quisque est tanto acrius urget; 
nomina sectatur modo sumpta veste viri1i 
sub patribus duris tironum. 
Horace likens the inhumanity of Fufidius to that of Menedemus 
in the Heautontimoroumenos of Terence in that his prosecutions 
extend not only to others, but also to himself. The relationship 
between Terence's characterisation of Menedemus and Chremes and 
the Stoic concept of humanitas, embraced by such authors as 
, 46 d 47 h b 1 d b G l' d' 48 h t C~cero an Seneca, as een exp ore y ag 1ar 1. T a 
Horace was aware of Terence's exploitation of this theme is se1f-
evident, while it is extremely unlikely that he was unaware of 
the Stoic connotations of any mention of humanitas. 
It is also significant that, in his first statement in 
moral terms of the purpose or direction of this satire, Horace 
employs a word which, though obviously common in its non-technical 
sense, was yet frequently employed in a quasi-technical sense by 
46 E.g. " ... u1ciscamurque eos, qui nocere nobis conati sint, 
tantaque poena afficiamus, quantam aequitas humanitasque 
patitur", Off. 2.5.18. Humanitas, a concept which sprang 
from a belief in the bro-tfierfiOOC1of all men, since -their 
"matter" and "spirit" were essentially the same, was 
responsible for the amelioration of the lot of slaves in 
ancient society. See further under the discussion of 
Satires 2.7 above. 
47 E.g. "Humanitas vetat superbum esse adversus socios, vetat 
amarumj verbis, rebus, adfectibus comem se faci1emque omnibus 
praestatj nu11um alienum malum putat, bonum autem suum ideo 
maxime quod a1icui bono futurum est amat", Epist. 88.30. 
48 D. Gagliardi, "11 Concetto di 'Humanitas' da Terenzio a 
Cicerone", L~~Paro1e et L'Id~e, Vo1.7 (1965), pp.1-12. 
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the Stoics. 49 . This word is stultus, WhlCh appears soon after the 
reference to the inhumanity of Menedemus: 
23-24 si quis nunc quaerat IIquo res haec pertinet?" illuc: 
dum vitant stulti, vitia in contraria currunt. 
Neither is it by any means a coincidence that the next 
passage of moralising, apart from the Aristotelian nil medium es 
of 28, is attributed to the Elder Cato, who, for all his lack of 
50 humanitas towards slaves, was considered both an archetype of 
traditional Roman virtue and, in behaviour, a prototype Roman 
stoic. 51 Note the wording of -the sententia Ca tonis employed by 
Horace: 
33-35 nam simul ac venas inflavit taetra libido, 
huc iuvenes aequum est descendere, non alienas 
permolere uxores. 
The idea of damaging or taking that which is the property of 
another is of paramount importance in Cato's understanding of the 
evils of adultery. This is close to the Stoic attitude to 
adultery, as may be seen from Origenes, Contra Celsum (S.V.F. 3, 
52 p.183). 
The Stoic reference of this part of the poem is further 
49 The Stoic doctrine was that all men who were not sapientes, 
i.e. had not achieved the summum bonum of virtue informed by 
wisdom, were fools; e.g. "nunc autem ita disserunt (Stoici), 
sic se dicere omnes stultos insanire, ut male olere omne 
caenum. at non semper. commove, senties. sic iracundus non 
semper iratus est; lacesse, iam videbis furentem", Cicero, 
Tusc. 4.54; cf. also, "stultus omnia vitia habet, sed non in 
omnia natura pronus est: alius in avaritiam, alius in luxuriam, 
alius in petulantiam inclinatur ... ne audacem quidem timoris 
absolvimus, ne prodigum quidem avaritia liberamus", Seneca, 
Ben. 4.27. Horace refers specifically to this paradox at 
satires 2.3.32. 
50 For Cato's attitude to slaves see De i Cultura 2.7. 
51 See Cicero, Paradoxa 2, "cato autem, perfectus mea sententia 
Stoicus". 
52 See above, p.14. 
emphasised by verses 37-46: 
audire est operae pretium, procedere recte 
qui moechis non vultis, ut omni parte laborent, 
utque illis multo corrupta dolore voluptas 
atque haec rara cadat dura inter saepe pericla. 
hic se praecipitem tecto dedit; ille flagellis 
ad mortem caesus; fugiens hic decidit acrem 
praedonum in turbam; dedit hic pro corpore nummos; 
hunc perminxerunt calones; quin etiam illud 
accidit, ut quidam testis caudamque salacem 
53 demeteret ferro. "iure" omnes; Galba negabat. 
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Not only does Horace make light-hearted use of what the Stoics 
considered the prime ethical impulse, namely self-preservation,54 
in his attempts to dissuade the potential adulterer, but it also 
seems that the clause audire est operae pretium of verse 37 has 
a Stoic flavour. It sounds like the beginning of a typical Stoic 
55 harangue; for it contains in the word pretium (37) the concept 
of value (aELa), with all the connotations of npOnY~Eva and 
anonpOnY~Eva which that involves. For, although the Stoics posited 
one unique summum bonum, namely virtue, and one evil, lack of the 
same, they did believe that such things as wealth, health and 
reputation, which they classified as "indifferents", could be 
either preferred or rejected (npOnY~Eva and anonpOnY~Eva) in 
accordance with their value (aELa) in aiding the probationer 
( ' , ) 1 h d h ' " f' 56 h' o npouonLWV a ong t e roa to t e acqulslt10n 0 v1rtue. T 1S 
53 See my discussion of the same topic with a different emphasis 
in Satires 2.7 on pp.165f~ 
54 E.g. Cicero, Fin. 2.11.33, "nec vero ut voluptatem expetat 
natura movet infantem, sed tantum u-t se ipse diligat, ut 
integrum se salvumque velit"; cf. Aulus Gellius, N.A. 12.5.7. 
55 Cf. The words of the Stoicising Damasippus, quoting Crispinus, 
at Satires 2.3.77. 
56 For a discussion of aE(a, npOnY~Eva and anonpOnY~Eva see, Cicero, 
Fin. 3 .. 50 and Diogenes Laertius, 7.106; for a discussion of 
Oi1pO}{on1"wv see, Cicero, Fin. 3.48, where,. although it is . 
rinmi -t-t-Prl i-h:=!r ~ rn .• rl.l! m;::l'u m:::"ll{'o n'Y'f"""'IgrC'lcC" +-f'""\T.7~'V"rlr" "tT'; 'V"..f-U"""" ·I-h,.... ,... ........ T ........... +. -.-..-~~~.-------- - ...... ~- -~ - ~ - .. \~>.A.J. .............. ~ ...... t"..L. ......... ..L.'--o.J>-J \-'--'VVlA.!-\.....1..o.J V..L.-L.L. c, l..J..I,v vuvc::a.t". 
is added that he is still essentially a fool, "item qui 
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imitation or reference may be of no more importance than any of 
57 Horace's short and sharp attacks upon individual targets, which 
punctuate the progress of his satires. However, if v.37 is such 
an imitation, it serves the purpose of keeping alive an awareness 
of Stoicism in the readers' mind. One should also add that recte 
coupled with procedere in v.37 sounds as if it is a specific, if 
ironical, reference to the Stoic probationer already mentioned. 
As may be seen from n.56 procedere is the regular translation of 
npou6nLELV in this technical sense, while recte also is the 
regular translation of opGwG, which is itself coupled with 
npou6nLELV. Also a thing recte factum is an officium or "duty", 
the performance of which establishes, as it were, the potential 
for the acquisition of the surmnum bonum. 58 
Although it is clear that adultery is morally the most 
reprehensible and also the most personally risky form of sexual 
release and that affairs with classes of women other than the 
rnatrona class are less reprehensible and less dangerous, Horace 
by no means suggests that, with this reservation "carte blanche" 
should be granted to the aspiring libertine. One must be wary of 
the damage that may be done to one's reputation and to one's 
family estate. As Lejay points out in his note ad loc: 
cette satire c'est tres important, parce que, mieux qu' 
ailleurs, on y voit la position pris par Horace dans les 
questions morales, celIe d'un Roman traditionel et pratique. 
processit aliquantum ad virtutis habitum nihi10 minus in 
miseria est quam il1e, qui nihil processit." 
57 E.g. the personal attack (ovo~aaLt UW~~6ELV) upon Galba in 
v.46 of this poem. 
58 For a recent discussion of this branch of Stoic ethics see 
A.A. Long, Hellenistic Philosophy (London, 1974), pp.179-205, 
esp. 184-199. On things rec-te facta see S.V.F. pp.136-l45. 
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However, it is in exactly this area that there is so much cornmon 
ground between the ethics of the Stoa, as developed by Panaetius 
and depicted by Cicero in the De Officiis, and the traditional and 
practical morality of Rome as epitomised by the supposed life and 
morals of Cato Maior. 59 What needs to be said here is that the 
Roman Stoics in particular laid emphasis upon the value of 
reputation and in this theY\diVerged to a certain extent from the 
hard and fast position adopt~d by such early Stoics as 
\ 
chrysippus. 60 Therefore, it {s not sufficient to say with Lejay \ . 
\ 
that Horace is merely pu"tting t\ view of a Roman "tradi tionel 
et pratique ll , especially in the li~~t of the Stoic references 
already noted within the poem and th~~anner in which Stoic views 
on usury and adultery serve to knit more closely the structural 
unity of the satire. 
As is his custom Horace intersperses serious arguments 
on the dangers of excess and adultery and on the less reprehen-
sible pursuit of freedwomen with advice in a lighter vein. It is 
in this lighter vein that we should consider the horse-trading 
section of the poem, with its message that one should at least 
have the chance to examine the goods upon which money and effort 
is to be spent. The reader is then brought back to the major 
concerns of the poem by a skilled piece of name dropping (Ca"tia, 
59 See the relevant discussion above in the introductory section 
on Ennius and Plautus. 
·60 Good repute was considered by the Stoics to be an lIindifferent ll , 
e.g. Cicero, Fin. 3.17.57, "de bona autem fama (quam enim 
appellant E6oot;Lav, aptius est bonam farnam hoc loco appellare 
quam gloriam) Chrysippus quidem et Diogenes, detracta 
utilitate, ne digitum quidem eius causa porrigendum esse 
dicebant: quibus ego vehementer assentior." However, later 
Stoics, not specified by Cicero in this passage, under the 
influence of Carneades, did declare, IIhanc ... bonam farnam 
ipsam propter se praepositam et sumendam esse", ibid. For an 
attempted reconcilia"tion of the Roman and Stoic views on fama 
and gloria, see Cicero, Off. 2.31-88. 
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in v.95), from where the dangers of adultery are once again 
brought to the fore, that is to say - commerce with other men's 
wives. Clearly the pleasure is not worth the candle, if pleasure 
it is, while the statement that danger adds spice to the hunt and 
capture has little attraction for Horace. After all, the satis-
faction of a desire does not require a grand passion; that, 
speaking in Epicurean terms,6l is neither na"tural nor necessary; 
on the other hand it contravenes, as noted before, the Stoic 
injunction to preserve one's own self, one's family and one's 
fortune. That Horace's attitude to the available serving g~l 
(or boy) is chauvinistic by modern standards should not bliJ~~s_ 
to the fact that he stands squarely in line with the traditional .~. 
attitudes of Cato Maior on this very point. 
C 
To answer the questions which were posed at the beginning 
of the previous section: the restriction of the examples of vices 
of excess to the areas of usury and, to a greater extent, of 
adultery, along with the suggestion that both vices are primarily 
wrong, because of both a) the damage they do to another's property 
or fortune, by abusing or appropriating it (theft) and b) because 
of the dangers to the "criminal", in terms of his loss of happiness 
(in the case of the usurer) and of more personal attributes (in 
the case of the adulterer) and c) because of harm to an innocent 
62 third party, the slave-girl go-between, in the case of the 
61 For the Epicurean analysis of pleasures, both kinetic and 
static, see Epicurus, istle to Menoeceus l27ff. 
62 This is an example of inh~!nani tas, 
above. 
cf. notes 46 and 47 
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apprehended adulterer, does point to a close connection existing 
between the wrongs of both usury and adultery; the number of 
other quite possible Stoic allusions within the poem, especially 
within the passage of transition between the discussion of the 
usurer and the discussion of the adulterer, support the contention 
that the Stoic conception of a kinship in nature between these 
two vices does provide a unity within the poem which is not other-
wise immediately apparent. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
HORACE' ITUDE TO THE STOA AS ILLUSTRATED BY 
SATIRES 1.3: AN ANTICIPATION OF SATIRES 2.3 AND 2.7 
The foregoing discussions of the first two satires of 
the first book have shown that Horace exploited his audience's 
knowledge of contemporary philosophical terminology in order to 
aid both the uni t'y of -the poems and their humorous effect. How-
ever, apart from the rather scathing references to the loquacity 
of Fabius and Crispinus in Satires 1.1.14 and 120, we have as yet 
no real clue as to what Horace's attitude to the Stoa actually 
was. We learn something of this attitude from those three Satires 
which deal with particularly Stoic themes, namely 1.3; 2.3 and 
2.7. What is apparent from an examination of these poems is that 
often seems to have found himself in sympathy with certain aspects 
of their beliefs, especially those which were compatible with the 
mores maiorum, he was unfailingly hostile towards both those 
extreme and rigid doctrines, which were peculiarly the property of 
the Stoics,l and also towards the manner in which those extreme 
views were presented. This latter concern was closely linked with 
his dislike of the manner and method of individual Stoic preachers. 2 
1 These doctrines are exemplified especially by those paradoxes 
collected and expounded by Cicero in the Paradoxa Stoicorum; 
one should mention as examples here the exclusive nature of the 
Stoic concept of virtue and wisdom, the condemnation of the 
great majority of mankind as slaves and fools, and the supposed 
equality of all acts of wrongdoing. 
2 The fact that Crispinus and Stertinius were supposed to have 
handled Stoic themes in verse, amounting on the part of 
Stertinius to 220 books, would not have endeared them to Horace; 
see Aero, Ad Hor. ist. 1.12.20. 
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The reasons for Horace's dislike will become apparent as we 
proceed. 
Satires 1. 3 
The structure of this poem does not present the same kind 
of difficulty as those which confront the reader of Satires 1.1 
and 1.2. The structure and meaning of this poem have been diss-
cussed before,3 while, as Fraenkel points out, Lejay's discussion 4 
illustrates clearly the connection between the conclusion of the 
poem and the main body of the poem. In brief the form and content 
of the poem are as follows: 
i) 1-19 
ii) 19-75 
Horace comments upon the mercurial temperament 
of singers and particularly upon that of Tigellius. 
, 
One should deal with the failings of friends 
with leniency and tolerance. 
iii)76-142 One should recognise that some faults are far 
worse than others; the Stoic doctrine that all 
faults are equal is ludicrous, but so is their 
picture of the ideally wise man. 
Although the introduction to the poem suggests that we 
may reasonably expect the remainder of it to deal with the 
inconsistency of all men, or with inconsistency as a common fail-
ing, the poem actually shades into an attack upon the intransigence 
of the Stoics in their belief that all sins are equal. Horace also 
attacks their picture of the sapiens. Here Horace betrays a 
certain inconsistency and ambivalence himself. 5 For the attack 
upon inconsistency in the introductory passage of this poem is 
3 E.g. Fraenkel, pp.86-90, and Rudd, pp.5-9. 
4 Fraenkel, at p.BS, n.S refers to Lejay, p.63. 
5 It is, however, part of Horace's technique in his satirical 
comment upon human nature to include himself as an example. 
The effect is to soften the otherwise harsh effects of the 
criticism. More will be said along these lines in the 
discussions of Satires 2.3 and 2.7. 
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entirely consonant with a doctrine which was especially Stoic. 
Therefore, aI-though Rudd' s comment, 
This plea for a sense of proportion and a rational 
scale of penalties is directed against the doctrinaire 
Stoics who maintained that all sins were equally 
culpable. The satire ends with a picture of the Stoic 
h f · dl d 'd' 1 6 preac er, r~en ess an r~ ~cu ous, 
is accurate in so far as it goes, it does not go far enough. It 
fails to account for the evident favour which is implied within 
the poem for another Stoic belief even more basic to their ethical 
system, the desirability of a consistent manner of living. Fraenkel 
notes that disparagement of inconsistency was a particularly Stoic 
trait,7 but further comments that such disparagement was not the 
property of the Stoics alone. 8 However, v.9 of this satire links 
Horace's expression of this idea very closely with the idea as 
expressed by the Stoics. Horace's line is: 
9 nil aequale homini fuit illi ••• 
while the initial section of the poem closes with: 
18-19 nil fuit uinquam 
sic impar sibi. 
According to Stobaeus, Zeno of Citium himself declared that a man 
whose life was not governed consistently according to one rule 
6 Rudd, The Satires of Horace and Persius (Harmondsworth, 1973), 
p.37. 
7 Fraenkel, p.86. 
8 On p.86 at n~4 Fraenkel refers to Plato's praise of the 
consistency of Socrates at Republic 561c-d and Cicero's comments 
on Socrates at De Officiis 1.90. It is worth mentioning here 
the peculiarly Roman virtue of constantia which, although, as 
it were, akin to Stoic aequalitas, should not be identified 
with it. However, it is interesting to note Cicero's use of 
constantia at Off. 1.125, where it is equivalent, in this 
technical moral treatise, to aequalitas, "nihil est autem, 




was bound to be unhappy. At least one Stoic of the later Roman 
period at least found the idea of consistency as an integral part 
of virtue particularly attractive; this is clear from the 
repeated references made to the doctrine by Seneca in his moral 
letters: 
i) perfecta virtus aequalitas est ac tenor vitae per 
omnia consonans sibi. Seneca, Epistles 31.8 
ii) ante omnia hoc cura, ut constes tibi. ibid. 35.4 
iii) stultitia semper incipit vivere: quam foeda est 
hominum lenitas cottidie nova vitae fundamenta 
ponentium, nova spes in exitu incohantium! 
iv) 
quid est turpius quam senex vivere incipiens? 
quid est sapientia? 
idem nolle. 
ibid. 13.16 
semper idem velIe atque 
ibid. 20.5 
The similarity of the statements both in meaning and in diction 
to Horace's description of the inconsistency of Tigellius is 
striking v even though it may be argued that Horace's comments on 
the foibles of such a target are far removed in spirit from Seneca's 
advice to Lucilius. However, Horace's exploitation of such ideas 
expressed in this way adds the humour of incongruity to the 
opening of the satire and thereby renders it the more amusing and 
arresting. It is also clear from the Senecan passages that such 
words as aequalitas were part of the technical Roman vocabulary 
10 
of Stoicism by the time of Nero. On the other hand, such words 
were employed by Cicero too in the context of Stoic ethical beliefs: 
9 Ta 6~ Tt~OG 6 ~~v Z~vwv OOTWG ~nt6wuE, T~ 6~0~oyou~tvwG ~~v 
TOUTO 6' E0TL ua~' Eva ~6yov uaL 0U~~wvov ~~v, wG TWV 
~axou~EvWG ~WVTWV uau06aL~ovouVTWV, Stobaeus, 2.7.6a. 
10 It should be noted, however, that the commonplace phrase ae~~~ 
animo need not be explained in most contexts by reference to 
philosophical ethics, except in so far as philosophical e<thics 
reflect and rationalise the cOlTImonplace. 
oratorem autem, nisi qui sapiens esset, esse neminem, 
atque ipsam eloquentiam, quod ex bene dicendi scientia 
constaret, unam quandam esse virtutem, et qui unam 
virtutem haberet omnis habere ea esse inter se 
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aequalis et pariAi ita, qui esset eloquens, eum virtutes 
omnis habere atque esse sapientem. sed haec erat spinosa 
quaedam et exilis oratio longeque a nostris sensibus 
abhorrebat. De Oratore 1.18.83 
Here Cicero is primarily objecting to Stoic fashions in 
11 
argument and rhetoric, although his use of aequalis is parallel 
to Horace's use of the word at Satires 1.3.9 and, furthermore, 
in its qualification of virtutes (in the Ciceronian passage) 
is analogous to, in a slightly different meaning of the word, 
paria qualifying peccata in verse 96 of the satire. It may also 
be noted that in verses 69 and 74 Horace employs the word aequum 
in the sense "equitable". Horace employs these words of cognate 
meaning and Stoic reference quite consciously to ease the transit-
ion trom approval ot one otoic notion, that of consistency, to 
disapproval of another, the paradoxical notion of the equal 
culpability of all sins. 
In the opening section of 1.3, therefore, Horace is 
utilising a recognisably Stoic doctrine in order to attack 
Tigellius and the language in which the attack is framed is also 
recognisably Stoic. That the message is not exclusively Stoic 
. t t . 12 ~s no a ~ssue. Horace's exploitation, in this approving way, 
of a Stoic doctrine at the beginning of this poem makes the 
attacks which he makes upon the Stoa later in this poem and in 
Satires 2.3 and 2.7 the more interesting. There seems to have 
been a tension between the acceptable ethical doctrines of the 
11 Cf. II S"toicorum autem non ig-noras quam sit subtile vel 
spinosum potius disserendi genus 0 II Fin. 3. L 30 
12 See above, noB. 
28 
Stoa and the unacceptable manner in which they were presented. 
The character of many of those who did the presenting was likewise 
unacceptable. One is reminded irresistably here of the criticisms 
13 
of the church made by C.S. Lewis in his Scre~tape Letters. 
One also wonders whether the more paradoxical utterances 
of the early Stoics became an ever greater embarassment to later 
adherents of the school in the way that the story of the virgin 
birth of Christ has caused problems for modern Christian 
1 . 14 apo OglStS. It was possibly the laughter of such critics as 
Horace which accelerated the modification of Stoicism during its 
long sojourn in Rome. For, in spite of doctrinaire and hypo-
I 
critical Stoics,lS the durability and success of Stoicism was 
largely due to its willingness to adapt itself to circumstances. 16 
That the later Stoics were aware of Horace and the philosophical 
relevance of his work is clear from Seneca's comments at Epistles 
120.20: 
qualem hunc describit Horatius numquam eundem, 
ne similem quidem sibi; adeo in diversa aberrate 
Here Seneca quotes the opening of Horace, Satires 1.3 as an example 
of the veracity and perspicacity of Horatian satire. Seneca is in 
13 C.S. Lewis, The Screwtape Letters (London, 1965). 
14 E.g. John A.T. Robinson, Honest to God (SCM Press, 1963), p~. 
7-8, "There are ... those •. who see the best, and indeed the 
only, defence of doctrine to lie in the firm reiteration, in 
fresh and contemporary language, of 'the faith once delivered 
to the saints' ...• A much more radical recasting ... is 
demanded, in the process of which the most fundamental categories 
of our theology - of God, of the supernatural, and of religion 
itself - must go into the melting (sic) ... we should do well 
to give up using the word 'God' for a generation, so impreg-
nated it has become with a way of thinking we may have to 
discard if the Gospel is to signify anything." 
15 E.g. those hypocrites attacked by Juvenal in Satires 2. 
16 See, "Political Morality and the Friends of Scipio", F,W. 
Walbank, J.R,S. (1965) 13ff. on the interaction between Roman 
political-~ls and the thought of Panaetiusj see also, 
PI-GSa Cox, liTo Do As ROIne Does Yl , ,-. D \..:'J I!I l.\. \Ii 
total sympathy with Horace, as may be seen from: 
maximum indicium est malae mentis fluctuatio 
et inter simulationem virtutum amoremque vitiorum 
adsidua iactatio. 
Seneca, Epistles 120.20 
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It is clear that Seneca took note of Horace's praises of Stoic 
beliefs and could not have remained insensible of Horace's 
equally perceptive criticisms. 
And yet it is not only in his attacks upon inconsistency 
that Horace is in sympathy with Stoic views in this satire. When 
an imaginary interlocutor takes Horace to task for satirising 
friends: 
19-20 nunc aliquis dicat mihi "quid tu? 
nul lane habes vitia?" immo alia et fortasse minora. 
Horace makes it clear that his chiding is gentle in spirit and 
has a positive aim as befits criticisms which are made by a friend. 
As Arnold points out,17 it did not befit the young philosopher 
to make enemies by harsh criticism. In fact, the right kind of 
criticism, gentle in spirit, could turn an enemy into a friend. 18 
This comment on friendship, although not necessarily nor exclus-
ively Stoic in tone, should, when taken in conjunction with the 
Stoicising nature of the poem's beginning and the uses of 
aequum at verses 69 and 74, lead us to look very closely at the 
grounds upon which Horace takes the Stoics to task in the latter 
part of the poem. 
One reason for Horace's attack is made clear when Horace 
17 E.V. Arnold, Roman Stoicism (London, 1911) p.367, reprinted 
1958. 
18 E.g. "monemus ut ex inimico cogitet fieri posse amicum", 
Seneca, ~. 95.63. It is interesting to compare Sophocles, 
Ajax 1376-77, uut VUV YE TEUUP~ LanO Lou6' aYYEAAO~aL / 
oaov LOL' EX&pOG n, Loaov6' ELvaL ~LAOG. 
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answers the question nullane habes vitia' (v. 20) with the words 
"immo alia et fortasse minora" in the same line. Horace is well 
aware of his own shortcomings, a fact that adds rather than 
19 detracts from his satire of society at large; his claim here is 
that his own failings, though real, are minor by comparison with 
those which he criticises in other people and different in kind. 
Naturally, therefore, any doctrine which categorically stated 
that all sins were equal in gravity would have little appeal for 
him, especially if the doctrine were expounded by a man -considered 
by Horace to be his inferior both as a poet and also intellect-
ually. This is certainly the attitude which Horace displays 
towards the supposed sapiens and his minion Crispinus at the end 
of the poem: it is an attitude of mingled antagonism, which is 
almost personal, and condescension. Whether or not one accepts 
this interpretation of the tone of the poem, it is indisputable 
-that fortasse minora foreshadows the criticism of the Stoic 
paradox that all sins are equal. Also foreshadowed is Horace's 
plea for moderation in criticism, which, although it is in accord 
with later Stoic beliefs regarding the nature and purposes of 
amicitia,20 is nevertheless aimed at the intransigence of the 
reactionary Stoic attacked under the ironical label of sapiens 
at the end of the poem. Horace prefers to err on the side of 
humanity: 
41-42 vellem in amicitia sic erraremus, et isti 
errori nomen virtus posuisset honestum. 2l 
19 Cf. Satires 2.3 and 2.7; also in the Odes Horace uses himself 
as an example, now wiser and older, of the folly at which the 
particular Ode is directed, e.g. Odes 1.5.13 and 1.16.22, where 
Horace characteristically introduces me towards the end of 
the poem. -
20 See above n.82: cf. also the discussion of friendship re Sat. 
2.6 above. 
21 Although Horace is attacking Stoicism, or, at least, one of 
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However, even here, perhaps in a spirit of irony, Horace employs 
a word honestum, which has inevitable Stoic connotations 22 of 
Stoic usage for the reader familiar with the language of the Stoics~3 
r say "perhaps in a spirit of irony", because it seems to me an 
example of typically Horatian wit to apply the word commonly used 
to describe the unique and rarified virtue of the Stoics to what 
he ironically describes as an~. By means of his irony, 
which at such times verges on the Socratic, Horace seems to be 
making the point that many aspects of Stoicism, especially those 
which deal with the officia24 of everyday life, had much to commend 
them, while the extremism, to which men like Stertinius and 
Crispinus still clung, had not. 
Horace introduces his attack upon the Stoic paradox that 
all sins are equally culpable by suggesting that crimes should be 
dealt with in proportion to their gravity; in other words, Horace 
takes the offensive from a standpoint of common-sense and 
experience, not to say expediency. In so doing, however, Horace 
uses a word again which has a Stoic flavour, if only because of 
the more extreme forms of Stoic doctrines, he is here in accord 
with the more humane and moderate Stoicism expressed by Cicero, 
Off. 1.136-7 on the virtues of moderation in recrimination, 
"obiurgationes e·tiam non nunquam incidunt necessariae, in quibus 
utendum est fortasse et vocis conten·tione maiore et verborum 
gravitate acriore, id agendum etiam, ut ea facere videamur 
irati. sed, ut ad urendum et secandum, sic ad hoc genus casti-
gandi raro invitique veniemus nec umquam nisi necessario, si 
nulla reperietur alia medicina; sed tamen ira procu1 absit, cum 
qua nihil recte fieri, nihil considerate potest." 
22 Honestum was one of the words used to describe the summum bonum 
of the Stoic ethical system, e.g.: "Zeno is erat qui ... id 
appellaret honestum, quod esset simplex quoddam et solum et 
unum bonum", Cicero, Academica 1.10.36. 
23 Horace never made any bones about the fact that his poetry, 
especially the Odes, was directed only at those who by reason 
of their educatio11could fully appreciate them, e.g. Sat. 1.4.73-
74; cf. Sat.l.lO.73-74 for the circle of friends. 
24 One of the major difficulties in which the.proponents of the 
St:nic: pt:hir'''ll C!yC!i-om f'nu"rl f-homcolHr.r ;,,,,,,...1,,,...,'1 ,.,~~ ~J.-.~ ~"~~J.-.'-m 
- '-'---' ___ ... __ C!. .................. _ ........... ~ -'-'-" ...... '-A. '-'..I..I._J.llo...J ....... ..L.V"--t-J ..J...I..l.VV..LVCU vvuc> L..1J.C l:--'..LVW-l.C L 
of adequately explaining the transition from the performance of 
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the demonstrably Stoic ambience of the whole satire to this point. 
For, at verses 77-79, we have: 
cur non 
ponderibus modulisque suis ratio utitur, ac res 
ut quaeque est ita suppliciis delicta coercet? 
Ratio is the word in question. 25 One would not want to push this 
reference too far, although the conscious use of this word with 
its readily identifiable Stoic connotations in a passage, which 
itself foreshadows an attack upon an aspect of Stoicism, may well 
be another example of Horace's ironical technique, especiallY when 
Horace is about to call into question the validity of the ratio 
f h . . 26 o t e St01C saplens. 
That Horace attacks the Stoic paradox that all sins are 
equal from the standpoint of cornmon-sense and experience is made 
clear by the amusing which he introduces into the poem 
in verses 80-95. The humanity of his statements on the ethics of 
_...--! .................. ___ ,.:] __ .... _.!_l.- ........ ___ .L -....--. ~ .... _ ......... ':a_.! ___ "'-.J- _.t:: ..1-1 __ .L., __ .~_.'t-L _.t:: T"'\~ __ .L_ 
'-'.L.-L1U~ Cl.J..L\..t. !:-"UJ.J...l.t7.:>1J.lllC1J.\... O,J..C .LCLlL..Ll.L..L.~,-e.Ll.l.. V.L L..J.J.t;;;;:: L.1J.VU':jllL.. UJ. rLUL..a.-
27 . 28 goras and also of Arlstotle. Horace's attitude is also 
comparable with that of Cicero. Compare the following lines from 
the satire with Cicero's remarks which follow: 
officia to the actual acquisition of absolute virtue, the 
summum bonum. See H.A.K. Hunt, The Humanism of Cicero 
(Melbourne, 1954), passim. 
25 Cf. the ambiguity in the use of ratio in Horace, Satires 1.1. 2 
and my discussion of the same at pp.5ff. 
26 In the attack upon the sapiens who, according to Stoic doctrine, 
lived in perfect accord with his peculiar nature, i.e. his 
"rational" element, Horace necessarily questions the validity of 
both the wise man's way of governing his life, his ratio 
vivendi and hence his ratio in the sense of reason. 
27 See Plato, Protaqoras 324a-c, and the discussion of same by 
W.ICC. Gu-thrie; Th-eSophists (Camb. 1971) p.67f. 
28 See Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 5.4, where, within the 
context of the doctrine of the mean, Aristotle argues that 
retributive justice should be in proportion to the gravity of 
the offence or loss. 
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96-98 a) quis paria esse fere placuit peccata, laborant 
cum ventum ad verum est; sensus moresque repugnant 
atque ipsa utilitas, iusti prope mater et aequi. 
b) orones, qui non sint sapientes, aeque miseros esse; 
sapientes omnes summe beatos; recte facta omnia 
aequalia; omnia peccata pariai - quae cum 
magnificeprimo dici viderentur, considerata minus 
probabantur. sensus enim et cuiusque natura 
rerum atque ipsa veritas clamabat quod am 
modo, non posse adduci, ut inter eas res, quae 
Zeno exaequaret, nihil interesset. 
Cicero, De Finibus 4.55 
Both Horace and Cicero are at one in attacking the extreme and 
theoretical view of the Stoics on the equality of crimes, because 
it suits their polemical purpose of the moment to concentrate 
exclusively on that vulnerable aspect of Stoic thought. It is 
the uncompromising extremism to which both of these men, who are 
by nature moderates, take exception. Both were, in fact, well aware 
that, despite this theoretical extremism, the Stoics did not 
prescribe the same penalties or punishments for all crimes. In 
the actual world the Stoics were as humane in their theory of 
punishment as they were extreme in their discussions upon the 
nature of evil and crime. This can best be seen from the dismcuss-
ions on punishment, clemency and cruelty in the works of Seneca, 
in particular in the De Clementia,29 and the De Beneficiis,30 but 
also in the De Officiis of Cicero, where Cicero, adapting the 
Panaetian IT€pt xa3nXOVLOG shows a particularly humane spirit. The 
29 Cruelty, a vice, is defined at De Clementia 2.4.1 and 3 as 
"atroci tas animi in exigendis poenis" and "inclina'tio animi 
ad asperiora", while the aims of punishment are described as 
(i) reformation of the criminal, (ii) the setting of an example 
to the potential criminal and (iii) the giving of a sense of 
security tothe community by removing offenders, this at Clem. 
1.22.1. There is no mention of revenge. 
30 E.g. Ben. 7.20.3; cf. also Cicero, Tusc. 4.21. 
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passage from the De Officiis 1.89, which is quoted below, is most 
instructive, because it shows Cicero approving of the thought of 
a Stoic on the question of punishment with regard to actual crimes, 
although at De Finibus 4.55 he shows overt disapproval of the 
extreme view of the Stoics on the equality of all sins. The 
passage from the De Officiis 1.89 is as follows: 
cavendum est etiam, ne maior poena quam culpa sit, et 
ne isdem de causis alii plectantur, alii ne appellentur 
quidem. prohibenda autem maxime est ira in puniendoi 
numquam enim, iratus qui accedet ad poenam, mediocritatem 
illam tenebit, quae est inter nimium et parum. quae 
placet Peripateticis, et recte placet, modo ne laudarent 
iracundiam et dicerent utiliter a natura datam. illa vero 
omnibus in rebus repudienda est optandumque, ut ii, qui 
praesunt rei publicae, legum similes sint, quae ad 
puniendum non iracundia, sed aequitate dicuntur. 3l 
Cicero, in reproducing the modified Stoicism of Panaetius, writes 
what almost amounts to a prose version of Horace's plea for mod-
eration and realism in Satires 1.3. Horace, however, whose 
purpose is to produce a reductio ad absurdum of the Stoic view, 
would not even accept the magnifice primo dici viderentur of 
Cicero. The satirist is not able to give the devil his due, since 
this process detracts from the caricature of Stoicism, which 
must itself be extreme, if it is to be satirically effective. A 
satirist's picture need not have, and does not have in this 
instance, philosophical validity. It suits Horace's purpose not 
to examine the rationale which lay behind the paradox and it suits 
him equally to ignore the more moderate Stoic ideas on punishment 
already mentioned. If Horace had taken cognisance, within the 
31 Cf. Seneca's discussion of anger and punishment in the De 
Ira; for a history of the topic in the ancient authors-,-see 
~Bourgery, Sen~~ue, Dialogues (Paris, 1961) 1, pp.xvi-xix. 
/ 
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satire, of these considerations, it would have undercut the 
vividness of the satirical picture which he paints. Such a 
technique would be dishonest in a supposedly dispassionate account 
by one philosopher of the work of another. However, although 
Horace had the training and intellect to make such a dispassionate 
study, such was not his purpose in this satire. Also, in a 
conversation, which is what the individual Satires (or Sermones) 
purport to be, the aim is not to justify each position adopted 
in the most convincing way possible. Horace is not composing a 
philosophical treatise, but attacking, from the standpoint of the 
32 
common man, or from the standpoint of the common sense of 
33 traditional Roman values, or from the standpoint of common sense 
Aristotelianism. 34 Horace's aim is to be both as destructive and 
entertaining as possible. That the attack upon Stoic extremism 
and upon the foibles of such second-rate practitioners as 
Crispinus is more personal than philosophical in tone may be seen 
from the way in which Horace sidesteps the interlocutor's explan-
ation of how critics like himself have misunderstood the meaning 
of Chrysippus' work or consciously ignored that meaning: 
126-128 "non nosti quid pater," inquit, 
"Chrysippus dicat: sapiens crepidas sibi numquam 
nec soleas fecit; sutor tamen est sapiens." 
Palmer explains the meaning of the paradox as follows: 
32 Epicurus, for example, also claimed that his philosophy was 
intended to serve as the means of salvation for the common 
man, hence he objected to the dialectic and logic of Plato 
and Aristotle, '"dlV 6I,aAE:}(:tl,H,nv Ws napE:AXOUOav an060H,L1l0,60UOI,V, 
Diogenes Laertius, 10.31. 
33 It may be thought that Horace, in fact, only sympathised with 
Stoicism when it was compatible with these values. For 
further comment on this question see the discussion of Satires 
2.2 below. 
34 For Aristotle's view see Nicomachean Ethics 5.4. 
The wise man is potentially a good shoemaker, though 
he never made shoes; as Hermogenes is a famous singer, 
although. not singing at the time; as A1fenus remained 
a barber after giving up his trade: in this sense a 
wise man may even be called a king. 35 
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Because the response which Horace allows himself to make at this 
juncture of the poem is typical of the wilful anti-philosophical 
stance, which he has assumed throughout Satires 1. 3, we are not 
to suppose that he was less capable than Palmer of following the 
workings of Chrysippus' mind. However, it does not suit his 
purpose to become embroiled in philosophical debate, so he resorts 
to abuse, but subtle abuse. It is subtle because he uses other 
mouths, those of 1ascivi pueri (v.134), to make fun of the sapiens. 
The ridicule which is poked at the philosopher is not even 
original. It springs from the kind of abuse poured on the 
36 Academicians by the poets of New Comedy. Also the abuse is 
subtle, because the final picture, which Horace draws of the 
35 A. Palmer, The Satires of Horace (London, 1888) note ad 10c; 
on the concept of the sapiens as king, see Plutarch, De 
Tranq. Animi 12.472a (S.V.F. 3.164.23-26), where Plutarch 
compares the seriousness 0 this belief among the stoics with 
the mockery it inspires among others. 
36 The opening of Sa"tires 1.4 shows that Horace intends to write 
in the comic spirit, if not the "new" comic spirit of the 
Greeks, although note Satires 2.3.11-12. Philosophers were 
fair game for satirists from the time of the Clouds of Arist~ 
ophanes, but, so far as one can judge from the fragments of 
Middle and New Comedy, the habit of attacking philosophers 
was especially common among the Hellenistic comic poets: the 
main targets were the dress and general appearance of the 
philosophers and also their practical uselessness and their 
frequent hypocrisy. Typical is Anaxippus' corrment in Keraunos: 
OC~OL ~LAoao~EtG· aAAu LOUG YE ~LAoao~ouG 
~v LOtG AOYOLG ~PovoOvLaG E6p[auw ~ovov, 
~v LotaL 6' EPYOLG QVLaG avOnLOUG opw. 
On Horace and comedy see Rand, Horace and the Spirit of 
Comedy (Rice Institute Pamphlets, 24.2), where the author 
discusses Horace's debt to the comic writers, esp. in his 
attacks upon the Stoics in Satires 2.3 and 2.7, e.g. "He serves 
the Stoics in the same style as before, laughing at their 
auctioneering the while he steals their wares", p.77. 
37 
supposed "kingly" wise man, is pathetic in the extreme and so 
utterly different from the proud conception of the sapiens to be 
found, for example, in the fourth book of Cicero, Tusculan 
Disputations, and at the close of the third Book of the De Finibus. 
To sum up: Horace, although tacitly approving certain 
Stoic doctrines, such as the Stoics' praise of consistency, and 
although employing, for the sake of irony, words with recognisable 
Stoic pedigrees, such as ratio and honestum, makes it the business 
of his satire to attack those areas of Stoic doctrine most sensitive 
to criticism and open to ridicule by the reductio ad absurdum 
process. Such areas of doctrine are the Stoic paradoxes and the 
picture of the ideally wise man. Later Stoics, such as Seneca 
and Marcus Aurelius, tended to play down the role of such ideas 
in the overall Stoic philosophy as were best depicted by the 
paradoxes. The sapiens was readily admitted to be rara avis. 37 
This modification of Stoic doctrine, as has been made 
clear, had its origins in the work of Panaetius, popularised at 
Rome by Cicero. Cicero recognised that what were of value to 
Romans were the less extreme of the Stoic doctrines, especially 
those which described the officia of day to day living. Horace 
also recognised the value of these "useful" Stoic doctrines; the 
question which must be asked, however, in relation to Horace's 
attitude towards these doctrines, is this: how far is Horace's 
approval limited to those aspects of the Stoic ethics compatible 
with established Roman custom? Does, as Lejay suggests,38 Horace 
give, in the satirical poems, the view of a practical and 
traditional Roman, who felt that the Stoic 'ideas were all very 
37 E.g. Seneca, De Tran. 7.4, "ubi enim istum (sapientem) 
invenies, quem saeculis.quaerimus?" 
38 Horace, Satires, p.7. 
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well, but essentially unnecessary? The point can be made that the 
use of such words as honestum, ratio, and aequa1itas bring this 
latter purpose to the fore; although it is true that they have 
developed a Stoic aura during the century before Horace wrote the 
t · 39 h d' d h . 1 h' 1 d 1 1 Sa lres, t ey 1 ave a strlct y Roman et lca an ega 
pedigree long before that. It was during this period before the 
40 intrusion of Greek influence that Rome became great; therefore, 
the traditional values, which sufficed then and which, to a large 
extent, parallel Stoic thought now, except where Stoic thought 
is ridiculously extreme, should be sufficient as a guide for our 
life now. However, as has been suggested in the discussion of 
satires 1.1 and 1.2, Horace could also exploit Stoic tags or 
doctrines for formative purposes within his poems, while l his 
main aim, the satire of the contemporary Roman world, could be 
aided by employing Stoicising attacks, where such attacks were 
relevant, and by employing the techniques of the Stoic diatribe. 
39 This takes as a convenient date for the approximate start of 
the IIcontact period ll 156 B.C. the date of the lIembassy of 
phi10sophersll; cf. Cic. Tusc. 4.5. 
40 The deleterious effects upon Rome of external influences were 
made much of by Sal1ust, Cat. 7-13 and Cicero, Rep. 2.3.5-9; 
Cato Maior was also concerned with this topic, speaking against, 
for example, the Athenian embassy of philosophers in 156 B.C.; 
see Plutarch, Cato Maior 22. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE STOIC CONTENT OF HORACE, SATIRES 2.3 
Both the elusive and allusive nature of Horace's treatment 
of and attitude towards the Stoa have become evident in the fore-
going discussion of Satires 1.1-3. Horace's attitude has been 
particularly difficult to pin down because, except in the latter 
half of 1.3, the Stoa was only incidentally his focus of 
attention. However, in Satires 2.3 and 2.7 we have two poems 
which deal throughout with Stoicism and which should make clearer 
Horace's attitudes towards the Stoa. This chapter will discuss 
Satires 2.3 in considerable detail. 
A 
Although Satires 2.3 is the longest of the Satires of 
Horace, the structure of the poem presents no particular problem 
comparable, for example, with the vexed question of the structures 
of Satires 1.1 and 1.2. In this satire, as was pointed out by 
. 1 h t' b t H d D . f LeJay, t e conversa lon e ween orace an amaslppus orms a 
frame for the speeches which are made by Stertinius"to Damasippus 
and to mankind in general: Stertinius speaks to Damasippus 
personally from vv.38-76 and to mankind in general from vv.77-295. 
The introductory conversation between Horace and Damasippus at 
vv.1-37 and the final altercation between them at vv.296-326 are 
of comparable length and provide a readily recognisable frame for 
1 Lejay, p.356. 
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the diatribe of Stertinius. For it is a diatribe which Stertinius 
produces, expounding, elaborating and illustrating, by means of 
various exempla, the Stoic paradox OLL nus a~pwv ~aCvELaL.2 All 
men are mad, except the sapiens, declares Stertinius, because 
they are under the influence of: 
a) avarice vV.82-l67 
[al) a bridge passage vv.168-l86J 
b) ambition vv.187-223 
c) luxury vv.224-246 
d) sex vv.247-280 
e) superstition - vv.281-295 3 
So much is clear, although there are inequalities in the treatment 
of these chosen topics within the framework of the diatribe. M. 
Cartaul t explains these "inegali v.~s " adequately: 
Ces inegalites, qui contrastent avec les pretentions 
logiques du debut du discours et avec la raideur de 
l'argumentation Stoicienne, sont Ie resultat des 
libertes que se permet Horace et de sa repulsion pour 
1 ""t' 4 a syme r:Le. 
One should also add that, apart from the repugnance which Horace 
may have felt at too perfect a symmetrical arrangement from the 
point of view of "poiesis", it was his intention to describe as 
realistically as possible the outpourings of a Stoic preacher, who 
was no·t of the first rank. Also, despite "la raideur de I' argum-
entation Stoicienne", the Stoics were well aware of the advantages 
of a more disjointed delivery. This point is well made by V. 
Brochard: 
It seems that when the Stoics talk of the necessity of 
2 For a prose treatment of this theme, see Cicero, Paradoxa, 4. 
3 This formulation is a modification of that of Lejay, p.356; 
however, on the division between a) and b) see above, pp. 84 ff. 
" 4 M. Cartault, Etude sur les Satires d'Horace (Paris, 1899) p. 85. ~~-~-~~-~~--~-~~~.~ - -
conceiving of a particular thing ••. they take refuge 
in a kind of 'common-sense', in an accumulation of 
experience felt throughout the world, to certain 
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empirical axioms consecrated by usage, by tradition, 
especially by language and by the universal consent 
argument ..• The fund of shared experience guarantees 
somehow or other the actual experience of each individual, 
while to argue against the results obtained in this way 
is to fly in the face of self-evident truths and dogmata. 
It is to be self-contradictory and to put at risk the very 
concept of oral and written cor~unication. There is e •• 
a method of argument per (mumerationem simplicem which is 
made without order and without method, but the results of 
which would seem to be certain, because they are not 
contested and because one cannot see the way in which they 
5 
can be by-passed. 
I quote Brochard's description of this particularly Stoic 
form of argumentation, because it is by no means clear whether or 
not Horace, although ostensibly satirising Damasippus and 
;l': in c::vmn:::lt-hu wit-h 
- - --- -.J. --~.L- -- ---,J. •• - --- the mr\"l-;:' 1 i ci nn -!-I""'I T.71-.; ro1-. -------------"J -- ....... -_ ..... StertiYlius 
gives vent. 6 If, as Rand suggests, Horace is attacking the means 
of exposition, but appropriating the message, where it avoids 
extremes, because the reader soon falls into the position of 
iden-tifying the moral ising voice of the poem's centre with that 
of Horace himself, then Horace is betraying that same sort of 
ambiguity which has been pointed out in the discussions of satires 
1.1-3. For, if Horace is in sympathy with much of the message of 
Stertinius, as it concerns the foibles of mankind, why does Horace 
react so violently towards Damasippus at the end of the poem? 
Horace reacts with verbal violence in much the same way as, at the 
5 V. Brochard, "Sur la Logique des Stoiciens" in L'Archiv fur 
Geschichte der Philos ie (1892) p.462. 
6 Rand, Horace and the 
24.2). 
irit of Come (Rice Institute Pamphlet, 
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close of Satires 2.7, he reacts with threatened physical violence 
towards his outspoken slave Davus. Horace reacts violently, 
because he objects on the one hand, to the form of the exposition 
(as described by Brochard~ and on the other hand, to the personal 
attack upon himself. This form of exposition is difficult to 
argue against since it appears to demand a necessary acceptance 
of the self-evident truth of its content. That Horace recognised 
the effectiveness of this kind of exposition is made clear by the 
way in which he utilises the method himself in Satires 2.2, in 
order to expound views with which he had some sympathy, namely 
the traditional moral views of the countryman Of ell us. There is 
no difficulty in accepting that a poet can exploit a particular 
means of exposition, while not approving of the method on moral 
or philosophical grounds. This merely suggests that the poet is 
something of an opportunist, with a ready eye for that which will 
make each poem produced by him as successful as possible. There 
is, however, some difficulty involved in understanding how a 
poet can utilise such a "doubtful" means of persuasion to propound 
views with which he is himself partially in sympathy and yet 
manifest great indignation when the moral point of some of those 
views seems to be directed at himself. For, although Horace may 
well have felt that the extreme position of the Stoic paradox 
O~~ nas a~pwv ~aLvE~a~, as depicted in Satires 2.3 was ridiculous, 
even as the Stoic paradox that all sins are equally culpable was 
equally ridiculous in Satires 1.3, he would have felt much 
sympathy with the illustrative material he puts into stertinius' 
mouth, so that the bare bones of the paradox may be fleshed out. 
Also, although the fourfold division of Stertinius' diatribe is 
based upon the categorisation of vices attributed to Zeno by 
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7 Stobaeus, nevertheless, Horace gives Stertinius' words an 
unmistakably H.oman flavour by his choice of examples, not the 
least important of which is Horace himself, who is taken to task 
ty Damisippus. These examples are largely, as Lejay puts it,8 
"indetermines ou anonymes ll and "purement Romains".9 However, if 
Horace takes these pains to make the diatribe more persuasive to 
a Roman audience, of which he himself was, within the fiction of 
the satire, a member, why the indignation and anger which is 
manifested at the satire's close? The answer may be that a Roman 
of good-sense, like Horace,or Of ell us in Satires 2.2, does not 
need a second-rate Greek philosopher to provide a modus vivendi. 
This feeling of superiority is sufficient to explain only some 
f ' d' d .. 10 d ld o Horace sanger towar s Damaslppus an Stertlnlus, an wou 
place him in that line of the tradition in satire which goes back 
to Lucilius who, although he was like Cato Maior, aware of the 
blessings conferred by Greek literature, was also suspicious of 
the pervasive influence of things Greek upon Roman society in 
general. ll A detailed examination of the Stoic and non-Stoic 
content of the satire should help to clarify why and how Horace 
exploits the Stoics in this poem. Such an examination will also 
give some indication of how to approach not only Satires 2.7, 
7 uaua OE ~oLaD~a a~poouvnv, auoAaoLav, aOLuLavi oELALav, 
uat n:av 0 EO~L JiaJiLa n l-tE"tEXOV JiaJ1.LaG. Stobaeus, Ecl. 
2.57.18. 
8 Lejay, p.373. 
9 Even the example which Horace uses ·to illuminate superstition, 
the sacrifice of Iphigenia, would have been familiar to 
Roman readers from a Roman context, if only because Lucretius 
uses the same ~xemplum at De Rerum Natura 1.80-101. 
10 Cf. Lejay, p.380, "Le Romain de bon sens se montre superieur 
a tou·t pretentieux predica teur, a Crispinus et a Damasippe." 
11 E.g. Lucilius, fro ap. Cie. Fin. 1.3.8 (R,O.L. vol.3, 
p. 30) . 
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but also the other moral satires such as 2.2 and 2.6. 
B 
ANTICIPATORY CHARACTERISATION IN VV.1-31 
The ironical tone in which Horace deals with Damasippus 
and, through him, with Stertinius, is set by the opening comments 
put into Damasippus' mouth by Horace: 
1-16 'Sic raro scribis ut toto non quater anno 
membranam poscas, scriptorum quaeque retexens, 
iratus tibi quod vini somnique benignus 
nil dignum sermone canas. quid fiet? at ipsis 
Saturnalibus huc fugisti. sobrius ergo 
dic aliquid dignum promissis: incipe. nil est: 
culpantur frustra calami, immeritusque laborat 
iratis natus paries dis atque poetis. 
atqui vultus erat multo et praeclara mirantis, 
si vacuum tepido cepisset villula tecto. 
quorsum pertinuit stipare Platona Menandro, 
Eupolin, Archilochum, comites educere tantos? 
invidiam placare paras virtute relicta? 
contemnere miser; vitanda est improba siren 
desidia, aut quidquid vita meliore parasti 
ponendum aequo animo.' 
Note first that, at the beginning of Horace's longest 
satire, he allows Damasippus to take him to task for literary 
desidia. Horace suggests that Damasippus mistakes the idleness 
enforced by serious composition for laziness. Therefore, despite 
his interest in humanism, which has been inspired by his contact 
with the Stoics (v.19), Damasippus betrays himself insensitive to 
the demands made upon an author by his calling. Horace was himself 
a literary perfectionist, as may be seen not only from the Ars 
Poe~tica, but also from the nature of his attacks upon the careless'-
ness in composition of Lucilius: 
.•• durus componere versus: 
nam fuit hoc vitiosus: in hora saepe ducentos, 
ut magnum, versus dictabat stans pede in uno: 
cum flueret lutulentus, erat quod tollere velles: 
garrulus atque piger scribendi ferre laborem, 
scribendi recte. 
Horace, Satires 1.4.8-13 
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Horace's irony has added poin't, when one remembers that one of 
the reasons for mentioning Fabius and Crispinus, the Stoic writers, 
, h f' t ,12 1 h' b' h' h In t e lrs satlre was to moc< t elr ver OSlty, w lC Horace 
had no intention of matching. In fact, in Satires 1.4.14-21 
Horace describes the kind of challenge which the copious Crispinus 
flings out to such perfectionists as himself. Horace is grateful 
to the gods because they have endowed him with a sparing and 
parsimonious genius, inopis .eo pusilli / animi, raro et perpauca 
1 ,13 oquentls. Horace did not intend this criticism of his supposed 
inclusion of this criticism,that Damasippus' judgement is to be 
considered suspect. This does not prevent the description, given 
by Damasippus, of the frustrations, which the poet endures while 
in the throes of composition, from ringing true. The description 
of the symptoms is accurate, the diagnosis of the disease is not. 
Horace does not give the name of Damasippus until v.16, 
neither does he inform the reader of Damasippus' philosophical 
persuasion until, at v. 33, Damasippus refers to Stertinius and, at 
v.44, to the Chrysippi E£rticus et grex. In other words, the 
12 Horace, Satires 1.1.13-14 and 120-121; we note that, by 
contrast with these copious writers and with Lucilius, Horace 
reworks what he has written because his ultimate aim is 
perfection. This is the strength of scriptorum guaeque 
retexens, (2.3.2). 
13 Horace, Satires 1.4.17-i8. 
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identity of Horace's critic and his beliefs emerge naturally in 
the course of the conversation. 14 We are plunged in medias res. 
However, Horace does prepare his readers, so that the identification 
of Damasippus as a Stoic comes as no surprise. Horace achieves 
this by sprinkling terms and references of possible, but not 
conclusive, Stoic connotation both in the preliminary remarks of 
Damasippus and in Horace's responses to them. In the speech with 
which Damasippus opens the satire, the Stoicising references 
which first occur are as follows: 
i) nil dignum sermone canas v.4 
ii) dic aliquid dignum promissis v.6 
These two clauses are open to various interpretations. Horace 
is again consciously exploiting the possibilities of ambiguity. 
The various interpretations are as follows: 
i) The phrase dignum sermone is equivalent to AOYOU aELov 
and means "worth mention,,;15 parallels in Greek are Herodotus 
1.133 and Thucydides 1.73, while in Latin there is little to 
suggest that dignum and sermo were commonly linked in this way. 
One could object that sermo is usually used of conversation between 
a group of people and is not merely a synonym for verbum. On the 
other hand, dignum sermone may mean "worthy of comment in a 
conversa tion" • 
ii) The phrase may mean "worthy of sermo or satire". This 
view is untenable. As Lejay says, "C'est supposer au sermo une 
16 dignite a laquelle ne songe pas Horace." 
14 Cf. also the beginning of Satires 2.7, where the reader is 
plunged in medias res, although the identity of the initial 
speaker in that poem is established by verse two. 
15 This is the interpretation, for example, of Palmer in his 
note on the passage and also of Rudd (p.82 of Penguin trans-
lation); cf. also Lejay, p.39l. 
16 Lejay, p.391. 
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iii) Related to ii) is the interpretation which would lead to 
translating the phrase as "worthy of publication", i.e. "worthy 
of inclusion within one of your own satires". The fact that 
sermo is not found in the singular, meaning a single example of 
Horace's satires or Sermones, does not preclude the possibility 
of such an interpretation. 
iv) The phrase may mean "worthy of your words", i.e. "worthy 
of what you said you would do" ... when your environment matched 
your mood. 17 This interpretation is supported by the dignum 
promissis at v.6; for although it is un-Horatian to repeat dignum 
within the space of so few lines, yet, if the meanings of the 
two phrases dignum sermone and dignum promissis are parallel, the 
repetition is not harsh, but emphatic. The poet is thought of as 
being angry (iratus, v.3), because his life of ease and debauch 
has prevented him from composing anything "worthy of his own 
comments". Damasippus tells him, therefore, to sober up (sobrius, 
v.5) and to produce (dic, v.6) something "worthy of the promises 
he has made". 
Of these interpretations ii) is the least likely. Each 
of the others is possible. However, the repetition of dignum in 
vv.3 and 6 may have more point than that considered even under iv). 
Dignum in Latin, like aELov in Greek, has specific Stoic connot~ 
t ' 18 a lons. Therefore, the repetition may well be intended to have 
the effect of characterising Damasippus as the Stoic neophyte, 
. 19 
upon whose tongue Stoic phrases are ever to the fore. It would 
17 Cf. atqui vultus erat multa et praeclara minantis, 
si vacuum tepido cepisset villula tecto, (9-10). 
18 For a discussion of dignum and aELov in a Stoic sense see 
Cicero, Fin. 3.50-51. 
19 For a discussion of the influence of comedy upon other aspects 
of Horace's dramatic technique in the sat~res, see the 
discussion of Satires 2.7 below. 
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also be in keeping with the professed Stoic ideals of Damasippus, 
if he deplored the waste of Horace's talent as a writer and his 
20 devotion to the attractions of wine and sleep. For, even as 
the Stoics believed that a man's actions should spring from a 
21 
settled disposition of the soul, settled in accord with nature, 
they also believed that it was a man's duty to choose his vocation 
in accord with his peculiar genius or talents, which is another 
way of saying "in accord with (his) nature." This is made clear 
by Cicero in the first book of the De Officiis: 
i) "sic enim est faciendum, ut contra universam naturam 
nihil contendamus, ea tamen conservata propriam nostram sequamur, 
ut, etiamsi sint alia graviora atque meliora, tamen nos studia 
nostra nostrae naturae regula metiamur; neque enim attinet 
naturae repugnare nec quicquam sequi, quod assequi non queas." 
Off. 1.110 
ii) "suum quisque igitur noscat ingenium acremque se et 
bonorum et vitiorum suorum indicem praebeat .•• " ibid. 114 
iii) "itaque se alii ad philosophiam, alii ad ius civile, alii 
ad eloquentiam applicant, ipsarumque virtutum in alia alius 
mavult excellere." ibid. 115 
Therefore, the supposed desidia of Horace would be seen by 
Damasippus as a dereliction of that duty which he owed to ingenium 
22 ~, that is, to his function as a poet. The idea of the 
20 On the asceticism of the Stoics see Arnold, pp.258,362 and 409; 
it was the role of the human reason to suppress the appetites, 
e.g. "intellegitur appetitus omnes contrahendos sedandosque 
esse", Cicero, Off. 1.103. 
21 See the discussion of consistency below at pp.25-27. 
22 It is interesting to compare this Stoic concept of decorum re 
the individual with the Platonic concept of justice which is 
propounded in the Republic and which declares that each man 
should do what is appropriate to his psychological constitution, 
~O oE YE aAn8Es, ~0~ou~6v ~~ nv, Ws EO~XEV, n o~xa~oauvn aAA' 
ou TIEPL ~nv sEw TIpaE~v ~wv au~oG, aAAa TIEPL ~nv Ev~6s, ws . 
o.A.n0w~ TIEPL Eau~ov xat ~a E:au~ou. Plato, Hepublic 443e. 
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dereliction of duty is picked up towards the end of Damasippus' 
speech: 
13 invidiam placare paras virtute relicta? 
Once again it is difficult to pin down the exact meaning of virtute 
relicta, although the general drift is clear from the context; 
for example, Palmer says, rather blandly, "giving up the castig-
ation of vice is meant.,,23 There are, however, various routes by 
which one can arrive at this conclusion. 
i) If we were to take our lead from the opening of Satires 2.2: 
quae virtus et quanta, boni, sit vivere parvo ... 
Satires 2.2.1 
we would take virtute relicta to mean "the study of moral virtue 
being neglected." That is to say: Horace believes that, by 
refraining from writing such morally edifying poems as Satires 2.2, 
which, as a form of literature, naturally arouses ill-feeling 
among those lacking moral virtue, he will ease the odium which he 
has already aroused. Rather, says Damasippus, he will now be 
despised as well as disliked. 
ii) It is possible to take Damasippus' reference to virtute 
relicta as being sarcastic in the sense that, although the direct 
translation of the line would be, "Do you think to assuage the 
ill-feeling you have aroused in others by leaving alone their 
virtue?" the implication is that Horace is leaving alone their 
vices also, which, incidentally, are in the preponderance. 
iii) It is clear that interpretations i) and ii) are closely 
related. However, they do not seem to me to fit closely enough 
in with the context and tone of Damasippus' remarks to make 
absolutely perfect sense. I wish to return to the Stoic concept 
23 Palmer, D. ad loco 
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of doing oneself justice by attending to the completion of one's 
own peculiar functions and skills. 24 If we consider that 
Damasippus is a devotee of what is essentially a Greek philosoph-
ical system, then we ought to be aware of the possibility that such 
a word as virtus in v.13 may be a translation of a Greek concept, 
25 
especially when it follows the mention of the Greek authors, 
who are enumerated in vv.11-12. Additionally one can draw the 
parallel between dignum sermone and &ELOV AOYOD in v.4, even if 
this is not the prime meaning of this consciously ambiguous 
26 phrase. The natural Greek equivalent of virtus is, of course, 
~PE~~, which is frequently used in Plato's dialogues with the 
meaning of excellence in a particular skill or ~~xvn,27 as well 
as meaning excellence in the business of living. The Stoics also 
recognised the close relationship between ~PE~n and ~EXVn, both in 
the immediate context of human existence 28 and also, on the cosmic 
scale, in the organisation of the universe through its inter-
penetration by the nup ~EXVLUOv.29 The human soul was itself 
thoughtby the Stoics to be a particle of this nup ~EXVLUOVJ 
interpenetrating the human body in precisely the manner in which 
24 See Cicero, Off. 1.110-115, and discussion on pp.48-49 above. 
25 without wishing -to become embroiled in the discussion about 
the identity of Platona, whether comicus or philosophus, in 
v.ll, a discussion dealt with by Lejay, n.ad loco and by Rudd 
(p.163 of Penguin translation in notes on Satires 2.3), I would 
suggest that the philosopher is, in fact, intended. The . 
Satires are dialogues; the arrangement of these four names 
with the sequence "philosopher", "comedian-comedian", "satirist" 
is more satisfying than !!comedian ll x 3 - "satirist". Also the 
emphasis on virtus and moral philosophy throughout the poem, 
along with the immeasurably greater fame of the philosopher, 
points in the same direction. 
26 See discussion above, pp.46-47. 
27 E.g. Plato, Protagoras 322d. 
28 E.g. S.V.F. 3.49.4-8, esp. OAOD yap ~ou SLOD ta~l ~EXVn n 
~pE~n, EV (i) }tal at aU1-maaaL npaf;ELG. 
29 E.g. S.V.F. 1.34.21-33 (Stobaeus on Zeno), cf. also, in the 
Roman-alithors Cicero, N.D. 2.57 and Acad. 1.39. 
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the nup ~EXVLUOV or fiery logos interpenetrated the universe. 30 
Although the discussion may seem to have drifted away 
from the meaning of the phrase virtute relicta in Satires 2.3.13, 
nevertheless I suggest that there are good grounds for believing 
that virtus in this instance is akin to dpE~~ in the sense of 
~€XVn, and that Damasippus is chiding Horace for neglecting to 
live and work in accord with the virtues, skills or talents of 
his own peculiar nature. Horace's peculiar skill is the 
composition of satirical poetry which attacks the shortcomings of 
others. If this skill is neglected (virtute relicta), because 
Horace is less. than assured of his social position, then he will 
indeed become an object of contempt for not having the courage of 
his convictions. 
If interpretation (iii) is acceptable, then we may 
say that Horace has seized another opportunity of characterising 
Damasippus, before his identity and beliefs are formally announced. 
Horace's response to these remarks of Damasippus also 
suggests that they have identified the speaker's beliefs to 
Horace. For, whereas the fashion of sporting a beard had been 
the hallmark of philosophers, especially of members of the 
Academy, pilloried by the poets of New Comedy in the Hellenistic 
period,3l in later times the wearing of the beard had become 
particularly identified as a Stoic trait. 32 So Horace's: 
30 E.g. Cicero, N.D. 2.40-41 and Censorinus, De Die Nat. 4.10, 
II Zenon Ci tieuS;---Stoicae sectae condi tor f principillm humano 
generi ex novo mundo constitutum putavit, primosque homines ex 
solo, adminiculo divini ignis, id est, dei providentia, 
genitos"; cf. Varro, L.L. 59, "sive, ut Zenon Citieus, 
animalium semen ignis s, qui anima ac mens." 
31 E.g. Ephippus caricatures a young man from the Academy in his 
Nauagos: EUT" , c' ." , lJ,e v lJ,a xa L pq, s uo~ E XWV ~ P L xw]..ta ~a , 
EU 6' '(moua"7l,et s a.~olJ,a TIC.0yWVOs !3a"7n, 
eu 6' tv nE6C~~ no6a 6e"7cts 6noE6p~ ••. 
Edmonds, G.C.~. 3b.14 
32 On the significance of the beard to the Stoic, see A.C. 
16-17 di te, Damasippe, deaeque 
verum ob consilium donent tonsore. 
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inunediately makes it likely that Damasippus is a Stoic. Also 
Horace's question: 
17-18 sed unde 
tarn bene me nosti? 
allows Damasippus to explain his conversion into a philanthropic 
humanist, again in terms which anticipate his identification as 
a Stoic in v.44. The description of the effect of Damasippus' 
conversion is as follows: 
18-20 postquam omnis res mea Ianum 
ad medium fracta est, aliena negotia curo, 
excussus propriis. 
Although socrates 33 and Diogenes 34 were perhaps the original, 
self-confessed, "citizens of the world", it was the Stoics who 
gave a technical basis to the belief in the brotherhood of man. 
The idea of the cosmopolis had an obvious appeal to those 
concerned with the justification of imperialism, if an actual 
35 
empire could be visualised as the manifestation of the Stoic 
cosmopolis. 36 However, our concern here is the effect this idea 
van Geytenbeek, Musonius Rufus and the Greek Diatribe, 
Eng. trans. by B~L. Hijmans (Utrecht, 1936), pp.119f. 
33 Cicero, Tusc. 5.108. 
34 Diogenes Laertius, 6.63. 
35 The belief is summed up well by Seneca, Epist. 95.52-53, 
"omne hoc quod vides, quo divina atque humana conclusa sunt, 
unum est; membra sumus corporis magni. natura nos cognatos 
edidit, cum ex isdem et in eadem gigneret. 1I 
36 Arnold discusses this concept at p.274 of Roman Stoicism, 
but without reference to primary sources. The identification 
of cosmopolis with patria is implied at Cicero, Rep. 1.19, 
bu·t without any intention of justifying the imperIUm. 
Plutarch, De Alexandri Virtute 1.329A makes a contrast 
between Zeno's "dream" cosmopolis and the actual empire of 
Alexander, TOGTo Znvwv ~EV £ypaw£v wan£p 6vap n £LOWAOV 
£6vouCa~ ~LAoa6~ou xat nOALT£(a~ &vaTunwadu£vo~, 'AA~EavopoG 
OE TQ A6y~ Ta £Pyov naptax£v. 
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had upon the behaviour of individual to individual and the spirit 
of enlightened altruism to which it gave birth. 37 However, the 
very way in which Horace formulates this answer of Damasippus to 
the question of verses 17-18 suggests, with a degree of irony, 
that Damasippus is only now interested in the affairs of Horace, 
because he has no affairs of his own to concern him; he is 
excussus propriis (20). Horace is not prepared to allow a man 
who is about to criticise him to have genuine altruistic feelings, 
even within the fiction of a satire. This cynical response on the 
part of Horace is reminiscent of Menedemus' brusque attitude 
towards that other well-intentioned, and subsequently ridiculous, 
meddlerChremes in Terence's Heautontimoroumenos 75-76: 
Me. Chreme, tantumne ab re tuast oti tibi 
aliena ut cures ea quae nil ad teattinent? 
Horace, in fact, expresses surprise that Damasippus has turned 
away from the love of objets d'art to love of humanity: 
26-27 novi 
et miror morbi purgatum te illius. 
Horace's caustic wit is evident here, not only in the obvious 
sarcasm and coarse expression of the comment, but also because of 
the way in which he employs stoic terminology to add point to 
this description of a conversion to Stoicism. The metaphorical 
37 For a discussion of "humanitas" see D. Gagliardi, "Ie Concetto 
di Humanitas da Terenlio a Cicerone", La Parole et L'Idee 
Vol.? (1965) pp.1-12.~ Cicero's concept of the need f6r 
mutual aid is clearly presented at Fin. 3.64, "mundum autem 
censent regi numine deorum eumque esse quasi communem urbem 
et civitatem hominum et deorum, et unumquemque nostrum eius 
mundi esse partem: ex quo illud natura consequi, ut conununem 
utilitatem nostrae anteponamus": cf. M. Aurelius, Meditations 
4.4, Et ~b VOEP~V ~Urv Kov6v, Kat 6 ~6yo~, Ka8" ~V ~O~~KOr 
EOUEV, KOLV6~· Et 1"OU~O, nO~~1"Euua1"6~ 1"t,vo~ UE1"EXOUEV· Et 
1"OU~O, 6 K6ouo~ woavEL n6~~~ EO~C· ~Cvos yap a~~ou ~nOEt, 1"Ls 
1"b ~WV aV8p0)l1WV na.v YEVO s KO ~ vou n:o~ ~ 1"EUUO,~Os l-LEH':XE ~ V; 
Seneca, Epist. 95.53 enlarges on the same, making the inevitable 
quotation-IrOm Terence, Heauton. 77. 
use of morbus as a sickness of the mind, which may be cured or 
purged by the medicine of philosophy, is not peculiar to the 
St ' 38 OlCS. However, the fact that a parallel use is to be found 
in the actual Stoic diatribe of Stertinius, within this poem, does 
strengthen the impression that in vv.26~27 Horace is being 
consciously witty. The parallel case is at vv.120-121: 
120-121 nimirum insanus paucis videatur, eo quod 
maxima pars hominum morbo iactatur eodem. 
B~ the time we reach the end of the poem we will feel that Damas-
ippus has perhaps swallowed the Stoicism of Stertinius too readily 
and with too little comprehension of all its ramifications. At 
this stage of the satire it is already clea~ that Horace intends 
us to recognise Damasippus as some sort of a Stoic, before the 
reference to Stertinius at v.33, to the Stoic paradox eLL naG 
a~pwv ~aLvELaL at v.32, and the conclusive reference to Chrysippi 
porticus et grex at v.44. We would have to be very slow indeed, 
i[ we wel.-e stoic ; r'l<=>rd-; i-v nf ---------,J. -
Damasippus by the time we had reached the reference to the paradox 
and by the reference, at v.35, to the typical Stoic beard 39 which' 
St t " . t t d' lOt' t 40 er lnlUS lns ruc e Damaslppus to cu lva e. Knowing Horace's 
attitude to the Stoics in part, from past comments in Satires 1.3, 
we are, therefore, warned in advance to expect Damasippus to be 
ludicrous and loquacious. Horace also suggests, by his ironical 
plea to be spared from physical violence, that this new passion 
which has seized Damasippus is of a type which has unbalanced his 
38 Chrysippus was, however, especially fond of the parallel 
between vice and physical ailments, as may be seen from 
Cicero, Tusc. 4.23, "nimium operae consumitur a Stoicis, 
maxume a Chrysippo, durn morbis corporum comparatur morborum 
animi similitudo". 
39 See above, n.32. 
40 Vv.34-35. 
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mind. Provoked by Horace's flippant irony, in much the same way 
as Thrasymachus, as portrayed in Plato, Republic 1, was provoked 
by the irony of Socrates, Damasippus reports the circumstances 
of his meeting with Sterti.nius and the diatribe which converted 
him to Stoicism. With great economy Horace has prepared the ground 
for the delivery of the diatribe, both by his subtle anticipatory 
characterisation of Damasippus as a new and enthusiastic convert 
to Stoicism, and by the betrayal of his own cynicism towards the 
genuineness of Damasippus' beliefs. The delivery of the diatribe, 
which, though originating with Stertinius, is reported in Platonic 
fashion by Damasippus, is directly motivated by the conflict 
between the urgency of Damasippus and Horace's casual amusement. 
C 
THE PRELUDE, VV.31-46 
However, the diatribe itself is anticipated by a tightly 
constructed passage of fifteen lines which serves as a bridge 
between the introductory conversation and the main business of 
the poem. This is an attack upon human nature from the point of 
view of the Stoic who believes in the validity of the paradox 
naG a~pwv ~aLvE~aL. This paradox occurs twice within these 
fifteen lines - at the beginning and end of the section. On the 
first occasion Damasippus speaks, as in a fit of pique, and on 
the second, seeking to justify his acceptance of the paradox, 
which sprang rather hastily to his lips, he quotes Stertinius' 
formulation of the paradox, which, in turn, leads into the report 
of the whole of the diatribe of Stertinius. The structure and 
text of these fifteen lines, which serve as prelude to the diatribe, 








Damasippus states the paradox naG a<ppwv lla~vE"taL 
in a fit of temper:-
"0 bone, ne te 
frustrere, insanis et tu stultique prope omnes .•. " 
Damasippus gives his itnmedia·te source for the 
parado:x::-
si quid Sterinius veri crepat, unde ego mira 
descripsi docilis praecepta haec .•• 
Damasippus describes the situation and time of 
hearing the paradox:-
tempore quo me 
solatus iussit sapientem pascere barbam 
atque a Fabricio non tristem ponte reverti. 
Dam~sippus explains the situafion:-
nam male re gesta cum vellem mittere operto 
me capite in flumen, dexter stetit et .•• 
Stertinius dissuades Damasippus from such a 
misguided and unworthy step. The paradox, of 
which Damasippus is unaware is hinted at:-
cave faxis 
te quicquam indignum; pudor, inquit, te malus angit, 
insanos qui inter vereare insanus haberi. 
primum nam inquiram quid sit·fuere: hoc si erit in te 
solo, nil verbi, pereas quin fortiter, addam. 
Stertinius states both the paradox itself and the 
source from which it derived:-
quem mala stultitia et quemcumque inscitia veri 
caecum agit, insanum Chrysippi porticus et grex 
autumat. haec populos, haec magnos formula reges, 
excepto sapiente, tenet. 
These fifteen lines are wrought by Horace into a tight unity by 
the exploitation of ring structure. If A = "statement of paradox", 
B = "source of paradox", C "'" IInarrative or explanatory text", then 
the structure of this passage may b~ represented as follows: 
ABC C C B A. 
The mingling of the statement of the paradox its ...... ." .-:J d.HU source 
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wi thin the lines spoken by Stertinius avoids that stultifying 
total symmetry to which Horace was so averse. 41 Clearly, then, 
in order to emphasise the unity of this specific sub-section 
within the poem, Horace exploits the device of ring-structure and 
the passages, which, as it were, forge that structure, are different 
statements of the same Stoic paradox. These statements are coupled 
with their respective sources in such a way that the first state-
ment, motivated by temper, and its source, Stertinius, anticipate 
the second statement, which is made by Stertinius, whose sources 
are Chrysippus and the Stoics. The second statement and its 
sources anticipate, in turn, that lengthy explanation and illust-
ration of the paradox by Stertinius which forms the major body of 
the poem. The art, by means of which the major concern of the 
poem, which is a satire upon human life from the point of view of 
the paradox naG a~pwv ~aCvE~a~, is introduced, is further 
disguised by the changes in speaker and in the different moods of 
the speakers. These changes both of speaker and mood match the 
formal progression of the poem in such a way that form and meaning 
complement each other as in a Platonic dialogue or a Sophoclean 
tragedy, "si parva licet conponere magnis." 
However, this prelude to the diatribe of Stertinius is 
not merely interesting from the point of view of its formal 
excellence and of its role within the structure of the larger 
whole. The content too repays study in that we can again see 
Horace indulging in anticipatory characterisation, but, on this 
occasion, of Stertinius, and exploiting Stoic terminology and 
doctrine both towards this end, the characterisation of Stertinius 
and Damasippus, and also with a view to increasing the wit and 
41 See n. 4 to Chap. 3 above (p.40). 
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humorous content of his poem. It is especially important that 
we gauge Horace's attitude towards Stertinius as accurately as 
possible; for it is upon the accuracy of that estimation that our 
correct interpretation of the poem depends, since no such correct 
interpretation immediately suggests itself. Horace never makes 
it clear whether or not we are intended to forget that he is 
speaking in a persona other than his own throughout this, the 
longest and most important section of the poem. It is, therefore, 
necessary to study in some detail the content, as well as the 
form, of the proem to the diatribe, as well as the form and 
content of the diatribe itself. Only by so doing can we hope to 
ascertain what Horace's attitude is, both to Stertinius himself 
and to the ideas to which he allows Stertinius to give vent. 
One should assume that Horace is capable of consciously 
disguising these attitudes and that he does, in fact, do so for 
specific purposes, rather than assume with Rudd that "difficulties" 
f . t . . f f I k h' 42 o ln erpretatl0n sprlng rom au ty wor mans lp. It is 
dangerous to take refuge in that critical bolthole which charges 
incompetence to such a painstaking artist as Horace, if a more 
satisfactory explanation is available. ~fuile admitting that 
Horace and Damasippus are potentially an ideally contrasting pair, 
Rudd complains: 
Unfortunately the pic·ture becomes blurred at a number of 
points. Damasippus' remark about minding other people's 
business after wrecking his own (aliena negotia curo, / 
excussus propriis) might be just inadvertance, but he 
ought not to use the disrespectful 'spiel' (crepat) in 
connexion with his teacher's sermon, and he ought not to 
refer so flippantly to his own beard, which was the symbol 
of his belief. All these are Horace's jokes and should 
42 Rudd, Satires of Horace, pp.174-175. 
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not be put in Damasippus' mouth. 
Rudd seems (consistently) to miss or misinterpret the point of 
what Horace is actually saying throughout this passage. 
Regarding "aliena negotia curo / excussus propriis" 
43 (vv.19-20) I have already made sufficient cOIT@enti Horace under-
cuts the authority of Damasippus as a speaker and his altruism as 
a Stoic humanist by the irony of this self~betrayal. Damasippus 
is shown to be lacking in both sensitivity and intelligence. This 
we already knew from his misinterpretation of the torments of 
literary composition. 
Rudd also assumes that crepat at v.33 must, of necessity, 
have a consciously derogatory connotation and translates it by 
"spiel ll • orelli4'1ays simply that crepat means lIet alta quidem 
voce, docere solet", without any sense of disrespect; the word is 
almost onomatopoeic. Lejay45 says that crepat almost always has 
an ironical or an unfavourable sense, but declares also that 
"l'ironie est inconsciente". In other words, Damasippus' comment, 
"si quid Stertinius veri crepat" does not show any conscious 
denigration of nor disrespect for Stertinius on the part of 
Damasippus. However, what Horace does achieve by the use of 
crepa t here is a further stroke in the portrait which he is painting 
of the raw and enthusiastic, but rather stupid and uncritical, 
Stoic convert Damasippus. "Distinctions" are not being "blurred", 
as Rudd would have us believe. Rather the developing characteris-
ation of Damasippus is amusing and consistent, clear and sharp. 
Further, the reference which Damasippus makes to his beard is 
43 See above, pp.52f. 
44 Orelli-Baiter, editio tertia, n. ad loco 
45 Lejay, n. ad loco p.396; cf. also comments on p.386: one 
may note the use of cre££ at Horace, Odes 1.18.5 where, 
although colloquial, the word is not ronic. 
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not to be taken, with Rudd, as being flippant. This is Damasi-
ppus' response to Horace's ironical comment of vv.16-17. 
Damasippus is explaining seriously, and perhaps with a rather 
heavy sarcasm, how he came to cultivate the beard of a philosopher. 
He is still somewhat nettled by Horace's attitude. A reference to 
a philosopher's beard is only flippant, if it originates with an 
opponent of a philosopher. Damasippus' tone is one of injured 
pride as he springs to th~ defence and the explanation of his 
metamorphosis from antique dealer to Stoic neophyte. Thus these 
are not "Horace's jokes" which are "put in Damasippus' mouth", 
but examples of Horatian wit. 46 
Although the cumulative effect of these errors of 
critical judgement must have a deleterious effect upon Rudd's 
overall estimation of the poem, each error or misjudgement is in 
itself only on a matter of minor detail. More serious is Rudd's 
misunderstanding of Damasippus' reading of his own, that is, 
Damasippus' mental state. Rudd writes,47 
Damasippus remains oddly ambiguous about his present 
condition. Is he insane or not? Clearly we are meant 
to suppose that after his conversion he is in some sense 
wiser than before. Yet when Horace begs him not to become 
violent his only reply is 'You too are insane' (32). 
Later, after recounting Stertinius' teaching he says 
'These were the weapons which Stertinius gave me, so that 
I could hit back if anyone called me names. Whoever says 
I am mad will be told as much in reply' (296-8). This 
seems to imply a lack of certainty in Damasippus' own 
mind and it weakens the effect of the final gibe in which 
he is addressed as insane (326). 
46 In n.22 on the sixth chapter of The Satires of Horace Rudd 
draws attention to the use of "grex,r--rnv.44 of ~satire. 
However, there is surely no suggestion that Stertinius is being 
irreverent towards Chrysippus and the Greek Stoics. Also 
"grex" need not have a pejorative sensei indeed, it may be used 
in a aood or laudatory sense. e.a. Cicero Att. 1.18.1: Drat. 
1.10.42.. ~. ~ . 
47 P.17S. 
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The root of Rudd's error lies in the sentence, "Clearly we are 
meant to suppose that after his conversion he is in some sense 
wiser than before." The fact is that there are no gradations of 
wisdom, so far as the doctrinaire Stoic is concerned. All men are 
equally fools until such time as they achieve wisdom although the 
nature of their individual insanities may differ. The exclusive 
nature of wisdom (and the wise) parallels exactly the exclusive 
nature of virtue (and the virtuous) .48 The only sense, in which 
Damasippus may be thought of as being wiser after his conversion, 
is that now he recognises the extent of his ignorance. Such was 
the "wisdom" of socrates. 49 However, as far as the Stoics them-
selves were concerned, Damasippus was essentially no wiser after 
the conversion than he had been before. Therefore, Damasippus, 
who is by no means a sapiens,50 is being precise when he says to 
Horace, insanis et tu ... , at v.32. There is no ambiguity about 
his condition. Similarly, the description of the weapons furnished 
for Damasippus by Stertinius betrays no "lack of certainty"; he 
knows that he is insane and takes comfort in the fact that he 
shares this fate with virtually all mankind. It is in fact, the 
exploitation of this particular aspect of Stoic belief by 
Stertinius that persuades Damasippus to give up the idea of 
suicide. Clearly Damasippus found the arguments of stertinius 
convincing and accepted his own insanity as part of the common lot 
48 For a statement of this doctrine see Cicero, Fin. 3.48, "ut 
enim qui demersi sunt in aqua, nihilo magis respirare possunt, 
si non longe absunt a summo, ut iam iamque possunt emergere, 
quam si etiamtum in profundo; nec catulus ille, qui iam 
appropinquat, ut videat, plus cernit, quam is qui modo est 
natus: item qui processit aliquantum ad virtutis habitum 
nihilo minus in miseria est quam ille qui nihil processit; 
cf. n.56,pp.l8fA 
49 E.g. Plato, AEolo~ 21. 
50 This, despite the fact that s scere barbam (v.35). 
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of humanity. The gibe insane at v.326 loses none of its force, 
as Rudd would have it; for Horace is calling into question the 
validity of the paradox, upon which the whole diatribe has been 
based, by declaring in the final verse of the poem, as fact which 
allows Damasippus no right of reply, that there are degrees of 
insanity: 
326 a maior tandem parcas, insane, minori! 
The comparatives at both the beginning and the end of the line 
show how emphatically Horace scorns the idea of the equality of 
the intellect of all men. He has, after. all, been at pains to 
h th t D ' " 11' h f h' 51 d s ow a amas1ppus 1nte ect 1S no matc or 1S own. An 
Horace is not making a joke out of the fact that Damasippus is 
still a fool and insane despite his conversion to Stoicism. Both 
Damasippus and Stertinius, as Horace well realised, were Stoic 
"probationers ll and thus equally and, what is more important, quite 
unashamedly fools and insane. 52 
It may be thought strange that the Stoic Stertinius takes 
trouble to dissuade Damasippus from suicide when the rationalis 
excessus e vi was, as it were, a notorious part of the Stoic 
ethical doctrine. However, Stoic suicide did not become fashion-
able at Rome until well into the empire when the Stoicising 
republican opposition frequently exploited this means of anticip-
ating imperial displeasure,53 although, during the civil wars, 
51 This is surely the point of Horace's description of Damasippus' 
attitude towards both himself and his poetic efforts and his 
equally insensitive use of language and lack of common tact 
when talking of his master. 
52 The sapiens was such a rarity that no shame attached to. the 
status of insipiens; on the rarity of the sapiens see e.g. 
Seneca, De Trane An. 7.4 (quoted at n.37, p.37 above). Perhaps 
because he thought himself farther along the road to wisdom 
than many other fools, Seneca carefully distinguishes between 
different kinds of ficiens at istulae Morales 75.8. 
53 Notables among the "stoic" suicides in the reign of Nero, for 
example, were tne otoic poet Lucan, Thrasea Paetus, Helvidius 
Priscus, Seneca and, of course, C. Calpurnius piso. 
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Cato had set the exemplum at utica in 46 B.C. 54 In fact, it 
was only in certain circumstances and for certain people that the 
Stoics recommended suicide as a viable and justifiable alternative 
to life. There is also the suggestion in th~ primary sources that 
it is never fitting for a fool to commit suicide. The fool never 
has that wisdom and knowledge which is necessary before a correct 
estimation of the balance of advantages and disadvantages within 
his life at any given time and under any given circumstances can 
be made. Also, the future consequences of any given situation, as 
well as its immediate consequences and circumstances, are unclear 
to the man who has not achieved wisdom. Only the man who has 
achieved wisdom, a wisdom which informs all his actions with a 
full awareness of their present and future consequences can 
legitimately take his own life. Thus Damasippus, who is a fool 
and quite incapable of completely understanding his fate, is in 
no position to take his own life, if, as Stertinius suggests, a 
major part of his motive for suicide is a misplaced sense of shame 
(pudor ... malus, v.39) inspired by the fear of being considered 
a fool by others who are equally foolish and insane, but whose 
insanity and foolishness is different in kind. 55 This should 
finally clear the air of the supposed problem surrounding the 
54 Lucan's treatment of Cato Uticensis in the poem Pharsalia 
shows how Cato became an inspiration to the "republicans" a 
century after his death, e.g. "victrix causa deis placuit, 
sed victa Catoni", Ph. 1.128: cf. Cato's awareness of the 
logos within in Bk.9;" 566-584,when he feels no necessity to 
consult the oracle of Ammon. 
55 For a full discussion of the question of Stoic suicide see 
J.M. Rist, Stoic Philosophy (Cambridge, 1969) ch.13; in the 
primary sources the illegitimacy of a fool's suicide is best 
described by Cicero, Fin. 3.60-61, but see also Stobaeus, 
Ecl. p.226 and Plutarch, De S·toic.Repugn. 14, p.1039E. 'l'he 
more "relaxed" attitude towards suicide in Jehe empire is shown 
by the frequent references to the topic in Seneca's works, e.g.: 
i) Epistulae Morales Nos. 24,30,54,70 and 71 (esp. 12-28). 
i i) Ad~rcIa'Iil19 - 2 5. . 
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"present condition" of Damasippus. 
It has been noted already that the paradox is mentioned 
twice in the proem, first by Damasippus and then by Stertinius. 
This repetition has not merely the formal function to which 
reference was made before. It increases our awareness of the 
uncertainty with which the very new convert grasps the doctrines 
of his school. Damasippus' statement of the paradox is provoked 
by the bland irony of Horace and as a consequence is brief and 
sharp, with more than a hint of a desire to puncture Horace's 
evident self-esteem: . 
32-32 "0 bone, ne te 
frustrere, insanis et tu stultique prope omnes ••• " 
The statement immediately lapses into a reference to its source, 
Damasippus' humility, when confronted with the authority and 
impressive character of that source - here the "docility" (docilis) 
of Damasippus is contrasted with Horace's assurance - and into a 
vague general commendation of the efficacy of Stertinius' 
teaching: 
33-34 "unde ego mira 
des,cripsi docilis praecepta haec I tempore quo me ••. " 
It is only when Damasippus comes to quote the actual advice of 
Stertinius, by means of which he was dissuaded from suicide, that 
there is enough authentic Stoic detail in the argument to suggest 
a proper awareness and understanding of the doctrine. Stertinius 
advises Damasippus not to do anything indignum, and we see 
immediately why and how the convert has latched onto this term 
as a catch phrase, a catch phrase with which he belabours Horace 
l'n 4 d 6 56 v. an v. . Stertinius' statement of the paradox also has 
an immediate and practical relevance to the situation in which he 
56 See pp.46ff. 
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finds Damasippus, whereas Damasippus is abusing the paradox by 
exploiting it in an attempt to cause Horace discomfiture. Indeed, 
within the fiction of the satire, one may believe that Damasippus' 
report of Stertinius' advice and of his wholG diatribe springs 
itself from a sense of shame at having thus abused the words of 
his master. Also the understanding apparent in Stertinius' 
formulation, as reported by Damasippus, suggests that Damasippus, 
as befits the neophyte, is much happier to report verbatim the 
words of his mentor than extemporise himself upon a Stoic theme. 
That Damasippus is indeed quoting Stertinius verbatim may also be 
understood from the formulaic manner in which the actual diatribe 
of Stertinius beg~ns at vv.46-48: 
nunc accipe, quare 
desipiant omnes aeque ac tu, qui tibi nomen 
insano posuere. 
With this one should compare also v.4l: 
.t: .......... ..-. __ _ 
J..Ul..t::l..Co". 
and v.77 and vv.80-8l: 
i) audire atque togam iubeo componere... (77) 
ii) huc propius me, 
dum doceo insanire omnis, vos ordine adite. 
D 
THE DIATRIBE OF STERTINIUS, VV.46-295 
(80-81) 
Paradoxically it is more difficult to assess the Stoic 
influence on a poem, which has, as its confessed topic, one of 
the paradoxes of the Stoics, than it is to assess the incidental 
stoic influence on what one may describe as the more secular 
poems of Horace. Stoic references in the vocabulary of the diatribe 
of Stertinius ha\Te already been collected and cornm.ented 
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upon. This, therefore, will not be my prime concern, although 
comment of that kind will be necessary from time to ·time, especi-
ally when examination is made of the Horatian wit which is evident 
in the presentation of the diatribe. For it is with the form and 
manner of presentation of this diatribe of Stertinius that I shall 
most be concerned. I shall attempt to show to what extent the 
diatribe of Stertinius, as presented by Horace in Satires 2.3, 
follows the accepted form and traditional pattern of the diatribe. 
The nature and origins of the diatribe are described by A.G. Lee 
in the introduction to his commentary upon the Paradoxa Stoicorum 
of Cicero; of most interest to us are his comments upon the style 
of the diatribes: 
In 
They display a lively and vigorous style in which humour 
is mingled with seriousness (anouoaLoY£AoLOV) i objections 
are raised by a supposed opponent; anecdotes, pictures 
from everyday life, examples from fable, mythology, and 
history, are introduced. Full use is made of the resources -
of rhetoric •.. Later the diatribe exercised a strong 
influence on Roman satire, and Horace refers to his 
writings in this style as 'talks in the manner of Bion', 
Bionei sermones (Epist. 2.2.60) .58 
fact, this style of discourse, a hybrid, born of the parents 
dialogue and rhetoric, was not only used by its originators the 
Cynics. 59 It was also exploited by anyone who found it useful 
for whatever purpose. Among such exponents we may include Horace 
and Cicero in the Satires, Epistles and in the Paradoxa Stoicorum 
also, even from the time of Chrysippus, the diatribe and its 
57 Lejay, pp.356-390, passim. 
58 A.G. Lee, M. Tulli Ciceronis Paradoxa Stoicorum (London, 
1953) p. 
59 See Heinze, De Horatio Bionis imitatore (Bonn, 1889) and also 
Teletis f"_eliquiae f ed.O. Hense (2nd ed., 1909) i ref. is 
made to these works by Fraenkel, p.92f. in his discussion of 
Horace, Satires 1,1. 
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techniques were employed by the stoics, as is made clear in the 
following extract from a letter of Fronto to the Stoic emperor 
Marcus Aurelius: 
attende quid cupiat ipse Chrysippus. num contentus est 
docere, rem ostendere, definire, explanare? non est 
contentus: verum auget in quantum potest, exaggerat, 
praemunit, iterat, differt, recurrit, interrogat, 
describit, dividit, personas fingit, orationem suam 
alii accommodat: ~aG~a 0' £a~tv aU~ELvf oLaaxEua~ELv, 
£~Epya~8a0aLf naALv AEYELV, £nava~EpELvf napan~ELv, 
~ 60 
npoawnonOLELV. 
A detailed examination of the diatribe of Stertinius/ 
Horace in this poem along lines of enquiry suggested both by 
Lee's comments and those of Fronto, will be useful in establishing 
Horace's intentions which gave birth to a poem of such ambitious 
length. such an examination should also indicate Horace's 
attitude to the Stoa and the ideas which he allows Stertinius to 
express. 
The method of this examination will be as follows: 
a) identification of devices listed by Fronto and Lee, 
b) description of these devices, and 
c) discussion of their functions in their immediate 
contexts. 
This discussion will proceed section by section within 
the poem, taking as its model for the poem's structure the formal 
analysis of Lejay (p.356). Finally the questions will be put 
regarding: 
i) the relationship between this poem and the diatribe 
form, 
ii) Horace's li!erary purposes in writing this poem in 
this way, 
60 Fronto, Ep. ad M. Ant. De Eloqu. 1.146; it may be of interest 
to draw a ttc.ntion here to Cicero IS COITlmen ts upon and descr-
iptions of the distinctions drawn between dialectic and rhetoric, 
this in ~ 32.113-115; cf. also Seneca, Epist. 89.17. 
iii) the manner in which Stoic ethical concepts are 
exploited by Horace to serve his satiric purpose. 
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For convenience of discussion the particular devices 
which are to be sought out and studied are capable of being 




the use of fictional or near-fictional mouthpieces, 
exemp1a drawn from life, myth and history, 
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other rhetorical devices listed by Fronto. 
By "the use of fictional or near-fictional mouthpieces" 
one should understand both those major figures who are introduced 
to people the dialogue form, which is adopted and adapted by 
Horace for the overall shape of the satire, namely Damasippus and 
Stertinius, and also the minor and anonymous objectors and inter-
locutors with whom Horace contrives that Stertinius peoples his 
address to Damasippus. The question why Horace should choose 
Damasippus and Stertinius a~ his two major figures, apart from 
himself, must await, however, the completion of the detailed work 
upon the different sections of the poem. The function performed 
by the anonymous interlocutors of Stertinius will be of more 
immediate concern, as will that of the various exemp1a by means 
of which, along with repetition, 6vo~aa~t UW~~6ECV, and 
exaggeration and anticipatory preparation,62 Stertinius achieves 
61 Of these devices most are different means of accomplishing 
that au~naLs which Fronto declares was considered desirable 
by Chrysippus (see above p.67f.), while the term 
npoaumonoLECv will be discussed naturally under "the use of 
fictional or non-fic·tiona1 mouthpieces." For a brief, but 
useful, discussion of Stoic rhetorical theory see Arnold, pp. 
148-150, where special note is made (p.149) of the stoic 
predilection for II neatness" or ucnaauEun, which is also 
considered desirable by Fronto. 
62 This is my rather tautological translation of the term 
praemunitio or nponapaauEun; for a discussion of the term see 
Cicero, De Oratore 2.75.304; 3.53.204; also Quinti1ian, 
9.2.17. 
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the necessary au~nOLs of his theme. 
DISCUSSION OF VV.48-76 
Even as vv.31-46 formed the proem to the diatribe of 
Stertinius and also linked the introductory conversation between 
Horace and Damasippus with Stertinius' address, so also vv.48-76 
form Stertinius' own introduction63 to his address which expounds 
and amplifies the theme of -the Stoic paradox OTLTIa.s acppwv llaLVETaL. 
Stertinius opens nis address with an analogy (48-51) 
which is drawn, as it were, from the idea of straying from the 
"strait and narrow path,,;64 whichever wrong direction is chosen 
by different people, their choices are equally wrong. The moral 
of the analogy is drawn in a manner which demonstrates the vivid-
f b · 1 . 65 ness 0 prover la expressl0n: 
51-53 hoc te 
crede modo insanum. nihilo ut sapientior ille! 
qui te deridet, caudam trahat. 
The vividness of the expression ~ay also be considered to be an 
66 
example of the use of OTIOUOaLoY8AoLOV, since the seriousness of 
63 It will also be interesting to see whether Stertinius'diatribe 
is at all compatible with the fourfold Stoic division of the 
typical rhetorical exercise, described by Diogenes Laertius 
at Bk. 7.42, TOU os OnTOpLUOU AOYOU EC s TE TO TIPOOLllLOV uat . 
ELs TnV OLnynOLV uat TU TIPOs TODs aVTLOCuOUs uat TOV ETILAOYOV. 
64 Cf. for the image, "unde queas alios passim •.• vividere/errare 
atque viam parantes quaerere vitae", Lucretius, 2.9-10. That 
the Stoics had an interest in the "parting of the ways" is 
also suggested by the story concerning their hero Herakles 
which is recorded at Xenophon, Memorabilia 2.21-34. 
65 The best examples of this kind of vivid proverbial expression 
(outside the comedies of Plautus) are to be found in the 
Satyricon of Petronius, e.g. "heu heu, quotidie peius. haec 
colonia retroversus crescit tanquam coda vituli", 44. One 
could argue that such farmyard analogies were a legacy of 
Rome IS agricul-tural background. 
66 For a recent discussion of spoudaiogeloion see L. Giangrande, 
The Use of _ Spoudaiogeloion in Greek and Roman Li tera-ture (The 
Hague, 1972) esp. pp.105-l09. 
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the meaning is no bar to lively or flippant expression; indeed 
the lively expression renders the meaning more memorable and the 
moral advice, which is rendered in this way, may be thought of 
as causing less offence. 
The following lines (53-59) give particular examples of 
the different kinds of insanity implied by the analogy of vv. 
48-51. It is shown, in this direct expansion and illustration of 
the analogy, that men who suffer from very different kinds of 
insanity are very clearly insane nevertheless, and equally so. 
The advice of their loved ones has no effect upon their lunatic 
behaviour (57-59) .67 The direct command of v.59, voiced, as it 
were collectively, by the madman's beloved ones, again adds vivid-
ness to the picture. The effect of this unheeded request is 
likened to that of the audience striving to awaken the hapless 
and drunken Fufius (60-62). Here, Horace with an illustration 
from everyday life in Rome, assuming that the theatre can be so 
described, again lightens the tone by means of spoudaiogeloion; 
he also achieves a smile by means of 6vo~aaTt XW~~6ELV at the 
expense of Fufius. The effect of the argument is by no means 
weakened by what may be termed as "window dressing". The audience 
is intended to remember the joke and, by association, the moral of 
the passage in question. The moral is, indeed, underlined itself 
once again at vv.62-63, which repeat the message of both vv. 
51-53 and v.47 and v.32. However, by the time this is repeated 
at vv.62-63 it has been strengthened precisely in the ways in 
which we may have expected, following the comments of Fronto. The 
67 Although it is not strictly relevant to this discussion, I 
feel that v.57 should be punctuated with a con~a at the end 
of the line after "amicallj there is a pleasant irony in thus 
balancing "amica" at the beginning of the sentence with 
"uxor ll at the end. 
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following analysis displays this more succinctly: 
a) 48-51 an extended analogy Ena,va,cpEpEI.V 
b) 53 vivid proverbial image anouoa,l.oyEAOI.OV 
c) 53-59 i) example8 
ii) the vivid warning II 
d) 60-62 comic aside and example na,pan~EI.V, anou6a.l.oyEAOI.O~ 
6vo~a.a~t uw~~6ELv 
e) 62-63 repetition of message naAI.V AEYEI.V 
This kind of schematisation can be continued to the end of this 
introduction to the diatribe: 
f) 64-70 the examples of Damasippus 6vo~a,a~t UW~~6ELV 
and Nerius exaggeratio 
g) 71-74 a mythological allusion 
h) 75-76 the example of Perellius - 6vo~a,a~1. uw~w6ELv 
Here it may be seen that the repetition of the moral 
at vv.62-63 acted as a bridge from the general and anonymous 
illustrations of the theme in vv.48-59 to the specific connection 
of the theme with the object of Stertinius' present attention, 
namely Damasippus. This specific mention of Damasippus enables, 
even necessitates, the introduction of another pair of proper 
names, Nerius and Perellius, allowing Horace further opportunity 
for 6vo~a,a~t UW~~6ELV as he draws his examples from the everyday 
life of Rome. The passage is further made more memorable by the 
allusion to Proteus and the metamorphoses which Nerius, Proteus-
like, will undergo as he attempts to escape from the clutches of 
Damasippus. It is also evident that Horace indulges in hyper-
bole: 
69-73 scribe decem a Nerio; non est satis: adde Cicutae 
nodosi tabulas centum, mille adde catenas: 
effugiet tamen haec sceleratus vincula Proteus. 
cum rapies in ius malis ridentem alienis; 
I 
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fiet aper, modo avis, modo saxum et cum volet arbor. 
As one might by now expect the major theme is repeated in vv.74-
76, rounding off the introduction and also anticipating the 
discussions of the various specific types of insanity, with which 
the remainder of the diatribe is concerned. It is also noteworthy 
that the examples which have been employed by Stertinius have been 
concerned from v.64 with finance and with avarice. This is, of 
course, related to the ultimate cause of Damasippus' at)cempt at 
suicide. It is also, however, a clear demonstration of how the 
man delivering the diatribe or writing the satire praemunit or 
"sets up" and anticipates the argument to follow. For that group 
of insane which is first invoked to pay heed to the wisdom of the 
Stoa are those who: 
78 argenti pallet amore •.• 
However, the attack upon the avaricious is not made until the 
structure of the remainder of the satire is anticipated by vv. 
77-81, of which the clause quoted immediately above is but a 
single part. This section which is programmatic in its intention 
and openly didactic in-tone is worth printing in full: 
77-81 audire atque togam iubeo componere quisquis 
ambitione mala aut argenti pallet amore, 
quisquis luxuria tristive superstitione 
aut alio mentis morbo calet; huc prop ius me, 
dum doceo insanire omnis, vos ordine adite. 68 
This invocation to the audience or reader has an impress-
ive or a pompous ring to it, depending upon whether we interpret 
Horace to be satirising the self-esteem of Stertinius at this 
stage or intending us to give serious thought to the merits of 
68 For the overt demand upon the readers' attention, cf. Sat. 
1.2.37; for the treatment of insanity and vice as types-of 
illness see above, PP.53ff. 
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what he is about to write, despite the rather odd choice of 
mouthpiece. Is it art or lack of it that causes the reader to 
forget that Stertinius. is speaking, as the diatribe progresses, 
until Damasippus' account is interrupted by Horace speaking £ropria 
persona? At this stage no positive answer can be given. 
THE ATTACK ON AVARICE VV.82-167 69 
The uses and abuses to which wealth can be put and the 
diverse effects which wealth can have upon individuals are described 
in this section of the poem. However, the aim is not so much to 
attack wealth itself, which was considered by the Stoics to belong 
to the class of things "indifferent",70 but to indicate by every 
means possible, to suggest to the intuition, that extremes of 
behaviour in any direction must be classified as types of insanity, 
whether, in this instance, the person responsible for that 
behaviour is miser or spendthrift. It may be noted here that the 
extremism of the ethics of the Stoics is admirably suited to the 
satirist's purpose; for the satirist, to be effective, cannot 
pose as a moderate, but must attack all examples of human folly 
with equal trenchancy and give the impression that the human race 
is universally foolish. This seems to be the clue to a proper 
understanding of Horace's use of the mask ofStertinius in this 
poem. Also the devices of the diatribe provide a lively means of 
preseriting the case for the universal insanity of mankind. As 
will become evident, the devices used to enliven the discussions 
69 It will be seen from the discussion below that the miniature 
drama surrounding the death of Servius Oppidius at vv.168-186 
is taken as a bridge between the attack upon avaritia and 
that upon ambitio. 
70 On things "indifferent" see above, Chap.l, n.25. 
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of avarice and ambition and also of superstition and luxury are 
those already mentioned as belonging to the stock-in-trade of 
the composer of diatribes and which made their presence felt in 
the proem to Stertir.ius' sermon. 
After the programmatic invocation of vv.77-8l, Stertin-
ius declares that, of all fools and criminals, the avaricious are 
in the majority by far. However, Stertinius chooses to make this 
\ 
declaration in a rather roundabout manner: 
82-83 danda est ellebori multo pars maxima avaris, 
nescio an Anticyram ratio illis destinet omnem. 
Why should Horace have chosen this particular form of expression 
for Stertinius, if not to remind us, by the use of the word 
ratio, of Stertinius' Stoic beliefs. This is the first quasi-
technical word which has appeared, since the introduction of 
Chrysippus by name at v.44, coupled with the statement of the 
71 paradox in vv.4S-48. Further, the central position of ratio in 
v.83 gives it a prominence which is unusual if no particular 
attention should be paid to it, especially when it is a term which 
does have significant Stoic connotations. It is also true that 
the meaning of ratio in the sense of IImeasure" or IIproportion,,72 
is especially relevant here, when Horace is talking of the 
prescribed dose of medicine to which the chronicly avaricious 
should be condemned. Therefore, Rudd's translation, " ... they 
ought, in fact, to receive all Anticyra's output", is essentially 
71 The use of these terms earlier 
of prefiguring or praemunitioi 
Damasippus is thus established 
stated. 
in the poem are also examples 
for the Stoic nature of 
or implied before being openly 
72 This is one of the major meanings of A6yos in what is recov-
erable of the writings of Heraclitus, e.g.: nupos TponaL· 
npC'nov ,saAaooa, ,saAaoOns O£ TO ]J,£v n]J,LOU yfj TO O£ nlJ,LOU 
npnOTnp ... yfj ,saAaooa OLaX€ETal., H.aL ]J,ETP€ETaL J?LG 1"OV 
aUTOV A6yov. Fr.3l Clem. Strom. 5.104.3. 
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inadequate,73 while Lejay, although closer than this with his, 
IIje ne sais s'il ne serait pas logique de leur reserver ••. 11 ,74 
also fails to capture the brilliant ambiguity of the Horatian 
phrase. Although it may, in fact, be impossible to recapture this 
ambiguity in a language other than latin, mention of its presence 
ought to be made. Furthermore, if, as seems likely, the Stoic 
element of the poem is being reinforced consciously by Horace at 
this stage, one would expect the first exemplum of avarice to be 
discussed in a particularly Stoic fashion. We could then recognise 
the advance use of ratio at v.83 as another example of Horace's 
praemunitio. 75 Examination of the exemplum of Staberius in vv. 
84-99 confirms that this is the case. However, the Stoic element 
within the story of Staberius is introduced with consummate skill 
by Horace. For, it is within the mouth of Staberius himself, who 
is the object of the satirical intentions of the passage, that 
we find language which is most reminiscent of that of the Stoics. 
While it is true that the words summam (v.84), prudentem animum 
76 (v.89) playa role similar to that of ratio in v.83, the most 
startlingly Stoic language is that which Stertinius places 
directly into the mouth of Staberius, e.g.: 
87-88 "sive ego prave 
73 Rudd, The Satires of Horace & Persius, p.85. 
74 Lejay, note ad loc.; Palmer's "a just view" is perhaps as 
adequate a translation of ratio as is possible in this context, 
although Palmer's note gives no justification for this 
version. 
75 The advance characterisation of Damasippus as a Stoic was 
accomplished in a similar manner by the exploitation of 
consciously ambiguous terms within the initial section of the 
poem; see below pp.44-55. 
76 Cf. n.71, p. 74: summam is reminiscent of the summum bonum, 
prudentem animum of one of the Stoic cardinal virtues -
pruden·tia or ~perantia. 
76 
seu recte hoc volui, ne sis patruus mihi.,,77 
and which expresses the thoughts of Staberius on the value of money 
and its supreme importance, as reported by Stertinius. These 
thoughts are collect2d and presented by Stertinius as follows: 
91-99 quoad vixit credidit ingens 
pauperiem vitium et cavit nihil acrius, ut, si 
forte minus locuples uno quadrante perisset, 
ipse videretur sibi nequior: omnis enim res, 
virtus, fama, decus, divina humanaque pulchris 
divitiis parent; quas qui construxerit ille 
clarus erit, fortis, iustus. "sapiensne?" etiami et rex, 
et quidquid volet. hoc vel uti virtute' paratum 
speravit magnae laudi fore. 
This passage is at once a statement and an explanation; vv.91-94, 
as far as nequior, give a statement of that "philosophy" by which 
Staberius lived his life. The statement of the philosophy 
explains the peculiar nature of the codicil which caused Staberius
' 
heirs such distress. However, vv.94-99 explain in detail the 
status granted to wealth by Staberius in his life. Wealth was 
the sine qua non of precisely those aspects of human existence, 
the existence of which depended, according to the Stoics, on the 
possession of the true and unique summum bonum, that peculiarly 
Stoic amalgam of virtue and wisdom. Thus with fine irony the Stoic 
Stertinius is made to demonstrate by Horace the "poverty" of that 
man, who believes, in company with Plato's oligarchs, that the 
true criterion of excellence is wealth. That Staberius is shown 
as talking in a parody of the stoic manner is finally made certain 
77 On the Stoic ring of this quota-tion see e. g. Stobaeus, Ec1. 
2.100.15, TnV 6E apETnv TIOAAOLs ovol-taat. TIpOaayopEuouat.v • 
. AyafJov TE yap AE:youat.v auniv, OTt. CiYEt. nlJii s ETIt TOV opfJov 
~LOV; also, in the context of the behaviour of the sapiens, 
see Stobaeus, Ec1. 2.66.14, •.. TOV aUTov TPOTIOV TIav"~j E~ 
TIOt.ELV TOV ~p6VL~OV, uat 000. TIOt.EL uat ou ~a ~La uat a ~n 
TIOLEL. TQ yap UaTa AOYOV opfJov ETIt.TEAELV TIaVTa uat oLOV uaT' 
apE "nlv • 
77 
by Stertinius when, acting as his own interlocutor, he slips in 
the word sapiensne at v.97. IIStaberius" immediately answers in 
the affirmative, declaring, indeed, that the dives is rex et 
guidquid volet, (97-98). In fact, the dives is given precisely 
the same attributes, in large measure, as the Stoic sapiens. This 
statement can be readily docurnen'ted. The dives is considered ·to 
be virtuous, just, courageous and brave. That is to say, he 
possesses the four cardinal virtues, which are the attributes of 
the Stoic who has achieved the summum bonum. 78 As a consequence 
of this, according to Staberius, he can do whatever he chooses; 
he alone is free, which is the claim made for the Stoic sapie~ 
also, nowhere perhaps more clearly or eloquently than at Horace 
Satires 2.7.83-88: 
quisnam igitur liber? sapiens sibi qui imperiosus, 
quem neque pauperies neque mors neque vincula terrent, 
responsare cupidinibus, contemnere honores 
fortis, et in se ipso totus, teres, atque rotundus, 
externi ne quid valeat per leve morari, 
in quem manca ruit semper fortuna. 
The dives, of course, is insanely afraid of poverty, as Stertinius 
is at pains to point outi however, the rich man, according to 
Staberius has also the par·ticular attributes of what Stertinius 
would describe as the attributes of wisdom. Particular mention 
is made both of his power over things human and divine and also 
his regal stature. Compare these statements with the following 
passages: 
a) ~6vov youv TOV ao~ov ot ~~A6ao~o~ Saa~AEa, 
VO~03ETnV, aTpaTny6v, 6Gua~ov, oa~ov, 3EO~~An Unp6TToua~v. 
Clement, Strom. 2.420 
78 For a full discussion of the cardinal virtues, see R.P. Bond, 
IIAeneas and the Cardinal virtues" Prudentia (University of 
Auckland) Vo1.6, no.2, 1974, pp.6 -
b) 06 ~6vov bE £ASU&8pOUG SrvaL LODG ao~ouG, 
aAAu uat BaaLAsaG, LnG SaaLASLaG OUanG aPXnG 
avunsu&uvou, nLLG nspt ~6voUG av LODG ao~ouG 
auaLaLn, ua&a ~naL XPUaLnnoG. 
Diogenes Laertius, 7.122 79 
78 
This should adequately show that Staberius' praise of wealth and 
the wealthy is modelled upon Stoic praise of wisdom and the wise. 80 
The ridiculousness of Staberius' position is thereby vividly 
shown, if one accepts the validity of the statements of the Stoics 
on the supremacy of wisdom, as the criterion of excellence, and 
on the status of the sapiens, as the paragon of virtue. That the 
majority of mankind do not accept the validity of , the Stoics' 
claims is "proof"·of their insanity, especially as, Stertinius 
points out, the vast majority of mankind are subject to that same 
desire for wealth, which bedevilled the life of Staberius. Despite 
, . 
his "philosophising" Staberius the miser is insane, but so also 
is the man whose actions point to the opposite extreme. This 
extreme is very briefly indicated by the picture of the Greek 
Aristippus (vv.99-102), while the point of the comparison is made 
by the question at the close of v.102, uter est insanior horum? 
Horace recognises that, in Stoic terms, it is impossible to give 
a satisfactory answer to this question. Both Staberius and the 
Greek are equally insane. This admission at v.103 performs the 
transition from one set of exempla, which may loosely be described 
as "historical", with great neatness to another set, the anonymous 
characters of which are drawn from the satirist's observation of 
79 For further discussion of the "sapiens" see below pp.166ff.in 
the context of Satires 2.7 and also the passages collected 
in S,V.F. 3, pp.146-170. For an illuminating study of the 
whole concept of the "sapiens" see Edelstein, The Mean of 
Stoicism (Cambridge, Mass. 1966). 
80 The comic inversion is noted by Palmer in his commentary, 
but no extensive demonstration is made. 
79 
everyday life. 
The "development of the argument in this passage (vv. 
104-128) is a trifle contorted, but consciously so, since this 
enables Stertinius to make his Stoic point in vv.120-121 the more 
vividly napa npoaooxLav. The argument breaks down as follows: 
a) vv.l04-108 Any man who hoards articles for which he has 
no use is insane. 
b) vv.l08-110 Presumably the man who merely hoards money 
is similarly insane. 
c) vv.111-119 In fact, the typical miser hoards all 
manifestations of his wealth. 
BUT 
d) vv.120-121 The majority of men do not find this insane; 
they are afflicted with the same disease. 
e) vv.122-128 Men hoard despite the fact that they cannot 
take their wealth with them. 
120-121 
The napa npoaooxLav of: 
nimirum ins anus paucis videatur, eo quod 
maxima pars hominum morbo iactatur eodem. 
is the more striking because of the common-sense arguments, and 
commonplace context of those arguments, to which it gives such 
an unexpected close, although the reader should have been fore-
warned by vv.82-83, as the verbal echoes indicate. In a sense, 
the reader's attention is distracted, or his intellectual guard 
lowered, both by the obvious acceptability of what Stertinius is 
saying in his description of the miser, and also by the vividness 
of the detail of that description. Therefore, the paradoxical 
nature of the couplet immediately quoted drags the reader from the 
state of false security, into which he has been lulled, and 
within which, presumably, he has been in complete agreement with 
the speaker, when he finds himself, as s hominum (121) under· 
80 
critical fire. 
This advantage is exploited in a similarly dishonest 
manner in vv.122-128, where, instead of producing a piece of direct 
mora1ising, which would not have been out of place, Stertinius 
launches another attack upon the reader. On this occasion the 
weapon is irony; for Stertinius appeals to the selfishness of 
the miser with the question: 
122-123 filius aut etiam haec 1ibertus ut ebibat heres, 
dis inimice senex, custodis. 81 
Any latent feelings of guilt, that such a question can provoke, 
are further exploited by: 
126-128 quare, 
si quidvis satis est, periuras, surripis, aufers 
undique? tun sanus? 
Far from promoting a feeling of self-satisfaction in his listener, 
as was initially suggested by the invitation to share in the scorn 
felt at the clearly insane of vv.104-119, the satirist has now 
identified the listeners with the victims of avarice to such an 
extent that he charges them too with insanity. Once again this 
reversal has not been achieved merely by the direct exposition of 
Stoic ethics, but by presuming that the listener (or reader) is 
well aware of the tenets of Stoic ethics and then, either present-
ing them by implication from an unexpected quarter, such as 
Staberius, or not presenting them at all, as is done in vv.122-128. 
The trap that awaits the "intelligent" listener in verses 122-128 
is baited by the reminder of the Stoic ambience of the poem in 
vv.120-121 and ·then sprung by the openly critical statement 
encapsulated in vv.126-128. That Stertinius (or Horace) does 
make the assumption throughout that the reader is well versed in 
81 Cf. Horace, Odes 2.3.20 and 2~14.25. 
81 
the basics of Stoic philosophy is made particularly clear from 
the fact that it is not wealth itself which is attacked in this 
part of the poem, but the various abuses of wealth, which are 
possible, and the effect its possession has upon those unfitted 
for that responsibility. 
So far as the Stoics were concerned, wealth in itself was 
neither good nor bad; indeed it could not be, 'if there was only 
one bonum and only one malum. The Stoic position regarding wealth 
is best understood by reference to the following passages: 
a) 1:'WV 08 QV't'0N (j)aot 1:'0. ll8V ayaoo e:rvat-, 1:'0. 08 H.aH.a, 1:'0. 
080UOE1:'Epa .•.. OUOE1:'Epa OE ooa lln1:'E W(j)EAEL lln1:'E 
SAan1:'Et-" orov ~oon, 6YLEt-a, ~oov~, H.aAAoG, tOXUG, 
TIAo{hoG •.• 
Diogenes Laertius, 7.102 
b) ot-xwG DE AEYEo3at- aot-a(j)opa" ana~ ll8V 1:'0. lln1:'E TIpoG 
Euoat-llovLav lln1:'E TIPoG H.aH.Ooat-llovtav OUVEpyoUV1:'a, wG 
EXEt- TIAOU1:'OG, 06~a •.• H.at 1:'0. ollot-a. 
Diogenes Laertius, 7.104 
Being of the status of an "indifferent" therefore wealth cannot 
properly, in strict Stoic belief, materially affect a person's 
happiness for better or worse, since that happiness depended up6n 
the acquisition of the true, unique summum bonum, which was virtue. 
However, although an "indifferent", wealth was, nevertheless, a 
thing TIPonYllEvov, rather than aTIonpOnYllEVOV and the possession of 
wealth could have "good" effects, if that possession were 
properly used: 
c) a~Cav 08 1:'nV llEV 1:'LVa AEYOUOt- OUllSAnOt-V npos1:'ov 
OllOAOYOUllEVOV SLOV, n1:'LG E01:'t nEpt ndv aya36v, 1:'nV 08 
ErvaL gEonv 1:'LVa DuvagLv n xpELav oUllSaAAollEVnv npoG 
1:'OV H.a1:'a (j)uot-v SLov, o~ot-ov ELnELV nv 1:'t-va npoo(j)EpE1:'aL 
TIpoG 1:'OV Ha1:'o. (j)uot-v SLov nAou~ 'n 6yLELa. 
Diogenes Laertius, 7.105 
This concept of the putting of money to good use is especially 
82 
relevant in the context of the discussion of Horace's miser. 
Cicero gives expression to the same sentiment at De Finibus 3.56: 
haec quae praeposita dicimus, partim sunt per se 
ipsa praeposita, partim quod aliquid efficiunt, partim 
t d 1 ·· d ff' . t . 82 u rumque .... quo ex se a lqUl e lClant, u pecunla. 
Clearly Horace's skillfully produced and ironical attack upon the 
miser's abuse of wealth is firmly based on an understanding of 
the underlying Stoic doctrines. Equally clearly, the effect of 
the passage can only be appreciated fully, if the reader is himself 
, . f h d d' 83 ln possesslon 0 suc an un erstan lng. A further indication 
of Horace's skill at characterising his Stoic mouthpiece is given 
by the fact that part, at least, of Stertinius' objection to the 
behaviour of the miser mirrors the objection which Damasippus had 
initially made to the supposed literary desidia of Horace; the 
talents of both were being neglected. 84 
The direct moralising of vv.120-l28 concludes with the 
tun uter 
est insanior horum? at v.102; for both questions mark the end of 
a clearly defined section or sUb-section of the poem. After the 
question, on each occasion, the diatribe continues on a slightly 
different tack; after uter est insanior horum? we have the 
82 For reasons which may be readily grasped Seneca was often 
at pains to point out the value of wealth in its real terms, 
e.g. "divitias nego bonum esse; nam si essent, bonos 
facerent. ceterum et habendas esse et utiles et magna 
commoda vitae adferentis fateor", Dialogues 7.24.5; cf. ib. 
21. 4; also Ep. 94.5 esp. "nisi opinio-nes falsas, quibus 
laboramus, expuleris, nec avarus, quomodo pecunia utendum sit, 
exaudiet." This special pleading did not convince H.J. Rose, 
A Handbook of Latin Literature (Methuen, 1936) pp.359-360, 
which contains an~mazing attack upon Seneca. 
83 It is interesting to compare Cicero's treatment in the 
Paradoxa, 6, esp. 44, lIanimus hominis non arca appellari 
solet, quamvis ilIa sit plena; dum te inanem videbo, divitem 
non putabo." 
84 See above, pp.44ff. 
83 
illustrations of the miser, which tend towards the general attack 
on the different means by which the miser amasses money in vv. 
126-128, although he has no idea of how that money should properly 
be used. After tun sanus? the idea of the means by which money 
is gained leads to a discussion of murder and allows Horace, by 
mentioning the most famous matricide, Orestes, to further enliven 
his diatribe with this illustration drawn from myth. The sequence 
of thoughtis as follows: men will become thieves and will perjure 
themselves in order to increase their wealth, but without having 
any very clear idea of how to employ it to any, or the best, 
I 
advantage. Their sole concern is that their wealth should not 
be diminished. The consequencesof this attitude are ultimately 
absurd: even murder will only be condemned as an act of insanity, 
if it reduces the murderer's capital, that is, if the victims are 
slaves quos aere pararis (v.129). The murder of a wife or 
mother, on the other hand, by poison or hanging may, if it is 
committed for financial gain, still be classed as a crime, but 
it will not be accounted an act of insanity: 
131-132 cum laqueo uxorem interimis matremque veneno 
incolumi capite es. 
Take, for example, declares Horace, moving into his next exemplum, 
the way in which the majority treat the case of Orestes; apparently 
they assume that madness descended upon him only after he had 
committed matricide occisa insanisse arente (v.134), although 
after the matricide, which was as blatantly an insane act as is 
imaginable, his action was that of a man who was sane. The 
reason why the matricide is excused is that Orestes' motive was 
completely comprehensible in the context of the passage on murder 
immediately presented in vv.128-l32; the motive was not revenge 
for the death of Agamemnon; but, .in the eyes of Horace's/ 
84 
Stertinius' materialistic audience, the recovery of Orestes' 
birthright. A small irony is that the need for Orestes to recover 
the otxoswas no small part of his motivation, according, indeed, 
to each of the three Attic tragedians. It is also interesting 
that, in exploiting the potential of myth to enrich the fabric 
of the diatribe, Horace does so in a characteristically oblique 
manner by using the myth to attack the commonplace interpretation 
of it, and of the motives of those characters who people the myth. 
This is analogous to the manner in which he attacks the validity 
of the view that money is the criterion of excellence in vv.84-99; 
the attack there is oblique, because Staberius is allowed to 
condemn himself out of his own mouth, according to the account of 
Stertinius, by praising wealth in terms appropriate, so far as a 
Stoic was concerned, to the praise of wisdom. However, Horace's 
ironical use of the myth of Orestes is not as successful; the 
link between the motive for the murder of C1ytaemestra and the 
murder of the anonymous matrem of v.131 is not made sufficiently 
clear, while the particularly Stoic irony which underlines the 
comments and the folly of Staberius is here missing. 
The idea of death provides the continuity between the 
exemp1um of Orestes and the miniature comedy of Opimius in vv. 
142-157; no other link is provided and the resulting contrast 
between the dignity of a myth of such literary standing and the 
low comedy of the story of Opimius is most remarkable, if not 
memorable. For this is the designed effect within the context of 
the moral diatribe. The comedy of Opimius, apart from under-
lining the kinship between diseases of the body and diseases of 
the mind and so anticipating vv.161-167, adds little that is new 
to the mora1ising of the diatribe. However, the "punch line": 
157 quid refert morbo an furtis pereamque rapinis? 
85 
is so good that, by association, the moralising which follows 
also becomes memorable and Stertinius also rises in the estim-
ation of his audience. The moralising which follows is especially 
memorable, because the defences of the audience have been 
I 
demolished by their responding with laughter to the story of 
Opimius. Any hostility which may have been felt towards the Stoic 
identity of the speaker is temporarily removed in the universal 
solvent of a shared joke, and Stertinius is quick to take advantage 
of the opening provided by his nimble technique: 
158-160 "quisnam igitur sanus?" qui non stultus. "quid avarus?" 
stultus et insanus. "quid, si quis non sit avarus, 
continuo sanus?" minime. "cur, Stoice?" dicam. 85 
Stertinius hastens to destroy the impression, that may have been 
fostered by his long emphasis upon the insanity of avarice in all 
its forms, that avarice is the only type of insanity abroad. To 
do this, he repeats the analogy between mental and physical ill 
health with great vividness in vv.161~167. Thic repetition has 
been prepared for by the story of Opimius: however, perhaps more 
important than this example of prefiguring is the way in which 
Stertinius wrings full advantage from the final line of the story 
of Opimius. For, after the analogy of illness, and the repetition 
also of the periphrasis for insanity involving Anticyra (vv.165-
166, cf.83), which is in itself reminiscent of the programmatic 
introduction to the diatribe within the diatribe itself at vv. 
77-81, the closing line and one half of the direct moralising, 
85 As has been observed already by Palmer, n. ad loc/these 
sharp interjections and questions are typical of Stoic 
discourses. They help to vary the pace of the discourse and, 
indeed, Cicero compares them to marks of punctuation at 
Paradoxa Stoicorum 1, "Cato perfectus Stoicus minutis interrog-
atiunculis quasi punctis quod proposuit efficit." In this 
satire they mark the divisions between sections and sub-
sections with great neatness.-
86 
at this half way point in the poem, echo the purposefully memor-
able joke of v.157. Compare: 
a) 
b) 
quid refert morbo an furtis pereamque rapinis? 
quid enim differt, barathrone 
dones quidquid habes an numquam utare paratis? 
(157) 
(166-167) 
Horace is making the most expert use of repetition and anticipation, 
iterat and praemun~t; also the repetitions and anticipations are 
achieved, not merely by single words, but by phrases, sentiments 
and even syntactical formulae, as in the example recently 
demonstrated. 
This skill in repetition, which avoids the pitfall of 
monotony by the variations employed in the exploitation of the 
technique, is made particularly clear by the manner in which 
Horace manages the transition from the attack upon avaritia to 
that upon ambi tio and, with much concealed art, main-tains the 
continuity and conversational ease and eff~9tiveness of this 
lengthy satire. The miniature drama, which centres upon Servius 
Oppidius and his two sons, in vv.168-186 is ideally suited to this 
role of effecting the transition, since not only is the drama set 
at the deathbed of a wealthy man, as was the comedy of Opimius, 
but it is also concerned with the behaviour of the rich man's 
heirs. Further, the two heirs epitomise individually the two 
extremes of vice to which wealthy men are prone, and which have 
been the objects of Horace's attacks as examples of insanity. One 
son is by nature miserly, the other is a spendthrift: 
170-175 hoc moriens pueris dixisse vocatis 
ad 1ectum: 'postquam te talos, Aule, nucesque 
ferre sinu 1axo, donare et 1udere vidi, 
te, Tiberi, numerare, cavis abscondere tristem, 
extimui ne vos ageret vesania discors, 
tu Nomentanum, tu ne sequerere Cicutam. 
The fa'ther urges moderation on the two sons: 
176-178 quare per divos oratus uterque Penatis, 
tu cave ne minuas, tu ne maius facias id 
quod satis esse putat pater et natura coercet. 
87 
I have already mentioned the attractions which the Peripatetic 
86 
mean seems to have held for Horace; here, however, oppidius 
is merely giving vent to home-spun wisdom, although the concept 
implied by natura coercet (178) does have Stoic connotations coming 
f th th f S t " 87 rom e mou- 0 ter-lnlUS. 
However; the switch to the attack upon arnbitio is now 
effected, almost as an afterthought, through the advice of 
Oppidius to his sons. The advice is introduced by praeterea (179) 
and, as a literary device, this works extremely well within the 
context of the continuity of the poem. This is especially so, 
because a further unifying link is provided by the similarity of 
the drama of Servius Oppidius, not only to that of Opimius, as 
first exemplum in the attack upon avaritia. Both the story of 
" 
Opimius and Oppidius are "deathbed" scenes, but Oppidius shares 
with the dead Staberius a desire to impose his posthumous will 
upon his heirs. There is,of course, variety in the fact that 
Oppidius' motives are praiseworthy, while those of Staberius 
88 
were not. 
I believe that, by the easy transition from the attack 
86 See above, p. 7, esp. n.17. 
87 This is because of the guiding role attributed to divine 
nature by the Stoics both in physics and ethics: in ethics 
this attitude is summarised in the tag secundum naturam 
vivere as at Cicero, Fin. 5.9.26. 
88 It is interesting to compare the anecdote concerning Oppidius' 
advice to his sons in vv.176-l78 with the story of the 
fortunes of the house of Cephal us and Polemarchus in Plato, 
Republic 330. 
88 
upon wealth, or avarice, to the attack upon ambitio as an abuse 
of wealth, Horace is indicating a deeper philosophical unity 
between these two sections of the poem, a unity which underpins 
the literary unity. The Stoics were extremely prone to categorise 
and systematise ethical concepts, both virtues and vices. A prime 
example of this tendency may be seen in their eager acceptance of 
h f 1 f f d · l' d d" 89 t e ormu ae 0 our car lna vlrtues an correspon lng Vlces, 
, 
and the subdivisions to which these virtues and vices, themselves 
subdivisions of the solum et summum bonum and the solum vitiq~, 
were themselves subjected. The following may be quoted as an 
example of this tendency to systematise: 
a) ~wv 0' apE~wv ~ab ~sv Erva~ npw~ab' ~ab os ~arb npw~aLb 
uno~E~ay~Evab. npw~ab os ~E~~apab Erva~ .... ~wv os 
uno~E~aY~Evwv ~arb apE~aLb ~au~aLb ~ab ~sv ~fj ~pOVnaE~ 
uno~E~ax5a~ .... ~fj ~EV ouv ~povnaE~ uno~a~iEa5aL 
SuSouALav, EUAoy~a~Lav, aYXLvoLav, VouvEx~av ... 
Stobaeus, Eclogae 2.104 
b) ava A6yov 08 xaC ~wv xax~wv ~db ~EV EIvaL npw~ab' ~db . 
0' uno ~au~ab' OLOV a~poauvnv ~EV xat oE~ALav xat 
a6~xLav xat axoAaaCav EV ~arb npw~a~b' axpaoLav os xat 
Spaouvo~av xat xaxoSouALav EV ~aLb uno ~au~ab' 
Diogenes Laertius, 7.93 
The fact that, so far as the Stoics were concerned, there was an 
essential unity in virtue 90 and an essential unity in vice helps 
to explain this desire to differentiate and categorise the 
different aspects of vice and virtue. However, if the stoics do 
recognise that all virtue is essentially related, to the point 
of forming a unity, and if the same applies to vice, then some 
-. 
of the strength of my argument concerning the philosophical under-
pinning of the literary unity of Satires 2.3 is lost, unless it 
89 For the cardinal vices see above, n.7, p.43. 
90 On the unity of virtue! see Plutarch, De Stoic. Repuqn. 1034. 
89 
can be shown that the stoics, or the Romans, saw some relationship 
of a special kind between avaritia and ambitio. For to say th~t 
avaritia is related to ambitio is to say no more otherwise than 
EUSOUALU is a subsection, as it were, of ~p6VnaLG and both of 
these are similarly related to oLuuLoauVn. Fortunately for the 
argument, it can be shown that there was something of a special 
relationship seen to exist, so far as the Roman, and, more esp-
ecially, the Roman Stoic, was concerned, between ambitio and 
avaritia. This relationship is made quite clear by the following 
passage: 
expetuntur autem divitiae cum ad usus vitae necessarios, 
. tum ad perfruendas voluptates. in quibus autem maior est 
animus, in iis pecuniae cupiditas spectat et ad gratific-
andi facultatem, ut nuper M. Cr~ssus negabat ullam satis 
magnam pecuniam esse ei, qui in re publica princeps vellet 
esse, cuius fructibus exercitum alere non posset •.•• 
nee vero rei familiaris amplificatio nemini nocens vituperanda 
est. sed fuqienda semner iniuria est. 
- -
rnaxime autem adducuntur plerique, ut eos iustitiae captat 
oblivio, cum in imperiorum, honorum, gloriae cupiditatem 
ineiderunt. 
Cicero, De Officiis 1.25-26 
Cicero lays emphasis, as Horace does throughout his attack upon 
avarice, on the abuse of wealth for political purposes, while 
he suggests, as does Horace again in the speech of Oppidius, that 
moderate expenditure on the maintenance of the res familiaris 
is quite justified and, in Roman terms, even necessary and 
honourable. So Horace, through the figures of the spendthrift 
son Aulus and the potential miser, Tiberius, attacks not only the 
vices which they exemplify, but also the long term motives, which 
are impu·ted to them by their father. For their ultimate aim is 
the acquisition of political power and social supremacy through 
the adroit dispensation of their wealth: 
185-186 scilicet ut p1ausus quos fert Agrippa91 fereg tu, 
astuta ingenuum vu1pes imitata 1eonem. 
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The motive is all important in the Stoic context, as is made 
clear by the continuation of the Ciceronian passage which was 
quoted above: 
sed in omni iniustitia permu1tum interest, utrum 
perturbatione a1iqua animi, quae p1erumque brevis est 
et ad tempus, an consu1to et cogitata fiat iniuria. 
1eviora enim sunt ea, quae repentino aliquo motu 
accidunt, quam ea, quae meditata et praeparata inferuntur. 92 
Cicero, De Officiis 1.27 
It is especially important to emphasise the question of motive 
regarding the acquisition of political power, because, even as 
wealth was considered to be an "indifferent", which could be put 
to good use,93 even so it was considered to be the duty of the 
~pier.s to involve himself in political affairs av ~n T~ UWAU~, 
w~ ~na~ Xpua~TITIoG, Diogenes Laertius, 7.121. Plutarch also 
:i::-8cC):::-ds the ':,-;c:::-ds cf Ch:!:"ysippt'.s C'n. this . topic rlnCl t.hAy are partic-
ularly relevant to the present discussion: 
Xoua~TITIoG 6E TIaA~V €V TQ TIEPL 'PnTOp~UnG ypa~wv, 'OUTW 
pnTOpE6aE~v uatTIOA~TEuEa-&a~ TOV ao~6v, wG uat TOU 
TIAOUTOU 0VTOG aya-&ou, uat TnG 66~nG uat TnG uYELaG'. 
Plutarch, De Stoic. Repugn. 1034b 
These sentiments were also expressed with approbation by Cicero 
at De Finibus 3.68: 
cum autem ad tuendos conservandosque homines hominem 
natum esse videamus, cOnsentaneum es-t huic naturae ut 
sapiens ve1it gerere et administrare rem pUblicam atque, 
91 We may note, in passing, an "anticipation" here of the actual 
attack upon Horace at vv.307-326. 
92 In the leviora GG' sunt ea of this passage we notice the 
common-sense mod':ificat'ion of extreme Stoic doctrines introd-
uced by Panaetius and accepted gratefully by Cicero for 
Roman consumption. For further comments on the question of 
guilt and intentlo see below in the discussion of Satires 
2.7.72~74 on pp ff. 
93 See above, pp. 8lf. 
91 
ut a natura vivat, uxorem aduingere et velIe ex ea 
l 'b 94 1. eros. 
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THE ATTACK UPON AMBITION, VV.187~223 
If we accept vv.168~186 as a bridge passage, which has 
equal relevance to the attack upon avarice and that upon political 
ambition, the la'tter attack plunges immediately into an exploit-
ation of the myth of Ajax, brother of Teucer, perhaps to remind 
us, as quickly as possible, by reference to this famous madman, 
that the basic subject of the diatribe is insanity. The inter-
pretation of the meaning of the exemplum of lijax and Agememnon is 
not so unclear as was the interpretation of the meaning, in context, 
of the exemplum of Orestes in vv.132-l4l. Partly this is because 
the mythical exemplum in the present case constitutes the whole 
_I: .J....l-..- _.1-.L ___ 1 .. ________ '_'!.L'!_ .!.c ... ___ ,~(') '('\~ _ ~_.- .J... ~ ___ ..L. _ ...:r _L __ .! -...L.'1 __ 
V.L. \"HC o.\..\..o.\....1"- UJ::.IVH o.lllJ...l.LL..J..V, .J...L. vV • .LUU-.LUU cu .. c \".I.Cct\..cu ;:;>\...I...I.L.\...Ly 
as a bridge passage and if vv.2l4-223 are treated as the moral 
epilogue of the myth. As a result, the exploitation of the myth 
of Ajax is self-contained and does not depend for its interpret-
ation upon its place within the context of a larger discussion. 
The exemplum of Orestes needed to be considered in the context 
of the attack upon avaritia. Moreover, the philosophical 
implications involved in the discussion of the motives of Ajax 
and Agamemnon are more evident and there are clear Stoic implic-
ations. The reader is, therefore, aware of where his sympathies 
should lie, as the debate with Agamemnon progresses. In fact, 
94 It is natural, in the light of Cicero's own political career, 
that he should warmly have supported this particular Stoic 
tenet; this may be seen especially from the De Re}2ublica 
and the De Legibu~. 
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the reader is forced into the position of an arbitrator to the 
debate and is skillfully guided into a position of sympathy for 
the Stoic by the almost Socratic irony of the Stoic interlocutor. 
The "trial" of Agamemnon, reminiscent almost of the 
agon of comedy, may be broken down as follows: 
a} 187-192 Opening address; this is marked by the false 
humility of Agamemnon's questi9ner and the 
general irony of his remarks. 
b} 193-207 Evidence; Ajax killed one thousand sheep, but 
Agamemnon killed his own daughter. 
c} 208-213 Judgement; Ajax was insane, but can Agamemnon 
not also be so described. 
d} 214-223 Moral; a question of motive; when men pursue 
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tone, it does suggest that the speaker considers Agamemnon to 
have reached the zenith of temporal power. Not only has he power 
of life and death, but even power over the dead. The aspirations 
of the brothers Aulus and Tiberius have been made concrete in the 
figure of Agamemnon. However, in the Roman context, the 
conscious opposition of the arrogant ~ and the subservient 
plebe ius in v.188 immediately undercuts the authority and credit-
ibility of Agamemnon: 
188 "rex sum." nil ultra quaero plebeius. 
Also, the use by Agamemnon of the word aeguam (188) and his claim 
to be iustus, by implication from non iustus (189), coupled with 
the use of ~, suggests that the device exploited against 
Staberius in vv.97-99 is once more being employed. That is to 
say, Agamemnon is describing himself in terms appropriate to the 
93 
description of a sapiens. 95 How far short he falls of that ideal 
will soon be made clear, while the sorry figure cut by the 
Agamemnon of Sophocles in his Ajax should warn the attentive 
reader what to expect. The same reader will also be aware of the 
harsh irony of: 
190-191 maxime regum 
di tibi dent capta classem reducere Troia!:6 
b) 193,207 
Although the attack upon ambitio is primarily intended 
to show the folly of considering political power a worthwhile 
objective, especially if the motivation of the aspirants is 
questionable, Horace also anticipates Juvenal's tenth satire by 
calling into question the value not only of political power, but 
also of military fame and expertise. This is implied by the 
~PR~ription of thp ironiPR of thp fRte of Ajax: whose patriotic 
services of time past could not, apparently, outweigh the effects 
of one act of madness and also by the appearance, at the close 
of the attack upon ambitio, of the goddess Bellona at v.223. 
However, Agamemnon does epitomise the acme of both 
political and military power. with this power responsibility 
goes hand in hand; this is his excuse for the death of Iphigenia, 
which says the prototype Stoic, was as insane, surely, as the 
slaughter of the sheep: 
199-207 tu cum pro vitula statuis dulcem Aulide natam 
ante aras spargisque mola caput, improbe, salsa, 
95 On Staberius and the sapiens see above, pp.77-78, while 
on the possible Stoic connotations of aequam see above, 
pp.26-27. 
96 Cf. the prophecy of polymestor at the close of the ~ 
of Euripides. 
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rectum animi servas? "quorsum?" ins anus quid enim Aiax 
fecit cum stravit ferro pecus? abstinuit vim 
uxore et gnato; mala multa precatus A'tridis, 
non ille aut Teucrum aut ipsum violavit Ulixen. 
"verum ego ut haerentis adverso litore navis 
eriperem prudens placavi sanguine divos" 
nempe tuo, furiose. "meo, sed non furiosus." 
Even in this descriptive passage the philosophical and Stoic 
implications are kept to the fore bi rectum animi servas? (201) 
and the contrast between the prudens of verse 206, which is the 
word used to characterise his own behaviour by the "wise" king, 
and the constrasting furiose and its denial in non furiosus of 
verse 207. 
It may be of interest to note at this stage that the 
Stoicising nature of this passage can help to justify a suggested 
emendation to verse 201. The mss are fairly equally divided 
between the reading: 
;:, , 
-, quorsuiTi l:i1Sa!i.uS quid' 811iru AidX 
h ' h . d d ' d b d't 97 'th ' d w ~c ~s accepte an pr~nte y most e ~ ors w~ a per~o 
marked after servas and a mark ot interrogation after quorsum, and: 
b) rectum animi servas quorum insanus quid eriim Aiax 
which is clearly unsatisfactory. Those who adcipt the reading a) . 
explain quorsum? as a heated interjection made by Agamemnon; 
such an interjection would have the force of, for example, the 
clause quorsum haec tendant? which is found at Satires 2.7.21, 
although the context on that occasion is far different; for 
there Horace is openly questioning Davus regarding the drift of 
his comments. 98 As Palmer suggests, this supposed interjection 
97 These include Orelli, Macleane, Palmer, Kiessling and Heinze, 
Villeneuve and Wickham. 
98 See n. ad loco 
95 
at v.201 is both clumsy in itself and places an unacceptable 
strain upon the single interrogative word quorsum. Further, the 
phrase rectum animi is awkward, although parallels may be drawn 
with Greek usage. 99 An emendation has been suggested which runs 
as follows: 
c) rectum animi servas cursum? 
where cursum is accepted in place of both the readings of the 
manuscripts. Had the initial error been to substitute quorsum 
for cursum, the further corruption to quorum is explicable in 
terms of the relatively unfamiliar interrogative quorsum. Although 
the Stoic connotations of rectum animi have been noted, in rather 
t ' b' I' d·' 100 th d t cryp ~c manner, y K~ess ~ng an He~nze, ey 0 no appear 
to realise the support this fact should give to the proponents of 
h d ' 101 t e rea ~ng cursum. Not only does this reading remove the 
clumsiness of the inte~jected "quorsum" and the obscurity of 
rectum animi, it also has the merit of being more than compatible 
with Stoic terminology and doctrine. The concept of man making 
a journey towards virtue is not one that is confined to the 
St ' , t" t ' i02 ·o~cs ~n an ~qUl y or s~nce; however, the emphasis which· is 
placed upon the concept of the proficiens by the Stoics did make 
this metaphor of the arduous journey to virtue especially 
99 Kiessling and Heinze, Q. Horatius Flaccus: Satiren (Berlin, 
1959) n. ad loco refer to Soph. Fr. 555 N, ELG 6p6ov ~POVELV 
and to Eur. Medea 119 t cf. above, n.77. 
100 Ibid. "op6oG AOYOG ist Terminus der stoischen Philosophie". 
101 This emendation seems initially to have been proposed by 
Boethe, who was followed by Peerlkamp, Keller and Holder, 
and, mos·t recently, by Buchner, Horaz: die Sa tiren (Bologna, 
1970) . 
102 The journey from Plato's Cave in Republic 514-518 and 
Bunyan's Pilgrim's Progress are but two examples which spring 
to mind. 
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theirs l03 and, in the context of this passage, with the recurrence 
104 
of Stoicising terms, one can only say that the reading rectum 
animi servas cursum? makes sound sense. In passing one may, 
perhaps, add that it is not uncharacteristic of Horace to intend 
105 
a play on the meaning of cursus as in cursus honorum. 
Presumably he still wishes his readers to realise that Stertinius 
is attacking Roman customs and society, however widely flung 
106 
are the areas from which his examples are drawn. 
The sUbstance of the defence made by Agamemnon against 
the charge of the Stoic that the killing of Iphigenia was as 
insane an act as Ajax's killing of the equally innocent sheep is 
that the death of Iphigenia was the result of a conscious choice 
(prudens, v.206), dictated by military and political necessity: 
205-206 verum ego ut haerentis adverso litore navis 
eriperem prud~ns placavi sanguine divas .•• 
Agamemnon's action should have found favour with a Roman audience 
nurtured on the ~nale~ of Ennius; these are the words of 
Decimus MUs, who devoted himself prudens: 
divi hoc audite parumper 
ut pro Romano populo prognariter armis 
certando prudens animam de corpore mitto. 
W. Ann. 200-202 
Ennius also recognises that children are born to die; this passage 






E.g. ou6Eva TWV aaTELwv 005' 660u 6La~apTavELv ... aAA' ou6E 
napopav aAA' ou6E napcowuELV vo~[~ouaL TOV aocpov; Stobaeus, 
Ecl. 2.111 (SVF 3.l47.l6), also EtvaL yap 660v TLva EUAEUTLUnV 
TWV EV Tat>TaLs Ta'C s TExvaLs OLUELWV npos apETT)v., avacpEpouaav 
aUTa Ent TO TOU SLOU TEAOsI ibid. 2.74. Cf. also Cic. Fin. 
3.48 and Sen. Ep. 75.8. and 13. 
See throughout foregoing discussion. 
E.g. at cic. Ad Fam. 3,11.2; for the common meaning of cursus 
as career or passage of life, see cic. 9ff. 1.117i Pro sestIO 
21.47; Pro_Caelio 17.39, etc. 
On the universalising 'and distancing aspects of the use of 
mytJ1 and "exempla", see below, pp.316f. 
W. Trag. 319-322. See discussion in Introduction, p.ix. 
ego cum genui tum morituros scivi et ei rei sustuli: 
praeterea ad Troiam cum misi ob defendendam Graeciam, 
scibam me in mortiferum bellum non in epulos mittere. 
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The Stoic, however, is suspicious of Agamemnon's motives. These 
suspicions are anticipated by furaose in v.207 and are given 
full expression both in the couplet 212-213 and in the moralising 
tailpiece to the exemplum in vv.2l4-223. Consider the whole 
passage from v.208-2l3: 
208-213 qui species alias veri scelerisque tumultu 
permixtas capiet, commotus habebitur, ,atque 
stultitiane erret nihilum distabit an ira. 
Aiax immeritos cum occidit desipit agnos:' 
cum prudens scelus ob titulos admittis inanis, 
stas animo et purum est vitio tibi, cum tumidum 
est cor? 
Clearly, as far as the Stoic is concerned, a man is insane whether 
his criminal act was the result of anger, as was that of Ajax, or 
of stupidity and miscalculation, as was that of Agamemnon. Ajax 
was mad because, in Stoic terms, he was not able to control his 
rage and disappointment a't the manner in which the armour of 
Achilles was disposed of. Those perturbations of the spirit, of 
which anger is perhaps the most severe, must be constrained by 
'-
reason, if disaster is to be avoided. Anger was particularly 
thought of as a desire to retaliate: 
quae autem libidini subiecta sunt, ea sic definiunt, 
ut ira sit libido poeniendi eius', qui videatur 
1 . ... 108 aeSlsse lnlurla .•• 
Cicero, Tusc. 4.21 
unless controlled it could result in miscalculation. 
Kat yap ~nLaU~[av Kat 6py~v Kat ~6eov Kat ~a ~oLaD~a 
nav~a, 66EaG ErvaL Kat KPCOELG novT)paGI 06 nEpl: EV ~L 
108 Cf. Diogenes Laertius,/7.ll3~ 
YLyvo~tvas ~ns ~uxns ~£pos, aAAa OAOU ~oD nYE~OVLUoD 
ponas uat EC~ELs uat ouyua~a&£OELs uat op~as uat OAWs 
EVEPYELas ~Lvas ouoas EV 6ALY~ ~E~an~WLaS' wonEp at LWV 
nai:owv EnLopo~at LO payoaLov uat LO ocpoopOV EnLocpaAEs 
uno aO&EVECas uat aStSaLov EXOUOL. 
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... 
Plutarch, De Virtute Morali 3.441c 
For judgements and acts of ethical choice and also "affections" 
arena&n of the soul and, if the soul is affected disadvantageously 
by a burst of anger, then a choice made under such circumstances 
must be irrational to the extent of overt insanity. Hence anger 
should be entirely eradicated from the character as it is 
eradicated in the character of the sapiens. 109 A further proof of 
the insanity of Ajax was the reason for his anger; his outburst 
was out of all proportion to the incident which caused it. In 
Stoic terms again Ajax was the victim of CPLAoLL~Ca, an immoderate 
desire for glory.110 This was particularly foolish, since honour 
or glory, ambitio, laus, fa~ or gloria are indifferents and 
incapable of materially affecting the soul for better or worse; 
this is the view of the fundamental Stoic. III 
109 E.g. "sed Stoici non viderunt esse discrimen recti et pravi; 
esse iram iustam, esse et iniustam; et quia medelam rei non 
inveniebant, voluerunt earn penitus excidere." Lactantius, 
De Ira 17, cf. 18 also Lact. Dive Inst. 6.14. Lactantius 
talks as a follower of the Peripatetic line to which Seneca 
objected so spiritedly, one is tempted to say, so "angrily".' 
at De Ira, 1.5-21. Perhaps Seneca's feelings were those of 
Diogenes of Babylon recorded at De Ira 3.38.1, " •.• de ira 
cum maxime disserenti adulescens pro"tervus inspui t. •• I non 
quidem I inqui t I irascor, sed dubi to tamen, an oportea t irasci I." " 
110 Cf. Andronicus, rrEp~ na&wv4(S.V.F. 111.97.16), CPLAoLL~Ca 
OE EnL&u~La a~ELpoS LL~ns. 
III The status of "reputation" underwent a metamorphosis at the 
hands of Roman Stoics: originally is was considered an 
"indifferent", e. g. 6.0 Lacpopa LO Lo.tha ... 06~av aoo~ Lav, Stob. 
Ecl. 2.57 quotes Zeno, and an "indifferent" of little worth, 
IIde bona autem fama .•. Chrysippus quidem et Diogenes, detracta 
utilitate, ne digitum quidem eius causa porrigendum esse 
diceban"t", Cic. Fin. .3.57 i however, "qui autem post eos fuerunt 
(sc. Chrysippum et Diogenem), cum Carneadem sustinere possent, 
hanc quam dixi bonam famam propter se praepositam et sumendam 
OC'l~a r1~'V"""""Y'nn+1I ;b';d. rof Cn'n",.--i-::-' P'Y"'\ ,a ,-, .. ~_",1r<r. 'V"\ h(\ "'h""'l"7~ 
'-t.....I"-''-'" '-!...L.I~"""'.I-'-'lJ..L""" , ...L ..L WI '-' Q '-"I".... J.'!''-'-'L..t., ~o I"/0.J..1/ U-L..:JV J.!Qvv U).Juv\..,.. 
p.20. 
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At base, however, suggests the satirist, this was the 
reason why Agamemnon allowed himself prudens to sacrifice Iphigenia 
at Aulis; it was done ob titulos ... inanis (212), and we note, 
in passing, the similarity in sound between inanis and insanus. 
For the <.pLAOl:"l,llLa of Agamemnon weighed more than the natural ties 
of affection. What is more, when the decision to kill Iphigenia 
had once been taken, by a mind already unbalanced by the desire 
for glory, then anger at the falseness of his own position caused 
the king to attack the child with a savage intensity which was 
both unnecessary and unnatural. This interpretation may seem, at 
first sight, to be itself outrageous by dint of being unnatural 
and unnecessary. Acceptance of it demands, however, only an 
acceptance of the fact that Horace knew and could himself interpret 
112 
with sensitivity the great chorus of the Agamemnon, where the 
sacrifice is described, and a realisation that the attack upon 
Agamemnon in this satire is made the more complete and satisfying, 
if the king is found guilty of both the errors, acts of insanity 
or misjudgement, for which he is punishing the corpse of Ajax. 113 
That is to say, Agamemnon is insane too because of his <.pLAOl:"L~La, 
as was Ajax, and his anger, which is indirectly the result of his 
<.pLAOl:"L~La, as was the anger of Ajax. To support this interpretation 
112 Aeschylus, Agamemnon 205-257, esp.: 
SPOl:"ouG 0paOOVEL yap aLoxp6~nl:"LG 
l:"aAaLVa napauona npWl:"onn~wv. 
Sl:"Aa 6' ouv 0ul:"np YEvEo0aL 
0uyapl:"oG, yuVaLuonoLvwv 
nOAE:~WV apwyaV 
uat npOl:"EAELG va~v. ( 227) 
For this interpretati0n of the guilt of Agamemnon see also 
Albin Lesky: "Decision and Responsibility in the Tragedy 
of Aeschylus", JHS (1966). 
113 From the strict Stoic point of view, which, not unnaturally, 
is ignored here, it should be a matter of complete indiff-
erence as to what treatment the corpse of Ajax receives, e.g. 
Cicero, Tusc. 1.108; cf. Sen. Ep. 92.34. 
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I would suggest that tumidum (213) means "swollen with anger", 
rather than "puffed with pride", although both meanings are possible 
and, perhaps, the phrase in which the word appears, is consciously 
ambiguous. 114 Furthermore, the use of furiosus suggests also the 
t f 11 " 115 th" . 11 . concep 0 anger, as we as lnsan1tYi 18 1S espec1a y so, 
because anger is an example of insanity and the same opposition, 
between stupidity and madness, and criminality and madness/anger, 
which appeared at vv.205-2l0, especially in: 
208-210 qui species alias veri scelerisque tumultu 
permixtas capiet, commotus habebitur, atque 
stultitiane erret nihilum distabit an ira. 
reappears at the close of the general moral drawn from the 
exemplum by Stertinius: 
220-222 ergo ubi prava 
stultitia, hic summa est insania; qui sceleratus, 
et furiosus erit ••• 
while further evidence that, in 208-210, Horace is consciously 
prefiguring the message of the moral epilogue to the exemplum 
may be found in the concepts of superficial misrepresentation and 
self-deception found both in the species alias veri of v.208 and 
in the pathetic (and amusing) lamb of vv.214-220. The unreal 
nature of ambition itself is further emphasised by the vivid 
metaphor with which this section closes: 
222-223 quem cepit vitrea fama, 
hunc circumtonuit gaudens Bellona cruentis. 
I 
114 Cf. Vergil, Aeneid 6.407; Horace, ,A,P. 94. 
115 Compare Vergil's language used to describe the anger of 
Aeneas' opponents in the Aeneid, e.g. Turnus: 
aestuat ingens 
uno in corde pud~r mixtoque insania luctu 
et furiis agitatus amor et conscia virtus 
Aeneid 12.666-668 
Cf. Cicero, Tusc. 3.11. 
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F 
THE ATTACK UPON "LUXURIA" VV.224-246 
The attack, which Stertinius makes upon luxury and 
ostentatious expenditure, is interrupted by a subsection of 
considerable length (vv.247-27l), which constitutes, in itself, 
an attack upon those follies which are symptomatic of the excesses 
f 1 . 116 o sexua passlon. There are several problems which relate to 
this unusual break within the regular succession of topics in the 
diatribe. One must ask why this attack upon sex and its effects 
is included at all, and why at this particular moment within the 
poem, although, as we shall see, the answers to these two 
questions are inextricably linked. It is also necessary to 
establish if any overall continuity exists between the several 
attacks upon ambition, luxury, sex and, finally, superstition. 
The criticism of luxuria opens abruptly by plunging the 
reader directly into the exemplum of Nomentanus, the moral of 
which is not immediately clear. However, we do note at once that, 
by contrast with the examples with which Horace chose to 
illuminate the attack upon the folly of ambitio,on this occasion 
f 1 f t h d f . t 117 Horace ee s ree to use targe s w 0 are rawn rom Roman SOCle y. 
It is also evident that Horace is at pains to maintain the 
continuity and conversational logic of the poem. For the 
discussion centres once more upon the abuse of inherited wealth 
116 The attack upon the abuse of the sexual instinct is not 
granted a separate identity in Lejay's formulation of the 
structure of this poem, see above p.39. 
117 Cf. the foreign examples used by Juvenal in Satires 10 to 
demonstrate the folly of praying for military success. 
Alexander, Hannibal and Xerxes may have been safer targets 
for ridicule on this score than the Roman generals, who had 
contribu"ted to the ex"tent of. the Emperor i s domain. 
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and the follies of "those who have inherited unearned income, as 
it has done throughout the poem. 118 As a result the Stoic views 
on the nature of wealth, and on the nature of the uses and abuses 
to which it may be put, are again the platform, or part of it, 
from which" the attack is 1aunched. 119 The Stoic viewpoint 
naturally receives a certain reinforcement from this repetition, 
although more than repetition alone is at work. For the criticism 
centres upon that unnatural and ostentatious indulgence in the 
"benefits" of massive wealth, which had already been the target of 
Rome's indigenous moralists. They too considered 1uxuria to be, 
h 11 120 .. d' d . 1 t t' b t' as we s a see, an lnSl lOUS an corrOSlve e emen con rl u lng 
to the moral decline of Roman society. Stoic doctrine and Roman 
mora1ising clearly join forces at this stage in the satire. 
However, this is an alliance which potentially has perilous 
consequences for both the argument and even the moral position of 
a man who is intent upon purveying to his fellows a philosophy 
which had its origins in Greece. The fact that foreign luxury 
had long been considered a contributory agent in the breakdown of 
moral standards may help to explain the intrusion of the attack 
upon sex and its folly in vv.247-271. However that may be, I 
~ou1d also suggest that the continuity of the satire is aided by 
Horace's prior exploitation of the figure of Agamemnon both, by 
implication, in the mythical exemp1um of Orestes (132-141) and, 
expressly, in the mythical exemp1um of Ajax and Agamemnon (187-
223). It has already been suggested that one interpretation of 
the guilt or insanity of Agamemnon, on the occasion of the 
118 C f. vv. 8 4 - 9 9; 12 2 ~ 12 8; 132 ;..,.15 7 and vv. 16 8 -18 6 • 
119 For a discussion of the Stoic attitude to wealth see above, 
pp.81-84. 
120 See below in the discussion of Of ell us , comments on luxuria 
and its deadening effect upon moral sensibility in Satires 
2.2. 
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sacrifice of Iphigenia, as described in Aeschylus' Agamemnon, 
helps to explain the meaning of the exemplum within -this 
t ' 121 sa l.re. The action of Agamemnon in stepping upon the purple 
tapestries, which makes one of the most awesome scenes of the 
Agamemnon, helps to foreshadow the attack upon 1uxuria, which we 
f1.'nd l.'n vv.224--2S0. 122 1 th f 11 f th 'h f - A so e 0 y 0 e r1.C men 0 vv. 
214-220 is used to underline -the equal insanity of Agamemnon 
immediately prior to the attack upon 1uxuria.Presumably the man 
'lectica nitidam gestare amet agnam" (214) is wealthy; the poor 
would prefer to eat the creature. Therefore, Agamemnon and the 
idea of extravagant waste, with which his name is connected, both 
in terms of human life and the destruction of wealth, prepare 
the reader for the transition to the formal assault upon 1uxuria, 
which is made by Stertinius. 
The beginning of this assault is clearly indicated by 
the -nunc age of v.224, with which one may compare huc J2roJ2ius me 
(80) and accipe (46) in this satire; 123 however, nunc ... 
the continuity of the satire, or, at least, the diatribe within 
the satire,_is made evident in other ways less obvious than nunc 
age, but more obvious than -the references to Agamemnon. For the 
continuity of the diatribe and its organisation is aided by the 
f th ,- , 12 4 h' h . d h h use 0 e St01.C term rat1.O w 1.C 1.S repeate t roughout t e 
diatribe. Compare the following lines: 





See above, P.99. 
Aeschylus, Agamemnon 914-947; one may note that a contrib-
utory cause-of Agamemnon I s downfall, his flaunting of 
Cassandra, matches the interlude of vv.247-271 in this 
satire. 
Cf. also at Satires 1.1.10S. 
On the Stoic term ~, see- above pp.5ff. 
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225 b) vincet enim stultos ratio insanire nepotes 
250 c) si puerilius his ratio esse evincet amare 
Each of the lines comes at, or very close to, the beginning of a 
section or sub-section of the diatribe. In 2ach of the lines 
ratio holds the central position, remi'nding the reader of the 
philosophical basis of each of Stertinius' attacks, while in each 
line the contrast between the rationality of the Stoic and the 
folly qr insanity of the rest of mankind is thrown into relief by 
the juxtaposition of ratio with words indicating that insanity 
and folly, namely a) ~nticyram •.. omnem (183), b) stultos •.• 
insanire (225) and c) puerilius. The effect is made even more 
obvious by the sandwich effect achieved in v.S3 and in v.225, 
while the rather combative spirit of the diatribe, reminiscent of 
the ardour of Lucretius,125 is also underlined in the two later 
lines, when Stertinius has warmed to his theme, by the use of 
vincet (225) and evincet (250). 
Although the beginning of the Nomentanus exemplum, with 
which the attack upon luxuria opens, is well signposted, the 
meaning of the exemplum within the context. of the attack itself 
is not so clear. One of the abuses of wealth to which Stertinius 
took exception earlier in the poem was its use in the pursuit of 
vitrea fama (222) and plausus quos fert Agrippa (185) .126 The 
suggestion on that occasion was that, by uaing money to buy 
political advancement, an otherwise undeserving man could achieve 
renown and influence within the state. However, the man who 
seeks to advance himself politically in this way is at least 
125 At Lucretius 5.735 we find a line which almost seems to 
anticipate Horace's diction here:"difficilest ratione docere 
et vincere verbis." 
126 On the Stoic attitude ,to fama, see above, pp.98f. 
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paying lip-service to those established ideals of behaviour to 
which the Roman male should traditionally aspire,127 and his 
"advance" will be in that area of endeavour within which the Stoic 
sapiens will also be duty-bound to involve himself,128 The 
ambitious and corrupt politician is mistaken chiefly in the belief 
that money can purchase political acumen as well as political 
power. Stertinius objects to the means by which a politician of 
this kind gains advancement and also to the motives which lead him 
into vast expenditure for the sake of vitrea fama. It is as if 
reputation were itself worthy of possession irrespective of how 
that possession was gained. 129 Such a character is undoubtedly 
undesirable and, from a Stoic standpoint, insane; the political 
and social situation of which he is a symptom is also undesirable. 
On the other hand, Nomentanus and men like him are symptomatic 
of the same disease at a more advanced stage. The mere possession 
and ostentatious waste of wealth is now counted sufficient grounds 
for fama. An examination of the exemplum of Nomentanus demonstrates 
that the kind of respect which was formerly given freely to the 
properly deserving130 is now bestowed upon men like Nomentanus, 
who have not even earned the wealth which they distribute with 
such a lavish hand. 13l 
127 Exemplified best of all in Roman literature by Virgil's Aeneas. 
128 See above, n.198. 
129 For the stoic views on motivation and intent see below pp. 
l65ff. 
130 One feels that the portrayal of Nomentanus' "court" is 
intended to contrast unfavourably with Cicero's pictures of 
the Scipionic circle in the De Amicitia and De Senectute and 
Horace's own portrayal of the men who gathered around 
Maecenas and Augustus, e.g. Sat. 1.5 and 1.9.48-60: cf. also 
Sa t. 1. 6 and 2. 6 • 
131 The progress of the disease described by Horace calls to mind 
Plato's portrayal of the falling away of the constitutions of 
the city-state from the ideal depicted in the Republic. 
Reason gives way successively to spirit, and then varIous 
types of appetite as the governing principle both in the 
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Horace indicates by his use of edicit in v.227 that" 
Nomentanus, on receiving his inheritance, immediately adopts, 
parvenu though he is, a manner of speaking which is more suited 
h d ·· f h t h' . t t' 132 to t e 19n1ty 0 a Roman praetor t an 0 lS own Sl ua lon: 
226-230 hic simul accepit patrimoni mille talenta 
edicit piscator uti, pomarius, auceps, 
unguentarius ac Tusci turba impia vici 
cum scurris fartor, cum Velabro omne macellum, 
mane domum veniant. 
The incongruity caused by the juxtaposition edicit with piscator 
t · . 1 f . h'" d 133 e c. lS tYPlca 0 Horace In lS comlC moo. The humour derives 
from the fact that edico is commonly used as a word to describe 
134 135 the summoning of the senate, an army or the holding of an 
election. 136 As a"technical term, it is also used to describe 
the public announcements of a praetor, especially when, on 
entering office, he sets out the rules by which he will be governed 
in the administration of iustice. 137 The legal parody is maintained 
by the manner in which the spokesman leno (231) speaks to 
state and in the individual; for a useful discussion see Sir 
Ernest Barker, Greek Political Theory (London, 1918) Chap. 11. 
132 Horace employs the word, with similarly ironical overtones, 
in Satires 2.2.51, where the praetorian connection is made 
quite explicit in v.50. 
133 For further examples of such incongruity see below in the 
discussion of the Comic and particula+ly Plautine influence 
on Horace, Satires 2.7. 
134 E.g. Cicero, Ad Fam. 11.6. 
135 E.g. Livy, Historiae 31.11; 22.12. 
136 E.g. Cicero, Ad . Fr. 2.2.2. 
137 At De Finibus 2.74 Cicero argues to the effect that no man 
can hold Epicurean views on the nature of the summum bonum 
and honourably enter public life with any hope 0 success; 
for, "est enim tibi edicendum quae sis observaturus in iure 
dicendo, et fortasse etiam, si tibi erit visum, aliquid de 
maioribus tuis et de te ipso dices more maiorum." The 
parallel between this procedure and the behaviour of 
Nomentanus is obvious. i 
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138 Nomentanus, although the colloquial domi est adds an element 
of the humour of incongruity: 
230-231 quidquid mihi, quidquid et horum 
cuique domi est, id crede tuum et vel nunc pete 
vel cras. 
while a certain amount of particularly Stoic humour is introduced 
by the use of aequus to describe Nomentanus at v.233: l39 
accipe quid contra haec iuvenis responderit aequus: 
"in nive Lucana dormis ocreatus, ut aprum 
cenem ego: tu piscis hiberno ex aequore verris. 
segnis ego, indignus qui tantum possideam: aufer: 
sume tibi deciesi tibi tantundemi tibi triplex 
unde uxor media currit de nocte vocata." 
The precise meaning of aequus in v.233 is difficult to ascertain, 
because of the irony of the passage, which depends to a large 
extent upon the meaning of this very term. Although Rudd's decent 
f h .. f' l' h' 1 t' 140 trans ers t e sp1r1t 0 1rony neat y 1nto 1S trans a lon, 
it does not communicate the essentially leqal and maqisteria1 
flavour of the original, which has, after all, been sustained 
throughout the exemplum by the use of edicit (227) and vel nunc 
pete vel cras (232). If the whole approach of Nomentanus is 
intended by the poet as a parody of the behaviour of the budding 
magistrate, which is, after all, in keeping also with the spirit 
of the attack upon ambitio, then aequus must be taken and under-
stood in that context. Perhaps the most common meaning of aequus 
is "equitable" and "impartial": this in respect of behaviour 
138 Palmer is aware of these ironical devices (n. ad loc.), as 
is Lejay (n. ad loc.) i neither, however, do more than point 
out that the irony exists, without explaining the purpose of 
the parody and irony. On the legal aspect of vel nunc Eete 
vel cras (231), see Palmer n. ad loco 
139 On aequus, in its Stoic senses, see above pp.25-27. 
140 Rudd, The Satires of Horace and Persius (Penguin, 1973), 
p.90. 
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towards others. 141 This is more than compatible with -the demands 
of the present context, where Nomen-tanus apes the behaviour of 
the praetor, especially since at Cicero, Verrines 2.4.65 we find 
aequus coupled not only with praetor, but also with sapiens, in 
the phrase, praetor aequus et sapiens. From a more philosophical 
work of the same author, one may compare aeguissimus aestimator 
et iudex at De Finibus 3.2. Although no great claims can be made 
regarding the interpretation of aequus in v.233 of the present 
satire, upon the basis of the commonplace juxtaposition of aequus, 
sapiens and praetor in the passage from the Verrines, nevertheless 
the juxtaposition does show that the concept of justice and 
wisdom were, not unnaturally, closely linked in popular political 
jargon, as they were in the more sophisticated jargon of Stoic 
ethical theory. Therefore, when the Stoicising Stertinius uses 
the word aequus to describe Nomentanus in a context where 
ironical use has already been made of traditional political 
conventions, the reader is surely intended to respond both to 
the political, and Roman implications of the word, and also to 
142 the philosophical connotations of the term. That the Stoic 
connotations are indeed present and should be appreciated is made 
eVen clearer by the recollection that, at the beginning of this 
poem, Damasippus attacks Horace in Stoic terms, which are echoed 
in the Nomentanus ~~mplum: compare, for example: 
a) iratus tibi quod vini somnique benignus 
nil dignum sermone canas ..• (3-4) 
b) dic aliquid dignum promissis... (6) 
141 E.g."praebere se aequum alicui ll , Cicero, Ad Fam. 2.1. 
142 This is especially true since the implication of the whole 
satire is that only the Stoic sapiens, who, by definition 
is aequus, escapes the, insani-tywFiTCfl afflicts mankind. 
~
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c) vitanda est improba Siren 
desidia, aut quidquid vita meliore parasti 
ponendum aequo animo ... (14-16) 
with the following: 
a) iuvenis responderit aequus (233) 
b) segtiis ego, indignus qui ... (236 ) 
and it becomes clear once more when Damasippus derived his 
vocabulary of criticism. Also the burden of the attack upon 
sexual passion in vv.250-27l is that it induces behaviour which 
. k d b 1 k f d ' d 'l'b' 143 h'l h 1.8 mar e y a ac 0 mo erat10n an equ1 1. r1um, w 1 e t e 
stoic concept of consistency was central to the interpretation of 
the structure of Satires 1.3. 144 
To summarise the intended effect of the exemplu~ of 
Nomentanus: society at Rome has reached such a low moral ebb that 
all values and standards'of excellence and repute have been turned 
'd d 145 UpS1 e own. The mere possession of enormous wealth is 
sufficient to guarantee the fcrtun~tc a~d foolish heir the adul-
ation of men the very existence of whom would have been scorned 
b th I , t f I' , d 146 Y e mora 1.S soan ear 1er per10 . 
The following examples of notorious extravagance and 
waste underline further a connection which exists between the 
folly of ambition and the folly of extravagance. For both ambition 
143 Vv.259-271. 
144 See above, pp.25-27. 
145 The free association of Nomentanus with the "Tusci turba 
impia vicil! of vv.227-229 could argue for an Horatian attack 
upon the excessive humanitas of the iuvenis ... aequus. 
146 Attacks upon extravagance are legion. Some which antedate 
Horace are: 
i) Lucilius, 19 frg. 557f.; 29 frg. 806f. 
ii) Sallust, Cat. 12. 
iii) Varro, Eumenides (see Norden, In Varronis Saturas 
Menippeas observationes selectae (Leipzig, 1891, p.329f.). 
:Lv) Cicero, Rep. 2,,3.5-9., 
110 
and luxury, as well as being considered ultimately insane ways 
of using wealth, have another aspect in common. This concerns 
the question of motivation yet again. The exempla, in vv.239-
249, of the filius Aesopi and the Quinti progenies Arri show that 
the ambitious and the wastefully extravagant are both interested 
in establishing fame or, more accurately, notoriety. The 
continuity between the exemplum of Nomentanus and the illustrations 
of this desire for doubtful reputation is established quite 
simply. The willing wife of v.238: 
237-238 tibi triplex 
unde uxor media currit de nocte vocata 
relates to Metella, wife of P. Cornelius Lentulus Spinther, who 
was also a notorious adultress. 147 Both of these women in turn 
anticipate the cause of the lover's anxieties in vv.259-27l and, 
therefore, further aid the continuity and structure of the poem. 
However, is it, in fact, totally clear that the two examples of 
extravagance and frivolity, which are described in vv.239-246, 
effect that temporary concentration upon the desire for notoriety 
which was adumbrated above? If the date of this satire is 
approximately 33 B.C. then it would have been written in that 
period when Octavian was fomenting public opinion against Antony 
and Cleopatra in preparation for the final struggle for absolute 
power. In that case, such stories as that concerning Cleopatra's 
consumption of a great pearl in 42/41 B.c. 148 would have been 
rife. The moral of such a story, in terms of political propaganda, 
147 For the historical details concerning Metella and her 
connection wi-th the son of Aesopus, see Palmer's no-te ad 
loco 
148 The story of Cleopatra and -the pearl is recounted at Pliny, 
H.N. 9.58; it matters not whether the s-tory was -true, only 
that it could have been used as a weapon against the 
reputation of Antony and Cleopatra. 
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would have been that this eastern woman was corrupting the honest 
Antony by a combination of sexual depravity and ostenta'tious 
extravagance. It seems likely, therefore, that the story of the 
filius Aesopi and his pearl is intended to call to mind the even 
greater ostentation and notoriety of Cleopatra, while the bringing 
to mind of Cleopatra also anticipates the attack on sexual excess 
in vv.247-27l. Furthermore, the very wording of 
240-241 scilicet ut decies solidum absorberet, aceto 
diluit insignem bacam. 
suggests that the actor's son is motivated by a desire for notoriety 
or, perhaps, that the poet cannot conceive of any other motive 
explicable in the context of such extravagance, although it could 
be suggested that to "acquire" the pearl in this way (absorbere) 
was to possess it to the ultimate degree, by making it part of 
one's physical constitution. The poet's incomprehension of the 
rationale behind the act is suggested by scilicet, while the 
potential notoriety of the deed is established within the two 
149 lines both by the specific description of the pearl's value 
and by the emotive insignem. The two sons of Q. Arrius are 
mentioned as examples of culinary extravagance and general frivolity; 
they contrast with the culinary modesty and moral earnestness of 
Of ell us in Satires 2.2 and with the sensible relaxation of Horace's 
friends in 2.6, while they are of a kind with the epicures of 
Satires 2.4 and 2.8. 
149 Apparently the pearl was worth only one third of the value 
of the services of the uxor ... vocata in v.238. 
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THE ATTACK UPON THE INSANITY OF 
SEXUAL PASSION VV.247-280 
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h b d b f 150 h' b t' f th As as een note e are, t lS su sec 10n a e 
attack upon luxuria constitutes a self-contained and consistent 
attack upon the insane behaviour of those men whose minds are 
deranged by the demands of sexual appetite. The mention of the 
willing wife of v.238 and of Metella in v.239, along with the 
inevitable reference to Cleopatra in vv.239-242, has foreshadowed 
this attack upon sex quite adequately, as has the reference to 
151 the behaviour of Clytaemnestra earlier in the poem. Furthermore, 
it had become a commonplace of moral writers that sexual extrava-
gance went hand in hand with financial irresponsibility and 
extravagance, perhaps nowhere more obviously than in the plays of 
Plautus and Terence. 152 It was to remain a commonplace of moral 
upon luxury, foreign influence and sexual depravity in his sixth 
satire. 153 Such moralists had the support of the Stoics, if they 
wanted it; for the attitude of the Stoics to sex was compatible 
with the traditional moral viewpoint of the Romans and is 
reflected in this attack made by Stertinius in vv.247-271. On 
150 See p.10l. 
151 This is implied ln vv.132-141. 
152 The expenditure of the family fortune upon amicae was a 
charge frequently levelled at the ad~lescentes of Roman 
Comedy, e.g. Plautus, Most. 15.33, where the honest country-
man Grumio complains to Tranio, the city slave, about the 
ruination of both the character and fortune of Philolaches. 
For the relationship between moral and financial collapse, 
see also Plautus, Trin. 223-241; for the traditional Roman 
view, see Cic. Off-:-3.15.63, where great emphasis is placed 
upon the sacrosanctity of the res familiarise 
153 On the relationship between these themes in Juvena1 6, see, 
W.S. Anderson, "Juvenal 6: a: Problem of Structure", CPh . 
( 1956) I pp. 7 3 ~ 9 4 • 
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occasion the Stoics also were inclined to correlate wealth and 
sexual depravity, especially when the sexual instinct was 




oux apa 0 
Alexander Aphrod. Comm. in Aris"tot. Topica 
2.107 (Ald. p.201.2l) 
While this passage is clearly using nopvoBooxLa as an 
prove the point that money is not capable of being classed as 
a "good", if its means of acquisition can be disreputable, and 
to 
nothing more, nevertheless, it shows the close connection in the 
puritanical mind between wealth and sex. This is a connection 
which Stertinius has already pointed out; for the uxor •.. vocata 
of v.238 is an example of nopvoBooxLa at work; further, the 
emphasis in the actual attack upon sex in the satire is upon sex 
which has been procured by money: 
252-253 an meretricis amore 
sollicitus plores ••• 
and the conversation, which Horace adapts from the beginning of 
the Eunuchus of Terence, concerns sex for which it is necessary 
to pay. 
So far as the Stoics were concerned, sex was an instinct 
or impulse (oP1J.n), which was essential for the preservation of 
both the species and, therefore, the state. Necessarily it was, 
then, compatible with the basic ethical instinct of self-
preservation. 154 Accordingly it the duty of the "",ise-man to was 
love, 155 it was the duty of the wise-man to take part in even as 
154 See Diogenes Laertius, 7.85, where the Epicurean view that 
pleasure is the prime ethical instinct is also attacked; cf. 
Cic. Fin. 3.16. 
155 E.G. "stoici sapientem amaturum esse dicunt"; Cicero: Tuse. 
4.34.72. 
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the political life of the state. 156 This love should exist 
within the context of marriage, within which estate the Stoics 
recommended that the union should be founded upon comradeship and 
1 t d l 't 157 mutua respec an equa 1 y. The subordination of female 
dignity in prostitution was, therefore, abhorrent to the Stoics, 
ideally speaking, but they objected to prostitution on practical 
grounds also, since prostitution undermined both the need for 
entrance into marriage and also the stability of the marriage 
contract. 15S Debasement of the sexual instinct into a mere desire 
for irresponsible aw~a~LXnG auvouaLaG,159 where the motivation 
was mere gratification of personal pleasure was considered both 
indecorous and potentially destructive; for ~O EPW~LXOV na.80G 
oux OO'LOV a.A..A.a. ~apaxw6EG. 160 It was part of the task of awcppoauvn 
to control the E:PW~LUOV na.80G, especially in the young, since 
,~" 6 ,. - u ~ ., • - 161 OUvELG yap YEP V~WV xaL ax~nG wpav ~rl EXOV~WV Ep~. The role of 
O'wcppoO'uvn in the guidance, not to say suppression, of the 
appetites is described by Stobaeus at Ecl. 2.63.6 W: 
156 See Cic. Fin. 3.68, also above p.90. 
157 See Stobaeus, Ecl. 4.22 and 25; also Musonius Rufus, Reliquiae 
ed. H. p. 66 . 
158 The practical bent of Roman ethics takes a different direction 
regarding prostitution, which is epitomised by the anecdote 
concerning Cato Maior at Acro, ad Hor. Serm. 1.2.32. 
Indulgence is sanctioned before marriage - in moderation. 
159 Andronicus, DEpt na8wv 4. 
160 Philodemos, De Mus. p.67 Kemke. 
161 Sextus, Adv. Math. 7.239. 
162 The corresponding virtue in Roman terminology is, of course, 
temperantia or moc1eratio, e.g. "temperantia est rationis in 
libidinem atque in alios non rectos impetus animi firma et 
moderata dominatio", Cic. Inv. 2.54.164; cf. ide Fin. 
2.19.60 and 1.14.7, also, "temperans, quem Graeci ~pova 
appellant eamque virtutem awcppoauvnv vocant, quam soleo equidem 
tum temperantiam, tum moderationem appellare, nonnumquam etiam 
modestiam." id, Tllsc. 3.8.16. 
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The hallmark of the man who gov~rns his impulses in this way is 
moderation and good sense, qualities notably lacking in the men 
criticised in vv.247-271, which brings us to a consideration of 
the actual attack which is made by Stertinius. 
That we are again dealing with a failing best described 
in terms of mental illness and to be remedied only by the 
appropriate virtue is made clear by ~ in v.250 and amentia in 
v.249, where we may suspect Horace is punning, and insignia morbi 
at v.254. The pangs of love reduce our behaviour to the level of 
that of children. Examples of such childlike behaviour form a 
frame for the description of both the conversion of Polemon and 
the adaptation of the opening of Terence's Eunuchus. The first 
examples of childishness occur at vv.247-249, the second group 
at vv.272-275, which, according to the schematisation followed 
so far,163 is outside the attack upon the effects of the unbridled 
sexual impulse. It seems as if we have here another example of 
that disguised transition from one topic to another, which was 
employed by Horace to such good effect in the bridge passage of 
vv.168-186. 164 Although there is no such obvious ring structure 
in this passage on sex as there was in vv.31-48,165 nevertheless 
the repetition of the "house of cards" concept at v.275 (aedificante 
casas) from v.247 (aedificare casas, both of which phrases occur 
at the beginnings of their respective lines, coupled with 
163 See above, p.40 and p.10lf. 
164 For discussion of this passage, see above, p.55. 
165 c.o. Brink, Horace on ~oetry: Prolegomena to the Literar¥ 
~I2istles (Cambridge, 1963) p. 6 comments on -this device of 
"gliding" from one topic to another in the context of the 
structure of Horace's Ars Poetica vv.294-306, "The textbook 
is played down by this convers onal and partly humorous 
way of constructing the link - but it is a link for all that, 
joining two distinct P9rtions of Jehe poem. II 
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illustrations concerned with apples, the first in the centre of 
this section at v.258 and the second at, or beyond, its close at 
vv.272-273, points up the total unity and cohesion of this section 
in an extremely marked ma~ner. It may be that the poet felt it 
necessary to underline the unity of this passage in this perhaps 
rather obvious way, since there is little of that continuity of 
thought and theme which marked the assaults upon avarice and 
ambition. Consider the passage in detail: 
247-257 To fall in love is the mark of an immature nature 
and more childish than childish games. Mature 
judgement can wean us away from such insanity. 
Polemon put away childish things. 
258-259 
260-271 
A major characteristic of the unformed 
childish nature is inconsistency. 
So it is with the man in love; neither is he 
master of himself nor does he know his own 
mind. He shows no moderation or consistency. 
Compared with the tone of the attacks upon avarice and ambition 
and luxury, this assault upon the abuse of sexuality is rather 
light-hearted. The very emphasis upon the fact that such passions 
are particularly a malady which affect young men sugg~sts that, 
like Polemon listening to Xenocrates, Horace and others can out-
grow such foolishness: this is consistent with the Stoic view 
1 d t . d th t . Q. .... , • ~ 1 6 6 a rea y men lone a OUvELs YEPOV~WV Ep~. The light touch 
of the section also allows the reader or audience some relief from 
the dour and uniformly gloomy picture of humanity which is painted 
in the earlier portion of the diatribe. Since the diatribe is 
drawing to its close, it is also necessary that its tone should be 
lightened somewhat, as it is by the mention of the conversion of 
166 
) 
See n.161 above p.114. 
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Polemon, so that the audience will be impressed with the idea 
that there is hope and that this hope rests with the creed which 
the speaker is attempting to impart. Further, the spirit of 
comedy, which is invoked by the adaptation of a genuine comic 
scene, cannot allow of total pessimism. However, the reader is 
brought back to the harsh realities, after this flight of fancy, 
by the brutal adde ~ruorem stultitiae ... of vv.275-276, and the 
whole of the passage which intervenes between the end of the direct 
assault on sexuality and the beginning of the attack upon super-
stition. 
As was mentioned above in the brief structural analysis 
of this passage, the major symptom of the young man's sickness 
. h" . 167 d ttl 1 k f If t 1 ~s ~s ~ncons~stency an 0 a ac 0 se -con ro . In his 
condition that self-control can only be achieved by aw~poa6vn or 
temperantia, as is pointed out by the slave: 
servus non paulo sapientior: '0 ere, quae res 
nee modum habet neque cons ilium, ratione modoque 
tractari non vult. in amore haec sunt mala, bellum, 
pax rursum: haec si quis tempestatis prope ritu 
mobilia et caeca fluitantia sorte laboret 
reddere certa sibi, nihilo plus explicet ac si 
insanire paret certa ratione modoque.' 
The first point of interest is that, in keeping with the traditions 
of comedy, the slave is portrayed as non paulo sapientior than his 
168 
master. However, this slave, drawn from the Eunuchus, is not 
of the type of cunning slave epitomised by Tranio in the 
Mostellaria, but rather of the sententious slave, typified by 
Parmeno in the Hecyra of Terence, and commoner in the more humane 
167 For a detailed discussion of the importance of consistency 
in stoic doctrine, see above, pp.25ff. 
168 The slave is Parmeno,the adulescens Phaedria. 
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comedies of Terence -than in the plays of Plautus. The Stoic 
Stertinius, with his necessary leanings towards humanitas in the 
treatment of slaves, readily finds a Terentian slave to suit his 
mJral purpose within this poem, within which the humanitas of the 
170 Stoics has already been featured. Furthermore, it seems likely 
that the idea of a slave, giving sound advice to an unreceptive 
master, appealed to the Horatian sense of humour, if we are to 
take this incident, within Satires 2.3, as anticipatory of the 
tirade of Davus against Horace himself at Satires 2.7. 
The sententious slave has the acumen to perceive that a 
love affair is totally incompatible with that reasoned moderation 
by which, according to the Stoics, all our emotions and appetites 
should strictly be controlled. It should, however, be noted that 
the ascription of the lines of dialogue in the manuscript of 
Terence is in some doubt~ especially regarding the juncture at 
which the slave breaks into the conversation. No consistency of 
life in accord with reason can be expected or achieved and 
maintained, if a man allows himself to fall prey to amor or EPW~; 
as well to attempt consciously to become insane in accord with 
reasoned moderation. The phrases ratione modoque (266) and certa 
ratione modogue (271) at the beginning and end of the slave's 
dd t h ' t 171 1 ' h f t t' d a ress 0 1S mas er are c ear perlp rases 0 emperan la an 
moderatio, while the clause: 
169 The fullest discussion of comic slaves is at Duckworth, The 
Nature of Roman Comedy (Princeton, 1952) pp.249-253. 
170 See above, PP.52f., see also below,pp.15lff. with reference 
to Horace's initial tolerance of the behaviour of Davus at 
the Saturnalia. 
171 There is some dispute as to where the slave's speech does 
end; Rudd extends the slave's speech to v.281 in his 
translation, destroying the effect of the repetition of 
certa ratione modoque,'but facilitating the interpretation-
of the Tstructure-of vv,272-28L -
265-266 quae res 
nec modum habet neque cons ilium ..•. 
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also encloses the concept of emotional moderation within itself. 
A comparison with Terence's language is instructive: 
ere, quae res in se neque consilium neque modum 
habet ullum eam consilio regere non potes. 
incerta haec tu si postulas 
ratione certa facere nihilo plus agas 
quam si des operam ut cum ratione insanias. 
Terence, Eun. 57-63 
Although the concept of control, which is implied by the use of 
regere at Eunuchus 58 is softened to ·tractari non vult by Horace 
in v.267,even so the specifically Stoic nature of the adaptation 
is emphasised by the prominence which Horace gives to the phrases 
~tione modoque (266) and certa ratione modoque (271), especially 
, th d t' h b 'd' d 172 1 't Slnce e wor ra 10, as as een ln lcate, pays a promlnen 
role in the overall structuring of the Stoic diatribe. 
The oscillation between states of war and peace, which 
is the lot of the committed lover, is taken rlj~n~etl~ from the 
Terence, while the picturesque image in: 
268-270 haec si quis tempestatis prope ritu 
mobilia et caeca fluitantia sorte laboret 
reddere certa sibi ..• 
is Horatian, and quite in keeping with such vivid similes as 
"velut silvis, ubi passim / palantis error certo de tramite 
pellit •.. " of vv.48-52. The concept of intellectual blindness;73 
172 See, p.103f.above. 
173 The concept of intellectual blindness is not limited to the 
Stoics, nor even to the philosophers, although the concept is 
common in Lucretius, e.g. 3.59, of the passions, and also at 
2.14, the famous 0 pectora caeca! The most famous philoso-
phical use of the concept i~Plato's analogy of the cave. 
In non-philosophical literature the interplay between physical 
and intellectual blindness in Oedipus the King provides one 
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implied in the image in vv.268-270, is also anticipated at vv. 
43-44, on the first occasion at which a specific and famous Stoic 
name, that of Chrysippus, is mentioned. The idea of mental 
blindness is most apposite in a treatment of the paradox na~ 
a~pwv ~aGvE~aL, and continues the illustration of mental illness 
in terms of physical disability which has been a continuing aspect 
of this satire, an aspect brought to the fore again in this section 
of the poem by the ponas in~i3nia morbi of v.254. As well as 
being Horatian and in keeping with the vivid images of the satire, 
the conceit of the storm, as well as the insertion of the comic 
scene into the poem, is entirely consonant with Fronto's 
description of the expository techniques of Chrysippus, attention 
. 174 
to which has already been drawn. 
It should be added, as a footnote to this discussion, that 
a man who governs his emotions in the manner prescribed by the 
Stoics will remain aequus and his behaviour will remain consistent 
with reason. The concept of equanimity and consistency is, as it 
were, anticipated by the application,albeit in a spirit of irony, 
of the epithet aeguus in a different, but related sense, to the 
foolish young Nomentanus at v.233. 
H 
THE PURPOSE OF VV.272-280 
The attack upon the insanity of sexual passion was given 
no independent status within the structure of the poem by Lejay, 
who seems to have thought of it as a subdivision of the attack 
of the most chilling examples of continuous dramatic irony 
which is extant. 
174 See above, pp.67ff. 
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upon luxury and an example of indisciplined wastage of the res 
familiarise I have treated the attack upon the insanity attendent 
upon sexual passion, as if it came to a close with the finish of 
the comments of the sensible slave at v.27l. At v,281 we have 
the clear beginning of a fresh attack, this time upon the madness 
of excessive religiosity; this leaves us with the problem of what 
to make of the nine lines of vv.272-280. 175 For, although these 
lines do not conclude the interrupted attack upon luxury, neither 
do they easily form an epilogue for the attack upon insanity 
caused by sexual desire. The lines divide naturally at sanior in 
v.275 and the simplest explanation of their function is to consider 
vv.272-275, as far as sanior, as the structural completion of .the 
formal attack upon sexual passion, structural in the sense that 
nothing new is added in terms of content; on the other hand, vv. 
275-280, from adde cruorem stultitiae .•. form a bloody post-
--------~----~------------
script, which is intended to remind the reader that, although the 
topic of sex can be treated with a degree of frivolity, sexual 
passion is also the stuff of tragedy. For the "crime of passion",. 
which is mentioned here, along with the suicide of the murderer, 
stands in bleak contrast to the comic plots of Plautus and Terence. 
The realities of unbridled passion are murder and suicide. A 
further sordid connection is made with the earlier portion of the 
satire in that the abuse of money is still below the surface, 
since the name Hellas suggests that Marius' destructive passion 
was for a courtesan. 
The problem was raised above 176 as to why the attack upon 
luxury was "interrupted ll by this attack upon sexual licence; it 
175 See above, p.116 
of the problem. 
176 p.lOl. 
where there is an anticipatory discussion 
J 
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can now be seen that the attack upon luxury is not interrupted, 
nor even,is it modified into the attack upon sexual licence. 
th . b . d 1 77 f ' . fl d Fur er, as agaln has een pOlnte out, orelgn ln uence an 
luxury imports and the importation of un-Roman behaviour, coupled 
with the lack of foreign military pressure, was cited by Roman 
moralists as causes of the decay in the ethical standards pertain-
ing a't Rome. This kind of attack was also often related to 
scathing comments upon the unhealthy influence of the Greek 
philosophical schools. 178 
It should be added, perhaps as a postscript to the 
passage on sex, that Horace indicates in characteristic fashion 
by exploiting "ring structure II that it should be treated as a 
complete entity in the structure of the poem. For we have in v.275 
the phrase aedificante casas echoing the aedificare casas of 
v.247i also characteristic of Horace's careful composition is 
that these two playful usages of aedificare anticipate Damasippus' 
criticism of the author at v.308. 
I 
THE ATTACK UPON SUPERSTITION VV.281-295 
One of the more interesting aspects of this attack upon 
the folly of superstition is that, were it not for the reference 
to Chrysippus (287) to signal the imminent close of the diatribe, 
even as reference to him had signposted the beginning of the 
diatribe at v.44, there would be little to indicate that the 
attack is being spoken by a convinced Stoic, who is intent upon 
177 See above, p.110 esp. n.148. 
178 Cato Maior, for example, supported the expulsion of all 
philosophers from Rome as recorded ap. Gellius, N.A. 15.11, 
while Catois reaction to the embassy of philosopners (156 B.C.) 
is recorded by Plutarch, Cato Maior 22: see also p.36, n.36. 
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converting another to his own beliefs. It is the kind of attack 
which one would expect to come more naturally from an Epicurean, 
or from a man professing the Epicureanising sentiments to which 
Horace himself gives expression at satires 1.5.101-103: 
namque deos didici securum agere aevum, 
nec si quid miri faciat natura, deos id 
tristis ex alto caeli demittere tecto. 
Also, the death of Iphigeneia, which was used by Horace as evidence 
for the madness of Agamemnon in vv.199-220, would have been 
familiar to a cultured Roman audience from Lucretius' use of the 
incident as an example of "tantum religio potuit suadere malorum" 
at De Rerum Natura 1.SO-101. For, although one can trace attacks 
upon the conventions of religious observance and worship as far 
b k X h d I , 179 't th E ' h ac as enop anes an Herac 1tUS, 1 was e p1cureans w 0 
made this their special concern in their eagerness to free men 
from fear of death and fear of the gods. ISO It may be that 
Stertinius 1S attempting to win support by suggesting that the 
Stoic view of nature and of life is not dissimilar in certain 
aspects to the more "popular" philosophy of the Epicureans, 
although it is difficult to imagine a doctrinaire Stoic taking 
this line of action. It may be that Horace is, in fact, satir-
ising the Stoics for their supposed exclusiveness, which yet allows 
them to put forward arguments which not only have an Epicurean 
flavour, but even include words such as casus in v.292 that loom 
179 E.g. Xenophanes, frs. 11,14 and 16 (DK) also Heraclitus, frs. 
14 and esp. fro 5 (DK), xat TOt~ ayaA~aoL 6s TOUTEOUOLV 
EuxovTaL, oxotov EL TL~ 66~OLOL AEOXnVEUOLTO, ou TL YLYVWOXWV 
0EOU~ 066' npwa~ OLTLVE~ ELOL. 
180 The Epicurean aim of philosophy is perhaps best summarised 
by Virgil: 
felix qui potuit rerum cognoscere causas: 
atque metus omnes et inexorabi1e fatum 
subieci t pedibus s·trepi tumque Acherontis avari. 
Georgics 2.490-492 
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t . 1 1 1 . h b l' f f th E . 181 par lCU ar y arge In tee le s 0 e plcureans. However, 
this difficulty can best be solved by examining exac"tly what is 
the object of attack in vv.281-295 and by comparing that examin-
ation and its results, both with the earlier attacks upon different 
kinds of folly within the poem, and also with the Epicurean and 
Stoic views upon prayer and the gods. For, if the difficulty is 
not solved~ then substance will be given to Rudd's claim that the 
eclecticism of Horace was facilitated by blurring of distinctions 
between the beliefs of the various schools, a blurring which had 
allegedly taken place during the later Hellenistic periOd. 182 
The freedman ofvv.281-287 is attacked because he prays 
to the gods to make a unique exception in his case and to save 
him from death. He mistakenly believes that death is an evil, 
when it is in fact, or should be, merely a matter of indifference. 
The ignorance of the freedman, however, extends far beyond his 
mistake regarding the nature of death and his beliefs with regard 
to the role played by the gods. The mistake regarding the nature 
of death is indicative of a total ignorance regarding the nature 
and, therefore, the purpose of life. For the freedman's motives 
for praying for an indefinite extension to the span of his life 
can only be construed as aiming at a continued enjoyment of, or 
quest for, wealth, political power and illicit sexual relations,' 
if the attack upon his prayer is read, as it needs must be, as 
completing that series of attacks upon human folly which is 
formulated within the diatribe. The misunderstanding of the 
nature and, therefore, the function of prayer argues for the 
181 The word is used in an ironical spirit of Epicurean doctrine 
at Cicero, N.D. 1.32.90, "sed tamen quis iste tantus casus, 
unde tam felix concursus atomorum, ut repente homines deorum 
forma nascerentur.!1 Cf. ib .. 2.2.6, also Lucre"tius, 6.1096. 
182 Rudd: pp.16-35~ see disc. above pp.2ff. 
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existence of an overall ignorance, or a~poouvn, of the workings 
of the cosmos and its organisation for the best under the guidance 
of the divine logos or Providence. Particular instances of this 
overall ignorance betray themselves in the cardinal vices of 
axoAaoCa and aOLxCa and are demonstrated in action by the mis-
guided means and motives of the foolish and insane in their quest 
for illusory goods. This ignorance and folly is compounded by the 
abuse of these illusory goods, notably wealth and political power, 
when once they have been achieved, yet, in its various aspects and 
subdivisions, this ignorance is merely an extension of that over-
all insanity and ignorance of which the behaviour of the super-
stitious freedman is symptomatic. 
The superstitious mother of vv.289-295 is similarly 
misguided in believing that, on the one hand, the gods concern 
themselves with the fate of individual humans and, on the other 
hand, that an extension of life on this earth is necessarily 
beneficial. Also her promise to the gods that her son, if cured, 
nudus in Tiberi tabit (291-292), betrays absolute ignorance of 
the basic workings of physiology, which are, also, under the 
guidance of the divine logos in its guise, subdivided, as the 
interpenetrating human ~uxn.183 
The attitude of the Stoics towards the gods and towards, 
prayer is more complex than that adopted by the Epicureans, who 
denied not that the gods had any existence, but that they had 
any concern with human affairs or even with the workings of the 
183 In the following passage Cleanthes is described as ascribing 
each element to its proper place, xat aUTOs (scil. KA.) 
aVL~~ Tas aAn0ELs apxus, 0EOV xat UAnv. xat TnV ~EV ynv 
~ETaSuAAELV ELs UOwp TO OE UOwp ELs aEpa, TOV os aEpa avw 
CpEpEo0aL I TO 08 TtUP d, s Ta TtEP eYE La XWPE LV, TnV OE ~uxnv 
OL' OAOU TOU xOOV,ou OLnxELv, ?is ~EPOs ~ETExovTas n~as 
E~~uxouo{)aL. HE'r:mias,'Irris. Gent. PhiL ,7 (S.V.F. 1.495); 
cf. Pluto De Virt. Mar. 
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cosmos. Similarly, the attitude of the Stoics towards death 
and eschatological problems in general is more complex than that 
of the Epicureans, who simply denied the possibility of any post 
mortem individual existence and, therefore, of post mortem 
punishment for transgressions committed in a terrestrial 
't 185 exJ.s ence. Death was described in almost Socratic terms by 
the Stoics as the separation of the soul from the body.186 Of the 
eight parts of the soul (each part isolated according to a specific 
f t ' ) 187 't' !>..), ..l h' h ' d h' T • unc 10n 1 J.s LU IJYE~OVLXuV W J.c survJ.ves eat EV ~ aL 
~aVLaaCaL xat at 6p~at YLvoVLaL xat O~EV 0 AOYOs avanE~nELaL· 
" .,. • £:.' 188 1 h h h d' onEp E~vaL EV xapuL~, a t oug t ere was some lspute among 
the Stoics themselves regarding the question of whose souls 
survived and for how long and also whether souls which did survive 
were punished or rewarded. Cleanthes, for example, seems to have 
believed that all souls survived until they were reborn as a 
result of the final ExnuPwoLs, while Chrysippus believed that 
1 tl 1 f h ' , d' 'd 1 ' l't 189 1 h I on y 1e sou sot e wJ.se won ln J.VJ. ua J.rnrnorta J. y. C eant es 
view was enthusiastically adopted by the early christians,190 but 
184 See Epicurus, ape D.L. lO.123f.; cf. Cicero, N.D. 1.43 and 
Lucretius, 1.62-101 and 5.1161-1240. 
185 See Epicurus, ape D.L. 10.65 and 125; cf. Lucretius, 3.417ff. 
186 XPuoLnnos OE ~nOLV OLL 6 ~avaL6s EaLL XWPLa~as ~uxns ana 
aw~aLoS 060EV O£ aow~aLov ana aw~aLoS XwpLkELaL· a60E yap 
E~anLELaL ow~aLoS aaw~aLov n O£ ~uxn xat E~anLELaL xat 
XWPL~ELaL LOU ow~aLoS· ow~a apa n ~uxn, Nemesius, De Nat. 
Horn. 34; cf. Plato, Phaed2 64c. 
187 See Aetius, 4.4.4, p.390 (Diels). 
188 Diogenes Laertius, 7.159. 
189 KAEav~ns ~EV ouv naoas EnLOLa~EVELV (LaS ~uxas) ~EXPL LnS 
ExnupwOEWsl XpUOLnnos O£ LaS LWV ao~wv ~6vov, Diogenes 
Laertius, 7.157; for the Stoics' attitude to naALYYEvEaLa, 
see Stobaeus, Ecl. 1.17. 
190 E.g. Lactantius, dive inst. 7.20, "animas quidem hominum 
permanere nec in'terventu morti s in nihil um resol vi i sed eorum 
qui iusti fuerunt puras et impatibiles et beatas ad sedem 
coelestem, unde illis origo sit, remeare vel in campos quos~ 
darn fortunatos rapi ubi fruantur miris voluptatibusi impios 
vero ... " where the author earns the title 'of the "Christian 
Cicero" . 
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I feel that the emphasis upon the name of Chrysippus in this poem 
and the despite shown for the insiyientes by Stertinius argues 
that he too believed that immortality was the privilege of the 
wise, or, at least, those who are consciously striving after 
wisdom. 19l Therefore, rather than pray simply to avoid death, 
men should train themselves in life in a preparation for death192 
and also ensure that their children are aware of the need for 
this training. It may be noted here that Horace introduces two 
human fears to thwart which the philosophy of Epicurus was 
consciously formulated, namely the fears inspired by death and the 
popular conception of revengeful gods. These are mentioned at vv. 
281-284, where th~ aged freedman begs the gods to preserve him 
alone from death, and at vv.290-295, where the anxious mother is 
diagnosed as suffering from fear of the gods, timore deorum (295). 
Both of these individuals seem less than well educated and to 
belong to that class which was of particular concern to Epicurus. 
Possibly Stertinius is suggesting that, although Epicureanism 
was designed to remove the anxieties of the "common people", it 
had failed in this aim and that Stoicism actually provided a more 
satisfactory solution to the perennial problems of human 
existence, even though the demands made upon the intellect by 
Stoicism were, at first sight, beyond the capabilities of the 
common people. 
Further, the Stoic concept of prayer and of the gods 
did not allow for the making of such individually selfish requests 
which are parodied in vv.281-295: for, on the one hand, a man 
191 The inconsistencies and difficulties of the religious beliefs 
of the Stoics are discussed by Arnold, pp.216-237, esp. p.217, 
"All through the Roman period the Stoics held in theory a 
definite and consistent position ... in the application ... to 
practical problems they showed that variation of standard and 
temperament which history has alwavs to record even of 
societies of honourable ::;md intelligent men." 
192 This 'dictum is again reminiscent of Plato, Phaedo 64B. 
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should not pray for things for which he cannot openly ask the 
193 gods, while, on the other hand, it is by no means certain that 
h d th 1 'h h' d' 'd 1 t ' , 194 h' h t e go s concern emse ves Wlt suc ln lVl ua rlVla, W lC 
should more properly be the concern of the individual himself. 
Ideally a man's prayers should be for what Juvenal describes in 
the famous lines of his tenth satire: 
orandum est ut sit mens sana in corpore sano. 
fortem posse animum mortis terrore carentem, 
qui spatium vitae extremum inter munera ponat 
naturae, qui ferre queat quoscumque labores 
nesciat irasci, cupiat nihil .•. 
Juv. 10.356-360 
By the time of Seneca and Epictetus, and also of Marcus Aurelius, 
prayer had developed virtually into an examination of a man's own 
soul "to know whether it is in tune with the purpose of the 
universe. ,,195 This ideal of living in accord with nature and 
also that ideal described by Juvenal, is far removed from the 
ignorant and foolish behaviour of the freedman and anxious mother 
196 here satirised by Horace. 
193 This precept is attributed by Seneca, Ep. 10.5 to one 
Athenodorus, probably the Stoic of thatname from Tarsus 
c.130-160 B.C., and is exploited by Juvenal in his tenth 
satire; cf. Sen. Ep. 41.1. 
194 The picture of the Stoic Jupiter at Seneca, N.Q.2.45.1 and 3 
is out of sympathy with the concept of such a personal approach, 
although there was dispute among the Stoics on the extent of 
influence felt by individuals upon their affairs from the 
gods. Compare, e.g., Cic. N.D. 2.65.164 with Cic. Off. 
2.6.19; Sen. N.Q. 7.30.3; Cic. N.D. 2.66.167. ---
195 Arnold, p.236, refers in his notes to Sen. Dial. 5.36.2 and 
Epictetus, Disc. 3.10.2 and 3. ----
196 A more detailed discussion than the foregoing of problems 
which relate to Stoic attitudes to prayer, free-will and 
evil may be found in A.A. Long, Hellenistic Philosoph~ 
(London, 1974) pp.163-170 and, by the same author, liThe Stoic 
Concept of Evil" PhQ 18 (1968) pp.329-343. 
J 
J 
STERTINIUS' MOTIVES IN SPEAKING 
TO DAMASIPPUS, VV.296-299 
129 
The extended quotation of the diatribe is closed by 
Damasippus at v.295 and in vv.296-299 Damasippus rounds off his 
exposition with a brief postscript. The burden of this is that 
these are the various types of argument taught him by Stertinius: 
297 posthac ne compellarer inultus. 
This reason betrays a considerable movement away from the original 
aim of Stertinius, which was to dissuade Damasippus from suicide, 
as reported in vv.34-4l, although the reason which was originally 
given why Damasippus should not take his own life is brought 
back to mind by the vivid final couplet of Damasippus' recital: 
298-299 dixerit insanum qui me totidem audiet atque 
respicere ignoto discet pendentia tergo. 
which echoes in sentiment: 
51-53 hoc te 
crede modo insanum, nihilo ut sapientior ille, 
qui te deridet, caudam trahat. 
Damasippus is immediately given the opportunity of putting the 
efficacy of Stertinius' instructions to the test, although we 
remember that his initial and unprovoked attack upon the desidia 
of Horace was rather inept; for Horace accepts the implied 
challenge by throwing out a question which serves as an introduction 
to the final conversation and altercation between himself and 
Damasippus. This conversation from vv.300-326 parallels the 
introductory conversation of vv.1-3l; both conversations form 




THE FINAL ALTERCATION VV.300-326 
The ironical challenge, which Horace flings out to 
Damasippus in vv.300-302 and which was inspired by Damasippus' 
confidence in his new faith, ensures that the final altercation 
between the author and his creation springs naturally from the 
close of Damasippus' speech. However, the meaning of: 
300-302 Stoice, post damnum sic vendas omnia pluris, 
qua me stultitia, quoniam non est genus unum, 
insanire putas7 ego nam videor mihi sanus. 
is obscure, within the overall context of the poem, although the 
literal meaning is not in any doubt. A proper understanding of 
the passage, especially of v.300, is necessary if the reader is 
properly to grasp the tone in which the whole poem closes. I 
assume that the tone is ironical and this is immediately suggested 
use of the address to 
D . 197 amaslppus. The treatment of Damasippus in the opening conver-
sation with Horace (1-31) matches the irony with which the figure 
of Damasippus is handled in the close of the poem. Horace's 
attitude has not been changed by the substance of the diatribe 
which has been regurgitated by Damasippus. Rudd's translation is 
accurate in both tone and meaning: 
My dear Stoic, to make up for your losses may you 
sell everything / at a profit! But in what folly 
(there are several forms) do you think / my madness 
. t 198 conS1S s7 
197 The ironical use of the vocative Stoice is akin to the use 
of the adverb philosophe in an iron ca sense at Plautus, 
Ru~. 4.3.37 and of the verb, philosophor, ide ~?pt. 2.2.34; 
PSG 2.3.21 and 4.2.18. Cf. n.36 above, p.36. 
198 Rudd, Satires of Horace and Persius, p.9l~ 
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although English idiom demands the breaking of the sentence into 
two independent structures. The irony lies in the use of the 
vocative Stoice, as mentioned above, as a virtual pejorative and 
in the fact that the ostensibly polite prayer or wish 199 of v.300 
is intended as a venomous reminder of that financial crash, which 
had been instrumental in bringing Damasippus to Stoicism. 200 
Horace suggests that there is but little reason to suppose that 
the Stoic Damasippus will be any more successful as a philosopher, 
on his present showing, than he formerly was as a man of business. 
It is also possible that Horace is here exploiting syntactical 
ambiguity to some advantage in order to give an added edge to his 
challenge to· Damasippus. For, although post damnum balances 
. oIDnia.pluris within the same clause and should be construed 
within the ambience of this extraneous wish clause, nevertheless 
its position immediately following the ironical Stoice (and 
conjoined with it by reason of its placement immediately before 
the caesura of v.300) does suggest that the reader is being 
invited to remember the implication of the confessions of 
Damasippus at vv.18-26, that he only became a Stoic after and as 
a result of his financial crash. If this implication is present 
in "Stoice, post damnum", we have a useful example of Horace 
relating, in a quite subtle manner, the two portions of the frame 
199 It is interesting to note that this optative meaning of sic 
and the subjunctive, divorced in direct sense connection---
from its surrounding sentence, is particularly a feature of 
the Augustan period. The meaning is, lias I hope that ••• " 
and the clause is usually followed by an imperative, e.g. 
Virgil, Ecl. 9.30 and 10.4, Horace, Odes 1.3.1. At Ovid, 
Met. 8.857-861 we find the sic clause followed by dic ubi 
sit, which is parallel to the present case in that a question, 
indirect, is introduced. At v.301 in this poem it is not . 
difficult to "understand" such an imperative as dic. 
200 Vv.18-26. 
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within which the diatribe of Stertinius is set,20l while, by the 
same means, the characterisation of Damasippus is shown to be 
consistent throughout the poem. Also the ironical tone of the 
setting may be thought of as contributing to the undercutting of 
the authority of the diatribe itself,202 especially when 
Damasippus makes a somewhat clumsy effort to apply the precepts 
of Stertinius to Horace during this final section of the poem. 
The efforts of Damasippus are clumsy, despite the fact that in 
vv.303-307 he gains an apparent, but temporary and illusory, 
advantage, since Horace grants Damasippus a debating point, the 
acquisition of which is neatly set up by Horace's confident claim 
t 't 203 'd 'h' (302) h "d o san~ y, ego na~v~ eor m~ ~ sanus . T e reJo~n er 
which Damasippus makes is as follows: 
303-304 quid, caput abscisum demens cum portat Agave 
gnati infelicis, sibi tunc furiosa videtur? 
Horace acknowledges the validity of this tragic example, by means 
of which Damasippus demonstrates that he has learned something of 
the techniques of his master. 204 Even this acknowledgement is, 
however, barbed with a degree of sarcasm and irony. For, although 
201 One may compare Horace's use of ring structure within the 
poem as at vv.3l-46; see discussion above pp.56f. 
202 Compare the Plautine technique of undercutting the stature 
of what should be an imposing or dignified character or 
speech exemplified by the portrayal and soliloquy of 
Alcumena at Amphitruo 633-653. As noted in the introduction~ 
I differ from W.B. Sedgwick, Plautus: Amphitruo (Mass. 1960) 
n. ad loco on this point, also from G. Karl Galinsky, The 
Herakles Theme (Blackwell, 1972) p.128. ---
203 In fact, Horace adopts the role of "victim" to the Socrates 
of Damasippus. However, the irony on this occasion all 
comes from the "victim", while the false-confidence, which 
is the mark of such Socratic victims as Euthyphro, Meno and 
Thrasymachus in the Euthyphro, Meno and Republic 1 of Plato, 
is here the mark of Damasippus,the would-be Socrates. 
204 Damasippus a ttemp'ts to exploit the exemplum drawn from myth, 
especially myth which has been made the subject of Attic 
tragedy; cf. in the diatribe vv.132-l4l and vv.187-223. 
133 
Horace admits defeat, his use of the words stultum (305) and 
insanum (306), at the opening and closing of his admission is 
clearly ironical, as was the use of Stoice in v.300. When an 
opponent employs the jargon of the opposition the tone is usually 
sarcastic. 205 While it may be argued that the terms stultum and 
insanum are not specifically Stoic, although they have both been 
used within the body of the diatribe,206 the particular question 
which Horace puts to Damasippus in vv.306-307 is undeniably Stoic 
in its phraseology, both in general and also within the specific 
context of this poem. Also, this specific question, couched in 
specific Stoic terms, has been anticipated and prepared for by 
the more general vv.301-302, with their rather more commonplace, 
but still Stoic vocabulary. The specific sentence at issue is: 
306-307 tantum hoc edissere, quo me 
aegrotare putes animi vitio? 
which picks up that attitude towards mental illness, which has 
207 been an ongoing part of the poem. Encouraged by his initial 
success, or apparent success, Damasippus forges ahead with a 
Stoicising attack upon the character of Horace, an attack which is 
formulated along lines which are suggested by the content of the 
diatribe of Stertinius. Rudd points this out at p.18l: 
Most of the forms of lunacy already mentioned are referred 
to again in the epilogue. Horace, says Damasippus, is 
ambitious in his building programme; he has a terrible 
temper (the word used is 'rabiem'), he lives recklessly 
beyond his means; and he is wildly promiscuous. One is 
given the impression that, if Horace had not interrupted, 
Damasippus would have completed the list with superstition. 
205 Compare, for example, Cicero's use, sarcastic use, of 
Epicurean technical terms at N.D. 1.26.74. 
206: E.g. at vv.32,40,48,54,63,67,8l,102 and so on. 
207 See above in discussion of vv.26-30 on pp.53f. 
But superstition, like greed, was so out of character 
that Horace would not allow himself to be accused of 
't 'k 208 1 , even as a JO e. 
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However, these comments, insofar as they are capable of being 
tested, are only true, or demonstrably so, to a certain extent. 
While it is certainly true that Horace displays ill-temper, once 
he has become the object of Damasippus' didactic attention, evil-
temper was not in itself an object of attack in the diatribe of 
Stertinius. The only excess of emotion which was attacked was the 
excess of sexual passion and the folly which it could engender. 
Rudd does suggest in this same discussion that there is but littl~ 
continuity in the total development of the poem, but in making 
this suggestion, which contains an inkling of the truth, he fails 
to recognise the real truth which is that, on the one hand, the 
logic of the diatribe is most certainly consistent, and, on the 
other hand, so is the characterisation of the insensitive Damas-
~.E?pu:::>. Pd:CC. ur -the dldLc..-H;'c.eL' .i::::>d. Lion or Lhe insensi Li vi Ly of 
Damasippus springs from the description of him attempting mis-
guidedly to apply the Stoic precepts of Stertinius to the very 
possibly genuine foibles of Horace, who was, after all, not above 
pillorying himself when it suited his purpose and so long as 
that pillorying was of relatively minor flaws. 209 
However, the first charge which is laid against Horace 
by Damasippus is in fact drawn from the moralising of Stertinius 
and his attacks upon the abuse of money for the sake of personal 
advancement and the enjoyment of luxury. If one were to take 
these attacks at all seriously, one could suggest that Satires 
2.2 and 2.6 are a sufficient answer to the charge of luxury, 
208 Rudd, The Satires of Horace (Carooridge, 1966). 
209 See above in the discussion of Satires 2.7. 
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especially since Satires 2.6 closes with a fable which is told 
rather better than that which is essayed by Damasippus in vv. 
314-320. 210 In answer to the charge that Horace, like the young 
man of vv.185-l86, is intent upon emulating his betters, one may 
cite the picture of the circle of Maecenas, as it is painted in 
Satires 1.6 and in 1.9.43-53, as evidence, on the one hand, that 
such emulation was not in Horace's sphere of ambition and, on the 
other hand, that Damasippus' view of the life of Maecenas and his 
circle was as misguided as that of the social climber of Sat. 1.6. 
~ 
Not only are the attacks of Damasippus misguided, they are also 
inconsistent, despite the fact that they are launched by a Stoic, 
who should have prided himself upon both the consistency of his 
211 
own life and that of his arguments. For, although Damasippus 
attacks Horace's supposed desidia in the introductory portion of 
this poem, at the close of Horace's longest poem he declares 
that any man who writes poetry is insane: 
321-323 adde poemata nunc, hoc est, oleum adde camino, 
quae si quis sanus fecit sanus facis et tu. 
non dico horrendam rabiem. 
Damasippus attempts irony, not realising, or not being allowed 
to realise by Horace, that this enthusiasm for irony, for fighting, 
as it were, fire with fire, is leading to inconsistency. Further, 
the charge of evil-temper which is laid against Horace in v.323 
does not sit easily with the patience with which Horace has 
endured the protracted sermon of the Stoic. The injustice of 
210 Rudd notes (p.177) that the Greek version of the fable of 
the calf and the frog is "more poignant than Horace's in 
its detail"; I would suggest, tentatively, that Horace 
consciously writes a weaker version than that of Babrius 
(28), because he wishes to undercut the persuasiveness of 
Damasippus' attack. 
211 For the importance of consistency to the Stoics, see above· 
pp.25ff. 
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this charge, coupled with the extremely personal comments of v.325, 
convinces Horace that his patience has been stretched far enough. 
Having come to this conclusion, Horace calls off the audience with 
a joke, again laden with irony, which sums up his attitude to 
Damasippus: 
326 0 maior tandemparcas insane minori! 
For the major message of the diatribe of Stertinius, which was 
originally intended as a consolatio to Damasippus, was that all 
men are equally mad, except the sapiens, even as all sins are 
equal. Therefore, Horace's jibe that, fool though he may be 
himself, Damasippus is a bigger one, has added bile, while the 
maior of v.326 calls to mind the maior of v.318. Thus Horace 
suggests that, if he himself is akin to the mother frog in emul-
ating the life style of Maecenas, Damasippus is guilty of a 
parallel failing in emulating, unsuccessfully the philosophical 
vigour and rigour of his own master, Stertinius. 
L 
PROBLEMS INVOLVED IN THE INTERPRETATION 
OF SATIRES 2.3 
Before embarking on the detailed study of this poem, I 
pointed out that, even though the structure of this lengthy 
satire did not present any great mysteries for explication, if 
only on account of what Rudd describes as its "architectural 
unitY",212 there were several other equally fundamental issues. 
These did require further elucidation. 213 
Paramount among these other issues was the question of 
212 Rudd, p.188 •. J 
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Horace's motivation regarding both the content of the poem, in 
terms of its moral didacticism and also in terms of those' 
characters, Damasippus and Stertinius, who were created by Horace 
in order to communicate that didacticism and message in a particular 
, 
way, a Stoic way, and also regarding the form of the poem, in 
terms of the length and importance within the poem of the Stoic 
diatribe of Stertinius. Put it more simply; why did Horace write 
this poem at all and why in this particular way? Related to the 
question and problem of why Horace places the central, longest 
and most important part of the poem into the mouth of another, 
whom he has been at some pains to ridicule,2l4 is the question 
whether Horace is, in fact, so inept as to allow "the picture.to 
become blurred at a number of points,,2l5 with the result that the 
reader is never sure whether he is listening to the voice of 
Horace or of Damasippus/Stertinius. If, on the other hand, this 
IIblurring ll , always a.dmitting that it exists, is conscious, what 
is Horace's reason for so confusing his readers that they are in 
a state of uncertainty regarding this vital question. It may, in 
fact, be argued with some conviction that Horace takes a certain 
amount of trouble to ensure that no such blurring does take place 
and that, if lithe satire's central idea is rather weak - at least 
. th f db' . ,,216 h 11 b 1n' e orm presente y Stert1n1us, t ere may we e some 
good Horatian reason for this alleged weakness. Following on 
from these considerations is the perennial question of Horace's 
attitUde to the Stoa as it is illustrated by this poem; there is 
also the related, but different, question of the attitude which 
214 Horace does this both in the introductory conversation, see 
pp. 44-55 above, and in the final altercation, see pp. 
130-136. 
215 Rudd, p.175. 
216 Th"; ..:J __, 00 
..!.J..J...L.U01 J::le.J..UUo 
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Horace adopts towards Damasippus and Stertinius, who are his 
creations within the details of the fiction of the poem, but 
bl 1 t t ' f f t' t' 217 presuma y a so are represen' a lve 0 a group 0 ac lve s 01CS. 
In the answers to these final and extremely complex questions may 
lie the solution to the problem of why Horace exploits the device 
of the mask of the Stoic preacher and whether this poem is 
ultimately successful. 
The basic question of why Horace wrote this poem and 
why in this particular way can be provided with at least three 
different, but nevertheless related, answers. The answers are 
related in that they are complementary to and not exclusive of 
each other. Some of what follows may seem too much a statement 
of the obvious, although the overall picture is obscured by the 
complexity of Horace's motivation. 
Horace states elsewhere in the Satires that his aims are 
1 d d 'd ' 218 mora an 1 actlc; in this he follows not only in the foot-
steps of Lucilius,2l9 but also of Lucretius. 220 Horace also 
, 221 
anticipates the moral earnestness of PerS1US and .also, on 







Stertinius, we know, was both a Stoic and a poet; cf. the 
comments of Horace at Ep. 1.12.20: 
Empedocles, an Stertinium deliret acumen. 
Teuffel comments on Stertinius at Rom. Lit. 250.4: the fact 
that the name bears such a close reseffiDlance to the latin word 
for to snore (sterto) suggests that Horace was either 
opportunistic or inventive. 
The moral purpose is most evident in the diatribes, such as 
Sat. l.li 1.2; 1.3 and 2.2; 2.3; 2.7, but also comes across 
in the attacks upon gluttony and ostentation in 2.4 and in 
2.8 and in the attacks upon the captatores in 2.5. 
Horace acknowledges his debt to Lucilius who "sale multo / 
urbem defriciut", Sat. 1.10.3-4, although, like Ben Jonson of 
Shakespeare, he felt that his prosody was careless, ibid. 
56-74. 
Although Horace lacks the philosophical fervour of Lucretius, 
yet the Epicurean poet's attacks upon human folly, especially 
when caused by ignorance of the true nature of g6ds or death 
is anticipatory of Horatian satire. 
Compare Persius, 3.63-76 with the tone of Hor. Sat. 2.3. 
Horace, Sat. 1.2 is anticipatory of Juvenal in both its vigour 
and its subject matter. 
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may assume that part of his aim is the expression of moral ideas 
in a didactic manner and that his concern is to attack and 
ridicule the various follies of mankind. In fact Horace does 
attack and ridicule the follies of mankind, especially where those 
follies express themselves in behaviour which is avaricious, 
ambitious, luxurious, sensual and superstitious. However, as well 
as satirising mankind in general, Horace has a second and more 
specific satirical purpose; for Horace wishes to attack those 
who themselves attack mankind, but who do so from an excessively 
theoretical and extreme philosophical stance. Such men are those 
philosophers who,setheories had long been considered irrelevant,223 
and whose behaviour was often attacked as hypocritical. 224 Horace 
chooses Damasippus and Stertinius as representatives of this 
class of men in much the same way that Aristoph~nes pilloried 
Socrates as a representative of the Sophists in the Clouds or 
Lamachus as a representative of unthinking militarism in the 
Acharnians. That Damasippus and Stertinius are Stoics of a kind 
involves further ramifications, which will soon be made apparent. 
Suffice to say now that Horace objects to the gross enthusiasm of 
the novice Damsippus and to his uncritical acceptance of the 
extreme doctrines and the extreme presentation of those doctrines 
which are characteristic of the diatribe of Stertinius. 
If the first two reasons adduced for Horace's composition 
of this marathon poem can be characterised by the terms "moral" 
and "satiric", then the third reason, which I am about to adduce, 
223 The irrelevance and hypocrisy of philosophers was often 
attacked by the writers of New Comedy, e.g.: on the use-
lessness of philosophers, Amphis, Amphicrates' E. p. 315.6. 
224 On the hypocrisy of the philosophers, see esp. the attacks 
upon the vegetarianism of the pythagoreans, E. p.525.9 and 
p.527.12-15; also E.p'.285.226i 213.113; 393.36 (on the 
Cyrenaic Aristippus); 177.33; 253.1; 177.33 etc. 
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can be characterised by the term "literary". For Horace does 
seem to have been fascinated by the diatribe form as it was 
exploited by the popular philosophers of his own day and of the 
225 Hellenistic period. As was pointed out by Brochard, the 
diatribe was undoubtedly effective as an instrument of persuasion. 
Cicero had attempted with a certain degree of success to give 
polished literary expression in latin prose to the diatribe form l 
this in the Paradoxa Stoicorum. As A.G. Lee writes: 
From what Cicero says in his preface to Brutus it is 
clear that his interest was aroused not so much by 
their (the paradoxes') substantial truth or their 
Socratic ancestry as by the artistic problem which 
an attempt to cast them into a popular and persuasive 
226 form would present. 
The same desire to overcome an interesting technical problem may 
well have been active in Horace's mind at the time of the compos-
ition of this poem, which, I tentatively suggest, is a lengthy 
attempt to give a reputable form and presentation in latin verse 
to what may have seemed at first sight to be relatively uncompro-
mising material, even though suited to the satiric genre more 
than any other. We know that Horace did pride himself as an 
innovator in the field of latin poetry from his own comments upon 
the achievement enshrined in the Odes,227 while, at a later date, 
it seems likely that the Epistles of Horace were th~ first verse 
1 tt f t . . t 228 1 d . t th d" f e ers 0 an lqUl y. A so, espl e e erlvatlve nature 0 
225 See above,pp.40f. 
226 A.G.Lee, M. Tul1i Ciceronis: Paradoxa Stoicorum (London, 
1953) p. 
227 E.G. Horace, Odes 3.30 esp. vv.12-14: 
ex humili potens 
princeps Aeo1ium carmen ad Ita10s 
c1eduxisse modos. 
228 The prose letters of e.g. Plato, Epicurus and Cicero ante-
date the Epistulae of Horace, but none of the earlier writers 
of the li,t~rary epistle seem to have operated in verse. 
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much latin poetry there was nevertheless always great "kudos" to 
be had from achieving the status of an innovator; this, of course, 
t f ' d 11th I' f' ld 229 was no con 1ne so e y to e 1terary 1e . Our final 
judgement upon the merits of Horace's diatribes in verse, namely 
Satires 2.2; 2.3; 2.7 and, to a lesser extent 2.6, must depend 
upon the extent to which we consider that Horace was successful 
in transposing into latin verse what was essentially a Greek, 
spoken, sometimes impromptu method of persuasive discourse. 
One mark of the possible lack of success with which this 
transposition was effected by Horace could be the alleged blurring 
of the distinctions between the spea.kers within the fictional 
dialogue and the voice of the poet who, after all, is constantly 
manipulating his puppets from behind the scenes in order that they 
may serve his particular purpose. I f~el that one should talk 
rather of the conscious existence or non-existence of such blurring 
rather than ascribe incompetence to the poet, unless no other 
interpretation of the facts presents itself. For if such blurring 
does exist, then it is explicable along the following lines: 
Horace recognisei the validity of what the Stoics say, at least 
in large measure. What the Stoics say is compatible with his own 
largely traditional views. Thus, after the introductory and 
extremely amusing and arresting conversation in which, as has 
230 been demonstrated, Horace takes great pains in his anticipatory 
characterisation of Damasippus and Stertinius, creating characters 
who "make an excellent foil for the ironical Horace",23l the 
229 This may be seen from the list of the "blessed" innovators 
in Virgil's underworld in Aeneid 6.661-664; here V. is in 
accord with Stoic doctrine on men who enjoy apotheosis for 
"services rendered", see Cic. N.D. 2.24.62. 
230 See above pp.44-55. 
231 Rudd, p.174. 
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sharp distinction is allowed to disappear,. so that the reader 
eventually accepts the voice of the moralising section of the poem 
as the voice of the poet himself. This illusion is ultimately 
destroyed when the "Horace" within the dialogue asks Damasippus 
to characterise, in turn, Horace's particular brand of insanity. 
Thereby a satisfactorily comic ending is achieved, to parallel 
the beginning of the poem, but the validity of the criticisms 
levelled at human nature in general, with which the central portion 
of the satire is concerned, is not affected. Such an interpre-
tat ion does have a certain plausibility, but is, I feel, spurious, 
smacking too much of special pleading. If the poem is read with 
a full and continuing awareness of the distinctively Stoic nature 
of the diatribe of Stertinius, not only in terms of its overall 
form, but also in terms of those devices described by Fronto232 
as quite particularly characteristic of the persuasive style of 
eh ' h' . d b t" th . t h 23 3 rys1ppus, w 0 1S mentlone y name W1ce W1 ln e poem, 
then it is difficult to understand how a reader can come to believe 
that he is listening directly to the voice of Horace, undistorted 
by the obvious Stoic mask through which the poet's words are being 
filtered. Also, the vocabulary of the diatribe is consciously 
studded with allusions to Stoic doctrines, as has been demon-
strated; the Stoic paradox, which is the central idea of the 
discussion is never allowed to be far from our thoughts; Horace 
has taken great pains to show not only that Damasippus was a 
Stoic reporting a Stoic, but also that he himself is somewhat 
sceptical of Stoic advice which comes from such a philosophical 
parvenu. This scepticism on the part of Horace is part of the 
232 Ep. ad M. Ant. de ~~ .. 1.146.N; 
these terms, see abov~ pp.67-69. 
233 This at v.44 and v.287. 
for a discussion of 
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final impression which one carries away from the poem after the 
final altercation between Horace and Damasippus. It seems, 
therefore, unlikely that we are intended to think the voice of 
the central section of the poem belongs to anyone else than the 
Stoic Stertinius, whose words are being reported to Horace by 
Damasippus. Similarly, we are never in doubt in Satires 2.7 
that the preaching voice belongs to Davus, although the charact-
erisation is perhaps more strongly maintained throughout the poem, 
especially by the frequent interjections of Horace;234 that 
poem is also considerably shorter. I would also argue that in 
Satires 2.2 we should always be aware that the major speaker is 
235 Of ell us. The technique of Juvenal in these matters is rather 
different. 236 
Where does this lead us, however, in our quest to 
answer the question of how Horace felt towards the Stoics in 
general and towards Damasippus and Stertinius in particular? It 
was shown earlier237 that, on a small scale, Horace is prepared 
to exploit Stoic terms and doctrines both to aid the structure 
of his poems and to add colour and intellectual stiffening to his 
attacks upon the folly of his fellow citizens. This tendency is 
taken to its logical conclusion in Satires 2.3; not only does 
Horace exploit stoic tags to aid the architecture of his poem, 
but, within a conversational and comic form and frame, Horace 
utilises a Stoic form and a Stoic mouthpiece and a Stoic doctrine 
in order to achieve with the maximum economy the fulfilment of his 
234 See discussion below, Chap.4. 
235 See discussion below, Chap.5. 
236 In, e.g. Juvenal 1.3, the mask of Umbricius is but a thin 
disguise for the saeva indignatio of Juvenal. 
237 See discussions of Satires 1.1; 1.2 and 1.3 above. 
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tripartite aim. Horace satirises human folly in general and 
simultaneously attacks those aspects of "Stoics" and Stoicism 
which he found particularly offensive. He also attempts to put 
into an acceptable literary form the popular diatribe of the street 
philosopher without materially affecting its nature. 
It may be objected that the simultaneous attack upon both 
human folly and the representatives of the Stoa selected by Horace 
would undercut the authority of that attack upon human folly which 
is perhaps the major aim of the poem. This is not the case: the 
very extremism of doctrine, to which Horace takes exception and 
which was characteristic of the fundamental Stoic, and that 
extremism of expression, to which that extreme doctrine led, was, 
and is, ideally suited to the polemical spirit. of moral satire. 
Horace's recognition of this fact enables him to kill three birds 
with one stone, while he smiles the smile of Socratic irony; for 
he effectively satirises the foibles of his fellow men, mocks the 
enthusiasm of the newly converted Stoic and, finally, makes a 
successful experiment with a new sub-genre in latin poetry. 
The use of the Stoic mask grants further advantages to 
Horace by distancing the author from the victims of his satire 
who, it would seem, had been both ruffled and vocal in the past. 238 
Similarly, the attacks, which Horace allows or invites the Stoic 
to make against himself as author, lessen the natural hostility 
which is felt towards one who, by the very action of writing moral 
satire, appears to set himself up as something more virtuous 
than his neighbours. This aspect of the use of the mask, both 
Stoic and traditional Roman, is discussed in more detail in the 
discussions of Satires 2.7; 2.2 and also 2.6 which follow. It 
238 This from the evidence/of Satires 1.10 and 2.1. 
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will also be necessary to consider, especially in the detailed 
discussion of Satires 2.7, whether Horace's treatment of the slave 
Davus and his peculiar brand of bastard stoicism is consistent 
with the theories which were put forward in answer to the 
difficulties encountered in the course of the detailed discussion 
of Satires 2.3. Rand, in his typically eloquent Horace and the 
Spirit of Comedy preempts to a certain extent my own comments on 
the diatribes of the second book of the Satires with: 
It (Satires 2.7) is a satire on the Stoics, whose 
diatribe Horace imitates, only to hoist them with 
their own petard. Yes, but this is not real Stoic 
doctrine, but only what Davus has absorbed at third 
remove from the concierge of Crispinus, himself a 
street-cleaner, a most lowly scion of the lineage of 
Zeno. 239 
However, I hope that my own more detailed study will yet 
be able both to substantiate what Rand suggests and make its own 
contribution to a proper understanding ot the diatribes. 




A DISCUSSION OF SATIRES 2.7 
A 
Davus, who is one of Horace's household slaves, takes 
advantage of the licence which is afforded by the Saturnalia and 
launches a critical attack upon certain aspects of his master's 
character. Horace suffers this criticism until his patience can 
endure it no longer; he then drives off an unrepentant Davus 
with threats of physical violence. Davus attacks Horace from 
something akin to the standpoint of Stoic ethics, although his 
personal acquaintance with that field of study comes from a doubt-
ful source, the doorman of Crispinus, who was himself even not 
held in any high esteem by Horace. 1 The structure of Satires 2.7 
is as follows: 
1-5 Prologue: Davus breaks in upon Horace, wanting to 
speak frankly to his master. 
6-20 Davus moralises in general terms on inaequalitas. 2 
21-22 Horace interrupts with the question, "quorsum haec 
·tam putida tendant?" 
22-27 Horace is himself accused in general terms of 
inaequalitas. 
28-43 Davus gives examples and compares Horace un favourably 
with himself and Mulvius. 
43-45 Horace makes an unspoken interruption. 
46-71 Davus attacks the sexual proclivities of Horace. 
72 Davus anticipates Horace's unspoken "non sum moechus". 
1 Crispinus is the object of Horace's mockery at Satires 
1.1.120-121. 
2 For the Stoic content of the criticism of ina~ualitas, see 
above in the discussion of Satires 1.3 pp.25ff. 
72-82 Horace would be moechus, if he could, says Davus 
and the intention is important. Horace is a slave 
to his desires and, therefore, less free even than 
Davus. 
83-88 Only the sapiens is truly free. 
88-111 Horace, however, cannot benefit from this sound 
advice. The standards of society which adjudge 
Horace a better man than Davus are at fault. 
111-115 Horace is also subject to another master which he 
cannot escape, the atra comes (115) which is cura 
(114) • 
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116-118 Horace threatens physical violence to drive Davus 
away. Davus ends \vith a joke, "aut insanit homo aut 
versus facit.,,3 Horace t.hreatens to banish Davus 
to a country estate. 
Before discussing the content of this poem in any detail, 
it may be worth while to point out an interesting feature of its 
structure which ensures that this poem, although parallel in many 
ways to Satires 2.3, also has close connections with the Socratic 
dialogue and the dialogue of comedy. Although, as Davus warms to 
his theme and grows in confidence, the interruptions which are 
made by Horace become fewer and farther between, nevertheless 
they are frequent enough to ensure that the fiction of a conver-
sation is more convincingly maintained than in Satires 2.3. This 
is not to suggest that the structure of the longer poem is 
inadequate by comparison, but that in 2.3 Horace's intention is 
to satirise particularly the form of stoic exposition in the hands 
of a novice, as well as the content, while in Satires 2.7 Horace 
is more concerned perhaps with content per se, since the question 
of slavery was of more immediate moment than the question of 
3 This is reminiscent-of the close of Satires 2.3 especially 
vv.321-322. 
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insanity, and with the comic possibilities of a conversation 
with a slave. A germ of this idea exists in Satires 2.3 when 
the slave, in the exemplum so neatly adapted from the beginning 
of Terence's Eunuchus, is described by Stertinius as "servus non 
paulo sapientior" (2.3.265). The comedy which Horace produces in 
Satires 2.7 is closer to reality on two counts: Davus is by no 
means wiser than his master and the relative positions of slaves 
"and masters are only temporarily forgotten. When Davus in full 
spate attacks his master rather too nearly, Horace asserts his 
ultimate authority and dismisses the slave abruptly with threats 
of dire punishment. This growth of confidence and its termination 
by Horace with a Catonic threat can be represented diagrammat-
ically; the following lines are approximately in scale to the 
length of the various sections of the poem: 
PROLOGUE vv.I-5 
DAVn.S (a) vv.6-20 
HORACE (a) vv.21-22 
D. (b) vv.22-42 
H. (b) vv.43-44 
D. (c) vv.46-7l 
H. (c) v.72 
D. (d) 
ALTERCATION vv.116-1l8 
The different lines match the basic divisions of the poem. It 
can clearly be seen that the growth in Davus' confidence is matched 
by the manner in which he manages to monopolise the conversation, 
until such time as Horace thinks it necessary to call a halt. An 
examination of the content of these sections will enable us to 
see if Horace's exploitation of the figure of Davus parallels at 
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all his exploitation of the figures of Damasippus and Stertinius 
in Satires 2.3 and if, despite his caricature of Stoic personnel, 
he also, as in 2.3, exploits the doctrines of the Stoics to give 
weight to his own attacks upon the foibles 0= Rom~n society. We 
should also consider the purpose of those attacks which are made 
upon Horace's character in this context. 
I shall discuss the poem section by section, utilising 




The opening of the poem anticipates closely the direction 
which the satire is to take: 
1-2 iamdudum ausculto et cupiens tibi dicere servus 
pauca reformido. 
This reference, which Davus makes to his own status as a slave, 
apart from identifying immediately his relationship with the poet 
and, thereby, setting a standard of expected behaviour for their 
current and observed interaction, anticipates especially his later 
statement of the Stoic paradox that only the sapiens is truly 
4 free. Like Damasippus in Satires 2.3, Davus has only recently 
been recruited to the ranks of the Stoics and is fired with 
enthusiasm for their moral theories. As Damasippus found some 
comfort and confidence in the idea that all men were as incompet-
ent and as insane as himself, apart from the sapiens, even so 
Davus finds encouragement in the stoic belief that all men are 
4 See esp. vv.83-88. 
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equally slaves, apart from the exceptional sapiens. This belief, 
coupled with the freedom traditionally granted by the Saturnalia, 
encourages Davus to repay Horace for some of the verbal punishment 
which he has had to endure throughout his lifetime as a slave. 
This follows the possible interpretation 6f iamdudum ausculto (1), 
which is offered by Palmer, in his note, as an alternative to the 
interpretation, which he actually prefers, that Davus had been 
lis-tening to Horace scolding some other slaves, and which is, itself, 
the third of a series of possible explanations. These are listed 
as follows: "(1) while Horace was reciting the last satire (Bent.); 
(2) while Horace was reading out or talking to himself (Or.); (3) 
while Horace was scolding some slaves (old comm.); (4) listening 
at the doors for his master's commands (Heind.); (5) perhaps 
listening until Horace awoke from sleep, or rose from his lectus 
lucubratorius." Palmer, in support of the contention that Davus 
wishes to pay Horace back for previous scoldings, which he has 
himself endured, refers to Juvenal 1.1: "semper ego auditor tantum, 
numquamne reponam?" On balance this is also the interpretation 
which I would support, although I do feel that, of the above 
explanations, (2) has much to recommend it. The idea of the slave 
interrupting the private, but spoken, musings of his master, 
possibly self-critical musings, has something attractive to offer 
in the light of the attack which Davus is himself about to launch 
against his master. For it is clear that Horace portrays Davus as 
being motivated by a genuine concern for his master, a concern 
which suits a slave who is "amicum / mancipium domino et frugi quod 
sit satis ... 11 (2-3). Davus' attitude and self-praise is reminiscent 
5 
of -the behaviour of the loyal slave in Roman comedy, as is much 
5 For a discussion of the loyalty of the Plautine and Terentian 
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else of his behaviour in this poem. This will become apparent as 
the discussion advances. However that may be, Horace is intrigued 
by this interruption, or irruption, which is made by Davus and 
allows the slave to have his say: 
4-5 age, libertate Decembri, 
quando ita maiores voluerunt, utere; narra. 
Horace suggests that it is only the freedom which is granted by 
the Saturnalia which will enable Davus to talk to Horace almost as 
an equal. On the other hand, one could also suggest that the 
initial tolerance, which Horace extends towards Davus, was 
fostered by that spirit of humanism which is reflected in the 
treatment and portrayal of slaves and prostitutes in the comedies 
. 6 
of Menander and Terence. The effects of this spirit of humanity 
upon even those members of society who had not actively embraced 
Stoicism may be seen in the slow butsure easing of the slave's 
lot from the time of Cato Maior to that of Marcus Aurelius, who 
actually introduced legislation to protect the servile classes.' 
Significant stages within this progression may be seen reflected 
in the comments of various authors, not all of whom are Stoic. 8 
slave see Duckworth, The Nature of Roman Comedy (Princeton, 
1952) pp~251-253; Phaniscus in Plautus, Most. 859 displays a 
timidity similar to that of Davus and also comments that such 
timidity is the mark of a useful and devoted slave. 
6 Cf. above, n.142. 
7 For legislatiOn regarding slavery and the influence on that 
legislation of the philosophy of the Stoa see Arnold, pp. 
402-403, who refers also to Renan, Marc-Aur~le pp.22-23 and 
Maine, Ancient Law pp.55-56. 
8 The Stoics rejected the Platonic and Aristotelian concept of 
the natural slave; e.g. Philo, Sept. et Fest. Di. p. 283 M, 
dv8pwnoG yap ~K ~6aEwG 6oD~oG o66E[G. However, the economic 
dependence of the ancient world upon slavery ensured that the 
Stoics urged the amelioration of the lot of the slave, 
rather than the abandonment of the system. Cicero and Seneca 
were in the forefront of those who urged that slaves deserved 
more humane treatmen·t: e.g. Cic. Rep. 3.25.37 and Off. 
1.13.41; Sen. Ep. 47.1-2; Ben. 3.18.2; 3.22.1; 3.22.3. 
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Horace, who was, in certain respects, an admirer of the mores 
maiorum, 9 feels guilty at acquiescing in the liberality of the 
Saturnalia, even though this liberality had been willed by the 
ancestors, "ita maiores vo1uerunt" ( 5) . Horace reverts to Catonic 
harshness only when his patience has been severely tested: 
117-118 ocius hinc te 
. (~' . b' 10 nl rapls, accedes opera agro nona Sa lno. 
Horace had other and more personal reasons for treating slaves 
with a degree of compassion and humanity, since he was himself 
the son of a freedman, was not afraid to publish the fact and had 
praised Maecenas for not holding his origins against him.ll In 
this sense, therefore, Horace would have had some basic sympathy 
12 for the idea that slave and free were essentially the same. 
However, whatever Horace's precise motivation, even if 
his major desire is to launch the satire in a vivid and interesting 
way, this prologue of four to five lines does suggest that Horace 
had more in mind than simply the freedom of the Saturnalia, even 
although this provides a valid excuse, if one is necessary, for 
listening to a slave. Davus takes his opportunity, but initially 
with diffidence, being unwilling to become too personal too 
9 See below in discussion of Satires 2.2 and 2.6. 
10 Cf. P1autus, Capt. 760ff., also Most. 4. 
11 E.g. Horace, Satires 1.6.45-48: 
nunc ad me redeo libertino patre natum, 
quem rodun-t omnes libertino patre natum, 
nunc quia sim tibi, Maecenas, convictor; at olim 
quod mihi pareret legio Romana tribuno. 
I do not think it too daring to sense an air of defiance in 
the repetition of "libertino patre natum", in the above , 
passage, which is possibly symptomatic of a certain insecurity 
regarding the foundations of his position within the circle 
of Augustus and Maecenas. 
12 E.g. Lactantius, Div. lnst. 3.25, "quod si natura hominis 
sapientiae capax est, oportuit et opifices et rusticos et 
mulieres doceri, ut sapiant ... senserunt hoc adeo Stoici, 
qui et servis et mulieribus philosophandum esse dixerunt." 
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quickly. Rather Davus treads warily and makes a general statement 
to test his master's reaction. 
c 
DAVUS (a), VV.6-20 
Davus praises consistency by attacking its opposite in 
a manner which is reminiscent of Horace's earlier treatment of the 
theme in Satires 1.3; however, unlike any true Stoic, Davus 
ultimately declares that a life of consistent debauch is prefer-
able to a life which swings from one extreme of virtue to the 
other of vice: 
18-20 quanto constantior isdem 
in vitis, tanto levius miser ac prior illo, 
qui iam contento, iam laxo fune laborat. 
Horace knows that no true stoic could subscribe to such a view, 
or even represent it: and: by the attribution of such a view to 
Davus, he both undercuts the authority of Davus as a moralist, 
in advance of that moral attack, which he is about to arrange 
that Davus should launch against him and Horace also demonstrates, 
as he did with Damasippus, whose author~ty he also undercut in 
advance of his (or Stertinius') diatribe, that the fresh convert 
is not the safest mouthpiece, however enthusiastic he may be, 
for a philosophical system. Horace also demonstrates, as the 
satire develops, that an "educated" slave can learn of concepts 
and theories which are capable of seriously undermining the 
stability of the established social and economic system, however 
laudable those concepts may be from a purely altruistic and 
humanitarian point of view. 
On a matter of finer detail, however, it is interesting 
to note a possible example of IIoratian wit in v.20. The line in 
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question runs as follows: 
20 qui iam contento, iam laxo fune laborat. 
where the origin of the proverb, which is being used by Davus, 
is unclear. Palmer dismisses the idea that the image is derived 
from rope-walking and suggests that perhaps the idea of a tow-rope 
. t . t 13 1S mos appropr1a e. This is the line taken by Rudd in his 
translation,14 while Lejay is unusually unhelpful and refers to 
Horace Ep. 1.10.48, where the concept again seems to be of a tow-
15 
rope. The idea would then be that a man who was being towed, 
as a slave or prisoner, which is a concept which is compatible 
with the continuing context of the satire, would suffer a degree 
of discomfort (laborat) from being towed too severely with a 
tight rope or from becoming entangled in too loose a rope. How-
ever, this does seem to be a rather obscure illustration of the 
basic concept that extremes are to be avoided, unless there is 
some added point, which appears to have been overlooked. A clue 
lies in the concept of tension, upon which the image of the rope 
depends. "Tension" had played an important role in both physical 
and ethical theories since the time of Heraclitus. 16 The idea 
that the soul is a kind of tension or harmony is explored by Plato 
in the Phaedo. 17 However, it is in the philosophy of the Stoics 
13 Palmer, n. ad loco p.359. 
14 Ruddls translation runs as follows, " ... the unfortunate / 
creature who is now chafed and now entangled by the rope", 
p.l06. 
15 Lejay, n. ad loco p.565. 
16 E.g. Heraclitus, fr.51 (Hippolytus, Ref. 9.9.1), 06 EuvLdaLv 
QuwG 6 LacpspOl-LSVOV E:wu'tQ EUl-LCDEps'taL· naA. (v'tovoG apl-Lov en 
Quwansp 'toEou uat A.UpnG. I accept the reading naA.Lv'toVOG, as 
supported in Kirk and Raven, The Pre socratic PhilosoEhers 
(Camb. 1962) pp.193f., against naA.Cv'tPonoGI supported by 
Vlastos, AJP 76 (1955) 348ff., although, even if one were to 
accept Vlastos' reading, one would have to accept the existence 
of 'tovoG within the lyre or bow. 
17 At Phaedo 91c-95a Socrates dismisses the epiphenomenal view 
that the soul is an "attunement", although'he admits that, 
were the soul to be described in such terms, the virtuous soul 
would be a soul perfectly "in tune". 
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that the concept of "tension" or 'LovoG assumed its greatest 
importance in both the fields of ethics and physics, as was 
natural in a non-atomic materialistic philosophy based upon a 
"continuum" theory of physics,18 in which 'LovoG was the material 
expression of the all-pervading role and purpose of the divine 
logos. Leaving aside the ro~e of 'LovoG, in what may be described 
as physics, as being strictly irrelevant to Horace, Satires 2.7.20, 
let us concentrate on the role of 'LovoG within the soul in the 
field of ethics, since the illustration of the rope is designed 
to illuminate a situation, which has arisen in a discussion of 
an ethical topic. Even as the 'LovoG, which is present in that 
Ttve:UlJ,a, which interpenetrates those bodies, considered by the. 
layman to be "inanimate", is responsible for the maintenance of 
those bodies in a relatively stable existence, even so the 'LovoG, 
which is maintained within the more sophisticated human organism 
by the human individual's share of Ttve:UlJ,a,19 or his soul, and 
which also exists within the soul, is responsible for the main-
tenance of a man's physical being,20 his capacity for 10comotion2~ 
and also for the moral state of his soul and intellect - and for 
the efficiency of the latter. That the physical health and 
mental health of an individual were maintained by an analogous 
18 For a discussion of 'LovoG in Stoic physics, see Sambursky, 
The Physical World of the Greeks (London, 1956) pp.132-l57 
also ide Physics of the Stolcs-(London, 1959) esp. pp.2l-48. 
On the "junction of soul and body" see Arnold, pp.259-26l. 
19 See Plutarch, De Virt. iVlor. 45lBi cf. Sextus Emp. 9.81. 
20 E.g. Chrysippus ape Gal. 5, p.287 Kuhn, n t./JUXT) nve:ul-ta. EO'Ll, 
a6lJ,~u'Lov nlJ,tv aUV€X8G naV'LL 'LQ oWlJ,a'Ll, OLnUOV EO'L' av n 
'LnG 6WnG aUlJ,lJ,E'LpLa napfj EV 'LQ aWlJ,a'LLi cf. Diogenes Laertius, 
7.157. On the relation of the human soul to the world soul, 
see e.g. Marcus Aurelius, 2.4; Epictetus, Diss. 1.14.5f. 
21 "Cleanthes CambulationemJ ait spiritum esse a principali 
usque in pedes permissu~", Seneca, :§E. 113.23. 
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22 process is made clear at Stobaeus, Ecl. 2.62.15 W, from which 
the following extract is particularly relevant to our present 
purpose: 
xaL OUOLWG WOTIEP tOXDG ~ou owua~oG ~6vOG Eo~tV 
tuavoG EV VEUPOLG, ou~w uaL n ~nG ~UXnG tOXDG 
~6voG Eo~tV tuavoG EV ~~ UpCVELV uaL TIpa~~ELv 
'... J.. nUll· ••• 
For Stobaeus lays emphasis upon questions of choice and action 
which are particularly relevant to the field of ethics, since the 
Stoic virtues are subdivisions of knowledge, which a+e concerned 
with choice in particular spheres of activity. That the concepts 
of ETILO~nun and ~6voG are closely related is made clear by the 
following extract from Stobaeus, Ecl. 2.74.l6W, STILOL"r1Uy)V ••. EE;LV 
uat 6uvaUEL xELo&aL. Also, a healthy soul, by which one would 
understand a virtuous soul (cf. Plato, Phaedo 9lc-95a) must be 
understood as having good ~6voG, as is made clear by, E6~uxta UEV 
Andronicus, DEpt TIaUWV p.22.l3. Schuchardt. The relationship 
between ~6voG in physics and ~6voG in ethics is summed up by 
Arnold as follows: 
The theory'of "tension ll has an immediate application 
to ethics. When the soul has sufficient tension to 
perform its proper work, it operates according to the 
virtues of Wisdom, Justice, Courage and Soberness; 
but when the tension is relaxed, the soul becomes 
disordered and is seized upon by the emotions. 23 
To return to Satires 2.7.20, I would suggest that the 
extremes of behaviour to which Horace makes reference in his 
exploitation of the proverb of the rope ,can be understood more 
22 See also in discus~ion'of Satires 2.3 above, pp.53f. 
23 Arnold, p.89. 
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clearly if the reader bears in mind that contento is a veiled 
reference to the E6~ovLa of a virtuous Stoic soul and that laxo 
is a reference to the immoral Stoic soul which is lacking the 
requisite ~6vo~. This interpretation is made even more likely by 
the emphasis which is placed upon another aspect of ~ovo~ or 
intentio, in the moral sense of "intention" in vv.72-74 of this 
satire, especially since another illustration is utilised there 
by Horace which involves questions of physical tension and 
t . t 24 res raln • 
There is also an extremely humorous exploitation of the 
concept of "tension" by Horace in vv.47-48: 
acris ubi me 
natura intendit .•. 
where the notion of sexual'tension, both physical and psycholog-
ical, is employed and is coupled with a domineering natura, 
according to the dictates of which the good Stoic should organise 
his whole life! It should be added that laxius is used in a 
pejorative sense by Roman authors without any particular Stoic 
reference. 25 
Horace characterises Davus' abuse of Stoic doctrine by 
the epithet which he employs to describe it in his interruption 
(Horace (a)) at vv.2l-22: 
non dices hodie quorsum haec tam putida tendant, 
furcifer? 
When applied to argumentation or Ii tera·ture the adj ecti ve putidus 
carries the meaning of "unnatural", II disagreeable", or "affected". 26 
----------
24 See the discussion below at pp.165ff. 
25 E.g. Sallust, Jug. 85, Romanos remoto metu laxius licentiusque 
futuros. --
26 E.G. Cicero, Off. 1.37.133, hi (Catuli) autem optime uti 
lingua Latina putabantur; sonus erat dulcis, litterae neque. 
expressae neque oppressae, ne aut obscurum esset aut putidum, 
sine contentione vox nec languens nee canora. 
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Further, by apostrophising Davus as furcifer in v.22, Horace 
attributes to Davus, by association, the more unseemly charact-
eristics of the comic slave, taking up and implicitly rejecting 
the self-praise of "amicum / mancipium domino et frugi ... " in 
vv.2-3. For furcifer is a common term of abuse applied to the 
scheming slave both in the plays of Plautus and} to a lesser 
27 
extent, in the plays of Terence. By employing this term Horace 
warns us against taking this particular poem any more seriously 
than we would a comedy of Plautus or Terence. The poet also 
reminds us 6f the status of Davus and so, once more, undercuts 
·the authority of the attack which is to come. It is by now clear 
enough to the reader "quorsum haec tam putida tendant". The 
ostensible exemplum Priscus is an obscure figure, who is quite 
unknown to us. Furthermore, it is clear, in the light of the 
accusations which Davus aims later 28 at Horace regarding his sex-
uality, that the poet is the implied object of criticism in: 
13-14 iam moechus Romae" iam mallet doctus Athenis 
vivere ... 
Horace had studied philosophy at Athens and felt the demands of 
29 
sex as much as the next man. In fact, Horace's suspicions 
27 E~g. Plautus, PSG 1.3.27; Am. 1.1.129; As. 2.4.78, etc. and 
Terence, And. ~5.12; Eun.~.7.28; cf. also Cicero, Deiot. 
9.26. -
2 8 Vv • 4 6'- 71. 
29 E.g. satires 1.5.82-85; Horace has too much common-sense to 
be overly troubled by the supposed tension between the 
demands of body and spirit. This "conflict" receives perhaps 
its best known treatment at Plato, Phaedo 64c-676, although 
the overlying moral purpose of the Phaedo obscures the fact 
that the historical Socrates was no averse to physical 
pleasure. See R. Hackforth, Plato's Phaedo (Camb. 1972) p.47, 
" ... he (Soc.) can on occasion enjoy his wine, and drink with 
the best; but he is, in the Greek phrase, 'master of himself' 
(UpEL~~WV au~oD) ,one who is not to be overcome by pleasure 
(n~~wv noovf)s)." One can see how the alleged character of 
Socrates anticipated that of the sapiens as described by Davus 
in this poem. The sapiens is sibr-lmperiosus (v.83), a 
reasonable translation of UPEC~~WV a6~oO. 
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regarding the direction in which the satire is leading are 
confirmed by the "ad te, inquam" of v.22. Davus attempts to 
substantiate his claim in the next section of the poem. 
D 
DAVUS (b), VV.22-42 
Davus comments on the supposed devotion which Horace 
feels for the mores maiorum( to which, as if in anticipation, 
reference had already been made in vv.4-S. Davus calls into 
question Horace's sincerity in praising the life-style of time 
past and, by so doing, suggests a key to the inteD?retationofthe 
moralising of Of ell us in Satires 2.2. 30 Apparently Horace pays 
only lip-service to the traditional ways. A twist is given by 
Davus to the treatment of UEU~LuoLpCa with which Horace chose to 
open his first satire. Horace has no real desire to return to 
31 the old ways: . 
22-27 laudas 
fortunam et mores antiquae plebis, et idem 
si quis ad ilIa deus subito te agat, usque recuses, 
aut quis non sentis quod clamas rectius esse, 
aut quia non firmus rectum defendis et haeres 
nequiquam caeno cupiens evellere plantam. 
The alternative reasons which Davus gives for Horace's hypo-
thetical refusal to join his ancestors are interesting. Either 
30 For a discussion of Horace's attitude towards the mores 
maiorum see in the discussions of both Satires 2.2 and also 
2.6, esp. his attitude towards Of ell us in 2.~ , 
31 Cf. Satires 1.1.15-19: 
si quis deus "en ego ll dicat 
lIiam faciam quod vultis: eris tu, qui modo miles, 
mercator; tu, consultus modo, rusticus; hinc vos 
vos hinc mutatis discedite partibus: eia! 
quid statis.?" nolint. 
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Horace's praises of the mores maiorum are insincere and hypo-
critical, or Horace has not the strength of character which was 
required to ~it one for the old ways. The terminology which 
Davus employs shows, as did that employed by Damasippus in 
Satir~s 2.3,32 that the neophyte can use Stoic jargon, even if 
he does not fully understand it. Fo~ rectius of v.25 and non 
firmus rectum of v.26 are consciously employed Stoic terms. 33 
For, although I cannot place firmus as a Stoic technical term, 
partly because of its more general reference, as a synonym of 
stabilis, it does have possible Stoic connotations. At Cicero 
Tusc. 4.53, for example, the meaning of stabilis in the passage: 
fortitudo est igitur ..• conservatio 
stabilis iudicii in eis rebus, 
quae formidulosae videntur •.• 
is clearly parallel in sense to the meaning of firmus in Sat. 
2.7.26; the reference is to psychological fortitude in both 
cases. The use of caenum in v.27 also has a surprisingly Stoic 
reference, although it is a reference which is perhaps more 
compatible with the subject matter of Satire~ 2.3; for Cicero at 
Tusc. Disp. 4.24.54 employs the term in the context of the 
paradox that all men save the sapiens are insane: 
Stoici, qui omnes insipientes insanos esse dicunt 
..• nunc autem ita disserunt, sic se dicere, omnes 
stultos insanire, ut male olere orone caenum. at 
non semper. commove: senties. 
The terminology is, therefore: sufficient to show that the attack 
has some basis in Stoic theory, but in what ways does Davus believe 
32 See discussion above on anticipatory characterisation in 
Satires 2.3, pp.44-55i in this satire (2.7) the Stoa is, 
similarly, not mentioned directly till v.45, where Davus 
refers to Crispinus. 
33 On the Stoic connotati6ns of rectum see above, p.lOS, esp. 
n.182 and Stobaeus, Ecl. 2.l00.1~; also 2.66.14. 
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that his master particularly falls short of the Stoic ideal, 
apart from his obvious ~£~~L~oLpLa? Coupled with this flaw is 
the fact that, when at Rome, Horace wants to be in the country 
and to enjoy freedom from business, although the Stoics demanded 
an active virtue,34 as did the mores maiorum. The Stoics also 
d d . f lf d It' 35 deman e a constant survel1lance 0 se an one s mO-lves, 
d t . t" 36 an a cer-aln asce lClsm. However, it is mistake of Davus to 
accuse Horace of hypocrisy in respect of such matters, if Horace 
had never been a confessed Stoic. On the other hand, it is 
legitimate to attack Horace on those points where he falls short 
of the behaviour to be expected of a devotee of the mores maiorum, 
especially his unwillingness to marry, which is relevan·t to Davus' 
attack in vv.46-74, and his aversion to political involvement in 
affairs of state. Point is added to the form of Davus' attacks 
in these cases because of the close connection between the stoic 
and the traditional Roman view. 
The beautifully observed description of Horace's eager-
ness to drink and dine with Maecenas, despite his protestations 
of vv.29-32, which again are reminiscent of Satires 2.2 and 2.6, 
comes very naturally from one of the slaves thrown into urgent 
action by Horace's demands for oil. The placing of these comments 
34 The active involvement of the sapiens in politics is recomm-
ended by Cicero, Fin. 3.20.68; see also above, p.90. 
Seneca stresses at Ep. 95.10 that the traditional wisdom is 
strengthened by the-Understanding which comes from a philos-
ophical (Stoic) grasp of the mysteries of the universe. 
35 False motivation f especially in ·the field of political 
ambi tion, was a target for attack in Sa·tires 2.3; however, 
Davus cannot accuse Horace of such a failing which is not 
compatible with nOD-involvement in politics. The motives 
behind that non-involvement should perhaps be questioned 
themselves. The ultimate criterion is whether one's motives 
are satisfactorily explicable to oneself. See, Seneca, Dial. 
5.41.2. --
36 For a discussion of Stoic as~eticism, see Arnold, pp.258f. 
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, 
into the mouth of a slave allows Horace to compare naturally the 
merits of the free and of the slave in the light of Stoic views 
on the unique freedom of the sapiens. The choice of Davus as 
mouthpiece achieves more than one purpose, as. did the similar 
utilisation of Damasippus in Satires 2.3, and as does the charac-
terisation of Of ell us in Satires 2.2. A major consideration in 
Satires 2.7 is the degree of dramatic effectiveness with which 
the dialogue within the satire is endowed. This is in very large 
measure achieved by the contrast between Horace and his inter-
locutor in station, character and intellect. Horace also 
achieves by this technique a degree of verisimilitude for the 
action and setting of his miniature drama. The danger of monotony, 
which is potentially existent in direct moralising, is also 
avoided. In addition Horace makes clear, by his actual compo-
sition of the satire, the links which he has declared to exist 
37 between satire and comedy. 
Davus now begins to concentrate on the supposed super-
iority of Horace to Davus himself and Horace's other slaves and 
parasites, declaring that that superiority is merely a matter of 
convention and that Horace is a hypocrite to attack the flaws 
of others (presumably in the satires) and wrap up his own vices 
, l't h' 38 In po l e eup emlsms. Davus claims that, slave though he is, 
he can show that Horace is more stupid than he: 
42-45 quid, si me stultior ipso 
quingentis empto drachmis deprenderis? aufer 
me vultu terrere; manum stomachumque teneto, 
dum quae Crispini dociut me ianitor edo. 
37 These links are noted specifically by Horace in the 
"literary" satires, e.g. Satires 1.4 and 1.10, but also 
at Satires 2.3.11-12. 
38 These words are an adaptation of Rudd's translation at 
p.107. 
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These lines also include what I have described as Horace's 
unspoken interruption. It is an interruption which Davus brushes 
aside; for the slave is determined to have his way. As in the 
previous section of the poem Davus' criticisms were reminiscent 
of Horace's attacks upon the chronically dissatisfied in Satires 
1.1, the following section bears at times a close resemblance 
to Horace's attacks upon adultery in Satires 1.2. 39 It appears 
that Horace is arranging for Davus to take him to task for his 
temerity in attacking others when his own record is not without 
blemish. It may be that Horace is at pains in this satire to 
show that, although he has faults of his own, they are "immo 
alia et fortasse minora. ,,40 Also the attacks upon himself are 
rendered less effective because of their source, while they 
reduce the sting of his own attacks upon others. That Horace 
did respond to adverse criticism of this kind in the real world 
is clear from Satires 1.10.1-4'-
E 
DAVUS (c), VV.46-7l 
Davus takes his pleasure with an honest whore, but 
Horace hankers after an adulterous and, therefore, extremely 
dangerous relationship. What dangers there are are described by 
39 Rudd, p.191 comments, "In tone and subject this takes us 
back to 1.2, in which adultery, with all its dangers and 
indignities, is contrasted with a casual liaison." 
However, although he declares that the treatment in 2.7 
is more sophisticated he draws no conclusions from the 
increased sophistication and the repetition of "tone, and 
subject" • 
40 Satires 1.3.20: hence Horace's impatience with the Stoic 
paradox that all sins were equal; see discussion above, 
pp. 31- 36. 
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Davus in vivid and in humiliating detail. 4l The picture is so 
vivid that one wonders here whether Horace has been influenced 
by a scene from mime performances; certainly no scene from 
extant comedy is so explicit. Of greater importance from our 
point of view is that voluntarily" to subject oneself to such 
danger in the search for sensual pleasure runs counter to the 
basic ethical instinct of the Stoics, that of the preservation 
42 
of self. However, Horace reacts quite violently to the 
criticisms, which Davus has made, with "non sum moechus" (70). 
Rather, these words are placed in the mouth of Davus as an 
anticipation of Horace's protestations of innocence. This 
introduces with great neatness the idea of the importance of 
"intention" in criminality and guilt. One feels that Horace him-
self felt this to be a matter of some importance if, as Rand 
43 " 
would have it, "from first to last, for all his dallying with 
comedy ... (he was) engaged in a course of self-analysis and 
self-improvement." Also, despite the incongruity of the comic 
setting and even the untrust~orthiness of the source, the doorman 
of Crispinus, Davus goes on to state or imply the Stoic doctrine 
f . t t' . th 44 o In en lO Wl. some accuracy. 
41 E.g. metuens induceris atque 
altercante libidinibus tremis ossa pavore. 
quid refert, uri virgis, ferroque necari 
auctoratus eas, an turpi clausus in arca, 
quo te demisit peccati conscia erilis, 
contractum genibus tangas caput? (56-61) 
42 See Cicero, Fin. 3.16 and discussion on dangers of adultery 
in Satires 1~127-134 and vv.4l-54i cf. the treatment 
above on p.16, also Cic. Fin. 2.11.33 and Aulus Gellius, 
N.A. 12.5.7. -
43 Rand, Horace and the Spirit of Comedy, p.94. 
44 On the attitude of the Epicureans to intention see A.A. Long, 
Hellenistic Philosophy (IDndon, 1974) pp.70-71, where it is 
streSSed that~earof-apprehension is what, according to 
Ep. K.A. 34; 35; 37 and 17, prevents men from commi"tting 
acts n injustice: cf. Lucretius, 3.1013-23. 
165 
F. 
DAVUS (d), VV.72-115 
The discussion of intentio is introduced by an illust-
ration which is extremely consonant with Davus' position as a 
trusted slave. The illustration as well as emphasising his 
position as a slave also anticipates the statement of the paradox 
that only the sapiens is free, the statement of which will occupy 
a good proportion of this section of the poem. The subject is 
also one which would naturally arise in conversation among 
educated slaves whose masters were given to philosophising. The 
initial statement of the doctrine of intention is as follows: 
72-74 "non sum moechus" ais. neque ego, hercule, fur ubi 
vasa 
praetereo sapiens argentea. toIle periclum, 
lam vaga prosiliet frenis natura remotis. 
Compare Arnold's statement of the belief on p.286 of Roman 
Stoicism "Virtue is a state of mind, a disposition of the 
soul; it is not an act. Hence the bent of the mind (inclinatio), 
its aim (intentio), its desire (~OUAnaLG, voluntas) is everything; 
the performance through the organs of the body is nothing." 
Cicero puts it well at De Finibus 3.9.32: 
sic timere, sic maerere, sic in libidi.ne esse 
peccatum est, etiam sine effectu. 45 
At first sight it may appear strange that Horace allows Davus 
to misconstrue Stoic doctrine in vv.18-20, but puts an accurate 
representation of the doctrine of intention into his mouth a mere 
fifty lines later in the same poem. One possi.ble conclusion is 
that Horace wished initially to detract from the authority of 
45 Cf. also Seneca Ep. 9~ and 97; Ben. 2.31.1 and Epictetus, 
Diss. 1.29.1 and~. 
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Davus as a critic so that, even when he does speak accurately 
and with good sense, the power of his criticism is somewhat 
wanting in effectiveness. A further consideration is that Horace 
allows Davus to overstate the case in vv.1-20 in order to exploit 
the play on the word contento, attention to which has already 
been drawn. It has also been pointed out above that the verbal 
play with the concept of ~6voG helps to unify the structure of 
the satire by anticipating the exposition of intentio in vv. 
72-74 and intendit in v.48. This is made even more certain by 
Horace's choice of metaphor in vv.73-74: 
toIle periclum, 
iam vaga prosiliet frenis natura remotis. 
Remove the tight reins by means of which man's animal tendencies 
46 
are governed and, given free rein, those tendencies take over 
and run wild. The frenis remotis of v.74 is closely parallel to 
the laxo fune of v. 20. 
It should be noted that the word sapiens in v.73 also 
has a special significance. On the one hand sapiens here 
anticipates the description of the Stoic sapiens in vv.83-88. 
For the comparison of the "free" Horace, who is "enslaved" to 
his inclinations, and, accordingly, less free than the "slave" 
Davus, the comparison made, in vv.75-82, with Davus, enables 
n 
Davus to move on easily in v. 83 to the question, "quifltm igi tur 
liber?" with the answer "sapiens sibi qui. •• " to follow naturally. 
However, the use of sapiens in v.73 is not only for the purpose 
of easing the transition to the discussion of the Stoic sapiens 
by the technique of foreshadowing or praemunitio. 47 For, 
46 See also discussion of Stertinius'attack upon excess of 
sexual passion in Satires 2.3.250-280 at pp.112-122 above. 
47 For praemunitio as a typical device of the diatribe see 
discussion ot Satires 2.3 passim. 
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although Horace allows Davus to make a point, which is valid from 
a Stoic viewpoint, namely that Horace is guilty of adultery, 
because of his intentio or voluntas, Horace's wit reduces the 
effectiveness of that point, be it valid or not. The immediate 
connotation which a reader would place upon sapiens by the time 
he had reached v.73 is that it is the epithet normally applied 
to the Stoic sage. However, all that Davus wishes to say is 
that because he was aware of the risk of apprehension and punish-
ment, because, that is, he was sa2iens . (aware) , he passed by 
the chance of stealing the silverware. Davus admits, therefore, 
that he is as guilty o~ theft as Horace is of adultery; on the 
other hand, Davus' claim is that he is superior to his master 
in that he admits this guilt to himself. The reader is amused, 
however, by the fact that Davus describes himself as sapiens, if 
only because he is aware of the picture of the Stoic sapiens 
which is painted, for example, by Cicero at De Finibus 3.22.75: 
quam gravis vero, quam magnifica, quam constans conficitur 
persona sapientis! qui, cum ratio docuerit quod honestum 
esset id esse solum bonum, semper sit necesse est beatus 
vereque omnia ista nomina possideat quae irrideri ab 
imperitis solent ..• 
Therefore, Horace exploits the difference between the technical 
and the non-technical meaning of sapiens in order to point the . 
48 finger of ridicule at the earnest Davus, even as the finger of 
ridicule was pointed at the true sapiens by the imperiti of Fin. 
3.22.75. Horace also exploits the particularly Plautine 
48 Part of the point of Horace's witticism is that the more 
serious of the Stoic writers openly admitted the infrequency 
with which men achieved the status of sapientes, e.g. "ubi 
enim istum (sc. sapientem) invenies, quem tot saeculis 
quaerimus?" Seneca, De Tran. An. 7.4 and also OO~E a6~av 
6 Xp6oLnnoG &no~aCvEL onou6a[ov OO~E ~Lva ~~v a6~oO 
yvwpC~wv n uaBnYE~6vwv, Plutarch, De St. Rep. 1048 E. 
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technique of incongruity by means of which the authority or 
dignity of a serious statement or description is made to appear 
ludicrous because of the circumstances which surround that state-
ment or descriptioL and also because of the established character 
of the speaker. 49 
Accordingly, although the description of the unique 
freedom of the true Stoic ~ which follows in vv.83~88 may 
well be described by Rudd as "the noble description of the truly 
free man",50 its effect is somewhat tarnished by the setting into 
which this pearl of wisdom is placed by Horace. This aspect of 
Horace's treatment of the Stoics also escapes the notice of 
51 E.V. Arnold who, although he accepts that as "in the main an 
Epicurean" Horace is "entitled to use the Stoic paradoxes as 
matter for ridicule", does not, in his necessarily brief comments, 
realise that, in the Satires at least, this ridicule has wider 
implications. It is also done in a manner more subtle than 
Arnold has the space to describe. For there is nothing inherently 
ridiculous in Davus' exposition of the freedom of the sapiens, 
any more than the exposition of the theory of intention was 
ridiculous; it is the context of these expositions and the 
character of the person who produces them, which are instrum-
ental in achieving the satiric and comic effect. 
After he has completed the description of the freedom 
49 Take, for example, the comments upon military virtue which 
are put into the mouth of the craven slave Sosia at Plautus, 
Amph. 186-262; their authority is undercut by the delight-
ful comment at vv.253-254, "haec illist pugnata pugna usque 
a mani ad vesperum / hoc adeo hoc commemini magis quia 
illo die inpransus fui!" 
50 Rudd, p.192. 
51 Arnold, Roman Stoicism p.286, n.96 and p.389, 432. It 
seems th~recognises also, along with Kenneth J. 
Reckford, Horace (1967) p.l09, that there was an increasing 
awareness in Horace of the value of Stoic ethics, although 
this is more especially true of the time of the composition 
of the Epistl~. 
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of the sapiens, in this, his longest unbroken speech within the 
satire, Davus places ever increasing emphasis upon Horace's lack 
of genuine freedom. By the question: 
88-89 potesne 
ex his ut proprium quid noscere? 
Davus suggests that Horace's case is, in fact, quite hopeless 
and this is further made clear by the following comments: 
92-94 "liber, liber sum" dic age. non quis; 
urget enim dominus men tern non lenis et acris 
subiectat lasso stimulos versatque negantem. 
Apart from the fact that we note that the concept of ~6voG is 
brought to the fore in lasso of v.94, it is evident also that 
the technique of incongruity is present. For the sentiments 
which are expressed in these three lines call to mind inescapably 
that "savage master" from which Sophocles was, according to 
Cephalus in Plato, Republic 52 so pleased to escape. The story 
Cicero's adaptation of it in the De Senectute 47. 53 The idea 
that Davus should echo such a one as Sophocles or, more part-
icularly, Cato Maior, when one considers his attitude to slaves, 
is so irresistibly amusing that it inevitably detracts from the 
impact which his words of criticism can make, even though the 
picture of Horace's agonising does make convincing reading. 
The case which Davus is making against Horace does, 
52 Kat 6~ Kat EO~OK~Et TIO~E ~~ TIOLn~fj TIapEYEVO~nv tpw~w~tv~ 
uno ~LVOG 'rrWG, E~n, w EO~OK~ELG, 'EXELG npoG ~a~p06CaLa; 
E~L oLOG ~. €i, yuvaLKt auyyLYVEaOOL.' KaL OGf 'Eu~n~EL,' 
E~n, 'w dv8pwnE" aa~Ev~a~a~a ~tV~OL au~a an~~uyov, ~anEp 
~u~~wv~a ~Lva Kat dYPLOV 6EaTIO~nV an06paG.' Plato, Rep. 
329b-c. 
53 Cicero adapts the foregoing passage as follows: "bene 
Sophocles, cum ex eo quidam iam affecto aetate quaereret, 
utereturne rebus veneriis, 'di meliora!' inquiti 'ego 
vero istinc sicut a domino agresti ac furioso profugi.'" 
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however, lose a considerable amount of its force in the examples 
which follow and which generally provoke Horace into responding 
with threats of violence and other even direr punishment. For, 
although Horace cannot p~operly deny that he does feel the 
effect of those appetites which, with soul, are common to all 
men, and that he is, if one accepts the logic and terminology 
of the Stoics, the slave of these appetites, at least to a 
certain extent, he can nevertheless deny most strenuously that 
Davus is his equal in other respects too, especially those which 
demand a particular skill or capacity. The provocative fallacy 
in the case which is laid against Horace by Davus is that 
shared humanity, or equal humanity, although involving shared 
mortality, also involves equality in any particular skill or 
capacity. In matters of aesthetics and artistic appreciation 
it may be true, arguably, in Sophistic terms, that each man's 
perceptions or interpretations are true for himself; however, 
it is not, or should not be, true that the layman's interpret-
ation should also hold good for others, unless the layman can 
54 
"give an account", to borrow a phrase from the Theaetetus, of 
his interpretation, which is acceptable to men who have 
established a reputation among critics and practitioners. In 
misjudging the quality of Horace's poetry, as a result of 
underestimating its real "quantity", Damasippus had made a 
similar mistake at the opening of Satires 2.3. 55 It is a mistake 
which Horace apparently saw as characteristic of the enthusiastic 
Stoic neophyte who, when carried away by the validity of one 
portion of his system, was eager to apply the whole of the 
54 Plato, Theaet. 20lc-d: Plato would also have sympathised 
with Horace that equality in freedom did nothing to 
guaran'tee equality of capacity; see ReE.. passim. 
55 See above, pp.44-55~' 
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system, in a somewhat uncritical spirit, to the whole spectrum 
of human behaviour. If taken to such uninhibited, or unbridled, 
lengths such an enthusiasm for a doctrinewhich, if properly 
directed, could become an effective weapon of persuasion in the 
hands of a writer of satire, becomes, in fact, counter-productive 
by making both itself and its adherents appear ridiculous. This 
surely is the point of Davus' claim to equal expertise with 
Horace in the matter of interpreting paintings in vv.95-l0l. 
One should also note that in v.97, only a little over twenty 
lines from the close of the poem, Horace takes the opportunity 
to use contento again, only a short interval after lasso in v.94. 
Both of the words echo the contento and laxo of the troublesome 
v.20. It may be that Horace is suggesting, with tongue thrust 
firmly into cheek, that the Stoic neophyte naturally enjoys a 
painting in which the action of the fiery pneuma is so evident. 56 
It may be added here that I understand contento poplite (97) as 
applying to the straining limbs of the painted gladiators: this 
is in agreement with Palmer 57 and against Rudd's rather prosaic 
"with legs rooted / to the spot",58 which applies to the figure 
of Davus, who is standing, apparently transfixed with awe, 
before the painted scene. The underlying notion of the LOVOb 
of linilis, which are fiercely involved in battle, seems more 
56 It is interesting to note, in following this line of enquiry, 
the following fragment of Heraclitus, l.jJUXo,[ apYl [cpa.LOI" 
Ho,&apwLspaL n EVL vouaoLb, fro l36~ Bodl. ad Epictetum, 
p.lxxxiii Schenkl: the close relationship, sometimes 
confusing, between what may be described as the literal and 
me'taphoric uses of the term "fiery soul" or pneuma lived 
on in Stoic doctrine, derived from Heraclitus, e.g. Cicero, 
Tusc. Disp. 1.18.42 (with ref. to Panaetius) and, more 
particularly, ibid. 1.18.44, "cumque corporis facibus 
inflammari soleamus ad orones fere cupidi,tates. II 
57 Palmer, n. ad loc., p.365. 
} 
58 Rudd, The Satires of Horace and Persius p~109. 
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appropriate than the static ~6vo~ of Davus' musculature as 
spectator. 
The attack, which Davus makes in vv.l02-111 on the 
expensive eating habits of Horace, suffers from a flaw similar 
to that which vitiates bhe effect of the attack made on Horace's 
reputation as a critic of works of art. 59 The suggestion is 
made that Horace enjoys food, only if it is expensive and difficult 
to obtain, even as the equally unfounded suggestion was made that 
Horace's sexual appetite was also only whetted by the prospect of 
adulterous and therefore dangerous or otherwise expensive 
conquests. Regarding sexual satisfaction, Horace had shown in 
Satires 1.2 that he disapproved of the dangers of adultery, 
while regarding gluttony and the alleged appetite for expensive 
and exotic foods, there is more than enough to suggest in Satires 
2.2; 2.6 and 2.8 that this attack too is unfounded. If Davus' 
attack is true then Horace must be accusing himself of hypocrisy, 
which seems unlikely. However: to return to the parallel with 
Davus' attack upon Horace's position as arbiter elegantiae in 
the field of aesthetics. Horace exploits the figure of the 
aggressive Davus for two purposes, both of which dovetail neatly 
with conclusions which were reached in the final discussion of 
Satires 2.3 above. 60 For, if we can acquit Horace of the charge 
of hypocrisy, which I think we must, Horace utilises Davus to 
attack the problem of luxuria from a perspective which is 
different from that employed in Satires 2.2i 2.6 and 2.8 and 
which is more akin to the kind of attack made upon luxuria in 
Satires 2.3. Also, even as Damasippus was himself a target for 
59 It is a small irony that Damasippus of Satires 2.3 was an 
"expert"in the art trade before the crash which brought him 
to Stoicism. 
60 See pp.136~145 above. 
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Horace's wit in Satires 2.3, Davus is exposed in Satires 2.7 as 
a man whose moral strictures are lacking themselves in discrim-
ination. For they are the uncritical moral strictures made by 
a man whose philosophy has blinded him to those skills and 
discriminatory powers which spring from experience and environment. 
This is a particularly serious flaw in the character of a would 
be Stoic, since in Stoic ethics there is ever a paramount 
importance attached to the role of knowledge and choice. Horace 
seems to be asserting that, although he is not himself a Stoic, 
he knows enough of genuine Stoicism to recognise the shortcomings 
in the effusions of such ill-informed "stoics" as Davus. To drop 
to the level of platitudes, Horace is suggesting, in an admitt-
edly humorous and relatively frivolous manner, that "a little 
learning is a dangerous thing", especially when it finds its 
way into the heads of men whose position in society makes that 
learning a potential source of instability within society. 
Although the attacks, which Davus makes upon Horace's 
claim to superior knowledge in the fields of aesthetics and 
"haute cuisine", can be shown to be fallacious from the evidence 
of Horace's own Satires, the final and most provocative attack 
made by Davus is worthy of more serious attention. For not only 
does it trigger Horace's outburst with which the poem closes, 
but also, in vv.111-115, Horace allows his creation to employ 
such serious and powerful imagery that the lines leave an indelible 
mark upon the reader's mind as he lays the poem to one side. 
The lines in question run as follows: 
111-115 adde quod idem 
non horam tecum esse potes, non otia recte 
ponere, teque ipsum vitas fugitivus et erro, 
iam vino quaerens, iam sorono fallere curam: 
frustra: nam comes atra premit sequiturque fugacem. 
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Whereas in vv.83-88 the picture of the sapiens, although serious 
enough in itself, was undermined by its setting, the pessimism 
of this picture is not affected by its setting. For, although 
it is true that the attacks upon Horace's aestheticism and 
luxuria which precede it are fallacious, they tend to throw into 
more sombre contrast this general attack upon the human predica-
mente Also the fact that nothing follows, apart from the brief 
alterca~ion between Horace and Davus, which itself ends on a 
61 
harsh note, allows the sombre tones of the lines to be 
maintained without any loss of intensity. 
Satires 2.7 is pervaded by a certain comic aura or 
spirit, because Horace exploits such comic devices as the figure 
of Davus. Nevertheless, it seems that the message of vv.lll-11S 
is intended to be taken seriously. This is not to suggest that 
there is any inherent incompatibility between the spirit of 
comedy and a serious or didactic intention. As Horace himself 
62 
elsewhere declares, he is following in the footsteps of the 
comic writers of Greece, whose works and intentions were 
frequently didactic and were, further, adopted and adapted by 
Plautus and Terence. It is not, therefore, a question of over-
dignifying these lines, if one considers that, despite the comic 
mouthpiece, they are a serious expression of Horace's own views~ 
It seems that Horace, when in a pessimistic frame of mind (and 
this may be the implication of the opening of this poem) 63 was 
dissatisfied with his own condition which he considered to be 
symptomatic of the human condition at large. Corroboration for 
61 On the nature of Horace's concluding threat in vv.117-118, 
see below pp.183ff. 
62 Cf. Horace, Sa"tires 1.4.1-5; also Sat. 2.3.11-12. 
! 
63 For a discussion of the various interpretations of the 
opening of this poem, see above, pp.149-153. 
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this idea is to be found in Horace Odes 3.1, one of the poet's 
most consciously dignified and serious works, where the theme 
of Satires 2.7.111-115 reappears and is further developed. 64 
My purpose at the moment, however, is to demonstrate 
how the delicately maintained balance between the lighter and 
more sombre overtones of the picture is maintained, un·til such 
time as the poet feels it opportune for the poem to become, how-
ever fleetingly,totally and essentially sombre. The maintenance 
of such a balance and the management of such transitions are 
among the most difficult tasks to confront the aspiring satiric 
poet. It is clear from the evidence of this poem, and especially 
from its close, that Horace was an adept in this particular area. 
The lighter comic element is initially maintained by Horace's 
use of such words in the description of himself that can be 
thought of as having been borrowed from the vocabulary of the 
Roman comic writers. The words in question refer to runaway slaves; 
they are fugitivus (113), erro (113) and, at the very end of the 
section the frequentative form fugacem (115). Fugitivus, as a 
noun, bears the meaning of runaway slave, e.g. "Quis sit 
fugitivus, definit Orfilius: fugitivus est qui extra domini 
domum fugae causa, quo se a domino celaret, mansit." Dig. 
21.1.17; erro, a rarer word than fugitivus, is also used of 
runaways, e.g. Pliny, ~. 2.10.5, while fugax is a frequentative 
synonym for fugitivus, which stresses the constant efforts made 
by Horace to escape his metaphorical servitude. The best parallel 
use of fugax in Horace is at Odes 3.2.14, "mors et fugacem 
persequi·tur virum." The constant references made to Horace as 
a runaway slave clearly underline the fact that Davus is still 
64 See below, pp.18Iff. 
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expounding the Stoic paradox that only the sapiens is genuinely 
free. That Horace is still maintaining the Stoic persona of 
Davus is further made clear by the use of recte in v.112. 
However, that Horace himself disapproved heartily of exactly 
this kind of inconsistency and that he was capable of attacking 
such inconsistency in proper Stoic manner, proper by contrast 
with the improper and distorted Stoic viewpoint of Davus, is 
demonstrated in my earlier discussion of Satires 1.1. The fact 
that Horace produces in Satires 2.7 a character, namely Davus, 
who accuses Horace of the very vice pilloried by the poet in 
Satires 1.1, gives added spice, through irony springing from 
reminiscence, to our enjoyment of the poem at present under 
discussion. Horace also enjoys those advantages in Satires 2.7 
which arise from the exploitation of a miniature dramatic form 
and which were listed in the conclusions reached after the 
discussions of Horace's treatment of the figures of Damasippus 
and Stertinius in Satires 2.3. 
According, then, to Davus, a real slave in the convention~ 
al meaning of the word, Horace is the really real slave. For, 
although Horace enjoys the supposed freedom of the ~ivis Romanus, 
he has but little control over his appetites, his interests or, 
particularly, his ambitions to emulate his "betters". It is 
possible to dismiss some of these criticisms, within the frame-
work of the miniature drama with which Horace is presenting us, 
as either totally unfounded or inspired by a natural jealousy 
and a jaundiced sense of injustice. It is implied that Davus 
(and presumably others) believes that Horace harbours similar 
feelings towards Maecenas. This sense of injustice itself 
springs from a nagging discontent with the existing social order, 
a discontent fostered and fomented by a palpably limited grasp 
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of the true meaning of the Stoic cosmopolis. Davus' own source 
is, after all, servile, the Crispini ... ianitor (45). Such 
considerations are inspired by the realistic manner in which 
Horace has depicted, indeed created, the figure of Davus. As we 
turn our attention to vv.114-115, however, we realise that 
although the comic mask of Davus is still in position, as it 
were, the voice is even more patently that of Horace himself than 
it was earlier in the poem. For the words which Horace speaks 
through the comic mask of Davus in vv.114-115 have a deeper 
significance than is compatible with merely extending further the 
realistic characterisation of the slave. We become acutely 
aware of the moral and didactic tone of the poet's voice as he 
expresses his own reservations about the quality of his own 
style of life and that of his contemporaries and friends within 
the circle of Maecenas. 
Certain Stoic doctrines may be utilised to point out the 
unsatisfactory nature of such a life style. Stoicism, however, 
is not by any means a complete answer; again it is made clear, 
as it was in Satires 2.3 that Horace particularly disapproves of 
Stoic sentiments when they are expressed in an extreme and 
inaccurate manner and when they sort ill with what may be 
described loosely as the mores maiorum. Accordingly, Horace 
disapproves of Davus' exposition of the virtues of consistency 
in vv.6-19, because, as has been pointed out, it could not have 
been made by any intelligent Stoic, or by any individual 
familiar with the realities of the Stoic system. Even as Davus' 
comments seem ludicrous by contrast with Horace's exposition 
propria persona in Satires 1.1, so do the slave's attacks upon 
Horace's sexual proclivities by comparison with Horace's own 
comments in Satires 1. 2. On the one hand it may be felt that 
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the attacks which Horace makes upon himself, through the exploi-
tation of the figure of Davus, allow the poet to set himself up 
as a sympathetic and humane critic of human behaviour. For, it 
is implied, he understands, in a very personal wa~, those 
temptations and doubts which assail mankind. The sting of his 
attacks is thereby reduced: the device is also used to good 
effect in Odes 1.5; 1.16 and 1.33. However, the increase in the 
sophistication of the form of ?~ 2.7, with its exploitation 
of comic devices and its dialogue nature, would suggest that 
Horace is concerned to exploit the persona of Davus for more 
than merely the distancing effect which has just'been described, 
and which was also achieved by the exploitation of Damasippus and 
Stertinius in Satires 2.3. Even as the figures of Damasippus 
and Stertinius, coupled with the development of the diatribe 
into a literary and satiric form, gave variety to Horace's 
criticisms of human nature in Satires 2.3 and allowed him to test 
the literary potential of the diatribe, just so, the figure of 
Davus and the miniaturisation of the comic genre, which is 
accomplished by Horace in Satires 2.7, allow him to give both 
variety and interest to his essay upon the vanity of human wishes 
and to test the possibilities inherent in the concept of the 
miniaturised drama. Comparing the minor with the great, the 
blend of humour, character and philosophical discussion is 
65 
reminiscent of the Socratic dialogues of Plato; one could 
even compare the figure of Davus with Plato's unflattering 
representations (or creation) of such sophists as Euthydemus and 
Thrasymachus. 
To return, however, to the content of the final criticism 
65 For more specific reference to Platonic dialogues in Horace's 
Satires, see Fraenkel, Horace pp.136-137, esp. n,l on p.l36. 
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which Horace puts into Davus' mouth and which, it is interesting 
to note, would have come with almost equal conviction from an 
Epicurean. 66 Anxiety for one's position increases with the 
importance of the position which one has achieved. Anxiety for 
one's wealth in proportion to the increases in the wealth which 
one has amassed. Horace agrees with the Stoics (and the 
Epicureans) that an unceasing and falsely motivated quest for 
social superiority can only lead to dissatisfaction and anxiety, 
especially when such superiority is based upon the possession and 
display of wealth. Death, which can be described as comes atra, 
and which is a portion of that cura, or a cause of it, which 
occurs in v.114, must also be an object of greater fear to those 
who feel that they have much to lose in terms of material possess-
ions and worldly status; by contrast the poor can even look 
forward to death as a release. 67 That Horace is being deadly 
serious in his con~ents at this stage is evident from the 
startling impact of the phrase comes atra (115): for the use of 
comes in a figurative sense is well established in philosophical 
verse by Lucretius and the connotations of the word in the De 
rerum natura seem inevitably to be sombre. In his description 
of the plague at Athens, for example, in Book 6 Lucretius uses 
comes as follows, "malis erat angor / assidue comes ... " and at 
v.1159, where Lucretius mistrans1ates, or adapts, the physical 
~aAaLnwPLa of Thuc. 2.49.3 into psychological terms. 68 The use 
66 The similarity between Horace's use of comes" and that of 
Lucretius is remarked upon below: one would almost believe 
that Horace is suggesting that for all practical purposes 
the beliefs of Stoic and Epicurean are parallel (and little 
different from those of Ofellus?)i cf. also, Lucr. 5.1l29f. 
67 This was a recurring theme in Middle and New Comedy, e.g. 
Diphilus at"Edmonds, 3a p.141.88. 
) 
68 See Bailey's note ad loc, vol.3, p.1728. 
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made of comes by Lucretius at 6.1159 parallels Horace's usage 
at Satires 2.7.115, if we read Lucretius' angor as closely 
parallel to cura in v.114 of this satire. At Lucr. 3.290 we 
find that aura is the co~es of formido, while, at Lucr. 2.580, 
we find that the comites of mors are the cries of those who 
mourn. The idea of death and the fears that beset mortality 
seem inseparable from the figurative use of comes in the De rerum 
natura. It is in keeping with Lucretius' purpose as a purveyor 
of Epicureanism to stress this factor in his poem, since 
Epicureans held that the idea of death was inevitably, but need-
lessly, accompanied in the minds of the uninitiated with concern 
for or fear of what would ensue after death. This anxiety is 
always present and cannot be assuaged by wine, nor does sleep, 
in which dreams may come, provide any temporary respite. At 
Lucr. 3.1046-1052 we find a juxtaposition of sleep and drink with 
curis that seems to anticipate Horace's vino ... sorono in Satires 
2.7.114 and the similar vini somnique benignus of 2.3.3. The 
sombre use of comes is also found at Cicero, Tusc. 4.8.19 in 
the simile, "exanimatio ... quasi comes pavoris." 
It was in accord with the spirit of Davus' final critic-
isms in this poem that Horace had depicted himself in Satires 2.6 
as praying for a modest sufficiency of material comfort. The 
farm there described as being well away from the turmoi"l of Roman 
urban life symbolised an ideal which was neither Stoic nor 
Epicurean; it was unequivocally an Italian ideal which, although 
it was capable of being lent support by the tenets of the 
Hellenistic schools, was quite independent of them in origin. 69 
69 One would say that it was a Mediterranean ideal, especially 
when one thinks of Virgil's farmer at Georgics 4.116-148; 
not, however, that Horace was unaware of the advantages of 
rational support for intuitively held beliefs. However, this 
aspect of the Satires is dealt with under the discussions on 
Satires 2.2 and2:-6-.-
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However that may be, it is appropriate here, to further 
strengthen the suggestion that the message of vv.111-115 is 
totally serious in intent, to examine Odes 3.1 which expands 
Satires 2.7.111-115,70 echoes much of Satires 2.3 and, with 2.3, 
anticipates much of the pessimism of Juvenal, Satires 10. For 
in Odes 3.1 we find that the rich and powerful man cannot sleep, 
although sleep does not feel too proud to visit the cottage of 
a poor and humble man or, it is implied surely, a modest farm in 
the Sabine hills: 
non Siculae dapes 
dulcem elaborabunt saporem, 
non avium citharaeque cantus 
somnum reducent: somnus agrestium 
lenis virorum non humilis domos 
fastidit •.• 
Odes 3.1.18-23 
Fear can climb as high as the wealthy man can build: 
sed timor et minae 
scandunt eodem quo dominus ••• 
ib. 37-38 
Black anxiety rides pillion passenger to the wealthy: 
post equitem sedet atra cura. 
ib. 40 
Neither wine nor Persian nard can remedy ill health: 
delenit usus nec Falerna 
vitis Achaemeniumque costum. 
ib. 43-44 
The final stanza of the poem sums up the message not only of 
this ode, but also of the conclusion of Satires 2.7: 
70 It would be interesting to consider whether Horace's Odes 
often expand with lyric freedom the message of the more--
prosaic Sermones: this would provide an interesting 
parallel to the Attic tragedian's use of the chorus. 
cur invidendis postibus et novo 
sublime ritu moliar atrium? 
cur valle permutem Sabina 
divitias operosiores. 7l 
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What we have therefore in ,this poem is a reiteration in "direct" 
lyric form of an idea first formulated in verse by Horace in 
the Satires. It may be that, at the time when the Satires were 
under composition, Horace did not feel sufficiently secure of 
his position within the circle of Maecenas and Octavian to give 
direct expression to ideas which could be construed as ungrateful 
criticisms of life under the new regime. When, however, such 
moral strictures as those encapsuL3.ted in Odes 3.1, and obliquely 
in Satires 2.3 and 2.7, began to serve the moral and political 
purposes of the Princeps, Horace was able to give them direct 
expression. Although this may sound somewhat hypothetical we 
do know that Horace responded violently to adverse comments made 
upon the Satires of Bocik 1; we can tell fro~ Satires 1.10 and 
2.1, for example, that others thoughthis poems excessively severe. 
Hence,perhaps, the distancing technique made possible in the 
second book by the exploitation not only of such Stoic figures 
as Damasippus, Davus and S·tertinius, but also of Of ell us in 
Satires 2.2. For it has been suggested that, in Satires 2.2, 
Horace takes the risk of enunciating a measure of political 
comment through the medium of Of ell us. However that may be, 
what is quite clear is that it is necessary to treat Satires 
2.7.111-115 with all seriousness as an expression of a view which 
Horace held consistently over a lengthy period of his life. We 
have in the Satires, as it were, an anticipatory recusatio and 
apologia. For, if Horace felt guilt at all about anything in his 
71 Cf. also Satires 2.3.307-313. 
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later years, at the time, for example, when he was working on 
the EEistles, it was because he had been less active in civic and 
governmental affairs at Rome than Maecenas or Augustus would 
have liked and than certain individuals, much to his chagrin, 
believed. 72 
G 
THE FINAL ALTERCATION, VV.116-118 
The spell woven by comes atra is broken by. these rumbus-
tious final lines where Horace demonstrates that in this world 
fact is more important than theory by threatening to exercise 
his rights as the actual master of Davus: 
116-118 unde mihi lapidem? "quorsum est opus?" unde sagittas? 
"aut insanit homo aut versus facit." ocius hinc te 
ni rapis, accedes opera agro nona Sabino. 
Horace verbalises the mute threats of vv.43-44 and Davus: status 
as a slave, according to the definitions of the Roman world, is 
made emphatically clear by the threats of Horace; what is more 
the rather weak joke of Davus in v.117, although it has a certain 
ironic ambiguity, as may be seen from the comments which 
presently follow, establishes Davus once again not only as a 
1 b . 1 73 save, ut as a comlC save. The inversion of roles of master and 
slave which had been sanctioned by the Saturnalia is now over. 
72 In this respect Horace's personal inclinations were in tune 
with the advice of the Epicureans on the question of 
political involvement, e.g. Epicurus, ape D.L. 10.141 and 
cf. also Lucr. 5.1129f. 
That certain individuals misunderstood Horace's position 
in the imperial circle is indicated by the attitude of 
Horace's interlocutor in Satires 1.9. 
73 Cf. the jokes of Tranio at Plautus, Most. 1149-1152 which 
are made to Theoropides, even althou~or perhaps because, 
Tranio's machinations have been discovered. 
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Also, although the ending of the poem is abrupt, it is necessary 
that this interview should have come to a sharp close when the 
tension, to borrow a Stoic term, which Horace depicts increasing 
within him, finally reaches breaking point and his temper gives 
way. The ending is parallel to the ending of Satires 2.3, while, 
as has already been suggested, the subject matter of the whole 
of 2.7 is reminiscent of that of the earlier satires. 74 More 
particularly, the final expostulation of Davus is clearly 
reminiscent of Damasippus' foolish attacks upon the alleged 
literary desidia of Horace in Satires 2.3. For Davus' comment, 
"aut insanit homo aut versus facit ••• " in v.117 is Horace's final 
jibe at the Stoics, or, at least, at such imitation or supposed 
Stoics as Damasippus and Davus. Davus identifies the composition 
of poetry with a symptom of insanity. On the other hand, 
Damasippus in Satires 2.3 had criticised Horace for not writing 
anything worthy of his muse. He had gone on to declare that 
Horace, along with all other men except the sapiens, was insane 
and had concluded with the statement that Horace's poems were 
conclusive proof of his insanity. This was a line of thought 
which Horace suggested did not bear close examination. Such 
false argumentation and inconsistency is consciously called to 
mind by Horace in v.117 of this poem, where Davus too is shown 
as being unsympathetic towards his master's art. The major irony 
is that it would appear that Horace agreed that a degree of 
insanity was an essential element of the poet's character. This 
is evident from the only partially humorous close of Horace's 
Ars Poetica (vv.453-476). Considering the treatment received at 
the hands of "philosophers" by Horace, it is especially interest-
74 The point is made by Rudd, p~194. 
ing that the most patently insane poet of all was the pre-
Socratic philosopher Empedocles: 
deus inunortalis haberi 
dum cupit Empedocles, ardentem frigidus Aetnam 
insiluit. sit ius liceatque perire poetis. 
Horace, A.P. 464-466 
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That Horace was well aware of Empedocles' philosophical preten-
sions is intimated in typically Horatian manner: ardentem and 
frigidus imply two of the primary opposites which were subsumed 
into the Empedoclean elements of earth, air, fire and water! 
To return to the close of Satires 2.7: after the sombre 
tones of vv.114-l15 the tone of the poem's ending is considerably 
lightened. However, a harsh element does now obtrude which is 
consistent with the darker aspect of Roman comic humour. For 
although Horace relates the close of the satire to that same 
spirit of comedy which, in different guises, has permeated the 
whole. the threats which he utters as master are uncomfortably 
redolent of the realities of the slave's lot. Plautus was able 
to exploit this reality by comparing it with the unreality of the-
world of his successful slaves. Grumio, for example, at the 
beginning of the Mostellaria wishes harsh and actual punishments 
and service in the country on the devious and unrealistic Tranio. 
One can also call to mind the fate of Tyndarus in the Captivi. 
More particularly, Horace's words "ocius hinc te / ni rapis, 
accedes opera agro nona Sabino" (117-118) are reminiscent of 
Cato Maior's advice concerning sick, elderly (and possibly 
recalcitrant) slaves at De ago cult. 2.7. Perhaps, indeed, from 
our point of view the final irony of this most ironical satire is 
that, although Cato was posthumously declared a sapiens, his 
advice regarding slaves and his attitudes towards women were 
alIHost totall~? unaffected b~i that spirit of humcJ.ni tas "v"Jhich vIas 
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one of the more positive contributions of the Stoa in the general 
field of ethics. 
This leads to my final comment upon this poem: despite 
the irony with which Horace treats the figures of Davus and 
those of similar persuasion, enough of what they say seems to 
recommend itself to Horace as being worthy of serious atten'tion. 
As may be seen from Satires 2.2 and, possibly, 2.6, a totally 
reactionary desire to return to the. way of life of Cato Maior and 
his generation, as Horace and his contemporaries understood it, 
was as unrealistic as it was ultimately undesirable. However, 
Horace, I believe, saw some prospect, at the time of the 
composition of the Satires, of combining the best of what the 
Hellenistic schools had to offer with what was worth retaining 
in the mores maiorum after the depredations of the past century 
of civil war and unrest. Something of this combination may be 
found in Satires 2.2 and 2.6 and, later, in the Epistles. 
Cicero seems to have recognised that one of the values of 
philosophy lay in this direction: 
Quaeque sunt vetera praecepta sapientium, qui iubent 
"tempori parere" et IIsequi deum ll et lise noscere ll j et 
"nihil nimis", haec sine physicis quam vim habeant (et 
habent maximam) videre nemo potest. atque etiam ad 
iustitiam colendam, ad tuendas amicitias et reliquas 
caritates quid natura valeat haec una cognitio potest 
tradere; nec vero pietas adversus deos nec quanta iis 
gratia debeatur sine explicatione naturae intellegi 
potest. 




A DISCUSSION OF SATIRES 2.2 
~=,,= are most readily comprehensible or, at 
least, best approached, in the light of a certain tension, not 
to say conflict, which clearly existed within Horace. This 
tension was between what may be called, for the sake of 
convenience, the IIcultured"and the "uncultured" aspects of the 
poet, if we understand cultured to mean "imbued with Greek 
culture " . For, on the one hand, the poetry of Horace, from the 
most dignified and high flown lyric to the more prosaic and 
didactic genres exemplified by the Satires and the Ar§~oetica, 
displays a deep, thoroughgoing and informed admiration for both 
_ . 1 
the prose and poetical works of Greek .Llterature.- Moreover, 
the recently completed discussions of Satires 2.3 and 2.7 
demonstrate an intricate knowledge of both the details of thought 
and expression 6f the Stoic school. Like other Roman poets 
before him, from Ennius to Catullus, Horace saw himself as 
adapting as well as adopting, as emulating and even improving 
th k f h · k' . 1 2 upon e wor 0 lS Gree orlglna s. It is also evident from 
1 For Horace's knowledge of Greek lyric poetry, see e.g. 
Fraenkel, ch.5, pp.154-224 and also L.P. Wilkinson, Horace 
and his Lyric Poetry (Cambridge, 1968) pp.87-l22; on 
Horace's ~cquaintance with e.g. the dialogues of Plato and 
Fraenkel, p.136f. and also below, pp.199 and 202. 
2 The comments of Otto Skutsch, Studia Enniana (London, 1968) 
p.l are interesting and relevant, II ••• his (Ennius') work and 
person seem to typify and crystallise in exemplary fashion 
that Roman attitude which made the Romans for ever the 
imitators of the Greeks, and yet creators in their own right. 
Nor was that attitude unconscious; it was deliberate, 
explicit and full of confidence and pride.-" For a playful 
expression of this type of national pride, see Propertius, 
2.34.65-66. 
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elsewhere that Horace was considered to be something of an 
authority on things artistic - and hence on things Greek. 3 As 
far as the sophisticated side of Horace's character is concerned, 
one should also note his occasionally condescending attitude 
towards the naive Italian rustic or provincial magistrate, an 
attitude which he shared with his smart friends and which, being 
a betrayal of his own origins, was perhaps. most evident when in 
h . 4 t e~r company. He did after all value their intelligent and 
5 
sophisticated appreciation of his art, which m~st, necessarily, 
have been more subtle and penetrating than that of which Of ell us 
of Satires 2.2 and the congenial Cervius and Are11ius in 2.6 were 
capable. It was only in town that such learned company was 
always available, hence what may be called Horace's love/hate 
relationship with Rome, which was observed, but misunderstood, 
by Davus. 6 
On the other side of the coin we have the picture of 
Horace as the sturdy provincial son of a former slave, who, 
although coming from one of those areas of Italy most open to 
Greek influence, is an Italian and is imbued as such with I·talian 
rustic values picked up at his father's knee: these are values 
which he never overtly rejects. 7 That same father is also 
depicted affectionately by Horace as being suspicious of the 
3 See Satires 2.7.95-101 where Horace is described ironically 
by Davus as II subti1is veterum iudex et callidus ll ; it is 
hardly necessary to mention again Horace's debt to the Greek 
comic writers which is recorded at Satires 1.4.1-5 and 
2.3.11-13. For a discussion of the latter passage see pp.44ff. 
4 See e.g. Satires 1.5.51-70 and 97-103. 
5 E.g. Satires 1.10.76-92, where special mention is made of 
Maecenas, Virgil and Octavius, the company of whom would be 
found and enjoyed in Rome. 
6 See Satires 2.7.28-35, esp. "Romae rus optas, absentem 
rusticus urbem / tollis 'ad astra levis." 
7 See Satires 1.6.71-99~· 
very education which he so dearly wanted his son to enjoy: 
aiebat: 'sapiens, vitatu quidque petitu 
sit melius, causas reddet tibi: mi satis est si 
traditum ab antiquis morem servare tuamque, 
c(!(;? ! 
dum ::C0stGCiis eges, vitam famamque tueri 
incolumem possum; simul ac duraverit aetas 
membra animumque tuum, nabis sine cortice. I sic me 
formabat puerum dictis. 
Satires 1.4.115-121 
The whole of this passage has been quoted for two reasons: 
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sapiens, in its ironical application to an unspecified philoso-
pher, anticipates the attacks upon the Stoic sapiens in Satires 
8 2.3 and 2.7; secondly, there is, I think, an example of 
Horace's wit vis-a-vis the philosophers. Compare v.120 of this 
passage, which denounces the efficacy of philosophically 
supported ethics, with a verse from the most seriously philoso-
phi cal of Rome's didactic poets, Lucretius. The line of 
Lucretius in question is as follows: 
quae quasi. membranae vel cortex nominitandast .•• 
De rerum natura, 4.51 
which occurs in Lucretius' exposition of the notoriously 
difficult problems connected with sense perception, especially 
vision. In the following line (4.52) we find formam. Is it 
too much to believe tha{~ the membra animumque, sine ~~ortice and 
formabat of Horace are conscious echoes of Lucretius? The 
reminiscence has added effect, if the major point of Horace's 
father's objections to the work of the sapiens is that it is 
irrelevant and technically difficult. As Ennius said in the 
same vein "philosophandum est paucis; nam omnino haud placet.,,9 
8 For a full discussion of the attacks upon the Stoic sapiens 
in 2.3 see above, esp. pp.130-136. 
9 This is quoted by Aulus' Gellius 5.19.9; it is also cited by 
Cicero at Tuse. 2.1 and De Or. 2.1561 cf. also Plato, 
Gorgias 48~ 
190 
On another occasion, in words which are even more familiar, 
Ennius anticipates the tenor of Horace's father's words with, 
f ". b .. t .. ,,·10 o course, morl us antlquls res sta Romana vlrlsque. Ennius 
too was aware of a certain conflict within himself between his 
national pride and admiration for things Greek; Horace, there-
fore, is writing in a certain tradition of truculent, but 
enlightened, nationalism in the composition of his poetry. The 
tension, which can produce such sophisticated witticisms as 
that indicated in the relationship between Satires 1.6.120-121 
and Lucretius 4.51-52, and which arises because of the conflicting 
claims of divergent loyalties upon Horace's poetry may, if 
properly understood, enable us to read such "Italian" poems as 
the satires under discussion with a greater sensitivity than 
would otherwise be possible. The complexity of the humour, to 
take one facet of the poems as an example, which is evolved by 
reason of Horace's conscious exploitation of this tension can 
be seen from the fact that the "Epicurean" witticism of Satires 
1.4.120-121 is written by Horace into the mouth of his father, 
when his father is actually denigrating the value of just such 
technical theories as those which were expounded by the 
Epicureans. 
Another aspect of this ambivalence of attitude towards 
things foreign in general, and especially to things Greek, should 
be mentioned before the more specific problems of Satires 2.2 
and 2.6 are tackled: this is the effect of the supposed moral 
decline of Rome, the beginning and spread of which was linked 
by moral ising poets and historians alike to the ever increasing 
10 One of whom, presumably, was Cato Maior who as much as any 
figure epitomises the .Janus-like nature of the cultivated 
Roman who is yet fiercely and independently proud of his 
national heritage. 
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expansion of the imperium Romanum beyond the confines of Italy 
and Sicily.ll However, it is with the more domestic effects of 
this large movement that Horace is concerned, although his 
12 
continued attempts to escape to the country may be seen as 
attempts to escape from the effects o£ this supposed decline in 
urban morals into an area, the country, where older values still 
held sway. It is interesting that this decline was thought of 
as taking place because of a constant and consistent erosion of 
those older values, which were also considered by some to be 
compatible in a remarkable way with the basic Stoic ethic. How-
ever, Stoic ethical values were not necessarily compatible with 
Roman ideas, as was made abundantly clear by Horace himself in 
Satires 2.3 and 2.7, especially when they were formulated by some 
of Horace's less philosophically gifted contemporaries. The 
same reservation has been made more recently and with some force 
by Sir Ronald Syme in The Roman Revolution, p.S7: 
As for the tenets of the Stoics, they could support 
doctrines quite distasteful to Roman Republicans, 
namely monarchy or the brotherhood of man. The Stoic 
teaching, indeed, was nothing more than a corroboration 
and theoretical defence of certain traditional virtues 
of the governing class in an aristocratic and republican 
state. Hellenic culture does not explain Cato; and the 
virtus about which Brutus composed a volume was a Roman 
quality and not an alien importation. 
11 Rudd, in his preamble to a discussion Satires 2.2, stresses 
this aspect of the Roman mentality, and refers to the valuable 
work done by Earl in The Political Thought of Sallust (Camb. 
1961) ehh.l and 4 at n.S, p.296 on Chapter six of his The 
Satires of Horace. Rudd refers also to Polybius 31.25.3ff; 
Pliny NH 17.244; Sallust Cat. 10.1 and Jug. 41.2; Velleius, 
2.1.1-~ To this list one ought to add Juvenal 6.292-300, 
esp. "prima peregrinos obscaena pecunia mores / intulit, et 
turpi fregerunt saecula luxu / divitiae molles." vv.298-300. ~ 
12 At the time 6f the composition of the Epistles Horace still 
was torn between his duty to Maecenas in Rome and his . 
cherished independence on the Sabine farm; see Epistles 
1. 7. 
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Syme does admit elsewhere, however, that philosophy "could 
provide a rational explanation of the nature of things" and 
"comfort in adversity,,:13 both Stoics and Epicureans would have 
claimed that their respe~tive systems were capable of making 
. t h .. 14 JUS suc a provlslon. Also, as we shall see, some claimed 
that the traditional mores and praecepta of rustic Italy were 
alone sufficient for this end. Horace, however, seems to suggest 
that no one way is in itself totally adequate. This is also 
implied by Syme who declares, "There is no warrant for loose talk 
about conversion to Stoicism, although this Epicurean (sic) man 
appeared to surrender to a Romantic passion for frugality and 
virtue, a fervent sympathy with martial and imperial ideals. 1115 
There was, in fact, no sudden surrender to ideals of frugality 
and virtue at the time when Horace was composing "the Roman 
Odes", as may be seen from the emphasis placed upon these 
concepts in Satires 2.2 and 2.6; neither is there anything 
inherently surprising in conceiving of an Epicurean, admitting 
for the moment that Horace was such, being frugal and virtuous, 
if his devotion to the "faith" of Epicurus was genuine. 16 That 
apart, however, Syme does recognise, both in his general 
discussions of the Roman character and in his specific comments 
upon Horace, those two elements, native and alien, which between 
them created that tension, which has already been described as 
existing in the moral and poetical consciousness and, indeed, in 
13 The Roman Revolution, p.247. 
14 On the Stoic ethical aim, see Stobaeus, Ecl. 2.138; on the 
ethical aim of the Epicureans, Lucretius~7-l9. 
15 The Roman Revolution, p.4l6f. 
16 On the asceticism of the genuine Epicurean, see e.g. Cicero's 
comments on temperantia at Fin. 1.47-48, but especially 
Lucr. 2.20-33;--~8~1119i~9-24, the last of which 
passages is also relevan-t to Davus v comments upon the 
anxieties of the rich and powerful in Satires 207. 
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the political consciousness of Horace. The polarisation of 
opinion and emotion, which was the natural result of this inner 
conflict, may be schematised as follows, although one would 
hasten to add that the schematisation is intended as a guide to 
rather than as a definitive statement of the tensions to which 
Horace shows himself to have been subject: 
A. CULTURE v. NAIVETY: this is the elemental polarisation, 
already discussed in general terms, which has been described 
as being between things Greek and things Italian. One can 
point to more specific sub-conflicts, which are symptomatic 
of this overall division: 
B. TOWN v. COUNTRY: this conflict is also illustrated by 
17 poems other than Satires 2.2 and 2.6. On one level the 
conflict is between the very different attractions of life 
in the town and in the country. The moral conflict, how-
ever: is further epitomised by another sub-conflict: 
C. FORMAL PHILOSOPHY v. NATIVE WIT: this conflict, which is 
the more readily comprehensible in the light of the comments 
ascribed to Horace's father in Satires 1.4, is epitomised 
by the differences between the mores of Of ell us (Sat. 2.2) 
and Arellius (2.6) and those of the stoics ridiculed by 
Horace in Satires 2.3 and 2.7. 
Although the initial impression which one derives from 
a reading of Satires 2.2 and 2.6 is that it is the native 
element in this conflict which ultimately emerges triumphant, 
even as it does in the later and less philosophically aware and 
17 E.g. Satires 2.7.28-37, but also Horace, Epistles 1.7 and 
1.10; one could also describe the persistent suppliant 
and would-be client in Sat. 1.9 as an example of the evils 
of city living; cf. al'SC)"Odes 3.29 -to Maecenas. 
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t t t ' f J 1 18 , b 'd t compe en sa lres 0 uvena, lt soon ecomes eVl en , upon a 
closer inspection, that this "victory" of the native element 
over the alien importation is not by any means total. Horace 
appears, in fact, as an advocate of a compromise which is of 
such a kind that the satirist seems to encourage by every means 
at his disposal the adoption of a genuine ethical eclecticism. 19 
A large part was played in the success of Horace's literary out-
put by the skilful combination of the fruits of an exceptional 
education in Greek literature and philosophy with an innate 
respect and admiration for the best in Roman and Italian moral 
and literary practice. I believe that Horace implies that the 
best means of successfully achieving an appropriate ars vivendi 
lie in a parallel course of action on, as it were, the moral as 
opposed to the literary front. Horace suggests that both the 
traditional Roman ways of ethical theory, or,rather, practice, 
and the theoretical Greek approaches to ethical practice have 
much to contribute towards the formulation of such an ars vivendi, 
if they are allowed to operate in concert. Similarly, neither 
the Roman nor the Greek way is capable alone of gaining a 
satisfactory result, since Roman life itself now is an inextric-
able mixture of Greek and Italian elements. 
The following detailed discussion of Satires 2.2 and 
2.6 should demonstrate quite adequately the interplay between 
the Greek and Roman elements in the literary construction of 
even the most consciously Italian of Horace's satirical poems; 
it will also be my intention to show that, in Horace's view, a 
18 One thinks especially of Juv. Satires 3 and 12. 
19 Rudd, p.19, makes comments of this kind, but is more 
concerned with the blurring of distinctions between specific 
schools than with Horace's exploitation in detail of that 





totally reactionary ethical stance could no longer be considered 
at all viable, especially given the then current political 
situation. The compulsive irony which Horace seems bound to 
exploit makes the successful achievement of this secondary 
intention a relatively simple matter directly consequent upon the 
critical exposition 6f the primary intention as stated. For, 
although Horace presents Of ell us as a reactionary Italian who, 
in Lejay's words,20 which paraphrase vv.2-3, is "un sage en 
dehors des formules, un homme rustique qui ignore les raffinements 
intellectual", the reader is nevertheless constantly made aware 
of the subtle Horace, philosophically acute and amazingly 
literate, manipulating the "mask" for his own ends - as he did 
so successfully in Satires 2.3 and also 2.7. To what ends 
Horace does manipulate the mask of Of ell us is a question which 
must await the completion of an analysis of the poem. 
DETAILED DISCUSSION OF SATIRES 2.2 
A 
THE PROEM: VV.1-8 
The single word boni, about which the crucial first line 
of this satire pivots, epitomises in itself those tensions 
between Greek and Roman ideals and concepts which perform an 
20 Pp.3ll-327 for the discussion of this poem in Lejay's 
commentary which, as usual, is most helpful; on this 
occasion, however, Lejay's contribution is vitiated to a 
certain extent by his desire to believe literally in the 
veracity of Horace's portrayal of Of ell us. On this, see 
Rudd's comments on p.17, " ... who (Lejay) tells us (p.3l3) 
that Of ell us could have had some rolls of Lucilius in his 
house. Presumably he also had works of Stoic or Pythagorean 
philosophy, for in v.79 he speaks of bodily indulgence as 
nailing the soul to the earth.!! 
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important structural role throughout the two satires at present 
under discussion. A clear grasp of the functions performed by 
these tensions is central to a full understanding, not only of 
the meaning of these peculiarly Italian poems, but also of 
Horatian satire in general. The first line reads as follows: 
1 Quae virtus et quanta, boni, sit vivere parvo ••• 
Since boni may appear, at first sight, to be innocent of any 
such bilateral sophistication, as has been suggested adheres to 
it, an examination of its total significance and function within 
its context is necessary. On its initial impact, in fact, boni 
seems to be a peculiarly Roman word in keeping with the Roman, 
or rather Italian, genius of Of ell us as described in vv.2-3. It 
may well, therefore, appear perverse to suggest that, so far as 
Horace's extremely literate readership was concerned, it would 
also sustain connotations which were markedly Greek. For the 
latin boni, as well as being a respectable latin vocative, is 
also the latin equivalent of the greek vocative ~yaaoC and, as 
a natural result, shares some of those associations which are 
inseparable from the greek word, especially when conjoined with 
xaA6~ in xaAo~ x~yaaoC. That the term is particularly suitable, 
when the group to which reference is being made is conservative 
in outlook (not to say reactionary), is made clear by an exampl~ 
to be found at Aristophanes, Knights 843: 
oux ~yaaot LauL' EOLC nw LauL~ ~a LOV rrooE~6w. 
Here Cleon harangues the chorus, reminding them of his exploits 
at Pylos, even as it was Cicero's habit to remind conservative 
audiences of his role in the discomfiture of Catiline, at a 
time when all the boni worked successfully together. However 
that may be, the chorus of knights were of a class, to the 
Italian equivalent of which it may be supposed that Of ell us and 
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his friends belonged, both materially and spiritually. It is 
also interesting to note that Cleon, like Of ell us , was intent 
upon persuasion, as was Socrates at Plato, Protagoras 3lla, 
where in tones of gentle remonstrance, Socrates characterises 
his interlocutor as aya~E.21 This is also the tone of boni in 
Satires 2.2.1: for the tone is not, I think, ironical, as is 
implied by Lejay, when he refers to certain parallel usages of 
the vocative boni in the comedies of Plautus and Terence. 22 It 
is not necessary to presume, at least at this stage of the 
discussion, that Horace is here reflecting a marked Plautine or 
Terentian influence, although comic precedents are acknowledgedly 
exploited by Horace in the composition of the satires; however, 
Of ell us cannot be as readily identified with any standard comic 
prototype as can, for example, Davus in Satires 2.7, although 
there are aspects of the reactionary and sententious senex about 
h ' 23 1m. 
Irony is also, perhaps inevitably, brought to mind by 
the reference just made to the parallel vocative aya~E at 
Protagoras 3lla. Horace's felt debt to Socratic irony has 
already been mentioned, as has his debt to the form, content and 
method of the Socratic dialogues of Plato. 24 There is no 
advantage to be gained on this occasion, however, by imagining 
that Of ell us is aiming shafts of Socratic irony at the recipients 
of his homely praecepta, even before he is well begun. Af·ter 
21 Cf. P,lato, Prot. 3l4d. 
22 Lejay (note ad loc.) refers to Plautus Captivi 954; Casina 
725; Pseudolus 1145 and to Terence Adelphoe 556,55 i 
Andria 616 et al: his is also the ref. to Aristophanes, 
al though he does no more than record the use of wya~o (, • 
23 See above in discussion of comic influence on Sat. 2.7 in 
Chap.4. 
24 Fraenkel, p.136f. 
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all the interlocutors have had no opportunity to express any 
contrary opinions. For the form of the first sentence precludes 
any contention that the reader is breaking in upon a discussion, 
which is already in full swing. 
By apostrophising his audience as boni Of ell us , in a 
rather Ciceronian manner, if I may anticipate momentarily some 
future comments, identifies both himself with his audience and 
also their common interests with his own. As yet, therefore, 
irony is something which runs counter to his purpose, within the 
fiction of the poem, as he attempts to persuade his audience to 
his own point of view. Irony at this stage could only alienate 
the sympathy and attention of his audience. On the other hand, 
Horace, as I am endeavouring to demonstrate, is consciously and 
with subtle wit exploiting a kind of literary irony by means of 
the ambiguity and equivocal meanings of the words, such as boni, 
which he puts into the mouth of Of ell us. 
The conservative connotations of ~ya0oL have already 
been hinted at, when reference was made to the collective 
character of the Chorus of the Knight~, who were termed ~ya0oL 
in Cleon's harangue. If boni is necessarily to be associated 
with ~ya0oL, then, in the context of Of ell us , address to his 
peers in the first verse of this poem, it must also be associated 
with the phrase xaAot xaya0oL, a directly flattering title with 
the meaning originally of "traditional gentlemen". I say 
lI originally" because it is extremely interesting, from our point 
of view, to trace the development of the meaning of this phrase 
in the full knowledge that Horace would have been equally in 
possession of this information, though not Of ell us. For, although 
the original implications of xaAa~ xaya06~ may have been 
flattering enough to Of ell us , if one could imagine that such an 
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unmitigated xenophobe could take pleasure in being associated 
with anything Greek, the later and more philosophically oriented 
associations of the phrase could not but have proven disagree-
able to him, if one could imagine him being aware of them. 
Of ell us , lack of awareness is, however, not material; what is 
material is Horace's total awareness as author and the awareness 
which, as author, he expects from his readers. 
The traditional meaning of xaAos xuya&os is well 
25 
attested: the phrase was usually applied to the kind of man 
who enjoyed to the full both the benefits and the responsibil-
ities which derived necessarily from the possession of inherited 
wealth, based in the possession of land, and that general 
mystique supposed to be the prerogative of the aristocracy. 
Theognis it was 26 who perhaps first impu"ted a moral as well as 
aesthetic and substantial dimension, to xaAosi this "natural" 
virtue became suspect in the great fifth century debate between 
the proponents of ~6aLs and the devotees of the primacy of 
vO~Os.27 It "then became customary for philosophical writers, 
especially Plato, to employ the traditional gentleman's 
"d f' . t . II f fl' t . . t d' t 28 e lnl lons 0, or examp e, JUS lce, ple y an Vlr ue as 
the norms against which to measure such rival theories concerning 
ethical behaviour as those put forward by Thrasymachus, Glaucon, 
d S t . f l' bl' 29 an ocra es ln, 0 course, P ato s Repu lC. 
25 E.G. Hdt. 1.30; Thuc. 8.48; Xen. Herl. 5.3.9 and Cyr. 4.4.23. 
26 Theognis, v.438. 
27 For a recent, succinct and lucid account of this debate, see 
W.K.C. Guthrie, The Sophists (Cambridge, 1971) pp.55~134. 
28 On traditional "justice", see Cephalus in Republic 33lb-c, 
on "piety", Euthyphro 5d, and on "virtue" and its teach-
ability, Meno, passim. 
29 For a penetrating discussion both of the use of the normal 
definition of justice in the Republic as, as it were, a datum 
line, and of other concepts of justice, s~e Sir Ernest 
Barker: Greek Political (London, 1964) pp.168-238. 
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Aristotle, in his rationalisation of the traditional 
Delphic ethic of l-Ln6EV ayav, takes the whole process a step 
further by developing the meaning of Ka~a~ K&ya86~ in a technical 
sense, until it becomes the equivalent of Aristotle's man of 
practical virtue, 6 LE~ECW~ aTIOU6aLO~, the completely virtuous 
man of the Nicomachean Ethics. 30 He is, of course, still well 
aware of the traditional meaning of Ka~o~ K&ya8o~1 as may be 
seen from his use of the phrase in a different context at 
Politics 4.8.4. The way was thus opened by Aristotle for the 
Hellenistic philosophers, who, in the context of Roman ethical 
theory, are of paramount importance, to use Ka~6~ and &ya86~ as 
equivalents of a6~0~ or prerequisites, in their substantive 
forms, of ao~~a, while La Ka~ov became identified with the 
31 
summum bonum of the Stoic school.· In fact, to use La tin terms, 
the sapiens, in the Stoic context, is automatically bonus. I 
think it is clear, therefore, that boni, in the first verse of 
this satire, is redolent not only of traditional Greek and 
Roman ethical values, with which Of ell us was in sympathy, but 
also of those Hellenistic philosophical notions to which Of ell us I 
address is designed as a corrective or counterblast. This is, 
I think, especially likely, when it is also realised that the 
opening of this line, within which boni plays an important 
structural role, is cast in the form of a question which could 
itself serve as a paraphrase of the title of Cicero's major work 
on Hellenistic ethical theories, the De Finibus Bonorum et 
Malorum. To counter any suggestion that it is ludicrous so to 
30 Aristotle, E.N. 2.9.2 etc. 
31 So also did La &ya86v: see e.g. Diogenes Laertius, 7.100, 
Ka~aV 6E ~€youa~ La L£~8~OV &ya8avi cf. Cicero Fin. 
4.68. ) 
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32 inflate the significance of a single word, which has an 
adequate and respectable latin meaning, I would again declare 
that it is an axiom essential to my whole approach to Horace that 
he, like Cicero,33 desired an extremely intelligent, sophisticated 
and scholarly audience, unlike Lucilius, who apparently only 
demanded a moderately well-read audience. 34 We know from else-
where that Horace thought that he was improving upon the literary 
quality of Lucilius' satires. 35 One can also presume that the 
content, as well as the way in which it was handled by Horace, 
was more sophisticated in his work than in that of Lucilius. 
As will become clear this makes Lejay's comments on the 
tone of Horace's proem difficult to follow. For, in his 
discussion 36 of the indirect question with which Horace opens 
the address of Of ell us, Lejay detects a note of simulated 
embarrassment. Horace, claims Lejay, excuses himself for the 
banality of the opening sentence and in vv.2-3 disclaims any 
responsibility for original authorship: 
nec meus hic sermo est, sed quae praecepit Of ell us 
rusticus, abnormis sapiens crassaque Minerva. 
32 Rudd, p.170, hints at some Horatian subtlety here with his 
comment, "it is a kind of accident to which Horace is 
markedly prone"; however, he does not develop further the 
idea of ambiguity in the meaning of boni, further, that is 
to say, -than a reference to the Greek 0)yaGo L and the P latonlc 
provenance of "nec meus hic sermo est". For a more detailed 
discussion see below. 
33 De Finibus 1.7, where reference is actually made to Lucilius. 
34 We learn this from a quotation at Cicero De Or. 2.25, 
"Persium non curo legere, Laelium Decimum volo". 
35 E.g. Satires 1.4.6-13 and 1.10.1-15: it is interesting that 
in Sat. 2.1 Horace not only stresses his genuine debt to 
Lucilius (N.B.,esp. "Lucili ritu nostrum melioris utroque", 
v.29), but also, in the poem immediately prior to 2.2 in the 
collection implies possible criticism of the settlement of 
veterans. See discussion on Of ell us , political comments 
below. 
36 Lejay, n. ad loco p.328, "Hor. s'excuse aussitot d'emettre 
cette banal i-te. " 
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The wit is at once more subtle and more packed than Lejay 
imagines or, for that matter, than seems apparent to Rudd. To 
dispose first of the charge of supposed banality: an examination 
of Satires 2.6.70-76 indicates that Horace felt that, far from 
such questions being banal, or even irrelevant, they were 
precisely the topics upon which he enjoyed relaxed and intellig-
ent conversation with his neighbours. 37 Also, if one considers 
that this particular satire is to a certain extent Socratic in 
tone, then this initial question, reminiscent of the abrupt 
opening of the Meno of P1ato 38 is totally suitable. 
That Horace is in fact operating at a highly sophisticated 
level of literary allusion, and allusion to Greek literature, 
at the beginning of a satire which is devoted ostensibly to the 
expression of an unsophisticated and essentially Italian view 
is further made clear by the content, organisation and intent 
of the second line of the poem. For although Horace is not by 
any means apo1ogising for the banality of the opening statement, 
knowing full well that in philosophical terms it is not the bare 
statement, but only its expansion and discussion of it, which 
can admit of a charge of banality, he is, nevertheless, 
distancing himself from the views which are about to be expressed 
and at the same time ensuring that he is not identified either 
with the person or persona of the character into whose mouth he 
has himself placed these views. As will become clear, Horace is 
neither totally in agreement with the views which he places in 
the mouth of Ofe11us nor does he discount their value entirely, 
37 Esp. 2.6.76, " ..• et quae sit natura boni summumque quid 
eius ll • 
38 Plato, Meno 70a uEXELG ~OL EtTIEtv, ~ E~Hpa~EG, dpa 
o LoaH~ov----r)'apE~li;· 'i'j 06 0 LOa}nOV; cf. Hor. Sa"tires 1.1 
ad init, but also Plato, Laws 624a. 
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any more than he entirely discounted the value of some of the 
ethical ideas and precepts which he was .pleased to place in the 
mouths of Damsippus and Davus in Satires 2.3 and 2.7; it should 
be added, however, that Of ell us is generally dealt with in a 
far kinder manner than are either Davus or Damasippus. This 
is natural, if one considers that Of ell us , although presumably 
liber rather than libertus, reflects attitudes dear to the 
heart of Horace's own father. However much one may admire the 
achievements of an alien culture, the effects of one's own 
culture and environment upon both character and spirit are 
ineradicable. However that may be, consider v.2 of Satires 2.2 
in detail: 
2 nec meus hic sermo est, sed quae praecepit Of ell us ••• 
The balancing of the possessive ~, at the beginning of the 
line, with the contrasting proper name Of ell us , at the line's 
close, suggests a deeper significance than can be explained 
adequately by the postulation of a desire to demonstrate metrical 
virtuosity for its own sake: this especially when the balancing 
occurs in the work of a poet as conscious and as careful in his 
composition as was Horace. It is likely that a contrast in 
temperament, education and, therefore, in outlook is indicated 
as existing between the poet and his present mouthpiece by the 
existence within the single line of the physical gulf between 
the two words which specifically refer to the two individuals. 
The nature and extent of this psychological gulf, indicated by 
the exploitation of metre and of word order, is further high-
lighted by the various contrasts between v.3, which further 
qualifies and characterises Of ell us , and the clause "nec meus 
hic sermo est" in v.2. For although this clause contains 
J 
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39 Horace's own term, which he employs elsewhere as a label for 
his satirical works, his essays in the only native Italian 
contribution to the tale of literary genres, it is also, on the 
other hand, so replete with Greek literary allusions that in its 
own brief compass it epitomises, if one takes into account the 
undoubtedly Italian reference to sermo to the satiric genre, 
the Janus like nature of Horace's attitude to things Italian 
and things Greek. Horace's exploitation of irony as a facet of 
his very literary wit is also in evidence: the literary 
allusions and associations which are triggered by "nec meus hic 
sermo est" are as alien as can possibly be to the staid and 
unsophisticated common sense of Of ell us. The allusions are to 
. . d 40 1 41 d . h 42 Eur~p~ es, to P ato an Call~mac us: Euripides was perhaps 
the most sophisticated and sophistic of the great tragedians, 
Plato the philosopher most divorced from the harsh realities of 
the phenomenal as opposed to the ideal world, while Callimachus 
was a representative of a new wave of poetry, consciously 
breaking new ground and out of sympathy with traditional ideas. 
By this typically allusive use of an apparently 
innocuous phrase at the beginning of this satire Horace achieves 
several ends: not only does he dissociate himself well in 
39 Horace's title for the Satires was Sermones, but also see 
esp. Sat. 1.4.39-48. 
40 Lejay (n. ad,loc.) lists Eurip. Melanippe 484 (Nauck) and 
Helen 513, ~6YOG yap ~a~LV o6u ~u6G, oo~~v 6' ~TIoGI which 
may be related to the sapiens of v.3: on the sophistication 
of Euripides see R.P. Winnington-Ingram, "Euripides: 
Poietes Sophos", Arethusa 2.2, 1969. 
41 The Platonic reference is to Symposium 177a where the 
speaker is the rather dry and:pedantic physician Eryximachus. 
42 See Callimachus, Hymns 5.56, uu60G 6' 06u ~uoG, a~~' 
£~£pwv. It may be of interest to note that Callimachus' 
Hecale probably introduces a new type of epic heroine from 
the same social grouping to which Of ell us himself belonged. 
Horace follows new literary directions, while simultaneously 
presen'ting a character out of sympathy wi th them. 
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advance from the ideas both moral and political,43 which he 
places in the mouth of Of ell us, but he also serves notice of 
his intention to exploit opportunities for witty and learned 
ambiguities as they may arise, whether or not they cut across 
the prevailing current of Of ell us , stream of eloquence which is, 
anyway, carefully stage-managed by the poet. For Horace also in 
v.2 establishes his own credentials, as a man who is well versed 
in the best of the Greek dramatic and philosophical authors and 
able to exploit that knowledge in an almost Socratic manner, 
before, in v.3 he moves on to characterise Ofellus as a peculiarly 
and consciously Italian individual, both in spirit and in 
education: 
3 rusticus abnormis sapiens crassaque Minerva. 
Our attitude to Of ell us in the remainder of the poem and, 
accordingly, to the pronouncements which he makes, depends upon 
the impression which this particular line makes upon us. As will 
become evident that impression is by no means as totally 
favourable as some would suggest, especially those who believe 
that the words which Horace puts into Of ell us , mouth are 
entirely consistent with the poet's own ideas and beliefs. 44 
For Horace's description of Ofellus in this line (v.3) is quite 
consciously double-edged: neither rusticus nor crassus are 
adjectives which could have been taken on an initial hearing as 
unequivocally complimentary, especially in satiric verse and 
also before a smart and sophi~ticated audience. Even though 
the possibility of undue comic influence upon this poem has 
43 For potentially dangerous poli"tical comment, see vv.126-136. 
44 E.g. Lejay, "Horace se contente de presenter son porte-
parole, un sage en dehors des formules, un howne rustique, 
qui ignore les raffinements intellectuals," in his 
introductory discussion of this poem, pp.3l1-327; cf. 
Palmer; n. ad loc, p.255. 
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45 
already been played down, nevertheless I would suggest that 
because of its association with dullness and stupidity in comic 
and other 1iterature,46 although agrestis is more commonly used 
47 in a derogatory se~se, rusticus here also possesses inevitably 
derogatory overtones regarding the basic stupidity and dullness 
of Of ell us. This is not to deny to Of ell us some of the more 
48 desirable attributes of the rusticus such as honesty. However, 
such honesty is often the result of naivety, so far as the 
. urbanus is concerned, rather than of any conscious virtue. 
Since, moreover, Horace uses rusticius with a similarly ambiv-
alent meaning in a similarly ambivalent context at Satires 1.3. 
31,49 it seems unlikely that rusticus in v.3 of this satire is 
being used in a totally neutral or in a totally comp1irnentary 
sense. This feeling that there is a certain ambiguity or 
ambivalence evident in Horace's attitude towards the intellectual 
stature of Of ell us at least, not to mention his moral and 
political ideals, is further emphasised by the phrase crassaque 
Minerva with which the line ends. This phrase balances and 
complements rusticus in the structure and meaning of the indiv-
idua1 verse, while the whole hexameter pivots about the word 
sapiens. Both rusticus and crassaque Minerva qualify sapiens, 
which, as has been amply demonstrated, seems incapable of 
sustaining a simple and straightforward meaning in the context 
45 See above,p.l97. 
46 E.g. Plautus, Persa, 2.1.2, but more especially Most. 1.1.39, 
where the rusticus Grumio berates the dishonesty-or-the 
urbanus Tranio: n. also Vergi1, Eel. 2.56 where Corydon 
is apos'trophised as rusticus, sure1y- "naive". 
47 E.g. Cic. Leg. 1.14.41: "0 rem dignam, in qua non modo 
docti, verum etiam agrestes erubescant." 
48 In Rosc. Am. Cicero illustrates the countryfied honesty of 
the accused: this defence necessarily depicts the accused 
as something of a bumpkin. . 
49 IIrideri possit eo quod / rusticius tonso toga def1uit et 
male laxus / in pede calceus haeret: at est bonus ... " Sat. 
1.3.30-32. 
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of Horace's moral and philosophical satire. It has already 
been suggested that rusticus, if read in an ironical fashion, 
devalues Of ell us , intellectual standing with the audience; by 
the same token crassaque Minerva qualifies that intellectual 
standing in a manner which is not necessarily complimentary. 
It is clearly suitable for the intelligence, the "stock 
of brains" as Palmer's note puts it, of such a typical and 
conscious Italian as Of ell us to be described or put in terms of the 
. f . 11 1 . dd f' d H • 5 0 spec~ ~ca y Ita ~an go ess 0 w~s om, rl~nerva. It is not 
quite so clear, however, why she should be described as crassa, 
unless she simply stands for "wisdom" as Vulcan stands for fire 
at Satires 1.5.74: Palmer explains that, as well as goddess of 
. d . . 1 dd f .. d . 51 w~s om, M~nerva ~s a so the go ess 0 sp~nn~ng an weavlng. 
Therefore crassus is a suitable epithet, if rather learned, in 
that it applies equally to the quality of thread, or the quality, 
of brains or intellect. However subtle this play on words may 
be, as Horace combines both aspects of Minerva's patronage in 
the phrase crassaque Minerva, and there is a suspicion that the 
critic is perhaps oversubtle, the overall result can hardly be 
thought of as being complimentary to Of ell us. The poet is going 
to great lengths to show not only his own subtlety, but also the 
lack of subtlety of Of ell us . One would even be tempted ·to 
suggest that Horace's desire to demonstrate his own intellectual 
dexterity through a calculated assault upon the mental equipment 
of Ofellus goes a stage further. For, although it is true that 
50 Although Altheim, Greichische Gotter, p.142, n.4 believes 
Minerva to be an Athena, borrowed through Etruria, most 
scholars think her indigenous to Italy: if my inter-
pretation of Horace's choice of her name here is correct, 
it would be evidence in favour of the beliefs of most 
scholars. 
51 E.g. Vergil, Aeneid 8.409; Ovid, Met. 4.33; Propertius 
') {'\ C' 
£,,(J);;Jo.J e 
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the phrases, almost proverbial, pingui or crassa Minerva aliquid 
facere commonly mean "without skill" or "without formal 
education",52 I would suggest that, where Horace is contrasting 
Of ell us, who is "unschooled" (abnormis, perhaps), with his own 
highly educated self, the phrase crassa Minerva must be under-
stood in the context of materialistic and physical theories on 
the nature of the human intellect. However startling this may 
sound initially, further investigation will show it to be a 
persuasive and attractive interpretation of crassa Minerva. 
At Horace, Ars Poetic a 385-6 we find the following use 
of Minerva: 
tu nihil invita dices faciesve Minerva: 
id tibi iudicium est, ea mens. 
Here Minerva is being used to represent that decision making 
and sovereign aspect of the soul, the mind, which the Stoics 
called ~O nYE~OVLXOv.53 Nothing is said or done, suggests Horace, 
without the consent of that rational part, nihil invita Minuerva. 
Mention of the Stoics is not out'of place here, since we find 
at Cicero, De Officiis 1.31.110 the following ,sentiment 
expressed: 
sic enim est faciundum ut contra universam naturam 
nihil contendamus, ea tamen conservata propriam nostram 
sequamur ut, etiamsi sint alia graviora atque meliora, 
tamen nos studia nostra nostrae naturae regula metiamur; 
neque enim attinet naturae repugnare nec quicquam 
sequi, quod assequi non queas. ex quo magis emergit, 
quale sit decorum illud, ideo quia nihil decet invita 
Minerva, ut aiunt, id est adversante et repugnante natura. 
52 Cf. Cicero, Lael. 5.19. 
53 It is interesting that on occasion the Stoics themselves 
identified Athena with wisdom in much the same way; e.g. 
Diogenes Laertius, 7.147. 'A0nvav os (sc. ~a0L) ua~a ~nv 
Et~ at0tpa 6La~a0Lv ~ou nYE~OVLXOU a6~ou"and also S.V.F. 
3~235",1, \~]11ere the com..rnent is lTlade in Philodemus, de Mus g 
4, p.105 Kemke, that 'A0nva =~p6Vn0L~. 
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The apologetic ut aiunt of Cicero warns the reader that he is 
employing a colloquial or proverbial expression in invita 
Minerva. The phrases crassa and pingui Minerva are also used 
proverbially54 and, as this is the case, are apt enough for 
employment in qualifying the intellect of Of ell us. However '. 
crassa Minerva does have more sophisticated associations than 
are appropriate, if it is Horace's intention merely to comment on 
the stolid good sense of his mouthpiece. For Minerva, as has 
been demonstrated, is capable of being used in a modestly 
philosophical work which is aimed at producing a practical modus 
vivendi, even as are the praecepta of Of ell us. 
It is at this point in the argument that the term crassa 
assumes greater significance than can adequately be explained by 
references to Minerva's role as patroness of the weaving trade. 
In Stoic doctrine the human soul was a material entity constituted 
from the same materials as, is, indeed, a part of that same 
TIvED~a, a mixture of air and fire, craftsmanlike (TEXVLXOG) in 
't ff t h' h 't ' t ' d 'th 55 1 S e ec, w lC anlma es, maln alns an organlses e cosmos. 
The station of each object within the hierarchy of being posited 
by the Stoics depended, as it were, upon the quality of the air 
and fire mixture which maintained its peculiar tension or 
, d h h h' '1' l' b' 56 h h' TOVOG an t roug t at ltS materla equl 1 rlum. T e co eSlve 
force or EELG within a stone, for example, is the same nVED~ 
in operation as that which, in a less gross form, maintains the 
nature or ~6aLG peculiar to a plant, while this ~6aLG is in 
54 Col. Praef. 33; Cic. Laelius 19; cf. also Horace, Ep. 1.4.15. 
55 On the rationality of the stoic arche and the role and 
meaning of logos in the universal and individual context, 
see H.A.K. Hunt, A Physical Interpretation of the Universe: 
The Doctrines of Zeno the Stoic, pp.26~44 (Melbourne 1976). 
56 On TOVOG and tension exploited by Horace, see above pp. 
156ff. in the discussion of Satires, 2.7. 
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turn more gross than that mixture of air and fire, that ~uxn 
which, being a spark of the divine logos, animates and maintains 
the peculiar nature of men in their unique position within the 
cosmos. The qualitative differences between the various nVEu~a 
types mentioned depend upon the ratio, within the mixture, of 
air to fire. The greater the proportion of fire, the more rarified 
the mixture and, accordingly, the higher on the scale of being 
of the object blessed with the more rarified mixture. 
Similarly, within the spectrum of a single species, the more 
rarified the nVEu~a in an individual man, for example, the 
sharper his intellect and, for that matter, the better the 
prospects of his soul both in its terrestrial existence and after 
it has been separated in death from the body, according at least 
to chrysippus. 57 This is particularly interesting in the light 
of the comments put into Of ell us , mouth at vv.70-79, where in 
a manner reminiscent of the lay view, ridiculed in Plato's 
Phaedo,58 Of ell us declares that gluttony weighs down the soul, 
even after death: 
quin corpus onustum 
hesternis vitiis animum quoque praegravat una, 
atque adfigit humo divinae particulam aurae. 
(77-79) 
A full discussion of these verses and the context in which they 
appear must await the full discussion of Of ell us' praecepta 
57 
58 
E.g. Diogenes Laertius, 7.157 KAEav6ns ~sv oOv naoas (sc. 
-cas ~uxas) EnlOLawtvELV ~£XPL -rns bmupwoe:wSI Xpuolnnos 
os -cas -cwv oo~wv ~ovwv: cf. Lactantius, Div. Inst. 7.20 and 
Arius Didymus, Epit. Phys. fr.39 Diels (S.V.F. 2.225.18-24). 
Compare the excellence of the fierier souls according to 
Heraclitus and the soddenness of drunken souls, fr.117, 
Stobaeus, An~h .. 3.5.7. 
?t 1 z· '\ \ \ 
Plato, Phaedo\'E~fjpl6€s O£ YE , c0 ~LAE, -rou-co OrEOOOl Xpn 
ELval UaL fjapu uat YEWOe:s uat opa-cov· '0 on }(,O>L EXOUs n 
-coLaU-Cn ~uxn fjapuvE-caL -CE uat EAuE-ral naALV ELs -rOV opa-cov 
-c6nov ~6fj4>. 
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which follows. However, suffice to say at the moment that 
Horace's description of Ofellus as being sapiens .•. crassa 
Minerva would be far from complimentary from a Stoic point of 
view. In fact, from a Stoic point of view it would be a contra-
diction in terms. 
To complete our study of v.3, we must now consider the 
phrase abnormis sapiens; although there is some doubt about the 
exact reading of the MSS at this point,59 there seems little 
doubt as to the meaning of abnormis or ab nQrmis or, even, 
abnormi. Palmer translates with "an unschooled philosopher" who 
60 is not "bound by the rules of any sect." Rudd translates 
neatly, "an unprofessional philosopher".61 In his explanatory 
note Lejay quotes from Cicero, Laelius 18 to illustrate this 
type of expression, but from a slightly different perspective, 
"quos sapientes nostri maiores iudicabant ad istorum (sc. 
Graecorum) normam fuisse sapientes." To a certain extent 
Horace's description of Of ell us as abnormis / ab normis sapiens 
anticipates his own description of himself at Epistles 1.1.14; 
there Horace declares himself to be "nullius addictus iurare 
in verba magistri." One could argue that this fact adds weight 
to the argumentsof those who suppose, with Lejay, that the views 
of Of ell us , as recorded by Horace, can be equated directly with 
the poet's own. However, that such an interpretation is not 
valid has been demonstrated amply by the delineation just 
completed of Horace's ambivalent attitude towar~s his mouthpiece, 
59 There is a useful discussion of various readings in the 
apparatus criticus attached to Lejay's text and commentary, 
p.328. 
60 Palmer, n. ad loco 
61 Rudd, The Satires of Horace and Persius (Harrnondsworth, 
1973), p. 
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Of ell us , and necessarily, therefore, to the sentiments expressed 
by him. Horace's depiction of Of ell us at the opening of this 
satire is anticipatory rather of his treatment of the sanguine 
roficientes Damasippus and Davus in Satires 2.3 and 2.7. For, 
even as Horace's gentler ridicule of Ofellus demonstrates, in 
the manner of its achievement, a subtlety of wit and an 
acquaintance with Hellenistic philosophy alien to our carefully 
acquired conception of the attainments of Of ell us , even so in 
Epistles 1.1, although disclaiming allegiance to any particular 
philosophical mentor, Horace nevertheless advertises his know-
ledge of their doctrines. He adopts philosophies according to 
circumstance and mood. As his satirical humour is opportunistic, 
so is his philosophical allegiance. In the light of all this 
we should be wary of likening Ofellus to Cato Maior; for Cato, 
despite his politically motivated antipathy to things Greek, 
was well aware, nevertheless, of their aesthetic and philosoph-
ical value. That is, unless Cicero's portrait of him in the 
62 Cato Maior is vastly astray. 
It is not only the nature of Horace's complex attitude 
towards Of ell us which is adumbrated in the opening lines of this 
poem. Even while Horace is depicting Of ell us as an aggressively 
proud Italian with little time for alien culture and no 
sympathy with imported ethicaL theories of a technical na·ture, 
he simultaneously anticipates the major recurrent themes of 
the poem, which are also among the major recurrent themes of 
his satires in general. This anticipation is achieved with 
great economy. The major themes of the poem are intimately 
62 See also Kienast, Cato der Zensor, seine Personlichkeit 
und seine Zeit (Heidelberg, 1954) and Della Corte, 
Catone Censore (Firenze, 1966). 
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linked with the xenophobic attitude which Horace ascribes to 
Of ell us. Horace's aim appears twofold, both aspects again 
intimately related. On the one hand Horace wishes to demonstrate 
that the traditional Roman or Italian views on questions of 
morality and ethics can stand no longer in isolation as a valid 
guide for individual behaviour. The current environment is too 
much infiltrated with alien influences to allow such an ostrich-
like stance as that adopted by Of ell us to maintain any satisfac-
tory practical effect. One aspect of this growing complexity 
is emphasised by the political comment introduced by Horace 
towards the poem's close. The urbs Romana had a constitution 
which had ultimately proved incapable of sustaining the strain 
imposed upon it by the weight and extent of the imperium Romanum. 
In a similar, even a parallel way, the mores maiorum were 
incapable alone and without modification of sustaining the 
demands made upon the individual by the complex society within 
which he found himself. In addition it was Horace's intention 
also to show that the Italian views which he puts into the mouth 
of Of ell us have much to commend them. They are, after all, 
based upon sound common sense and broad experience of life, as 
were the Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle and, more relevantly 
perhaps in the light of much of what is said in Satires 2.2, 
af· the peculiar "hedonism" of the Epicureans. In fact, briefly 
to anticipate a general conclusion on the nature and import of 
Horaceis satires, Italian ethics, supported by Greek culture 
and moral theory, defended by men capable of utilising the best 
of both worlds, Greek and Italian, should perhaps in Horace's 
view have formed the basis of daily behaviour for intelligent 
Romans in the period immediately after the civil wars. 
If this is a correct understanding of Horace's dual 
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intention, the next question is how does the present satire 
attempt to fulfil that purpose and, secondly, how successful 
is it in its attempt. 
The first approach which Horace adopts is to present the 
praecepta of Of ell us, abnormis s iens though he may be, in the 
form of a diatribe. As this discussion progresses it will become 
clear that Horace, writing in a peculiarly Italian genre, namely 
satire, and ostensibly reporting (nec meus hic sermo est) the 
ideas of an unashamed Italian, namely Of ell us , nevertheless 
finds it useful to employ techniques of persuasion which are the 
mark of the diatribe form, which was itself the typical vehicle 
for expression of the proselytizing Hellenistic philosophers. 63 
Secondly, Horace also finds it expedient to utilise technical 
terms in the reporting, or rather in the composition,of Of ell us' 
diatribe. These terms immediately trigger associations with 
the actual technical usages of the Hellenistic schools. There 
is, indeed, a certain amount of humour to be extracted from the 
juxtaposition of the homely illustrations, especially those of 
a culinary nature, with which the satire abounds, with potent-
ially technical language. This is the type of humour of 
incongruity which Horace exploits in the initial discussion of 
the attributes of Of ell us. If indeed there is a specific comic 
influence upon this satire, this is where it is to be found. 64 
Of more importance, however, than the transient comic effect 
is the fact that Horace is able to suggest by means of these 
carefully managed and arresting juxtapositions, that not only 
is it impossible to discuss effectively or propound ethical 
63 For a discussion of the characteristics of the diatribe as 
they affect Horace, Satires 2.3, see above pp.65-69. 
64 For a discussion of the element of incongruity in Plautus 
see Segal, Roman r (Harvard, 1968) ch.l. 
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topics at any length, without using the methods of those very 
philosophers whose efforts one affec-ts to disdain or ignore, 
but it is also impossible to avoid this inconsistency in the 
details and language of one's arguments. And, since, as Horace 
65 poin-ts out elsewhere, all inconsistency is to be avoided, it 
is far preferable to acknowledge a debt of gratitude where it 
is due, than to persist in fruitless and bigoted ideological 
insularity. 
Before continuing I would also suggest that the preceding 
paragraphs have disposed of one of the major obstacles which 
Lejay sees as standing in the way of a clear understanding of 
the poem. For in his discussion Lejay declares (p.312) "La 
tache est vaine de vouloir distinguer ce qui appartient a 
Horace et ce qui revient a Of ell us. La fiction permet au poete 
de meller, suivante son habitude, les mots d'auteur aux tirades 
de personnage et de mystifier un peu le lecteur." The mystifi-
cation of the reader is caused by difficulties which arise wlien 
attempts are made to distribute the dialogue precisely between 
Horace and Of ell us. Lejay, by contrast with the majority of 
editors wishes to attribute vv.1-52 directly to Of ell us, 
considering verses 2 and 3 as an interjection by Horace. That 
is to say, Lejay believes we have another opening in medias res, 
where we are not immediately aware of the identity of the 
66 
speaker. However, Lejay is creating problems, which do not 
exist, and the answer to which he has anticipated himself in 
the words "de mystifier un peu le lecteur"; for, if Horace's 
intention is to mystify the reader, which I doubt, that 
65 For Horace's discussion of the importance of consistency 
see Satires 1.3 and my discussion of that poem above, pp. 
23ff. 
66 Cf.,for example, Satires 2.3; 2.7 and 2.8. 
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mystification is intended to facilitate the ambiguities, which 
are central to Horace's main purpose in the poem. Lejay brings 
these difficulties upon himself, as is noted by Rudd, by 
wishing to understand Of ell us as a gentleman far~er who, although, 
through no fault of his own, fallen on hard times, nevertheless 
, th b f' f l'b 1 d t' 67 L' h b reta~ns e ene ~ts 0 a ~ era e uca ~on. eJay as een 
captivated by the plausibility of Horace's fiction. One should 
also remember that Horace usually only allows his creations to 
speak in a IIton doctoral" when he wishes to hold them or their 
ideas up to a certain amount of ridicule. This is certainly the 
case with Damasippus and Davus in Satires 2.3 and 2.7. It is a 
pity that Lejay feels the need to accept an authentic bio-
graphical accuracy for the depiction of Of ell us. This basic 
error not only leads him into difficulties regarding his over-
estimation of the intellect of Of ell us, an overestimation which 
itself necessarily springs from Lejay's profound understanding 
of the source material for Of ell us , diatribe,68 but also blinds 
him to the way in which Horace exploits the complex pattern of 
source material and to his purpose in doing so. 
Although this interlude of discussion may have seemed 
a trifle inorganic within the developing and detailed discussion 
of Satires 2.2, it did seem advantageous to anticipate at some 
length the course of the investigation of the remainder of the 
poem, even as the tone and content of the poem are themselves 
foreshadowed by Horace in vv.1-3. 
67 E.g. Lejay, p.3l2, "N'oublions pas qu'avant d'etre fermier, 
il a ete proprietaire ..• il est tire de la vie contemp-
oraine." 
68 I am indebted to Lejay's commentary for the majority of the 
references to source material which occur in the following 
pages; this should serve as an anticipatory acknowledgment. 
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Whether we now treat v.l as Horace's report of Of ell us , 
verbatim words, or as a modified version, along with the rest 
of the poem, of the praecepta of Ofellus is strictly irrelevant. 
Within Horace's Satires the master of the composition is always 
the poet. Therefore, although it may be true that "Quae virtus 
et quanta, boni, sit vivere parvo" is an undoubted commonplace 
and that, perhaps in a spirit of irony, Horace disclaims owner-
shipi even so, the line is as it is because Horace wanted it to 
be. While certainly commonplace in its almost Christian equation 
of poverty with virtue, the line is consistent with the not 
totally favourable impression Horace is ensuring that his mouth-
piece initially makes. Horace wishes to develop a picture of a 
man who instinctively mistrusts the intellectual and who fears 
such a creature through ignorance. 69 One is reminded of Cicero's 
comments at De Officiis 2.87: 
sed de quaerenda, de collocanda pecunia, vellem etiam 
de utenda, commodius a quibusdam optumis viris ad 
Ianum70 medium sedentibus quam ab ullis philosophis 
ulla in schola disputatur. 
In its attempt to reduce questions of ethics to such a basic 
level and its conscious spurning of theory, this passage seems 
almost as perverse as Socrates' choice of the just man as the 
ideal thief in Republic 1,71 although Cicero lacks Plato's irony. 
However, Cicero, unlike Of ell us, does recognise that "utilitatum 
comparatio .•• saepe est necessaria." Then it is that the mind 
which is best trained rationally to investigate circumstances 
will prove superior to the mind of the abnormis ~piens. Horace 
69 Cf. Plato IS Meno and the attitude of Anytus to ·the Sophists 
at 90-94. 
70 There is some confusion in the MSS of the De Officiis at this 
point, although the general meaning is clear enough; practical 
men of affairs are more trustworthy than philosophers. 
71 Plato, Republic 334. 
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too would recognise this fact and would realise also that it 
was a shortcoming in men of Of ell us , type that this was a 
concession unlikely to be made by them. However that may be, 
Cicero elsewhere too praises poverty as the nursemaid of 
respectability and honour, quoting Caecilius to this effect at 
Tusculans 3.56: 
nam aut ips ius rei natura qualis et quanta sit 
quaerimus, ut de paupertate non numquam, cuius onus 
disputando levamus, docentes quam parva sint quae 
natura desideret, aut a disputandi subtilitate 
orationem ad exempla traducimus. hic Socrates 
commemoratur, hic Diogenes, hic Caecilianum illud: 
saepe est etiam sub palliolo sordido sapientia. 
cum enim paupertatis una eademque sit vis, 
quidnam dici potest quam ob rem C. Fabricio 
tolerabilis ea fuerit, alii negent se ferre 
posse? 
N t 1 d F b . . 72 tIt o on y oes a r1C1US seem 0 serve as a prototype amos 
for Of ell us , but the very form of the method of investigation 
described by Cicero anticipates the "quae virtus est quanta" 
of the opening line. The point here is not, of course, that 
Horace necessarily used the Tusculans as a source for the 
composition of this satire, although this is not itself beyond 
the bounds of possibility, but that the form of words which he 
places into Of ell us , mouth is redolent of a type of formal 
ethical discussion which, originated by Socrates and his 
contemporaries, recorded by Plato, was finally imitated in the 
dialogues of Cicero. Take this into account with the Platonic 
overtones of "nec meus hic sermo est" and one can see that the 
portrait of Ofellus is not as simple as some would have us believe. 
72 Fabricius' historicity is well established: Cic. Or 2.268; 
Off. 3.86; Planc. 26.60: Val. Max. 4.4.3; Gellius-,-1.l4; 
Juv. 9.142 and Plin. 33.12.54 and 153. 
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It seems that the idea of poverty and virtue enjoying 
some special relationship was one which had a continuing 
attraction for Horace, although his concept of what constituted 
poverty could well have astounded the less fortunate of his 
contemporaries. This question will reappear in the context of 
the discussion of Satires 2.6: however, more relevant for the 
moment is a later work, the sixteenth poem in Odes 2. In this 
poem Horace returns to the theme of the cares which attend the 
73 
wealthy. From our present point of view it is something which 
Horace writes towards the end of the poem which is important: 
mihi parva rura et 
spiritum Graiae tenuem Camenae 
Parca non mendax dedit et malignum 
spernere vulgus. 
Odes 2.16.37-40 
Although I would hesitate to number Ofellus with those scathingly 
described as malignum vulgus, I would suggest that what 
distinguishes Horace, not only from the common herd, with their 
vulgar aspirations, but also from Of ell us , with his dour and 
stolid common sense, is the poet's obvious delight and expertise 
in Greek literature, a delight which is highlighted in this ode 
by "spiritum Graiae tenuem Camenae." 
It is also appropriate at this stage of the discussion, 
if we can take our cue from the tone and content of the poem's 
opening, to outline briefly the views of the major Hellenist:ic 
schools on the related questions of poverty, virtue and 
asceticism. Such an outline will anticipate those associations 
which will inevitably be made as discussion of the poem develops. 
For it is not the formal element of the diatribe delivered by 
73 Cf. Satires 2.7 ad fin~ 
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Of ell us that alone is anticipated by the ethical discourses of 
the Greeks; the content too is anticipated, naturally, as 
Horace consciously and obviously exploits Greek source material 
directly and also through the medium of Cicero's dialogues. 
Although Ofellus would have been in sympathy with, as it were, 
a statement formulated along the lines of "praecepta quidem haec 
tota nostra sunt", Horace, on the other hand, is only too well 
aware of the dubious nature of such a claim. For Horace was 
the first to acknowledge his own debt, as a satirist, to the 
related elements in the works of the Greek authors both directly 
and also through the medium of Lucilius. 74 
The developing attitudes of the Stoics towards both the 
question of poverty and the status of the pastoral ideal make 
a fascinating study in the light of this poem and the Italian 
attitudes which Horace presents in it through the diatribe of 
Of ell us. On the whole the views of the Stoics are not too far 
removed from those of Of ell us. I hesitate to say on this 
occasion that the views of Of ell us are "compatible" with those 
of the Stoa, and this is not simply because of his vehement 
claims to an Italian independence of spirit. For, although it 
is true that Horace utilises his own knowledge of Hellenistic 
philosophy in the composition of this poem, I think that the 
point should be made also that it is quite possible, even likely, 
that the moralising of the later Stoics, such as Seneca, 
Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius, may owe as much to Horace's 
persuasive formulation of Italian ethical values, in such a' 
74 Horace mentions the following Greek authors explicitly: 
Archilochus (Ep. 1.19.25), Bion (Ep. 2.2.60), Eupolis, 
Cratinus and Aristophanes (Sat. l~.l) and also Plato, 
the philosopher, and Menander (Sat. 2.3.ll~12): on his debt 
to Lucili us I see Satires 1. 4; 1. 10 and 2. '1. 
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poem as this, as Horace's poem is indebted to Hellenistic views 
received through both the medium of Cicero and of the lectures 
which Horace attended in Athens. The views of the later Stoics 
may then fairly be described as examples of Roman stoicism. 
The early Stoics considered that poverty was an 
indifferent and, therefore, incapable of materially affecting 
th h · f . d' . d 1 75 I d' th th' b l' f e applness 0 any ln lVl ua . n accor Wl lS e le 
in the a6La~opov status of nEvCa the Stoics attacked the 
conservative views of the aristocratic poet Theognis with great 
vehemence. This fact is recorded by Plutarch at Comm. Not. 
22.1069d: 
~ov ~OLVUV 8£OYVLV a6~ot nav~EAw~ aYEVVn 
UUL ~LUPOV nyouv~aL AEyov~a 
xpn nEVCnV ~Euyov~a uat E~ ~Eyaun~Ea nov~ov, 
pLn~Etv uat nE~pwv, UUPVE, ua~' nAL0a~wv· 
ou~w~ ano6ELALwv~a npo~ ~nv nEv(av a6La~opov ouaav. 
I have quoted this in full since it neatly combats Syme's view 
of the aristocratic bias of Stoicism,76 although this may, if 
present at all, have developed after the transmission of the 
doctrines to Rome. However, although Theognis was taken to task 
for having the temerity to express the traditional Greek view 
that poverty was an evil, the Stoics did compromise to the 
extent that they listed nEvLa, along with ill-health and 
1 . th .. 1. 7 7 C . t ug lness, as some lng anonpony~cvov or, as lcero pu s 
75 The attitudes of Zeno and Chrysippus in this respect are 
recorded at Stobaeus, Ecl. 2.57.18 and also at Diogenes 
Laertius 7.102, where i·t is mentioned as the opposite of 
nAou~o~, equally a6La~opov. 
76 The Roman Revolution, p.57; the passage is quoted in full 
at p.191 above. 
77 E.g. Diogenes Laertius 7.121 (on the views of Chrysippus) 
and also Sextus, Adv. Math. 11.59; cf. Stob. Ecl. 
2.83.10. 
222 
. 78 .. d lt, relclen um. In doing this they reflect the practical view, 
and its influence, of Aristotle and the peripatetics. 79 
There is, of course, nothing surprising, given the ever-
present and ubiquitous nature of poverty and its effects upon the 
quality of life,80 in the fact that the Stoics were interested in 
questions relating to the status and effects of poverty from the 
very beginning of the activities of the school. That this was a 
continuing concern is shown by Seneca's report of a difference 
between Posidonius and Antipater of Tarsus on the question of 
defining the essential nature of poverty at Epistles 87.38: the 
conclusion of this passage of arms was that Antipater defined 
poverty as "non per posi tionem •.. sed per detractionem ••• 
Graeci xa~a a~EpnaLv dicunt .•.. paupertas enim est non quae pauca 
possidet, sed quae multa non possidet." However interesting this 
debate on the nature of poverty may be in itself, it is of 
especial interest in the context of the present discussion in 
that it shows continuing concern with poverty among the Stoics 
at the time of the transmission of their doctrines to Rome. 
Up until this stage, however, it does seem that nEvCa / paupertas 
was treated on the whole as something undesirable, anonpOnY~EVOV 
or reiciendum. 
It has been suggested on occasions from the time of 
81 Aeschylus and Sophocles that wisdom and virtue were most often 
78 Cicero, Fin. 3.50. "itemque eorum quae nulla aestimatione 
digna essent, partim satis habere causae quam ob rem 
reicerentur, ut dolorem, morbum,sensuum amissionem, paupert-
a tem ..• Zeno ... quod a.nonponYW~;vov nomina vi tit: cf. Seneca, 
Ep.o 85.30. 
79 The views of Aristotle on the material prerequisites for 
Eu6aq-LOVLa are summarised neatly by G.E.R. Lloyd, Aristotle: 
The Growth and Structure of his Thought (Cambridge, 1968), 
p.213f. 
80 The dominant influence ,of poverty, discussed by Aristophanes 
in the Wealth, remained a topic of importance to the writers 
of New Comedy. 
81 The most famous statement of this idea is in the great lyrics 
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the fruits of bitter suffering. This had also been at least 
a possible implication of the Odyssey, that patience in the face 
of cumulative misfortune will eventually be rewarded. This 
82 implication was drawn by the Stoics themselves, who also 
83 
counted Herakles along with Odysseus among the posthumous 
sapientes of antiquity. Herakles was deified also because of 
h · . f d b h If f ff' k' d 84 lS serVlces per orme on e a 0 su- erlng man In . Plato 
had suggested earlier, in his image of the prisoner enduring 
physical and psychological discomfort in his escape from the 
cave to true enlightenment, that knowledge could only be achieved 
through sUffering and the suppression of earthly instincts~85 
In Roman literature Virgil preached the doctrine of labor 
. b . th G . 86 lmpro us In e eorglcs, while it has been.argued that the 
Aeneid can be interpreted as the pilgrimage of Aeneas through 
suffering to perfection in leadership.87 It was natural that 
this concept should have an immediate appeal to the Stoics in 
the light of the importance which they placed upon the activities 
of the proficiens on his pilgrimage towards the summum bonum of 
virtue in wisdom. In fact, such later Stoics as Seneca 
attempted to moderate the strictness of the absolute distinction 
of the Agamemnon's first stasimon; the Oedipus Coloneus 
is Sophocles testament to the validity of this concept. 
82 Cf. Horace's comment, in Stoic spirit, at Epistles 1.2.17-18. 
83 E.G. Seneca, Dial. 2.2.1, "Vlixen et Herculem ... Stoici 
nostri sapientes pronuntiaverunt, invictos laboribus, 
contemptores voluptatis et victores omnium terrarum." 
84 E.g. Cicero, Off. 3.5.25, "Herculem illum, quem hominum 
fama, beneficiorum memor, in concilio caelestium collocavit." 
85 Plato, Republic 515-518; cf. Phaedo 66b. 
86 See Vergil, Georgics 1. 121-128 i cf. Hesiod, Erga. 474. 
87 For a discussion of the evidence regarding this view, see 
R.P. Bond, "Aeneas and the Cardinal Virtues", Prudentia 
Vol.6.2,Nov.1974, pp.67-91. 
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between sapiens and stultus,88 following here in the footsteps 
f t ' 89 o Panae lUS. Perhaps the later Stoics felt that too little 
encouragement was provided for the proficiens by the rigid 
adherence to the principles of Zeno and Chrysipp~s, whose 
advocation of an imperceptible struggle towards virtue must have 
seemed an endlessly unsatisfying task. To return, however, to 
the question of poverty; it can be seen that, as the visage of 
poverty, the risk of poverty and its cruelty grew sensibly less 
severe,as the distance from poverty of the practitioners of 
S '" d 90 t Id b 'd d th' tOlclsm lncrease, so pover y cou e conSl ere as some lng 
to temper the soul's toughness in its pilgrimage towards virtue 
d 'd 91 an W1S om. This idea, working in concert with the very Roman 
notion that wealth, especially imported wealth, was deleterious 
in its effects upon the mental and spiritual health of the 
individual, as is pointed out by Of ell us , led to a situation 
where Stoics confused the merits of asceticism with the 
unconscious effects of poverty. This attitude is especially 
evident in Seneca, where the very vehemence of the attacks upon 
luxus, anticipating the indignation of an impoverished Juvenal, 
92 
seem to argue for the excellence of poverty: 
88 Seneca, Epistles 75.8, "inter ipsos quoque proficientes sunt 
magna discrimina: in tres classes ut quibusdam placet 
dividuntur." 
89 Cf. Cicero on Panaetius at Fin. 4.79. 
90 This perhaps confirms Syme's view (see above p.191) of what 
Stoicism ultimately became, as the ideals of the founders 
were eroded and the doctrines became adapted to the moral 
code of the Roman senatorial class. 
91 As early as Aristo of Chios (c.250 B.C.), however, we find 
it stated that OULWs 0 ~EV nEnaLoEu~£VOs EV nAouLw ua~ EV 
nEvL~ 06 LapaLLELaL, 0 0' anaLoEuLoS EV a~~otv, Stobaeus, 
Ecl. 2.218: this is particularly interesting in the light of 
Ofellus'/Horace's comments at the close of this satire. 
92 Juvenal also sees virtue and poverty as going hand in hand, 
although in his opinion poverty is the necessary result of 
virtue rather than vice versa, e.g. Juv. Satires 1.74, 
"V"\'Y" ...... h..: -1- ......... 1 .... ., .. ..::J .... .f-,,-vo et alcret! ~~V~=LUu ~auuaLUL ______ J 
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a) fugite delicias, fugite enervatam felicitatem, 
Seneca, Dial. 1.49 
b) quem specularia semper ab adflatu vindicaverunt. 
cuius pedes inter fomenta subinde mutata temuerunt, 
cui us cenationes subditus ac parietibus circumfusus 
calor temperavit, hunc levis aura non sine periculo 
stringet. ibid. 
c) audire solemus sic quorundam vitam laudari, quibus 
invidetur ~ molliter vivit hoc dicunt - mollis est. 
Epistulae, 82.2. 93 
As will shortly be seen, such comments as these seem to echo 
those made by Of ell us within Satires 2.2: they also echo the 
sentiments of generations of Roman satirists from Lucilius to 
Juvenal and of Roman historians from Cato Maior to Tacitus. 94 
They parallel, moreover, the famous comments of the New Testament 
regarding camels and eyes of needles, while the emphasis upon 
t . 1 . . t f . t 95 t" t b th W d 01 as a prerequ1s1 e or v1r ue an 1Clpa es 0 or s-
....... _..;.-1-""" ,_ ~1,..,. ..... _ ..... _*- ........... _+= ..s-~_ T..1 ............................. T_-r .... ~_.: __ ...... t...._ ........... _ .. 
VYV..L. '-.LJ. 0 '-J.J.U..L.UI""..o'-~J.. \,J..l.. '-.1.1-.:;;:::: J..1U.pl.J:f VVU.J....L. ..LVJ.., VV.L1V vvo.;;:). 
More skilful in self-knowledge, even more pure, 
As tempted more; more able to endure, 
As more exposed to suffering and distress 
and Tennyson's briefer comment, 
'tis held that suffering makes us wise,96 
93 These references are taken from Arnold's Roman Stoicism 
p.362: Arnold also refers to Stobaeus, Ecl. 3.29.78 and 
3.29.75, where the Spartans are used as examples physical 
and moral excellence: cf. Seneca, Ep. 14.9; 17.5; 20.7; 
80.6 and 123.16. --
94 E.g. Polybius, 31.25.3ff.; Sallust, Cat. 10.1 and Jug. 41.2; 
Velleius, 2.1.1-2: cf. Tacitus' comments upon the "noble 
savage II in the Germania, and his description of Calgacus in 
Agricola. 
95 One should add that the early Stoic attitude to novoL was 
consonant with their attitude to the more specific problem 
of poverty; novoLwere aOLacpopoL. Take, for example, 
Stobaeus, Ecl. 2.57.18 where novos is considered as the 
opposite of noovn and equally as an aOLacpopov. 
96 Tennyson's In Memoriam. 
226 
which is perhaps a suitable note upon which to return to Horace's 
poem, with the hope expressed that these comments upon Stoic 
attitudes to poverty will allow the commentary upon the satire 
itself to continue now with less interruption. Any briefer 
comments upon, for example, the asceticism of the Epicureans will 
be interleaved with the ongoing discussion of the satire. The 
necessary discussion of Stoic and Epicurean attitudes towards 
the advantages and disadvantages of rural life will also appear 
within the context of the discussion of the poem. 
After the packed and evocative detail of the first three 
verses, it comes almost as a relief to enter line four and to 
realise that, although the discite, at the beginning of the line, 
sounds like the beginning of a diatribe,97 or, rather, perhaps, 
a didactic poem, the following portion of v.4, and the lines 
which immediately follow (5-2),lapse into commonplace. However, 
although the message of these verses is familiar enough to 
readers of satire an~ history, as has been indicated above, 
the composition of the lines is less innocent of that tension 
between Hellenistic and Roman influences than might at first 
sight appear. For, although the message is that of Roman satire, 
the language in which it is couched has undeniable philosophical 
associations which sort ill with Of ell us , status as rusticus. 
Of ell us suggests that a man's ability to exercise moral 
choice suffers lamentably when his eyes are blinded by the 
coruscations of the rich man's plate and dinner table: 
4-6 discite, non inter lances mensasque nitentis, 
cum stupet insanis acies fulgoribus et cum 
acclinis falsis animus meliora recusat. 
97 For a discussion of the diatribe form, especially as 
utilised by the Stoics, see above in the discussion of 
Satires 2.3 pp.66ff. 
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The eyes are blinded, stupet acies, by the insanis fulgoribus 
and, as a result, the intellect too is dumbfounded. This is 
shown by the fact that the mind rejects morally better courses 
of action, animus meliora recusat, because of its inclination 
to falsis, things of no real worth or validity, which parallel, 
in their effect upon the mind's eye, the effects of lances 
mensasque nitentis upon the physical organ of sight. It is true 
that this may initially seem to be philosophically entirely 
neutral in tone, reflecting, as it does, the traditional common-
sense and commonplace ethics of Of ell us. The analogy between 
physical and mental blindness is an obvious one, even though it 
is true that the most magnificent exploitation of its ironic 
and dramatic potential is to be found in the Oedipus the King 
of Sophocles,98 while Plato's analogies of the Sun and the 
Divided Line 99 initially perhaps placed it in the shared fund of 
philosophical imagery. On the other hand, the analogy be·t.ween 
the actual eye and the eye of the mind, or the intellect, does 
have particular significance for the adherents of the material-
istic philosophies such as Epicureanism and the doctrines of 
the Stoics. Both of these schools recognised the necessity of 
interaction between what the proponents of abstract existence 
termed "body" and "mind", as if the two concepts were substant-. 
ially distinct; such interaction, they argued, proved the 
material nature of mind lOO and, accordingly, of the operation of 
98 This is best summarised in Oedipus' famous line at v.371, 
~U~AOG ~a ~'w~a ~6v ~E vouv ~a ~. o~~a~' Er. 
99 Plato, Republic 507-514: the most persuasive interpretation 
of these two analogies is that of J.E. Raven, Plato's Thought 
in the Making (Cambridge, 1965) which pays especial attention 
to the role played by the visible world as a "model" for the 
operations within the world of forms. 
100 Cicero, Acad. 1. 39, "(Zeno) nullo modo arbitrabatur quidquam 
effici posse ab ea (natura) quae expers esset corporis ..• 
nee vera aut quod efficeret aut quod cfficcretur, 
non corpus ll ; cf. Pluto Comm. Not. 1073e. 
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perception and thought through contact,lOl which again argued 
f th 1 . d . f'" 1 . . 1 0 2 f or e va 1 lty 0 lnltla sense lmpressl0ns. In so ar as 
a man of Of ell us , intellectual standing can be said to have 
thought about the problems involved in the relationship between 
body and mind, we can safely align him with the materialists, 
since the concept of abstract existence, devoid of in 
space, came late 103 to the philosophers of Greece and is, 
perhaps, beyond the scope of an amateur. Horace, indeed, wittily 
suggests by the phrase crassa Minerva in v.3 that Of ell us is 
intellectually allied to the materialist cause, the adjective 
crassa being particularly suited tothe discussion of materialistic 
philosophy, while quanta also, in v.l, argues for a materialistic 
attitude to the definition of an ethical question. 
It does, however, become more difficult to dismiss 
stupet ..• acies as simply an example of an obvious and well known 
analoqy, when one takes into account the words used by Horace to 
describe the source of the stupefaction of the eyes, namely 
insanis fulgoribus. For it becomes evident that the connection 
between the formal and conscious materialism of the Hellenistic 
schools and the naively unconscious and philosophically 
uninformed materialism of Ofellus is far from accidental. Horace 
arranges the connection both to demonstrate the impossibility of 
philosophical discussion without recourse to technical jargon 
101 Cicero, Fin. 1.21 on material nature of Epicurean theories 
of perception; cf. Lucretius, 4.26-268; 522-705; 722-817; 
877-906. 
102 Sextus, Adv. Math. 8.9.U.244, 6 6~ "EnCKoupoG ~a ~~v ata8n~a 
ndv~a f~EYEV &~n8~ Kat 6v~a. 
103 When the breakthrough took place to the apprehension of the 
abstract is, of course, difficult to define, although it is 
clear that the ~6yoG of Heraclitus and the voDG of Anaxa-
goras are on the brink of moving from material cause to an 
abstract concept of formal or final cause. See the 
discussions of vJoKaCa Guthrie, The IIistory of Greek P11~~osop11Y 
(Cambridge, 1965) Vols.l and 2. 
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derived from the work of the Greeks and also to enliven the 
humour of the poem's opening by ostentatiously placing philoso-
phical ambiguities into the mouth of the supposedly staid and 
unimaginative Of ell us. 
In his note on v.5 Lejay treats insanis as "excessifs" 
and gives examples from Plautus and Cicero. l04 Lejay substant-
iates this interpretation by giving further examples of the 
105 
adverb ins anum these examples are also taken from comedy 
and are thereby the more persuasive, if only because of Horace's 
acknowledged debt to Plautus and Terence. Of these examples, 
however, one, from Plautus, Hostellaria 908, is of especial 
interest in the present context: it runs, "insanum bonam 
(porticum)," which sounds very much like a Plautine pun on 
porticus (Stoa), and the intellectual attributes of those who 
have not achieved the status of sapientes, namely the insani et 
stulti. 
Although, in short, "excessifs" may be a common enough 
meaning for insanus, it hardly does justice to the tightly 
woven pattern of Horatian humour at this juncture. Indeed, it 
seems perverse to ignore the meaningsof insanus along the lines 
of "mad", "insane" and "foolish". For insanus can quite 
properly be applied to inanimate objects as well as to the 
demeanour and appearance of human beings or animals. However, 
it must be admitted that when the word is applied to inanimate 
objects the author's intention is invariably to invest those 
objects with human characteristics, especially malevolence. 106 
104 E.g. Plautus, Trin. 673, insanum malumst; cf. Cic. Mil. 85. 
One should also no·te Horace, Odes 1.34.2, where there1s 
an ironical allusion to the Ep:Lcureans. 
105 E.g. Plautus, Bacch. 761; Most. 908; MiL 24. 
106 E.g. of nwaves!! at Virgil, EcL 9.43, and !!winds!! at Tib. 
2.4.9. 
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A meaning of insanus which may be to the fore in the present 
instance is "that which causes madness", although the authority 
for this interpretation is a little late~ On the other hand 
Lucan, who describes fames as insana at Bk. 7.413, has undeniable 
Stoicising tendencies. Consider this meaning of insanus, this 
active meaning, in the light both of the Stoic paradox that all 
save the sapiens, which word has already been employed in v.3, 
Ith h . bl' . 11 . ft' . 107 d th a oug POSSl y lronlca y, are ln ac lnsanl, an at 
the sapiens alone is never subject to or victim of amazement, 
108 
never, indeed, can be described as stupet. Surely, then, that 
glitter which blinds the eyes and causes, because of the material 
connection between mind and eyes, the intellect to ignore the 
path of true wisdom, to become acclinis falsis, which phrase has 
Stoic connotations of its own, can very reasonably and, in this 
context, wittily be described by the phrase insanis fulgoribus. 
The phrase means "maddeninqll or, perhaps, "stultifying 
glitterings"i 109 Rudd's "senseless", al though it correctly 
captures the basic notion of folly, does not communicate, 
however, the active nature of insanus in this particular instance. 
I have suggested also that v.6 is replete with Stoic 
allusions: in fact, in the case of this line the allusions are 
so indisputably present that they corroborate the statements 
made more tentatively in the case of v.S. The sixth verse runs 
as follows: 
6 acclinis falsis animus meliora recusat. 
107 On this particular Stoic paradox see Cicero, Paradoxa 4. 
108 Diogenes Laertius, 7.123 records that, according to the 
Stoics, ELL YE LOV ao~ov ou6ev &au~a6ELV LWV 60uoUVLwv 
napa66fwv: although the context is that of physics, the 
wisdom of the sapiens should never be at a loss in any 
field. 
109 Rudd, The Satires of Horace and Persius, p.77. 
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Rudd translates well with: 
. .. and the mind 
" 110 swings in favour of the sham rejecting better th~ngs. 
The adjective acclinis, meaning "inclined towards" is described 
by Lejay in his note as rare, although he does give two 
'f l' l' , V '1 111 comparat~ve re erences, one, ~tera ~n mean~ng, to erg~ , 
f ' t' t th H;stor;es of L;vy.112 one, ~gura ~ve, 0 e ~_ ~ k The concept of a 
psychological "propensity" or, "proclivity" towards or for 
anything is usually expressed in latin by such adjectives as 
113 proclivis, promptus, pronus and propensus; the abstract 
nouns which are employed in the expression of this concept are 
proclivitas and propensio. Both the adjectives, especially 
pronus and proclivis, and the two abstract nouns are used in the 
latin discussions of the Stoic concept of EUE~n~waLa, the 
cognate adjective of which, parallel in meaning to pronus and 
its fellows, is EUE~n~w~osi this concept of EUE~n~waCa is 
particularly relevant to the ethical discussion of which the 
line in question is a part. The definition of EuqmnuaLa, 
according to Stobaeus, Ecl. 2.93.1 is as follows: 
EUE~n~waCav 0' ErvaL Euxa~a~opCav ELs na00s n ~L 
LWV napa ~uaLv EPYWV, olav EITLAUnLav, 6pYLA6Ln~a, 
~0ovEPLav, axpoxoALav xat ~a O~oLa. YLyvEo0aL O£ 
EUE~n~waLas xat ELs aAAa Epya ~wv napa ~uaLv, 
olov ELs xAonus xat ~oLXELas xat U~PELs, xa0' as 
xA£n~aL ~E ~OLxot xat u~pLa~at AEyov~aL. 
This definition describes that disposition of the soul towards 
110 Ibid. 
111 Virgil uses the word at Aeneid 10.835 in the phrase 
adclinis arboris trunco. 
112 The reference to Livy is more relevant and occurs at 
Bk. 48.9, "adclinaturos se ad causam senatus". 
113 E.g. Cic. Re2. 2.26.47; Lucr. 6.147; Suet. Caes. 50 
(not unnaturally in libidines and 'l'ac. l',g. 
232 
those wrongful acts, which are contrary to the dictates of 
nature, and which a soul, capable of rational processes and 
decision making, would take it upon itself to suppress. In 
other words a soul or mind which operates secundum naturam would 
repress E6E~nTwaCaL even as it would suppress the effects of La 
na&ni indeed, the na&n and £6£~nTwaLaL operate in a parallel 
and deleterious fashion. However, the mind which is the subject 
of recusat in verse six is incapable of performing its proper 
rational function. Like the eye which is, as it were, the 
window of the soul or mind,114 and which has had its perceptions 
dulled and blunted by the environment within which it finds 
itself, the mind or soul is functionally impaired. Because, 
therefore, the functions of the mind have been dulled, the mind 
has become acclinis falsis, "liable to hanker after false 
things". These falsa must be considered as vitia or mala, if 
we identify them through their obvious opposites encapsulated 
in the words meliora recusat. The fact that Horace uses the 
comparative shows that he does not intend to follow Stoic doctrines 
too closely; after all, the a6La~opa are all equal, if not the 
same in kind. llS It is a mingling, which is itself unconscious 
and uncritical, of common-place and technical vocabulary which 
best serves Horace's purpose as already outlined. However, by 
dint of vocabulary, which is reminiscent of technical Stoic 
language, Horace suggests, through Of ell us, that the proper 
function of the ra'tional soul, which is the making of discriminatory 
114 It is worth noting that Horace's choice of acies for eye was 
governed by Cicero's frequent use of the word in connec·tion 
with mentis, ingenii and animi as the "mind's eye", e.g. 
Leg. 1.60; Acad. 2.122; ND. 2.45; Tusc. 1.73. 
115 See Cic. Paradoxa 3, also discussion of Satires 1.3 above 
and Stobaeus, c. 2.7, p.106,2l: raa T~ AEyouaLv 
r ..... 111 ~ D, cb U SuVO.L TO. 0.l-l0.pTl11-l0.To.; OU}{STL () OJ-LOLa," 
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and nicely calculated ethical choices based upon the evidence 
provided by perceptions and memory, is sensibly impaired by a 
wealthy environment, since the processes of visual perception 
and intellectual comprehGnsion of visual presentations are 
closely parallel to the processes involved in the making of a 
rational ethical choice. A detailed examination of meliora 
recusat further strengthens the impression that Horace is 
exploiting technical Stoic ideas in his treatment of Of ell us. 
For we necessarily become embroiled here with the Stoic concept 
of "assent". 
The concept of assent or auyxaTa~£a~b or assensio is 
implied, positively, by acclinis, in the sense that "assent" is 
given to unworthy choices of action or preference and, 
negatively, by recusat in the sense that "assent" is withheld 
from worthwhile aestimanda / nponyu~va) courses of action. In 
the workings of sensory perception, according to Stoic doctrines, 
the senses present a picture (cpavTaaLa / visum) to the mind. 
The picture implies a statement; e.g. "this is a man"; the 
statement can be accepted or rejected. If the cpavTaaCa is 
consonant with experience and stored knowledge (En~aTnUn / 
scientia) then assent (auyxaTa~£a~b / adsensus), which is an act 
of will and, therefore, within our power can be given. The 
cpaVTaOLa thereby becomes an item of comprehension ( cpavTaaCa 
xaTaAnnT~Xn / comprehensio) the store of which forms the memory 
or bank of En~aTnun. This is the theory of Zeno in its essentials, 
as described by Cicero in the Academica 1,40_41. 116 The 
operations of the mind in reaching moral decisions are closely 
116 Cf. Cicero, ND. 1.70; for modern discussions see e.g. 
Rist, Stoic Philosophy (Canillridge, 1969), pp.133~151 and 
Long, Hellenistic Ph:rIos (London, 1974) pp.123-l31. 
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parallel: a set of circumstances, or an emotional impulse, 
which demands an ethical choice, causes a ~av~aaCa to be 
presented to the mind which either gives or withholds "assent" 
to the course of action which is prompted by the opun or 
appetite. Even as the granting of assent to a visual ~av~aaCa 
depends upon the "clearness" of the cpav-caaCa or its £vapYEl.a I 
perspicuitas,117 just so the granting of ethical assent properly 
depends upon the clarity of the mental perceptions and the 
healthiness of the mind or soul. As Arnold puts it,118 a healthy 
assent leads up to a right action: a false assent to a blunder 
or sin." In other words, one of the functions of a healthy 
mind was to distinguish true things from false things,119 so 
that 
acclinis falsis animus meliora recusat 
is an extremely succinct expression of a view so compatible 
with that of the Stoics as to be, apart from the comparative in 
meliora, almost identical. Moreover, it is important to stress 
that in the Stoic view it was impossible for ethical decisions 
to be made without antecedent sensory stimulation, even as it 
was impossible for the mind to create images without at some 
time having been subject to stimulation by a cpav~aaLa, "assensio 
non potest fieri nisi commota viso",120 which gives added point 
t h · . t' h f' d' 121 o t e Juxtaposl lon ere 0 aCles an anlmus. It would 
117 Cic. Acad. 1.11. 41, "visis [Zeno] non omnibus adiungebat 
fidem sed iis solum quae propriam quandam haberent 
declarationem earum rerum quae viderentur." 
118 Roman Stoicism, p.256f. 
119 Cf. Cicero, Fin. 3.17, "a falsa aurem assensione magis nos 
alienatos esse-quam a ceteris rebus quae sint contra 
naturam arbitrabantur"; cf. Cic. Div. 2.106. 
120 E.g. S.V.F. 2.21.8; 2.35.12; 2.283.17. 
121 For the phrases acies'animior acies mentis see,e.g. Cic. 
1\T1\ ") 1'7 lit::. rn,,~~ 1 ':1i'l '7? .... ~r1 c~~ 'J? Q? 
J."!-I 0 ~ 0 .J- I 0 ""'X",) I ..L U. U '-' 0 .J.. Il> ...,) V e f..J UJ. J. \...I,. U 0;;:::; J..t 0 U ...J " U.J 0$ 
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seem that Of ell us was very much in sympathy with Zeno, of whose 
ideas Cicero writes: 
errorem autem et temeritatem et ignorantiam et 
opinationem et suspicionem et uno nomine omnia quae 
essent aliena firmae et constantis adsensionis a 
virtute sapientiaque removebat. 
Academica 1.42 
One should say finally with reference to this line that the verbs 
which are normally associated with the withholding of assent 
from either a visual or psychological presentation are abnuo, 
122 
renuo and denego. 
The same complexities of interpretation are not present 
in v.7, the main purpose of which is clearly to prompt the 
question cur hoc? the answer to which forms the bulk of the first 
main section of the poem. There is in verum (7), however, the 
suspicion of a pun: for, although the syntax of this opening 
sentence demands that verum here be read as an adversative 
conjunction, which points up the contrast between "inter lances 
mensasque nitentis" and hic, nevertheless, there is a temptation 
to see in verum a covert reference to the true virtue which the 
mind acclinis falsis refuses to accept, meliora recusat. Also 
the contrast between hic and inter lances ... as competing 
environments for the pursuit of wisdom would make the reading 
of verum as"truth" an attractive proposition, were it not for 
the asyndeton which this would involve. Were it not for the 
fact that a "true" ~ appears almost immediately in v.S, in 
the clever phrase male verum, there would be a temptation to 
a-ttempt to manipulate -the insertion of a colon or its equivalent 
122 On the other hand, cf. Pliny, NH. 37.13.76, "(fa1sae 
gemmae) recusant 1imae probationem", while at Cicero, Mil. 
36.100 -there is ample proof of the synonymity of abnuo-
and recuso. 
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at the close of v.7. However, Horace is more subtle than the 
potential textual critic; the appearance of verum in v.8 as 
well as in v.7 both serves to ease the transition from the 
proem into the first major section of the poem a~d also to 
indicate the exact similarity in form between these two words 
of quite different meanings. That the quest for truth, moreover, 
is not an isolated topic in Horace confined to this passage may 
be seen from Horace's use of the phrase quaerere verum in 
Epistles 2.2.45. It is almost as if by consciously and clearly 
exploiting the potential ambiguity of a single common word 
Horace is demonstrating and anticipating the potential for such 
exploitation in poems which deal with ethical issues. It is 
clearly immaterial whether the leading figures in such satires 
are professed philosophers or not. In fact, Of ell us , very 
denial of any philosophical allegiance hightens the humour of 
such word play in Satires 2.2. 
B 
LUXURY CORRUPTS: VV.8-52 
Nothing in the way of originality can be. claimed in 
what follows regarding the identification of possible source 
material for the diatribe of Of ell us. The debt of the critic 
here is to the work of Lejay, Hense and Thiele;123 however, 
the way in which the sources were exploited by Horace is capable 
of sustaining a fresh examination, as is the nature of his 
123 Acknowledgement has already been made to the thoroughness 
of Lejay's commentary. Hense's work on sermo Bioneus 
Rh. Mus. 47 (1892), pp.22lff. is invaluable, as rS'Tfiiele's 
on the~asceticism of Socrates at Hermes 41 (1906) f pp.58lff. 
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attitude towards Ofellus and, no less important, the attitude 
which Horace indicates is held towards such men as himself by 
Ofellus and his kind. Horace himself, in fact, could not have 
claimed any originality here on the score of content. The 
commonplace that hunger was the best sauce for a meal and -that 
luxury inhibited the pleasure of food by making the palate jaded 
was very well worn. Typical are Varro's comments, "sitienti 
. d . 1 .. . b' -. 1" ,,124 Vl erl aquam mu sum, esurlentl panem C1 ar1um Sl 19lneum ; 
in a more philosophical context we find the following statements 
of Cicero: 
a) Socratem qui voluptatem nullo loco numerat audio 
dicentem cibi condimentum esse famem, potionis sitim. 
De Finibus 2.90 
Here a Stoicising speaker rejects the Epicurean claim that 
pleasure is the supreme good on the grounds that this belief 
makes fortune beatae vitae domina, even though Epicurus claimed 
that fortune interfered but little with the wise man. 125 Far 
preferable is the self-sufficiency of the Stoic sapiens, to 
which, it may be thought, Of ell us approximates in his shrugging 
off of the effects of fortune. 126 
b) An Scythes Anacharsis potuit pro nihilo pecuniam ducere, 
nostrates philosophi facere non potuerunt? illius 
epistula fertur his verbis: Anacharsis Hannoni salutem. 
mihi amictui Scythicum tegimen, calciamentum solorum 
callum, cubile terra, pUlpamentum fames; lacte, caseo, 
carne vescor. 
Tusc. 5.90 
Here by contrast the speaker praises Epicurus (hic vero ipse 
127 quam parvo est contentus) at the expense of "pompous" (isti 
124 Varro, 28 Riese, Non., p.88. 
125 Fin. 2.89. 
J 
126 Cf. vv.126~136 of Satires 2.2. 
127 Cicero, Tusc. 5.89. 
238 
d 'l ,128) gran 1. oqU1. Stoics; a new note is introduced by Cicero 
which, consonant with the doctrines of Epicurus, as we shall see, 
also seems to be at one with the attitude of Of ell us. Not only 
'th 'b1 t 'th ff" 129 h 1.S e sensJ.. e man con 8nt W1. a mere su J..c1.ency, e 
positively rejects wealth. Once more the archetype of asceticism 
is Socrates: "in pompa cum magna vis auri argentique ferretur: 
Quam mu1ta non desidero! inquit.,,130 Although Cicero's attitude 
towards the asceticism of Epicurus may seem oddly ambivalent in 
the light of these almost contradictory passages, one should 
bear in mind the quasi-dramatic form of these dialogues. Also 
it is not the asceticism of Epicurus with which the philosophically 
critical Cicero takes exception in Fin. 2.90; rather he is 
concerned that the ethical basis upon which such an asceticism 
depends is intellectually unsound. 
However that may be, it is merely necessary to note at 
this juncture that the asceticism which Horace ascribes to 
Of ell us is in tune with the asceticism which in Socrates was an 
object of praise, which was emulated by the disciples of Zeno 
and Epicurus and which was commended by most of the Roman 
authors whose work had any philosophical or moral bias. Mention 
will be made of the beliefs of both the Stoics and the Epicur-
eans as they become relevant to the continuing detailed discussion 
of the satire. 
As has been indicated verum in v.8 has the meaning 
"truth" but its appearance has been neatly anticipated by the 
128 Cicero, Tusc. 5.89, "qui tandem isti grandi10qui contra 
haec duo~ae maxime angunt, me1ius se habent quam 
Epicurus?1I This a description of Stoics no doubt greatly 
pleasing to Horace; cf. Sat. 1.1.13-14 and 120-121. 
129 On what constituted a sufficiency for Horace, see Sat. 2.6. 
130 Cicero, Tusc. 5.91. 
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adversative verum in v.7. The transition from proem to discuss-
ion is eased in a manner ironical enough to anticipate the tone 
of the humour of the remainder of the poem. The oxymoron, for 
example, which Horace immediately springs upon the reader in 
the phrase male verum in v.8, is convincing evidence of this. 
For Horace has juxtaposed what are virtually synonyms of the 
summum and solum bonum and the summum and solum malum of Stoic 
! 131 
ethical theory. The corruptus Lndex of v.9 is analogous to 
the stupefied animus of v.6 which was incapable of operating 
rationally in its proper function of distinguishing true from 
false, goods from evils. 
NOW, in almost Socratic vein, Of ell us continues to 
moralise, using illustrations drawn from the activities of every-
day life, from hunting and physical exercise. These illustrations 
are not, however, without a hint of Horatian subtlety; for 
Horace manages to to those t....: ____ ...t ____ _ U-Lo:> J:-lVCL..LY well, 
that Of ell us is shaking an admonitory finger at Horace. In this 
Horace anticipates the more rigorous and direct criticism of 
himself which he puts into the mouths of Damasippus and Davus 
in Satires 2.3 and 2.7. The attack upon"Horace, or rather 
perhaps on certain aspects of Horace's behaviour and interests, 
is included parenthetically in vv.lO-13: 
10-13 - vel si Romana fatigat 
militia adsuetum Graecari, seu pila velox 
molliter austerum studio fallente laborem, 
seu te discus agit, pete cedentem aera disco -
Horace confesses elsewhere to being constitutionally averse and 
physically unsuited to exercise, even when its labours are 
131 E.G. Aulus Gellius, NA. 12.5.7. 
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132 disguised with the pila velox. Neither was Horace's record 
of military achievement in any way outstanding, except perhaps 
in the sense that it allowed him to imitate the behaviour of 
some of his favourite Greek poets. 133 Of ell us , ~se, in 
contemptuous tones, of adsuetum Graecari is then justified as an 
attack upon Horace and his interest, both literary and philoso-
phical, in Greek culture. It is justified, that is to say, 
from the blinkered and narrowly xenophobic standpoint of such a 
one as Of ell us. This is the picture of Ofellus which Horace 
is at pains to present. The attack upon Horace needs no overt 
rebuttal of the type which is meted out to Damasippus and 
Davus. Horace is constantly, but covertly, undermining the 
extreme position which is adopted by Of ell us. For the audience 
for which Horace was composing this piece would have recognised 
that Of ell us , own diatribe, as produced for him, of course, by 
the poet! was inevitably and quite consciously indebted to 
ethical terminology and theory which ultimately derived from 
the Greeks. 
I would also suggest that in v.12 Horace wishes to 
remind the reader of his own aims as a poet and moralist involved 
in the composition of satire. The line, which is neat and 
carefully constructed, runs as follows: 
12 molliter austerum studio fallente laborem 
Horace's aim was to point out to his audience the folly of 
mankind: two of the means by which this aim was to be achieved 
132 Horace, Sat. 1.5.48-49, "lusum it Maecenas, dormitum ego 
Vergiliusquei / namque pila lippis inimicum et ludere 
crudis." For the sentiment of Sat. 2.2.10-13, cf. Odes 
3.24.53. --
133 See Odes 2.7.10: Horace's attitude towards his military 
career was alway~ whimsical (cf. parmu1a, the diminutive). 
There is reference to the behaviourotAlcaeus, Archilochus 
and Anacreori. 
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were the gentle mockery of himself, an example of which we have 
already observed in this poem, and the gentle mockery of others, 
since "ridiculum acri/fortius et melius magnas plerumque secat 
res.,,134 This sugaring of the ethical pill is analogous to the 
use of the ball, which, Ofellus condescendingly maintains, 
eases the burden of physical exercise. 
Although the language of vv.14-15, "cum labor extuderit 
fastidia, siccus, inanis / sperne cibum vilem"is extremely vivid, 
there does not seem to be any particular philosophical reference. 
On the other hand, the use of siccus in v.14 is worth noting 
perhaps in the light of Heraclitus' praise of the dry soul, a 
viewpoint which was consonant with the Stoic concept of nVEG~a 
as the material basis of both the hu~an and the cosmic SQul. 135 
However, it is clear that here the adjectives siccus and inanis 
apply much more particularly to the physical aspect of the 
soul and body duality! from which aspect all the evil humours 
have, as it were, been purged by violent exercise. It is, 
nevertheless, worth remarking that Horace has already expended 
a good deal of poetic energy in reminding us of the inextricable 
links between the physical and psychic aspects of man. 
In vv.lS-20 Ofellus sums up his message to date in the 
following way: 
lS-20 unde putas aut 
qui partum? non in caro nidore voluptas 
summa sed in te ipso est. 
The source of pleasure exists within the individual, the perfect 
and adequate satisfaction of whose desires is the actual cause 
of pleasure. Pleasure has nothing to do with the expense of 
134 Horace, Sat. 1. 10. 14-15. 
135 Heraclitus, fro 118 ape Stab. Anth. 3.5.8; cf. on Stoic 
~uxn, SVF, 2.218.38f. 
242 
the items by means of which a natural and necessary appetite 
is satisfied. Here Of ell us is talking in away which bears a 
close resemblance to the doctrines of the Epicureans as expressed 
by Cicero at Fin. 1.45f.: 
quarum (cupiditatum) ea ratio est ut necessariae 
nec operamultanec inpensa expleantur; ne naturales 
quidem multa desiderant, propterea quod ipsa natura 
divitias quibus contenta sit et parabiles et terminatas 
habet, inanium autem cupiditatum nec modus ullus nec 
136 finis inveniri potesta 
Horace is fully aware of the technicalities of both the Epicur-
ean and Stoic doctrines and is able to exploit this knowledge 
whenever necessary. On this occasion it is not his purpose to 
show simply that Of ell us , point of view is basically Epicurean, 
although it is consonant with an Epicurean standpoint, or 
basically stoic, although the asceticism advocated by Of ell us 
is akin to that advocated by Cicero at Off. 1.106. In fact, 
if one were to consider the origins of Epicurus and the stated 
aims of his philosophy of the "common man",137 it would not be 
surprising to find close affinities between his ethical 
doctrines and the views attributed by Horace to Of ell us. And 
such a consideration would strengthen Syme's claim that Stoicism 
became ·the acceptable code for an aristocratic elite. However,. 
so far as Ofellus is concerned, anything Greek is despicable 
and potentially dangerous. He is unaware of the similarities 
between the views he expresses and those of both the rival 
Hellenistic schools on the merits of asceticism. Yet he would 
no doubt shrink with horror from association with either group. 
136 Cf. Epicurus, ap. D.L. 10.149. 
137 Epicurus' parents farmed in Samos, see D.L. 10.1, while he 
prided himself on being untutored, naLosLav OE naaav, 
)..La){O:.PLs, cpsuys, ib.6: cf. Athenaeus 13.588 A. 
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One can compare the attitude of Anytus to the sophists. 138 
Of ell us , I feel sure, would have felt particularly offended at 
the suggestion that his ideas have much in common with those of 
a school the professed summum bonum of which was voluptas. It 
is this blindness which Horace satirises, even as he admits the 
validity of much of the ethical advice the untutored mind has 
to offer. 139 
Horace now has Ofellus concentrate upon the details of 
diet and the deleterious effects of a luxurious diet upon taste, 
both in its physical and in its aesthetic and moral senses; 
for Of ell us continues to emphasise the links between bodily and 
spiritual or mental health. The subject matter here gives 
Horace only small opportunity to exploit the type of play on 
words with which the moralising opening of the poem was replete. 
It would anyway have been prodigal of Horace to reduce the 
effect of such ambiquities by squanderinq his resources. On 
the other hand, Horace neatly takes advantage of the more limited 
opportunities which present themselves, with the result that 
the intellectual tempo of the poem is not allowed to slacken. 140 
138 Plato, Meno 92 c. 
139 One should note in passing here that the idea of the power 
for pleasure existing within the control and nature of 
the individual smacks of the Stoic concept of a6~apxE~a, 
which is best summed up for present purposes by Diogenes 
Laertius, 7.127, a6~apxn ~E Erva~ a6~nv (~nv apE~nV) npoG 
E66a~~ovLav xa0a ~na~ Znvwv. 
140 It is worth' noting that, in entering the field of diatetics, 
Of ell us is again embracing a complex discipline with all 
the arrogance of the untutored layman; this is part of 
the intellectual humour of the poem. On diatetics in the 
ancientworld, see Hippocrates, TIEpt 6~aL~ns UY~E~Vns; 
TIEpt 6~aC~ns 1-4, also Galen, 'YY~E~v6v, 1-6 and Philostratos," 
TIEpt ru~vaa~~xns. For modern discussions see L. Englert, 
Studien z. Gesch. d. Med. (1929) and J. Marcuse, Diatetik 
im Alterth-Urrt(1899). 
Rudd discusses this element of Satires 2.2 in The Satires 
of Horace pp.16l-l73;" he also refers in:-his notes 
useful study L'Alimentation et la Cuisine a Rome (Paris; 
1961) by J. 
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The vividness of the detailed description ensures that audience 
attention is maintained by more orthodox methods. 
Two methods are employed by Horace to maintain the 
intellectual tempo of the poem. One is merely the continuing use 
of words put into the mouth of Ofellus which have wider philoso-
phical connotations than would possibly be suspected by that 
character, supposing, as we must, that the continuing character-
isation of Ofellus is consistent with ,Horace's own description 
of him in the opening verses. Secondly, Horace increases the 
thematic importance within the poem of the conflict between 
reality and illusion, true and false judgements; on a very 
basic level, as intended by Of ell us , this involves us in a 
discussion of ostentation in diet. However, in the light of 
Of ell us , own description of the link between physical appetite 
and senses and the impulses and aptitudes of the mind and soul, 
one must assume that Horace is covertly introducing a highly 
sophisticated element into Of ell us , discussion. This, again, will 
be seen to be more complex than Of ell us , as presented, could ever· 
have suspected and with a longer intellectual history. This 
incongruity is a conscious part of Horace's presentation of the 
character. Since, however, the thematic complexity becomes 
apparent only through the language in which Of ell us , moralising 
is couched, it would be more sensible initially to discuss 
possible ambiguities in that language. 
A phrase which immediately catches the eye, because of 
the irony which is evident in its placement in the mouth of 
Of ell us, is pinguem vitiis albumque in v.21. Ofellus is 
describing the unenviable physical state of the man whose sensi-
bilities have been blunted by overindulgence. Such a man is 
pale and gross as a result of his vitiis. Even though his faults 
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lie in the direction of "gluttony" it is, I think, doing less 
than justice to translate the general vitiis by the particular 
"gluttony", as does Rudd. 141 "Vices" would be more appropriate, 
in that Horace is consciously using a word here which calls to 
mind the Stoic summum malum. This is not far-fetched. After 
all, as we shall see, the poet uses honor in a similarly ambig-
uous way in v.28, while virtus (1), sapiens (2), insanis (5), 
verum (8), and, possibly, siccus and inanis(14) are sufficient 
anticipation of such an ambiguous use of vitium. Moreover, the 
) 
use of vitiis in conjunction with Einguem is intended to call 
ironically to mind the description which Horace gives of 
Of ell us himself in v.3 as sapiens ... crassaque Minerva. As 
was suggested above in the detailed discussion of this line, 
this description would have been a contradiction in terms so 
far as a Stoic was concerned. For, nobody who is possessed of 
a mind or soul which can be described physically as crassus can 
legitimately in Stoic view by described as a sapiens. However, 
in v.21 Of ell us , crassa Minerva, according to Horace, describes 
the glutton as pinguem vitiis. Clearly vitia and Minerva balance 
each other or, perhaps more accurately, are parallel, as being 
words which do inevitably call to mind the extremes of the 
Stoic ethical spectrum. One should remember here, if there 
seems too much of a gulf between an attack upon the particularly 
physical vice of gluttony and its visible effects, and the 
concept of the sole and "supreme" evil, that Ofellus himself 
has been at pains to point out that all the discriminatory 
faculties are impaired in efficiency by indiscriminate gluttony. 
Furthermore pinguis and crassus are synonymous. Horace, there-
141 Rudd, ~heSat~~~s~_of ~or~ceand?ersius,' p.98. 
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fore, may be thought of as allowing his speaker to condemn 
himself out of his own mouth by allowing or ensuring that that 
speaker describes a man, who is used as a type of the gross 
vice of gluttony, in language which, if this interpretation is 
correct, is consciously reminiscent of the language used by the 
actual poet to describe the speaker himself. That language is, 
moreover, reminiscent itself of the terminology of the Stoics. 
The tension between the Greek and Italian elements in the 
characterisation of Ofellus is thereby maintained, as is the 
humour which depends upon the recognition of that tension. That 
Horace is using his by now familiar technique of foreshadowing 
to give an internal unity and cohesiveness to the loose and 
conversational structure of the satire is confirmed by the 
appearance in v.25 of the phrase c6rruptus vanis. For not only 
does corruptus here echo the same word, which occupies the same 
position in v.9! where it qualifies the judge who is incapable 
of grasping the truth, but vanis in v.25 also echoes insanis 
(5), falsis (6) in meaning and anticipates the angry vocative 
insane at v.33, which necessarily has Stoic connotations if 
only because of the infamous paradox that all save the sapi~ 
are insani. 
Attention has already been drawn to the possible 
ambiguity in honor in v.28: the context within which the word 
appears is as follows: 
25-28 corruptus vanis rerum, quia veneat auro 
rara avis et picta pandat spectacula cauda; 
tamquam ad rem attineat quicquam. num vesceris ista 
quam laudas pluma? cocto num adest honor idem. 
It is interesting here to note how Horace has adapted the 
sentiment which was received from Lucilius in the following 
manner: "cocus non cura.t caudam insignem esse illam, dum 
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. . . t 11142 pl.ngul.s Sl.e • Horace's treatment is at once more vivid in 
that the plain statement has been developed into the question and 
answer which is so typical of Horace's style in the composition 
of his diatribes. One aiso notes that pinguis is applied by 
Lucilius to the bird, while Horace has derived more benefit 
from the word by applying it above (v.2l) to the glutton himself. 
The other major difference is the substitution of a clause, in 
which honor appears as a subject, for the rather less arresting 
phrase candam insignem of Lucilius. If we assume that Horace 
was, as ever, intent on improving upon his original, as the 
imaginative use of pinguis would indicate, it should be possible 
to detect in what way honor may have been thought of as an 
improvement upon the adjective insignis. 
The meaning of honor seems clear enough: it is 
translated by Lejay as "eclat,,143 and he cites also Epodes 17.18 
translates the entire question: 
28 cocto num adest honor idem? 
. 144 
by, "Does the thing look equally splendid cooked?1I If Horace 
means simply by honor the beautiful appearance of the bird, one 
should nevertheless note the further associations which the 
word inevitably had for Horace's Roman audience, especially when 
involved in reading a poem which is dedicated to the presentation 
f t · 1 1 l' h d f h' . 145 h o a par l.CU ar y Ita l.an c aracter an 0 l.S Vl.ews. T ere 
is also a possible irony and a more elegant one in that Roman 
142 Lucilius, 27.12 M, 536 B. 
143 Note ad loco p.334. 
144 Rudd, The Satires of race and Persius p.78. 
145 E.g. Cic. Brut. 81.281, "cum honos sit praemium virtutis 
iudicio studioque civium delatum ad aliquem qui eum 
sententiis; qui suffragiis adeptus est; is mihi est honestus 
et honoratus videtur": cf. Cic. Fam. 10.10.1. 
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writers on Stoicism, in dealing with the important topic of the 
values and motives of the acquisition of good repute, regularly 
used to identify honor, meaning "reputation" with fama and 
gloria,146 and hence with the Stoic concept of 6oE;a. in its non-
epistemological sense of reputation. This ,necessary association 
of ideas has the following consequences: as well as the bird 
being considered an object of aesthetic delight because of its 
tail, the beauty of which does not survive the oven, the 
reputation of notoriety, which comes from such extravagance, and 
which is also implied by laudas in v.28, does not survive the 
dinner table either. Also, coming from men of corrupt judgement, 
corruptus vanis rerum (25), such praise and attendent repute is 
worth less than nothing. Like Juvenal 147 ~fter him and Plato148 
before, Ofellus deplores the decline in popular standards of 
excellence by comparison with which the granting of reputation 
is governed. Not only~ therefore. does Horace enjoy himself at 
the expense of Of ell us , pretentious moralising, but he also 
reaps the formal benefits of employing another Ilsignpostll word 
by means of which he is able to endow his poem with a real but 
unapparent unity. 
One of the ways, therefore, in which Horace enlivens 
the moralising of Ofellus is by employing terms in the mouth 
of Of ell us which are far more sophisticated than such a 
character would naturally use. Even as Horace presents Of ell us 
146 For discussions of fama, gloria and honor and their status, 
see Cic. Tusc. 3.2.4 and 5.16.46; for Horace's use of 
fama (in a Stoicising poem) see Sat. 2.3.95. 
147 In Juvenal, Satires 6 the poet complains that Pudicitia has 
given way to luxuria as the criterion of female behaviour. 
148 For the gradual substitution of "reason" as the guiding 
political principle, initially by "spirit" and then the 
various types of "appetite", see Plato, Rep. Bks. 8-9. 
249 
as blissfully ignorant of the subtleties of his vocabulary, so 
also he allows Of ell us to introduce and discuss philosophical 
topics in a popular and naive fashion. Horace and his audience 
knew that these topics and similar ones had exercised the most 
gifted minds of Greece and Rome for generations. One feels, 
therefore, that Of ell us , confidence in these areas is the result 
of presumption born of ignorance. There is no comparison 
between the moral effusions of Of ell us here, moreover, and the 
ethical discussions of Horace and his friends as they are mentioned 
in Satires 2.6: Horace and his friends enjoy that modesty which 
should spring from a liberal education. Only the ignorant can 
dogmatise as freely and as naively as Of ell us , ignoring the 
value of the contributions of other men. The question of the 
nature of virtue, "quae virtus et quanta?" with which the satire 
opens, is a case in point, even though it may be admitted that 
the general nature of such a question itself qualifies the 
question as suitable for general discussion along popular lines. 
Of greater philosophical depth and significance is that question 
which the whole of the first part of Of ell us , diatribe raises, 
namely: what is really real and how can we distinguish reality 
from illusion? This question extends into both the fields of 
physics and ethics, especially into the physics and ethics of 
the schools of Epicurus and the Stoics. For it was a major 
concern of these rival Hellenistic schools to justify their 
particular ethical beliefs and teachings by relating them to 
their total world views. Of~llus constantly harps upon the 
deception of the ignorant by gaudy appearances and upon the 
corruption of the critical faculties through a lack of temperance 
or moderation. However, his views are expressed in such a way 
that it is evident th~t he has no real conception of what 
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distinguishes reality from illusion. I am not suggesting that 
Horace is totally unsympathetic towards Of ell us , whom he presents 
as an example of what has become something of an anachronism, 
one of nature's gentlemen. In the same way Platc is not 
unsympathetic to the conservative and elderly Cephalus at the 
opening of the Republic,149 but he does introduce that character 
to show that, as times and circumstances change, so too must the 
traditional views on morals and behaviour, if those views are 
not to become morally bankrupt. As in the Re2ublic Plato is 
not sympathetic to the sophistic views put forward by Thrasy-
h 150 d Gl 151 't' b t 'th t th mac us an aucon on JUs lce, u recognlses a . ey 
must be heard and refuted, so Horace, though aware of a need 
for change, since Of ell us , views are no longer adequate, does 
not totally agree with such Stoic ideas as are expressed by 
Davus and Damasippus. Such views, however, must be taken into 
account, tested and then utilised in conjunction with what may 
be allowed to survive from the traditional mores and in 
conjunction with whatever other approaches seem suitable in the 
light of society as it is and the constant changes within it. 
Horace indicates the poverty of much traditional thought on 
morality by emphasising the limited appreciation traditionalists 
have of the complexities which confront the conscientious 
moralist. The level of sophistication, however, at which such 
a moralist as Of ell us is allowed to operate by Horace is 
indicated by his concern over the appearance of peacocks and the 
size of fish. Ofellus does not indicate that the ostentatious 
expenditure on such luxuries as these is to be thought of as 
149 Plato, Republic 33lb esp. of 327-336a. 
150 Ibid. 336a-354c: termed Radicalism by Barber, Greek 
Political (London, 1964) p.179. 
151 Ibid. 357-367e. 
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symptomatic of a deeply seated malaise. Socrates was always 
willing, it is true, to utilise commonplace examples to illustrate 
concepts of much more significant ethical moment; at least, 
this is true of Plato's representation of him. 152 There is no 
intimation here, however, that Horace is treating Of ell us with 
the same respect as that shown to Socrates by Plato. One could 
rather level the same charge at Of ell us , with some degree of 
justice, which he himself levels at his own targets, namely: 
35 ducit te species video. 
For species here fulfils a dual function: it sums up both the 
object of Of ell us , attack and simultaneously and ironically 
indicates that area within which Of ell us , own shortcomings as 
a moralist are most painfully apparent. Since, as well as its 
simple meaning of surface "appearance", species is also the word 
used by the latin authors to translate the technical terms 
~aVTaaCa and Er60~, Of ell us is once more being made by Horace 
to employ a word which is more complex in its associations 
than he can possibly appreciate. In the light of the untutored 
comments of Of ell us on sense-perception and intellectual 
decision in vv.3_9 153 there seems little doubt that Horace's 
use of species is consciously humorous and ironical for the 
reasons which have already been stated. There is, furthermore, 
an additional and equally conscious irony in v.35. This is the 
juxtaposition of the confident video of Of ell us and that species 
which Of ell us "sees" so misleads those who are less acute than 
himself. 
The remainder of Of ell us , attacks upon the variously 
152 Pla'co I s example of the insane friend to whom it would not 
be "right" to return arms at Republic 331 is a trivial 
example which consciously illustrates a larger problem. 
153 For a detailed discussion, see above pp.226ff. 
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corrupting effects of luxury upon the Roman way of eating and 
also upon the sensible and intellectual awareness of his 
contemporaries reiterates and reillustrates the charges which 
have already been made. 
It may be possible that the manner in which the discuss-
ion of the details of Of ell us , attack upon ,the intellectually 
debilitating effects of luxury has been carried out has obscured 
a further important element in Horace's portrayal of that 
character and in the characterisation of Of ell us , comments as 
philosophically naive. Not only does Of ell us use words without 
a full grasp of their meaning, according to Horace, but Of ell us , 
attack has an unusual degree of formal excellence. A decision 
has to be made here as to whether Horace would sacrifice the 
formal excellence of one of his own poems, in order the more 
realistically to produce a portrait of one of his characters, 
or the formal excellence of the diatribe put into the mouth of 
Ofellus is a further element in Horace's attack upon that 
character. My suggestion is that the formal excellence imposed 
upon the diatribe of Of ell us , at least in its constituent parts, 
by Horace is intended to have a similar effect upon the attentive 
reader as that which is achieved by Of ell us , unconscious use of 
a partially technical vocabulary. For not only is it quite 
impossible for such a speaker as Of ell us , who is intent upon 
expressing traditional ethical views, to avoid technical terms 
in such an ethical discussion, but it is also equally impossible 
for such a speaker, who is ben't upon successful persuasion, to 
avoid that formally effective manner of speaking which is 
affected by such figures as Damasippus and Stertinius, the 
antics and beliefs of whom would surely have been an anathema 
to such a figure as Of ell us. Even if we consider that Horace's 
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bent for comedy and naturalism in the composition of the Satires 
did not extend as far as the creation of poems which were 
consciously flawed, irrespective of the characters with which 
he peopled them, there is still an element of humour present in 
having the uncultured rustic speaking in such a formally 
. 4t' th 1 f . . t 154 conSC10US manner; ~ 1S e 1umour 0 1ncongru1 y. 
That there is a readily definable substructure evident 



















A general statement 
A general illustration 
Mora1ising 
A "fowl" illustration 
A "fishy" illustration 
Mora1ising 
A general illustration 
A general statement which culminates in an 
arresting and "punctuating" statement: 
ergo 
si quis nunc mergos suavis edixerit assos, 
parebit pravi doci1is Romana iuventus. 
As can be seen from this analysis of the attack upon luxury, 
Of ell us , arguments are expressed in an extremely symmetrical, 
and satisfying form by means of which the attacks upon luxury 
and capricious expendi,ture are given greater impact. 
Verses 53-55 form a bridge passage between the attack 
which Of ell us makes upon luxury and that which is made upon the 
154 Part of the subtle texture of the humour in the admittedly 
more artificial and pastoral world of Theocri,tu8 and 
Virgil is achieved by the poets through their exploitation 
of the tension which exists between the formal perfection 
and elegance of content of the Idylls and Eclogues, 
especially in the amoebean compositions, and the supposed 
rusticity of the characters who appear and perform in 
them. 
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equally undesirable folly of "stinginess"; although described 
as a "bridge" passage vv.53-55 may also be thought of, within 
the overall structure of the poem as part of the general 
statement with which Ofellus introduces his attack upon that 
vitium which is the extreme and opposite of luxus. 
C 
STINGINESS EQUALLY ABHORRENT: VV.53-62 
Of ell us continues his attack upon what he considers to 
be ethically misguided styles of life by declaring that, in 
h · . d 155 .. . f d f th 1S JU gement, a proper ascet1c1sm 1S ar remove rom e 
vice of meanness: 
53-54 sordidus a tenui victu distabit, Ofello 
iudice ••• 
As Lejay points out,156 Of ell us is in sympathy here with the 
sentiments of Epicurus, as he had been in vv.19-20. Of ell us , 
choice of vocabulary is, moreover, reminiscent of Cicero's 
comments at Fin. 2.90: 
negat (Epicurus) tenuissimo victu, id est 
contemptissimis escis et potionibus minorem 
voluptatem percipi quam rebus exquisitissimis 
ad epulandum. 
155 I believe, with Palmer (n. ad loc.) that Ofello iudice is 
spoken by Of ell us himself: this solves most difficulties 
regarding attribution of lines, cf. Ovid Her 4.74; one 
should also note that Of ell us had himself talked of corruptus 
iudex in v.9, so that, in perhaps a slightly arrogant manner, 
Ofellus sets himself up as a model with which unfavourably 
to compare others less gifted in wisdom than himself. 
156 N. ad loc.: also more fully on p.3l6, where the similarities 
are noted between Of ell us , views and those expressed by 
Epicurus in the letter to Menoecus, this'with regard to vv. 
80-88 of this satire. On Bpicurus and asceticism, cf. also 
Cic. Tusc. 5.102; Off. 2.58,64,75 and 1.102 and 106; cf. 
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However, as has been pointed out already, a proper and moderate 
asceticism was not the property of any particular school, 
although the philosophically untutored would see such an 
asceticism as more appropriate to the Stoa than to the Epicureans. 
The opponents of the Epicureans most certainly canvassed this 
view. 157 The beliefs of the Cyrenaics alone perhaps should have 
merited that kind of charge. However that may be, it was 
generally accepted that the life-style of the earlier Stoics, 
158 
especially Zeno, were marked by a moderate asceticism and 
it is likely that in this, as in other matters, the Stoics were 
d h ' fl f h 't t' 159 un er t e ~n uence 0 t e Per~pa e ~cs. It is certainly 
evident that Of ell us , words reflect the attraction which the 
common-sense and moderation of Peripatetic ideas held for his 
creator: 
54-55 nam frustra vitium vitaveris illud 
si te alio pravum detorseris. 
After the general statement of vv.53-55 Ofellus once 
more descends to particular description and illustration, as 
he had done previously in his attack upon luxury and the evil 
effects of excess in that direction. In fact, one could suggest 
also Sen. Ep. 4.10; 27.9 and 119.7. 
157 Plutarch's comments at Contr. Epa Beat. 17.1098d are 
notorious, ot aVapwnoL ~nG n60vnG ~O ~SYEaOG HaaanEp 
HSV~P~ Hat 6Laa~n~a~L ~fj yaa~PL nEPLypa~ouaLi cf. Cic. 
Fin. 2.69. 
158 See e.g. Diog. Laertius, 7.10. 
159 On the influence of the medium aureum on the ethics of 
the Middle Stoa, which period is of especial significance' 
in this context, because of its influence upon those Stoic 
ideas introduced to Rome through, for example, Panaetius, 
see esp. Schmeckel, Die Philosophie der Mittleren Stoa 
(Berlin, 1892) p.221. Something has already been said on 
the influence of Aristotle's thought directly on Horace 
in the discussion of Sat.:.ires 1.1 p. 7 and n.17. 
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an alteration to the overall structuia1 plan of the satire in 
line with which this discussion is being developed. After the 
initial general statement of the subject matter in vv.1-8, 
Of ell us describes particular follies in vv.8-69, excesses in the 
direction of luxury in vv.8-52 and in the direction of meanness 
in vv.55-69, while vv.53-55 serve as a bridge between these two 
subsections of Of ell us , initial attack. Clearly, the implication 
of this whole assault is the unremarkable one that the ideal 
lies in a mean course between excess and defect. This is 
pointed out explicitly a little later in vv.63-69, which pick 
up once again the Peripatetic or common-sense view, which has 
been implicitly anticipated in the discussions of luxury and 
meanness and explicitly again in the bridge or pivot passage 
of vv.S3-55. The advantages of a moderate life-style are then 
elaborated upon in vv.70-79. The remainder of the poem is then 
directed towards a discussion of more immediately relevant 
political topics. This switch of direction is neatly encapsul-
ated within vv.99-101 and anticipated by the references to the 
age of Roman heroes in vv.89-93 which compared so favourably 
with the decadence of contemporary times, as described, in terms 
of decadence and reputation, in vv.94-99. 
However, whether one treats the attacks upon luxury and' 
meanness as balancing elements of a general attack upon human 
folly in the attempts of humankind to discover "quae virtus et 
quanta, boni, sit •.. " (1), or as a more fragmentary assault is 
largely irrelevant to the present discussion, except in so far 
as Of ell us , exploitation of neatness of form is considered 
humorous and ironical in itself. The major element of humour 
within the satire is still the fact that Ofellus denies the 
~Jalue of -things Greek, yet, in his II Italian" morc .. lising f is 
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constantly, if unconsciously, reminding the reader of Greek 
ethical doctrines which are drawn from the whole spectrum of 
Greek philosophical thought. 
The exemplum with which Horace provides Ofellus as an 
illustration of the vice of meanness in vv.55-62 is a case in 
point. The humour of the passage goes beyond the vividly 
amusing description of the dietary habits of Avidienus. This 
name itself is clearly designed to conjure up the concept of 
avarice in the reader's mind, because of its similarity in sound 
to avidus (despite the difference in the quantity of the initial 
"a") and aviditas this, however, is the kind of rather obvious 
pun which Horace allows Of ell us consciously to make. More 
subtle and outside of Of ell us , range of appreciation is the 
play on words which Horace exploits through his knowledge of 
the ostentatious asceticism of the followers of Antisthenes and 
Diogenes known as the Cynics. Therefore, when Of ell us mentions 
that the nickname of Avidienus is Canis: 
56 cui Canis ex vero ductum cognomen adhaeret ••• 
Horace's intention is that his audience will see that this nick-
name has not merely been earned by his bad temper, as was the 
nickname of the original Cynics,160 but because of the similarity 
of his excessive and tiresome niggardliness to the asceticism 
of the Cynics, which was also thought of as being excessive and 
tiresome by their critics. Not but what, it's interesting that 
in Epistles 1.17.13-35 Horace, speaking on his own behalf, 
mentions Aristippus in favourable terms: his contention is that 
the in-tellectual honesty of the Cynic and the true value of his 
160 In his note to v.56 Palmer mentions the Cynics, but does 
not drawn any conclusion apart from that connected with 
evil temper, itself the result of miserliness. 
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moral convictions are, despite his material poverty, worth much 
more than the material goods of the wealthy. Also, the inde-
pendence of spirit of the Cynics is considered desirable: 
. "b l' .. l' 1 161 prlnclpl us p aCUls~e VlrlS non u tlma aus est. 
Here Horace endeavours to maintain his supposed independence of 
Maecenas and Octavian. However, the major point now at issue is 
the opportunism of Horace as a satirist, especially in his treat-
ment of the Greeks whether openly, as in Epistles 1.17, or more 
covertly in Satires 2.2. My suspicion is, therefore, that Canis 
in v.56 is a conscious reference on the part of Horace to the 
Cynics and their asceticism. Of ell us is unaware of the 
associations of the word and, one can suggest, would again have 
been disgruntled to discover that this latin nickname was 
reminiscent of an appropriate Greek philosophical school. One 
should add finally that, in E~istles 1.17.30, Horace uses canis 
ina proverbial expression not dissimilar to that which is found 
in v.64 of Satires 2.2. It would be something of a coincidence 
if, in two passages, one of which is specifically concerned 
wi th the adherents of Aristippus, the word canis should be used in 
proverbial expressions and yet not have reference, in the 
author's consciousness, to the Cynics in both contexts, especially 
since both contexts are consonant with the ideas of the Cynics. 
It is also interesting that in Epodes 6.1-2 Horace uses canis 
and lupus in opposition, as he does in v.64 of Satires 2.2; 
in Epodes 6 Horace chides the watchdog that barks at unoffending 
guests and yet maintains silence at the approach of a wolf. 
Surely Horace is here enjoying a subtle philosophical joke also 
- at the expense of Plato, Republic, 375f. where the excellent 
161 stIes 1.17.35. 
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guard-dog, analogous to the "guardians" of the ideal state, 
demonstrates great judgement in discriminating between friend 
and foe. It would seem that the subtle philosophical joke is 
a typically Horatian trait. I would also suggest that the words, 
ex vero ductum are intended to pick up verum in v.7 and male 
verum in v.8, which have already been discussed in terms of the 
problems associated with reality and illusion. At this stage it 
also is interes·ting to note further "signposts 11 by means of 
which Horace helps to maintain the unity of the poem and its 
coherence as an artistic whole. I refer to the fact that lupus, 
which is about to occur again at v.64 has already appeared at 
v.36, while the empty stomach of v.18 was described as latrantem. 
We shall also see in the discussion of v.76 that the pale 
complexion of the glutton has itself been anticipated by the 
appearance of both extreme kinds of malefactors at v.2l and, in 
a more subtle manner at v.6l. Discussion of these instances of 
"signposting" must await discussion of the most daring express-
ions of philosophical sophistication put into Of ell us , mouth 
by Horace, this in vv.76-88. Meanwhile, Of ell us, prompted by 
"Horace" moves into a positive description of how to live 
virtuously on a small income. 
D 
THE BENEFITS OF A PROPER ASCETICISM 
AND FRUGALITY: VV.63_99 162 
As was mentioned immediately above Of ell us is induced 
162 It may be that vv.89-99 should be thought of as a bridge 
or pivotal passage anticipating the content of vv.99-l36. 
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to move on to a more positive disquisition by two questions 
which, I would suggest, are put, in the manner of diatribe as 
exploited by Horace, by his audience, that is to say either 
"Horace", or an imaginary interlocutor. Generally speaking the 
two questions: 
63-64 quali igitur victu sapiens utetur, et horum 
utrum imitabitur? 
are punctuated as if they formed an integral part of the 
continuing stream of Of ell us' monologue, presumably because they 
repeat, in a slightly different form, the question with which 
the satire opened. I would, however, prefer to punctuate them 
163 
as, for example, Garrod punctuates the question cur hoc? in 
v.7. A similar interruption in vv.63-64 would seem to be in 
keeping with Horace's usual technique of broken diatribe, which 
is seen perhaps to its best advantage in Satires 2.7. After 
approximately fifty-five lines of monologue such an interruption 
is,in fact, overdue and, if the interruption is seen as an 
important reminder of what the original question at issue was, 
so much the better. I would also suggest that the questions may 
readily be thought of as reflecting a certain amount of typically 
Horatian irony. Take, for example, the word sapiens, all the 
connotations of which are by now adequately known, in v.63. Its 
appearance in v.63is anticipated by its appearance in v.3, 
where Horace interpolates his description of the rustic sage. 
It has already been argued, I hope convincingly, that Horace's 
description of Of ell us in vv.2-3 is ironical, because of the 
ambiguities which the poet exploits. Added support has been 
found for this ironical interpretation in the substance of 
163 In the Oxford Classical Texts Horace (Oxford, 1959). 
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Of ell us , complaintsabout luxury and meanness. Accordingly, it 
is natural to assume that Horace is now openly employing a word 
in an ironical sense which formerly, in an exactly similar 
metrical position in v.3, had been used ironically, but in, as 
it were, an "aside". Since Of ell us has been speaking as a self-
confessed sapiens, which even the most arrogant Stoic never was 
guilty of, it is very likely that sapiens in v.3 is an example 
of Horace at his most dangerously and quietly satirical, 
especially if we believe that Ofello iudice in vv.S3-S4 is 
spoken as a confession of excellence by Of ell us himself. One 
can fruitfully compare cur, Stoice? and Stoice in Satires 
2.3.160 and 300, where Horace is allowing an enthusiastic 
proficiens to demolish slowly and surely any claim he might like 
to make to progress on the way to the summum bonum and the wished 
for status of Stoic sapiens. 
One miqht also suspect that Horace wishes the reader to 
think of these questions as being put by the poet, because of 
the almost pun in utetur in v.63 and utrum in v.64. Also the 
proverbial answer to a real philosophical question, the answer, 
that is, in "hac urget lupus, hac canis, aiunt." (64) is 
especially in tune with Horace's description of Ofellus as 
presented in vv.2-3 to suggest that the rustic sage is taking a 
positive delight in answering his impatient questioner in a 
manner which is as remarkable for its oracularity as for its 
rusticity. In his note on sapiens in v.63 Lejay, who sees no 
hint of irony, also refers tothe beginning of the poem, "tel 
qui'il est defini en debut et qu'Hor. Ie depeint dans ces 
satires, l'homme penetre des traditions romaines qui sont des 
traditions de sens pratique et d'equilibre moral." However, 
Lejay considers that Horace is presenting Ofellus as an ideal 
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while, of course, my contention is that Horace is as aware of 
the shortcomings of Of ell us , own narrow approach to ethical 
questions as he is of the shortcomings of the Stoic, the 
Epicureans or the Cynics. Aristotle recognised the value of 
, I 
the advice from the man of practical virtue in the formulations 
of a modus vivendi,but nevertheless saw the necessity to bolster 
the advice given by Of ell us , prototype, as it were, with sound 
rational argumentation. Of ell us , on the other hand, proceeds 
by precept and example. Horace was as aware as Plato that the 
blind traditional view was ultimately and necessarily 
inadequate. 
The only other factors worthy of special mention, from 
the point of view of this discussion, in vv.63-69, which enclose 
the first part of Of ell us , switch to positive advice, are the 
humanitas recommended by Of ell us in the treatment of slaves in: 
hic neque servis 
Albuci senis exemplo, dum munia didit 
saevus erit .•• 
and the use of vitium again in v.69 where, I would contend, the 
irony, which Horace intends, springs from the fact that Ofellus 
is so lacking a sense of proportion in questions of ethics 
that he can describe a relatively minor social solecism in 
terms more suited to a discussion of mortal sin or, to be less 
anachronistic, of the summum malum of the Stoics. 
We come now to a passage which is of central position 
and, therefore, not surprisingly, of central, even crucial, 
impor"tance for a full and proper understanding of the poem. On 
the interpretation of the passage, which is itself centred about 
the divinae particulam aurae of v.79, depends also that inter-
pretation of Horace's attitude towards Of ell us , which it has 
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been the purpose of this discussion consciously to further. It 
is here, moreover, that that supposed tension between the 
inevitably Greek connotations of Of ell us , comments on the soul 
and his character as an Italian xenophobe is at its most 
apparent. The basic question, which must now be asked, and 
finally answered, is whether Horace intends his reader to under-
stand this tension as a humorously exploited means to achieve 
the undercutting of the authority of a man who has the arrogance 
to consider himself to be beyond the effects of an otherwise 
massively influential foreign culture. For either this is Horace's 
intention, or it is to depict, in laudatory manner, Of ell us as a 
man who genuinely has no need for what an alien culture can 
provide for him in the way of support for his traditional and 
time-honoured beliefs. 
Horace maintains a continuity, despite the subdivisions 
of the poem's structure by the use once again of victus tenuis 
in v.70. These words echo the phrase a tenui victu of v.53. 
Similarly the question of the poem's beginning is picked up by 
the form of the more specific indirect question in vv.70-7l; 
in the same way the ironical sapiens of v.63 was an echo of the 
equally ironical sapiens in v.3. The most telling example of 
this kind of cross connection within the poem's structure comes 
in the use of pallidus in v.76: clearly the word picks up the 
164 album~ue of v.2l, where the victim or devotee of excess is 
described in terms anticipatory of the present discussion even 
down to the use of pinguem vitiis, which, also in v.2l, is 
164 One should note also here that the somewhat rare albatus 
occurs in v.6l, while the name Albuci senis occurs at 
v.67; although the first example refers to the festal 
dress of the miser, it is interesting that in respect of 
a certain kind of pallor his appearance matches that of 
the devotee of luxury in v.2l and v.76. 
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anticipa'tory of "corpus onus tum / hesternis vi tiis" in vv. 
77-78: mention has already been made of the repeated use of 
vitium within the satire, as, for example, at v.54 and v.69. 
However, this use of verbal signposts, although it often depends 
upon words which are capable of cov'ering extensive areas of 
meaning, both philosophical and lay, as vitium in this satire 
and ratio in Satires 2.3, is not quite so intriguing as the force 
of the quasi philosophical commen'ts which are found in vv.76-79: 
76-79 vides ut pallidus omnis 
cena desurgat dubia? quin corpus onustum 
hesternis vitiis animum quoque praegravat una, 
atque adfigit humo divinae particulam aurae. 
It has often been noted that Of ell us , words at this juncture 
have a philosophical ring. The point is made by Palmer, for 
example, who refers to Plato, Phaedo 83d, "where Socrates says 
that each pleasure and each pain have, as it were, a nail, with 
which they nail the soul to the body and make it corporeal.~! 165 
He continues by declaring that the divinity of the soul was "a 
dogma of the Stoics and pythagoreans"; Palmer then refers the 
166 
reader to a number of useful illustrative passages, but does 
not comment further upon why Horace has introduced ·this 
particularly striking passage at this particularly central and 
important point in the body of the poem. The comments of Lejay 
165 The text of the Phaedo 83d is, EHaa~n noovn Hat Aunn 
wansp nAov Exouaa npoanAoC a6~nv (~nv ~uxnv) npo~ ~o 
aW]J.a Hat npoanEpovq, 'Hat nOLSL a0)]J.a~oELofi. 
166 E.g. Cic. Cato Maior 21. 78, "audiebam Pythagoran 
Pythagoreosque numquam dubitasse quin ex universa mente 
divina animos delibatos haberemus": cf. Tusc. 1.26.65 
and 5.13.38; also M. Aurelius 12.26; 2.4;-S:-27 and 
Virgil, Aeneid 6.746: 
donec longa dies perfecto temporis orbe, 
concretam exemit labem purumque reliquit 
aethereum sensum atque aurai simplicis ignem. 
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f 11 d . 1 t' f t 167 are at once u er an , to a certa1n extent, ess sa 1S ac ory. 
Lejay also refers to the passage from the Phaedo, which is cited 
by Palmer, but attempts to make a distinction between the aims 
of the Platonic and the Horatian images; "l'image est cependant 
tres differente dans Horace: Ie corps, alourdi par l'orgie de 
la veille, est comme un poids qui entralne l'ame et la fixe a 
la vase ... dans Platon, Ie plaisir cloue l'ame au corps; dans 
Horace, Ie corps maintient l'ame sur Ie sol." Lejay continues 
and cites two passages from the works of Seneca, namely Epistles 
65.16 and the De Brevitate Vitae 2.3, where the Stoic author 
seems to echo the sentiments of Horace, although Lejay has 
already discounted the idea that Of ell us , words have a partic-
ularly Stoic origin; "on songe d'abord a l'attribuer aux 
Stoiciens .... mais Ciceron l' a trouvee dans la tradition 
th .. ,,168 py agor1c1enne. Rudd in the text of The Satires of Horace 
(p.171) dismisses Lejay's contributions on this tooic rather in 
an ironical manner; "even this is not too much for Lejay, who 
tells us (p.313) that Of ell us would have had some rolls of 
Lucilius in his house. Presumably he also had works of Stoic 
or Pythagorean philosophy, for in v.79 he speaks of bodily 
indulgence as nailing the soul to earth." In his note on p.297 
Rudd adds, "The closest parallel seems to be Plato (Phaedo 83d)', 
who says that every pain and pleasure nails the soul to the 
body." While it is true that Lejay tends to overemphasise the 
education and learning of Of ell us, this mistake is the result 
of a desire to see Satires 2.2 as an artistic and satisfying 
167 Lejay, n. ad loco and also p .. 320. 
168 Lejay refers here (p.320) to Sen. Ep. 120.14 and also to 
Cic. Cato Maior 21.78 and Nat. Deo:--1.27; cf. also Mayor's 
note on Virgil, Aeneid 6.7~nd 746, with which one can 
compare Fletcher'b comments in the introduction to his 
edition of Aeneid 6. 
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whole, in spite of a certain puzzlement concerning Horace's 
aims, or perhaps, confusion concerning Horace's aims in producing 
the poem. As will be shown shortly, Lejay's interpretation must 
be questioned, both in general terms and also in detail. Rudd 
is himself on rather shaky ground here, I fear: he writes: 
If, however, one believes (as I do) that the setting 
is Rome and that Horace is transmitting the teachings 
but not the words of Of ell us , then the old farmer becomes 
a rather feeble device. Clearly he is supposed to have 
some kind of independent existence which will prevent the 
reader from ascribing all the sentiments in the poem to 
Horace. But for the most part Ofellus is too vague and 
shadowy a figure to perform this function, and so 
dramatically 2.2 is weaker than several of the other 
. 169 pleces. 
I doubt whether a character,who is described as: 
3 rusticus abnormis sapiens crassaque Minerva .•• 
can be thought of as either "vague" or "shadowy". However that 
may be, let us examine Lejay's comments before returning to 
Rudd's assessment of the poem. 
It is interesting that, although Lejay draws a very 
proper distinction between the images of Horace in vv.76-79 of 
this satire and those of Plato in Phaedo 83d, he does not mention 
that the effect of making the soul like the body is to keep it 
close, as it were, to the earth. In fact, this very point is 
made by Plato himsel£ in another related passage of the Phaedo 
which describes in a humorous vein how a soul which is weighed 
down with corporeal vices is rendered thereby somehow more 
corporeal itself and is, therefore, bound, on its ultimate 
separation from the body, to exis·t in a kind of limbo, neither 
169 Rudd, p.17lf. .J 
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released from this world nor yet of it. As a result it frequents 
170 graveyards. Hence malevolent ghosts are explained. Such an 
unfortunate soul's fate is exactly parallel to that in store 
for such a one as is described by Horace in vv.7e-79. The fact 
that Lejay appears to miss this closer parallel is significant, 
since he does not appreciate that Horace is now exploiting an 
irony which is not unworthy of Socrates himself. For in Phaedo 
70a5 and 81c-d Plato is at pains to ridicule those who believe 
in the material nature of the immortal soul, since, as it later 
becomes clear, immortality is not compatible with a material 
nature. Plato also ridicules those whose beliefs concerning the 
soul are so naive that they not only feared for its safety, if 
death took place on a s·tormy day, but also felt that it could 
somehow be physically adulterated by a life of sin. By over-
stating such commonly held or traditional beliefs Plato was able 
to demolish them before he moved on to the more positive 
discussions of the later portions of the dialogue. I would 
suggest, therefore, that the irony here exploited by Horace 
comes from the uneducated farmer giving vent to ideas on the 
nature of the soul, in all seriousness, which call to mind ideas 
mentioned in the Phaedo for the sake of light relief - and only 
so that they could be humorously dismissed. There is also a 
possible irony in the fact that the materialistic ideas, which 
were attacked by Plato in the Phaedo,were, in a sense, proto-
types of the thoroughgoing and conscious materialism of the 
Stoics and Epicureans, whose own theories regarding the material 
nature of the soul were derived ultimately from the ideas of 
Heraclitus, Anaxagoras and the atomists of the fifth century, 
) 
170 Plato, Phaedo, 81D. 
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Leucippus and Democritus. The crude materialism of Of ell us is 
certainly a rough reflection of the developed materialism of 
the Hellenistic schools. Yet in Horace's poem this crude 
materialism appears cheeK by jowl, as it were, with a clear 
reference to that portion of a Platonic dialogue which reduces 
to the absurd those physical explanations of the nature of the 
soul which apparently were held by men as naive as Of ell us is 
depicted by Horace to be. 
It is not, therefore, surprising that editors and literary 
critics are torn between a choice of Platonic or Pythagorean or 
stoic origins for the ideas appearing in this section of the 
poem. It is in Horace's best interests, as he devalues Of ell us 
in a manner which is parallel to the devaluation of the equally 
dogmatic Damasippus and Davus, to leave the question vague, even 
as Virgil's poetic underworld in Aeneid 6 is deliberately hazy 
in its provenance. I also feel that this discussion of the 
, I' 171 conSC10US lterary and philosophical ironies, with which this 
passage is replete, should also serve as a possible counter to 
those misgivings felt by Rudd and quoted above. Horace is in 
complete control of his material, as is inevitably the case. 
Accordingly, the character portrayal of Of ell us is produced 
precisely to serve Horace's purposes. This, as has been indicated, 
is to depict the folly of any view which is too narrow to benefit 
by whatever help is available, no matter how they may feel 
emotionally towards the source and origin of that help. 
One should perhaps conclude the discussion of this 
section of the poem with a brief note on tenuatum in v.84 in order 
171 Rudd's translation of cena dubia (77) as "problem meal" 
misses the humorous reference to Ter. Phormio 2.2.28; the 
translation suggests that he had in mind the disguised 
dishes at Petroni us , Sat. 56. 
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to show how watchfulness for examples of Horace's wit at Of ell us , 
expense must be maintained. Clearly the tenuatum corpus of 
v.84 is consciously contrasted by Of ell us with the corpus onustum 
/ hesternis vitiis of vv.77-78, which had such a deleterious 
effect upon the unfortunate soul with which it was united, 
animum quoque praegravat una. The tenuatum corpus is, according 
to the logic of the passage, likely to be less of a burden to 
the soul to which it is united. It comes, therefore, as no 
surprise to discover that the air and fire, which form the rare 
nVEu~a that animates the universe, is i·tself tenuis or in the 
words of Alexander Aphrodisias, LO LE nup uaL LOV uspa AEnLogEpfj 
,- ,. •. 172 h hI" . LE uaL UOU~ uaL EULova oVLa. T e uman sou 1S, 1n St01C 
doctrine, a spark of that divine flame, as Censorinus tells us, 
"primosque homines ex solo, adminiculo divini ignis id est dei 
providentia genitos.1I173 Generally speaking, the more rarified 
or £iery that human soul, and the less influenced by the crass 
material DAn, the happier and more efficient it was. 174 I would 
hesitate to suggest that all this was in the mind of Horace when 
he composed v.84; nevertheless, such subtlety is a mark of his 
humour and would be appropriate at this juncture after the 
provocative lines which centre about divinae particulam aurae. 
Also, the formal advice with which the poem ends would demand, 
as we shall see, a soul the dispositions of which and the inner 
harmonies of which reflect the workings of a properly attenuated 
and fiery logos. 
There is further undermining of the authority of Ofellus 
172 Alex. Aphrod. De Mixt. p.2l6.l4 (Bruns). 
173 Censorinus, De Die Nat. 4.10. 
174 See e.g. Seneca, Dial .. 7.3.3: the emphasis on physical ills 
as the result of excess causing mental discomfort is also 
reminiscent of Cic. Tusc. 4.13.30. 
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in Horace's description of this reactionary Italian's praises 
of time past and his desire to be transported to the time of 
antique Romans: 
92-93 has utinam inter 
heroas natum tellus me prima tulisset! 
Although, in fact, Ofellus expresses a wish that he had been born 
long ago rather than that he could return to the days of yester-
year, nevertheless one is bound to remember, to Of ell us , 
disadvantage, both Horace's attacks upon ~E~~L~oLpCa, in the first 
person in Satires 1.1.15-22, and through Davus at his own expense 
in 2.7.22-27. The second of these two references is particularly 
relevant: 
laudas 
fortunam et mores anti quae plebis, et idem 
si quis ad ilIa deus subito te agat, usque recuses, 
aut quia non sentis quod clamas rectius esse, 
aut quia non firmus rectum defendis, e"t haeres 
nequiquam caeno cupiens evellere plantam. 
Satires 2.7.22-27 
There is no suggestion in Satires 2.2 that Ofellus is anything 
less than genuine in his devotion to Rome's past. However, there 
is throughout the poem a clear suggestion that a reactionary 
nature, which is as blinkered and as undiscriminating as that 
which is possessed by Of ell us , is not only more than slightly 
ludicrous to an educated observer, but also unhelpful. It is 
also ironical that Of ell us , jUdgements should appear to be lacking 
in discrimination when a large part of his own evident self-
satisfaction is dependent upon a confidence in his own untutored 
ability correctly to distinguish which mode of life is most 
beneficial. In the light of this Horace's introduction of: 
rancidum aprum antiqui laudabant, non quia nasus 
illis nullus erat ... 
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into Of ell us , arguments is particularly amusing, especially 
when, immediately after the wishful thinking of vv.92-93, Horace 
has Of ell us complain again of the folly of mankind in not being 
able to discriminate between what truly is conducive to a worth-
while reputation and what behaviour simply brings notoriety for 
excess and luxury. 
The interlocutor of vv.99-10l, although himself 
misguided, sees that, if Of ell us has a potential weak point, it 
is his inability to distinguish between cases: 
99-101 "iure" inquit "Trausius istis 
iurgatur verbis; ego vectigalia magna 
divitiasque habeo tribus amplas regibus." 
It is as if the interlocutor, and here we may perceive Horace's 
guiding hand, considers Of ell us to be as unswerving in his 
devotion to an ethical ideal as were the Stoics in their 
devotion even to the paradoxical consequences of their peculiar 
philosophical beliefs. However that may be, the structural 
purpose of the interruption which is contained in vv.99-l0l is 
to swing the discussion to matters of immediate consequence 
which, in their political and social relevance, contrast sharply 
with moral generalisations concerning an age of honour now long 
dead. The question which, I feel, is implied in the remainder 
of the poem is whether or not traditionalism, as epitomised by 
the attitudes struck by Of ell us , can provide a totally 
satisfactory answer to life's problems in the face of the 
complexity and consequent tensions in the immediate post civil 
war period. Can, in short, the final return of Of ell us to 
generalisation in: 
135-136 quocirca vivite fortes, 
fortiaque adversis opponite pectora rebus. 
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be taken seriously as Horace's short answer to a major ethical 
dilemma? It seems unlikely, when the general tone of the final 
couplet follows the particular political reference of the section 
which precedes it. However a satisfactory answer to the question 
can only be hazarded when the final section of the poem has 
been considered in detai14 
E 
CONCLUSION: VV.99-l36 
There are certain structural difficulties which relate 
generally to the substructure of the poem's conclusion and 
specifically to the distribution of the lines between the 
speakers, Of ell us and Horace. I would suggest that the follow-· 
ing schematisation of poem's conclusion will provide at least 
an adequate guideline for our treatment of it: 
a) Vv. 99-111 
b) Vv.112-11S 
c) Vv.116-136 
Altercation between Ofellus and an 
anonymous interlocutor: the duties 
of the wealthy man. 
Interruption by Horace: this is parallel, 
in a structural sense, to Horace's 
comments in vv.2-3. 
Conclusion of Of ell us , diatribe: the 
essential independence of the land. 
This final section of the poem is largely concerned to 
expound two commonplace themes, the duties of the wealthy man 
and the independence of the good earth. There are but few 
major difficulties of interpretation, although it is possible 
that Stoic terminology may help to explain a puzzle in v.123: 
123 post hoc ludus erat culpa potare magistra 
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where the problem revolves around the exact meaning of the 
phrase culpa pot are magistra, although it seems to be generally 
agreed that the infinitive depends upon ludus. The meaning of 
post hoc ludus ... potare is then either, "after t.his we enjoyed 
a drinking game" in which ludus is specific, or "after this it 
was our pleasure to drink", in which ludus must refer to the 
general air of relaxation that benefitted the holiday festivities. 
That previous editors have found the striking culpa potare 
magistra a stumbling block to their understanding is clear from 
the various emendations which have been suggested: cuppa, by 
Lambinj cupa or nulla, by Bentley; pulpa, by Heinsius and 
nupta or Polla, by Peerlkamp. These are dismissed by Lejay as 
"inutiles" and he continues in his notes to v.123 to give his 
own views, which attempt to explain the text as it stands by 
reference to Plautus, stichus 725 and also to the comments of 
Porphyry. "si quando libere potare volebant antiqui. id est sine 
archiposia, dicebant se magistram fa cere culpam." Lejay's 
explanation is as follows: 
Apres qu'une de ces fautes avait ete commise, les 
autres convives obligeaient Ie coupable par leurs 
. .... . d 175 cr~s a v~ er une coupe. 
This is the meaning which is adopted by Rudd, whose translation 
is, "Then we played drinking games where a failure means a 
forfeit. ,,176 This, however, is a considerable expansion of the 
latin and demands that culpa have the meaning of multa, which 
is used in the Plautine reference for an actual forfeit of a 
goblet of wine which the loser foregoes. This does not suit 
175 Lejay, n. ad loco p.353. 
176 Rudd, The Satires of Horace and Persius, p.8l. 
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the idea of drinking freely which is demanded by the festal 
atmosphere of the passage which seems to anticipate Horace's 
pleasant party in Satires 2.6.67-70. However, Palmer too accepts 
the meaning of "forfeit" and takes to task Porphyry in the same 
breath with, "this shows he simply knew nothing whatever about 
't 11177 l. • The same rather unsatisfactory reference to Plautus is 
repeated. At the end of his note almost, as it were, for the 
sake of completion, Palmer comments that some have offered a 
different explanation; he cites M' Caul (1833, ed. Wheeler), 
"that culpa means 'excess' - 'each person took as much as he 
pleased, restricted only by the feeling that excess was 
culpable'." A case can be made out in support of this view 
with the aid of Stoic terminology. It becomes apparent that M' 
Caul was working along the right lines in observing the spirit 
of the passage as a whole. The holiday drinker should be allowed 
to drink freely, both in the sense of "deeply", as understood by 
Porphyry, and also in the sense of solutus legibus insanis, to 
employ the phrase of Horace at Satires 2.6.68f. That Of ell us 
should wish his holidaymaker to be free of legibus insanis is 
all the more natural, since it would appear from Lejay's note 
th t h 1 I , 1 Greek. 178 H th h 1 a suc aws were pecu lar y ow, oug, can cu pa 
... magistra mean "freely" in either of the required senses? 
How can M' Caul's view be substantiated or modified; for 
modified it must be, since culpa must of necessity contain 
within its meaning, whatever complexion that meaning has acquired, 
the idea of a crime committed or a mistake or error already made. 
177 Palmer, n. ad loco 
178 Lejay, n. ad loco p.353, "Au contra ire dans le coutume 
Grecque decrite dans les Odes Odes 1.4.18 et 
2.7.25." 
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In this culpa is closely associated with the Stoic term 
vitium f 1 '" f 'It" 179, th or cu pa, meanlng sense 0 gUl I lS e awareness 
of vitium, once that vitium, through an error of judgement or 
lapse in virtue, has been committed. The relationship between 
these two words was known to Horace: this is clear from Satires 
2.6.7 where both words are among a group of terms which have 
consciously Stoic or other philosophical connotations. However, 
perhaps the most useful parallel which can help to solve the 
puzzle of culpa in v.123 of Satires 2.2 is to be found in the 
Stoic satirist, and admirer of Horace, Persius in Satires 
3.32-34: 
sed stupet hic vitio et fibris increvit opimum 
pingue, caret culpa, nescit quid perdat, et alto 
demersus summa rursus non bullit in unda. 
This passage translates as follows: 
But this man is dumbfounded by his vice and the 
1:: __ 1 _ __________ .!_,_ .!~_ ,_.! _ _ ~i- ___ .!'_ '--_ , __ , ____ .... 
Lal.. '::JLUW~ L.L\,;U .LA! U.L~ \::l!l..l.ct..L.L~, UO;;:: .Lct~J'>.~ U!!,Y 
sense of guilt, and submerged deep he will not 
bob again on the surface. 
Take the passage clause by clause, the object of Persius' attack 
is "qumbfounded by his vice ll , his intellect is deadened. This 
parallels the dulling of the senses, physical and intellectual, 
which Of ell us attacks in Satires 2.2.9, corruptus iudex, v.2l 
pinguem vitiis, v.25 corruptus vanis rerum and, finally, the 
whole passage vv.76-88, which is discussed above. 180 Equally 
the ability of Persius' victim to make proper moral judgements 
and to realise his moral danger has been ruined so that nescit 
quid £erdat, because of the crassness of his intellect which 
179 Cf. Cic. Fam. 7.3.4, "vacare culpa magnum est solacium"; 
Sen. Phae2fra, 163, "animus culpa plenus"; also, Juv. 
1.16 . 
180 See above,pp.264ff. 
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has resulted, in fact, in the loss of all sense of shame, of 
guilt, caret culpa. The culpa, although lost, is still thought 
of, however, as being potentially operative after those vitia 
which have stultified the intellect have been committed. One 
should also note that the actual physical debasement of Persius' 
target is described in terms reminiscent of Of ell us , attacks 
upon the debauched and also of Horace's wry implications 
regarding the intellectual attainments of his "mask". For 
Persius uses pingue, which is almost an echo of pinguem vitiis 
in Horace, Satires 2.2.21 and of corpus onustum / hesternis. vitiis 
in v.77f. It has been, therefore, established that culEa can 
mean a sense of guilt occasioned by a lapse of moral control. 
It has also been established that the holiday drinking at the 
close of Satires 2.2 is anticipatory in spirit of Horace's 
convivial evening towards the end of Satires 2.6. So much is 
made clear by the plainness of the fare on both occasions and 
also by the conviva ... vicinus of Satires 2.2.119f. It would 
seem, therefore, that by writing culpa ... magistra in Satires 
2.2.123 Horace means that each individual's drinking will be 
governed not by artificial rules nor by the dictates of anything 
but his own conscience or the hardness of his own head on that 
particular occasion. The individual will know when his personal 
limit has been reached only when he has transgressed it, so that 
the warning sensation can properly be described by the phrase 
culpa potare magistEa. If he continues to drink, the individual 
will be fully aware, through the promptings of Culpa of what he 
is doing. However, on this holiday occasion, when normal rules 
181 
are relaxed, the individual is free to act according to his 
181 The freedom granted to Davu8 in 2.7 is a·useful parallel: 
Horace becomes only too aware of his mistake when it is, 
as it were, too late. 
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nature or will, secundum naturam. A suitable rendering would 
perhaps, therefore, be,"according to conscience's guidance". 
This would be in keeping with Horace's constant irony towards 
Of ell us. If one of Of ell us , reasons for rejecting the silly 
drinking games was that the rules were influenced by foolish 
Greeks (and this devalues the explanation of culpa ••. magistra 
adopted by Orelli, Lejay, Palmer and Rudd), then the fact that 
Horace places the phrase culpa potare magistra, which is only 
totally comprehensible via Stoic terminology, into Of ell us , mouth 
at the moment he rejects the leges insanae is in itself a 
supreme irony. 
As far as the other matters, which arise in the context 
of the poem's close are concerned, Lejay has a full discussion 
of the concept of "generosity" and also of the "independence" 
of the land in p.3l7f. of his introduction to Satires 2.2. 
I, } 
Horace's words on wealthkcorrespond to a theme developed by the 
C ' 182 h' h' f ' 1 . t t ft th C ' yn~cs, w 1C 1S 0 espec1a 1n eres a er e pun on an~s 
discussed above with reference to v.56. Cicero records the Stoic 
contribution on this topic at De Officiis 3.63, where he 
attributes the idea to Hecato of Rhodes. The concept can, 
183 however, be traced back to Socrates along with many of the 
commonplaces of Hellenistic philosophy. Lejay's conclusion is 
as follows: 
Nous sommes reportes encore a Anacharsis et a Socrate, 
c'est-a-dire a ce melange de sagesse populaire et 
d'idees philosophiques ou il est impossible de demeter 
l'enseignement reel du Socrate historique. L'idee elle-
meme n'est ni grecque ni latine, ni philosophique ni 
182 Lejay quotes Musonius, ed. Hense, p.108.l4 in support. 
183 Stobaeus, Flor. 94.34 M, TBv n~oOTov ~anEp ~(~ov ~XTEVfl 
}t.a t a:n:poqy.ia L OLO\.' £ l. ~ -rc)"G UU.\O"k; 6E L TIO'"pa.A..o.:W.f3a .. \.' E L \' l1pctf; E L C ~ 
populaire: elle est antique. Elle correspond tout 
particulierement a des preoccupations urgentes chez 
les contemporains d'Horace et il lui a donne une 
expression conforme aces soucis. Une idee qui est 
commune a tout Ie monde n'appartient a personne. 
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While in general agreeing with Lejay's comments here, 
especially regarding Horace's desire to give a literary expression 
to the anxieties of his contemporaries, I find the definition 
of these views as vaguely "antique" as somewhat unsatisfactory. 
It is clear that Horace thought of the ideas expressed in 
Of ell us , speech as both Italian and yet Greek, rather than 
neither or neutral. Without the tension between the Greek and 
Italian elements within the formal literary expression of these 
ideas, at the very least a good deal of the humorous effect of 
the poem would be destroyed. It may be as well to remind our-
selves here of Coleridge's comments to the effect that, "the 
creative imagination shows itself most intensely in the balance 
or reconciliation of opposite or discordant qualities." Horace 
achieves such a balance between things Italian and things Greek 
within this poem, and part of his success is in the development 
of Ofellus as an outmoded figure who is himself unaware of or 
who consciously ignores a large area of human culture and 
thought. 
I also feel that Lejay could have made somewhat more 
of th~ discussion of benignitas in the De Officiis of Cicero: 
in fact, whereas Lejay's reference is to Book 3.63, a more 
useful discussion for our purpose is to be found in Book 2.52-
64. I say that this discussion is more useful, since it contains 
a cautionary note, v.lhich may, if also present in vv .10 1-106 of 
Satires 2.2 even by implication, do something to anticipate 
that political COffiil1en t in vv.116-135 which has been thought of 
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as a veiled criticism of octavian parallel to Virgil's comments 
in Eclogues 1. Cicero is at pains to point out that the 
liberality of the wealthy man is praiseworthy, but easy, costing 
little, while the liberality which a man of slender means 
accomplishes .by way of personal service is truly valuable. 
Of ell us , suggestion that the wealthy man is at relatively greater 
risk in the face of fortune, ad casus dubios, is parallel to 
Cicero's comments on the trials that attend wealth. The point 
is also made by Cicero that the wealthy man must carefully examine 
his motives before expending great sums on public works. This 
is of interest in the light of "quare I templa ruunt antiqua deum?" 
in vv.103-104, and also in the light of the programme of public 
works, which was ultimately undertaken by Octavian. Syme's 
comments are relevant here: 
Two deities deserved special honour. In 29 B.C. the 
temple of Divus Julius vowed by the Triumvirs was at 
last dedicated. The next year saw the completion of 
the great temple of Apollo on the Palatine. 184 
Thus, when this poem was written these major works were either 
envisaged or in train. One could perhaps be surprised at Apollo 
receiving such an honour at the hands of Octavian. Syme is again 
most helpful: 
Phoebus, to be sure, was Greek in name and origin. 
But Phoebus had long been domiciled in Latium. 
Though the national spirit of Rome was a reaction 
against Hellas, there was no harm, but every advantage, 
in invoking the better sort of Greek deities on the 
right side, so that the War of Actium could be shown 
as a sublime contest between West and East. 185 
The "War of Actium" was still in the future when Horace wrote 
184 The Roman Revolution 'p.447f.: in this context, note Odes 
185 The Roman Revolution, p.448. 
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Satires 2.2 at some time between 35 B.C. and 30 B.C. However, 
octavian's Tota Italia campaign was in full swing, as he 
attempted to enlist the support of Italians against Antony's 
forces in the East. 18G However, it would seem that, if the work 
on the temple of Apollo is thought of as significant, the Tota 
Italia campaign was not as narrowly xenophobic as might be 
imagined. In this case Horace's misgivings regarding the blind 
nationalism of Ofellus could well have found favour with Maecenas 
as Octavian's adviser in matters of propaganda. The supposed 
cautionary note regarding excessive expenditure on temples and 
public works, as sounded by Cicero and, perhaps, thereby implied 
in Horace's poem can also be taken as consonant with a certain 
unease in aristocratic circles, which still existed both regarding 
the absolute legality of Octavian's position in the period 
before Actium and of his behaviour during the settlement of 
confiscated land on the allied veterans after the victory of 
Philippi. A final thought, which, although fanciful, _may yet 
be of interest. At the time at which Horace was composing 
Satires 2.2 the two most powerful of the advisers of Octavian 
were Horace's own patron Maecenas and M. Agrippa, two men who 
emotionally and also intellectually were poles apart, mirroring 
in their different characters the tension between inward looking 
parochialism and enlightened awareness of other cultures. 187 I 
see Agrippa as a wholehearted and practical advocate of the Tota 
Italia campaign, intent on mobilising public opinion against 
Antony and Cleopatra and in favour of Octavian by stressing the 
186 lb. 276-293, which concludes aptly with the quotation from 
Aeneid 8.678f., "hinc Augustus agens Italos in proelia 
Caesar /cum patribus populoque, penatibus et magnis dis. 
187 For a literary conflict between Agrippa and Maecenas, see 
Dioo Casso 5202-400 
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material benefits, especially in terms of public works, which 
would accrue to Italy under the guidance of octavian. I see 
the more subtle Maecenas mobilising his own rather different 
resources towards a similar end, but the genius of his poets 
and his own liberal education, coupled even with his peculiar 
status as an Etruscan aristocrat, militated against his advocating 
too exclusive a view of Italian excellence. As has been mentioned 
before, Virgil also had somewhat harSh comments to make after the 
, ,,1 \ ~ 1 de~Eaaa~iEffB of 40 B.C. 88 Ultimately, however, poets and 
patrons reached a compromise when the best of Italian and the 
best of Greek influences combined to produce Virgil's Aeneid 
and the Odes of Horace. It is interesting to note that in 
Od 1 6 d th 'f t' 1 t' 189 H ~ . , un er e gUlse 0 a conven 10na recusa 10, orace 
gives his sole and rather sketchy acknowledgement to the 
achievements of Agrippa, whose attitudes are perhaps reflected 
by those of Of ell us in Satires 2.2, even as the poet's subtle 
delight in the details of Greek philosophy and literature 
reflected the interest of his patron in those topics. Even if 
one were not to venture so far, it is interesting that this 
brief attempt to place Satires 2.2 in its historical and political 
context, because of the political implications of the poem's 
ending, has served to substantiate in this way suspicions 
which were aroused by a slow and careful reading of the poem. 
Having said this, I think it is clear in what spirit Horace 
intends the commonplace advice of vv.135-136 to be taken. 
188 See Eclogues 1.70-72. 
189 Horace, Odes 1.6.5-20, esp. 5-12. 
CHAPTER SIX 
A DISCUSSION OF SATIRES 2.6 AND 
A DRAWING TOGETHER OF THREADS 
Introductory Remarks 
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Much of the labour has been removed from the preparation 
of the following discussion of Satires 2.6, because of the 
amount of attention which this particular poem has received 
at the hands of such men as Lejay, Fraenkel, Brink and Rudd. 
It is hardly surprising that this carefully composed and 
attractive poem, with its readily recognisable themes and its 
famous tailpiece, so to speak, should have received relatively 
more critical attention and acclaim than Horace's other satires. 
For there is a consensus of ouinion that this 
to the other satirical works of Horace: thus Brink, " ••• one 
of the best, perhaps the best, of these poems, the 6th of the 
Second Book of the Satires - Hoc erat in voti..§..",l and also 
Fraenkel, "Perhaps it is unfair to judge the rest of the second 
book by the standard of the uncommonly happy sixth satire.,,2 
It is possible that this critical consensus springs in part 
from the fact that Satires 2.6 harbours less difficulties of 
structure and content than other longer and more complex works 
such as Satires 2.3. This relative directness of approach is 
itself directly attributable to the fact that Horace speaks 
1 c.o. Brink, On Reading a Horatian Satire: an Interpretation 
of "Sermones" II.6 (The Sixth Todd Memorial Lecture, 
Sydney 1965), p.4. 
2 Fraenkel, p.144. 
283 
propria persona throughout the poem, apart from vv.79-117 at 
the end, with the result that the critic is spared the necessity 
of calculating what effect the "mask" has in distorting the 
poet's message. However, although the poem has been fairly 
eXhaustively examined, certain details and themes can be 
discussed again in the light of work reported in the foregoing 
sections. Also it is the privilege of each new critic to 
assess and perhaps to modify the findings of his antecedents 
in the field. 
Of the work already done on this poem, it seems to me 
that Brink's, On Reading a Horatian Satire takes perhaps the 
best total view of its form and content, although, naturally 
because of the nature of the Todd Memorial Lecture series, 
the detailed evidence for that total view is not provided. 
Brink's analysis of the tensions which exist within the poem, 
and which are instrumental in imposing the discipline of form 
upon it, is very much in keeping with my own views on the 
different, but equally formative, tensions which operate within 
and upon Satires 2.2. Certainly, Brink's analysis and under-
standing of the complexity of these tensions, a complexity 
which goes far beyond a simple polarity between Horace's 
,\ 
attitudes to the town and country and to Maecenas and Horace's 
rustic neighbours, serves as a useful corrective to the perhaps 
rather simplistic interpretations of the poem such as that put 
forward by Lejay.3 Moreover, Brink's comments on what he calls 
the "moral dialectic II of the satire are extremely useful and 
deserve quotation: 
3 E.g. p.512, "Le fond de la satire est une opposition entre 
la vie de la ville et celIe de la campagne." 
No better name than 'moral dialectic' occurs to me for 
the way in which the poet has shaped his material. It 
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is not the dialectic of the philosophers, yet it is a 
strongly rational principle. Two pairs of logical 
opposites or contradictions are made to serve their 
purpose. One pair is dominant, the other is subordinate. 
The dominant pair is Horace the countryman: Horace the 
townsman. The countryman provides the framework: Horace 
begins with the country, and returns to it in a circle 
at the end. The city forms the centre of the poem, 
surrounded by its antithesis. The subordinate pair is 
Horace's indebtedness to Maecenas for his countryman's 
existence and Horace's indebtedness to Maecenas for his 
townsman's existence - the former only implied ••• but 
so forcibly implied that no one ••. has ever doubted it; 
the latter explicit. 4 
Such an analysis of the opposites within the poem issues in the 
following structural scheme, vlhich I adopt myself in my 
discussion of the poem: 
~\ 't7,.7' '_1C:::: I-IcrGca I s ........ _..::I ___ ..L... ........... _..L..! _ __ 1.-'=..1-': ___ ..... , v v • ..... ""-.1 lLLU\..A.CO '- J...U,U'-..L.V auLU..L \........I..UJ,J,i:) 
b) Vv. 16-59 Horace's urban toils 
c) Vv. 60-76 Escape to the country 
d) Vv. 77-117 The fable of the mice. 5 
As can clearly be seen a) and c), both about fifteen lines in 
length, form introductions to b) and d) which are the major 
sections of the poem and which are also comparable in length. 
Before moving on to a detailed discussion of the poem, 
however, I must take issue with one of Brink's conclusions, and 
also consider both the strengths and weaknesses of the cases 
which have been presented by Fraenkel, Lejay and Rudd. 
Brink takes issue with those "who take Horace literally, 
4 Brink, p.ll. 
5 Lejay's structuring of the poem on p.523 is marginally 
different, but not so as to cause any great difficulty of 
interpretation. 
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and think that he tells us something about his person." Brink 
continues, "They are mistaken. He only seems to talk about 
Horace the individual. For ..• the traits which he discloses 
are so selective, so sharply overstated or typified, that in 
fact we learn very little about himself, though we may learn 
something about ourselves and the world, if we wish to.,,6 
without in any way disputing the validity of the final portion 
of this statement, I would take issue with Brink's denial of 
autobiographical validity in Horace's satires. While it is 
true that the disclosures, which Horace makes are selective 
and, indeed, so selected to further his moral and didactic 
ends, it is also true that his description of the details of 
the journey in Satires 1.5 is selective, as is the portrayal of 
the "Pest" in Satires 1.9. In 1.5 Horace gives particular 
attention to those elements of the journey which he himself 
found particularly amusing or distasteful. Why else should so 
much time be devoted to the slanging match between Messius and 
Cicirrus in vv.5l-70? Selection by the artist is surely the 
element which distinguishes art from catalogue, yet both art 
and catalogue can be true in their own way. In the same way 
that the realism of the novel is not the realism of history, 
so the realism of Horace's satires is not the realism of, for 
examples, the letters of the younger Pliny. Horace's satires 
are inrneasurably more entertaining, because of the selection and 
organisation of material. Yet selection is not exclusive of 
validity, even if that validity is not what one would demand of 
a more documentary approach. Certain truths about Horace's 
moral stance can, I believe, be abstracted from Horace's Satires 
6 Brink, p.12. 
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2.6, especially if consideration of this poem is tempered with 
information derived from Satires 2.2 and elsewhere, especially 
1.6, as is noted by Lejay and Rudd, and also Satires 2.3 and 2.7. 
One should, however, stress here that it is likely 
that Brink's cautionary tone is intended as a warning to those 
who would follow too closely in the footsteps of Lejay 7 and, 
like him, attribute too much in the way of literal truth to the 
portraits within the poems. This trait is particularly strange 
in Lejay, when one considers the vast extent of the attention 
which is paid by him to the tracing of the different literary 
sources of the philosophical ideas which are utilised by Horace 
in the composition of these poems. Lejay's approach, however, 
is vitiated to a certain extent by his desire to ignore the 
evidence which he is himself so adept at accumulating and 
exposing and to postulate that the moral philosophy of Horace 
is more strictly to be attributed to the exploitation of a fund 
of folk belief. Although it is true that such a fund existed, 
it had been given literary shape since at least the time of 
E . 8 d h d' h . d b 11" nnlUS, an a, Slnce t en, been contamlnate y He enlstlc 
ideas. Few were more aware of this than Horace. In keeping 
with this desire to see Horace as the mouthpiece of this fund of 
traditional beliefs is Lejay's desire to see Of ell us , for example, 
as "un des se plus humbles representants" of that class "a 
laquelle appartiennent Virgile, Ovide, Ie pere de Ciceron.,,9 
The inadequacy of this view was demonstrated in the discussion of 
Satires 2.2. 
The literary scholarship of Fraenkel is, of course, 
7 Lejay's views are put forward in both his introduction in 
pp.512~523 and h~s commentary upon the poem. 
8 See introduction to thesis, above pp.vi-xii. 
9 Lejay; p.517. 
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unimpeachable, both in respect of primary and of secondary 
sources, even as was Lejay's knowledge of Horace's indebtedness 
to the philosophical treatises of Cicero. Especially important 
and valuable are Fraenkelvs references to the seminal works of 
such scholars as Heinze and Wieland. lO However, despite the 
wealth and value of the literary armament that Fraenkel brings 
to bear upon the poem, on occasion he seems thereby blinded to 
the gentle irony of the poet. Also, his discussion of the moral 
ideas which are expressed by Horace and Cervius, while stressing 
again the dangers of the approach adopted by Lejay, "no sensible 
reader will be tempted to believe that peasants in the region 
of Vicovaro, whether sotto il buono Augusto or in any other age, 
would talk as if they had perused Cicero's de finibus bonorum 
11 
et malorum", is itself brief, includes no comment on the 
tension set up within the poem by such "educated" peasants, and, 
indeed, could with fairness itself be described as commonplace. 
Take, for example, the following: 
Solid honesty, combined, perhaps, with a good deal of 
shrewdness, and steadfast principles are indeed at home 
in these humble cottages, where one spurns the sophistication 
and idle talk of the townspeople. The form in which 
Horace makes his rustic friends talk about the things 
which they hold most precious is a form lent to them by 
the poet, but the substance of their talk and the scale 
of values which is manifested in their meditations are 
th . 12 elr own. 
I am not entirely sure that the form of "their meditations" can 
be so absolutely divorced from their "substance", since, as was 
shown in the discussion of Satires 2.2 the Greek influence 
10 See Fraenkel's comments, p.140, and nn.l and 4 on that page. 
11 Fraenkel, p.143. J 
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upon both is considerable, if only because of the mutual inter-
action which demonstrably took place between Hellenistic and 
Roman ethical views in the period from the middle of the second 
century B.C. to the time of the composition of Horace's Satires. 
Insufficient account is taken of this fact by Fraenkel, whose 
comments on the moral direction of the poem show a good deal of 
insight, but also a somewhat blinkered attitude towards the 
possible influence of the philosophers.13 
Although Rudd declares that, "It was one of Horace's 
aims to arouse men's self-respect, but he was not so cynical 
as to believe that pudor was a prerogative of the senatorial 
order,,14 (and few can have felt that by the end of the first 
century) and seems to be in accord with Fraenkel's comments on 
Horace's praise of "the rules of sound economy", "moral decency", 
"the limitations of human decency" and "wisdom pleasing to the 
gods whoever they be",15 nevertheless his initial approach to 
Satires 2.6 is from a different direction. He couples it with 
1.6 and comments upon the change undergone by the relationship 
b d 16 d . I d . etween Horace an Maecenas an, stress1ng Horace s eS1re 
that his good fortune be permanent, declares that primarily, 
"This is a poem about wishes.,,17 I would suggest that such a 
statement is in the nature of an eye-catching oversimplification, 
which the remainder of Rudd's chapter does little to 
substantiate, although interesting things are said about the 
prayers to Mercury and Matutinus. However, Rudd misses the 
13 Mention has been made above of Fraenke1's relative blindness 
in this respect, see pp.2f. 
14 Rudd, p.165, wi-th reference to Satires 2.2. 
15 Fraenke1, p.139. 
16 Rudd, p.253; the point is also made by Lejay, p.322. 
17 Rudd, p.243. 
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significance of pingue in v.14, although, again, the breadth 
of his approach may be the reason for this, even as it is the 
reason behind his very informative discussion of Horace's 
d 1 · ... h . 18 th t b eve oplng assoclatl0n Wlt Octavlan. However a may e, 
Rudd's prime interest is in Horace's attitude to prayer here 
and he suggests that, "The predominant spirit is Epicurean. ,,19 
It will be the aim of the following discussion both to test the 
validity of this bold statement, and to attempt to throw 
further light upon problems raised by the discussion of the views 
of Fraenkel, Lejay and Brink. However, in conclusion to this 
section, I would quote Rudd's comment on the fable of the two 
mice, since it shows a full awareness of the tensions discussed 
by Brink. The comment also encapsulates a good deal of truth 
regarding the special and intricate genius of Horace in the 
Satires: 
..• the tale we are given is so serious that it sums up 
a great deal of the satire's message, and though told 
by a country neighbour it shows the poet at his most 
urbane. 20 
How seriously we are intended to take and treat a tale which 
concerns the misadventures of two mice and which, on occasion, 
resounds with the hollow thunder of mock epic, is a difficult 
question. However, this aspect of Horace's poem will receive 
attention in due course. 
Before moving on to a discussion of Horace's mice and 
other details of the poem, certain prefatory remarks are necess-
ary, since they will indicate the direction which the detailed 
18 Rudd, pp.256-7. 
19 Rudd, p.250. 
20 Rudd, p.245. 
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discussion will follow. For a distinction ought to be drawn 
at the outset between the nature of prayers and supplications, 
which are directed towards some particular being, human or 
jivine, and those vaguely expressed desires, described as wishes, 
and which have no particular patron in mind. I make this 
distinction both because of Ruddls comment that "this poem is 
about wishes", when it is demonstrably about prayers, and because 
of the direction I intend to take in the discussion myself. As 
is indicated by the various meanings which are attached to votum, 
especially that of the actual object vowed in thanks and 
t .. . f 21 . 1 . th t . an ~c~pat~on 0 success, prayer ~mp ~es a success lmposes 
a certain obligation upon the suppliant. 22 Wishes imply no such 
obligation, since they are made with no specific benefactor in 
mind. The relationship, moreover, between suppliant and 
supplicated deity or person is parallel to the relationship 
between patron and client in republican politics and, in its 
more developed form, between Maecenas and Horace. It should be 
clear from these preliminary remarks that it is my intention to 
deal with this poem from the point of view which accepts that 
the poem's major concern is with prayer, and with the status of 
those to whom prayers are extended. In keeping with that view 
of prayer, which is implied by Horace's use of the word votum, 
not only in v.l, but also in v.59 at the close of b) with non 
sine votis, this will also necessitate a discussion of the 
obligations and duties which are imposed upon the favoured 
recipient of divine largesse. It will be shown that the 
21 The original meaning of votum seems to have been the 
"promise" made to the entreated deity. 'l'he transfer in 
meaning to the actual object vowed, as, e.g. at Virgil, 
Aen. 3.279, is easy. 
22 Horace's votum is moderation in his demand's and satisfaction 
with what he has received, hence, Sat. 2.6.14-16. 
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obligations, which are owed and genuinely felt, may be in 
conflict with the enjoyment of the objects of the original 
prayer. This confrontation between desire and duty sets up a 
typically Horatian irony and tension, while, as a result, the 
nature of what constitutes a proper object for prayer becomes 
suitable meat for discussion, as are the Stoic and Epicurean 
views on the matter in so far as they are relevant. The town 
and the country, as the rival settings for both the obligations 
of Horace and his aspirations, will also bear dlscussion, as will, 
again, the Stoic, Epicurean and Italian views on their respective 
merits, in so far as these have not been discussed in the study 
of Satires 2.2 and in so far as they are relevant. What 
certainly is relevant is the catalogue of questions, which 
Horace describes as the basis of conversation with his friends 
in vv.72-76, since they embrace or imply both the vexed question 
of what ought to be desired and, relevant particularly to 
Horace's situation, the problem of the motives and bases of 
friendship: 
72-76 sed quod magis ad nos 
pertinet et nescire malum est agitamus: utrumne 
divitiis homines an sint virtute beati; 
quidue ad amicitias, usus rectumne, trahat nos; 
et quae sit natura boni summumque quid eius. 
Far from being a mere catalogue of commonplace philosophical 
-topics, this list is of particular relevance to Horace and men 
in his situation vis a vis a patron and also to the encircling 
subject matter of his poem - "sed quod magis ad nos / pertinet 
et nescire malum est." 
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A 
HORACE'S RUSTIC ASPIRATIONS: VV.l-lS 
Although Horace's desire for a modest farm and garden, 
well watered and wooded, may in origin have been an example of 
wishful thinking, which was itself inspired by an idealised 
and even Pastoral view of his own rustic Italian background, 
the fact that the gods have responded more than generously to 
his wishes has put him under an obligation to them: 
3-4 auctius atque 
di melius fecere, bene est. 
Who these gods are is momentarily left unclear, although Horace's 
audience and readers are aware of the generosity shown to the 
poet by his patron Maecenas. Brink declares that, "Cormnentators 
have always taken it for granted that this satire is a tactful 
2.!!d ,delicate 
for the gift of the Sabine farm.,,23 Although Brink does 
acknowledge that there is an element of truth in this, he also 
adds that the pleasure which Horace derives from possession of 
the farm is not entirely unalloyed, since, "Horace is indebted 
to him (Maecenas) not only for his countryman's existence but 
also for his townsman's existence, which is as much the basis 
24 
as it is the negation of the other." The implication is that 
Horace's reticence in refraining from naming Maecenas as the 
specific benefactor is not only governed by tact and delicacy, 
but also by a desire on the poet's part to allow himself room 
for comment which may have within it an element of criticism. 
23 Brink, p.lO. 
24 Ibid. Sf. 
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One may perhaps compare the similarly veiled comments in Satires 
2.2 which concern the resettlement of veterans and the problems 
caused thereby, a topic which, incidentally reappears in this 
poem at vv.55-56. 
While it is true, however, that there is no explicit. 
reference to Maecenas in this opening section of the poem, the 
poet's indebtedness to his patron is nevertheless clearly implied 
in a number of ways. As has been suggested, and as will become 
evident, deities of various kinds continue to appear as the 
satire progresses. After mention of the anonymous di of v.4 
(and these occur in one guise or another elsewhere, as, for 
example, in v.20, sic dis ~lacitum, v.52, deos quoniam propius 
contingis, v.54, at omnes di exagitent me and at v.65, 0 noctes 
cenaeque deum) Horace makes his prayer for security and 
continued enjoyment of his farm to Mercury: 
4-5 nil amplius oro! 
Maia nate, nisi ut propria haec mihi munera faxis. 
An amazing and unnecessary amount of concern has been generated 
by this apostrophisation of Mercury, which should not be taken 
much more seriously than the conventional recusatio of Virgil, 
for example, at Eclogues 6.3f., where the god in question is 
Apollo or of Propertius 2.1. Take Fraenkel's comments as an 
example of what may be described fairly as an overly literal 
approach: 
If Horace expected his readers, Maecenas and his other 
friends, to take this prayer to Mercury as the 
manifestation of a belief in the god as his personal 
benefactor, he would indeed be guilty of hypocrisy. 
It is, however, safe to assume that he relied on the 
sympathetic understanding of these enlightened men whom 
he knew to be capable of seeing the difference between 
the that lay behind the prayer and the form 
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25 in which he expressed them. 
In short, Horace's apostrophisation of Mercury, which deity 
can be described as Horace's particular tutelary deity,26 is 
a graceful compliment to Haecenas, although Horace's later 
portrayal of himself as a messenger of rather different gods 
than the Olympians, namely of Octavian and Maecenas, does put 
a somewhat wry complexion upon the compliment. That Horace's 
spirit of irony is, as ever, present in the prayer to Mercury 
and in the verses which follow is also evident. It seems to me 
that in vv.6-7 Horace consciously echoes a Platonic statement 
of traditional virtue, which is put into the mouth of the aged 
Cephalus in the first book of the Republic. Cephalus declares 
that, in terms of making money, he lies in a mean between the 
profligacy of his father and the tight-fisted acumen of his 
27 grandfather. By this reference to the Republic, which parallels 
the almost undoubted references to the Phaedo and Symposium in 
Satires 2.2, references which are cited above,28 Horace maintains 
that tension between the sophisticated content and the indigenous 
form of his pedestrian muse, musaque pedestri (17), a tension 
itself productive of the sparkle and life of the poems. One 
should also note that Horace's very moderation is an indication 
of his liking for the Golden Mean of the Peripatetics, modus 
agri non ita magnus (1), his garden (hortus in v.2) has 
inevitable associations with the life style of the Epicureans 
25 Fraenkel, p.140f.: one should mention in this context the 
number of times that Horace uses "0" in this poem about 




This may be seen from Horace, Odes 1.10; 2.7 and 2.17; 
connection between divine and human patron as providers 
wealth and supporters of the poet's art is clear. 
See Plato, ReEublic 330b. 




ideally enjoyed,29 while the terms ratione (6), vitio (7) and 
stultus (8) equally inevitably have stoic connotations. Ratio 
is, as has often been noted, a direct translation of the all 
pervading AOYOG, vitium is, as it were, the ultimum malum, 
while a stultus is every person who is not a sapiens. This 
final comment has particular verisimilitude in that a discussion 
of prayer, in a Stoic sense, and of the paradox that all save 
the sapiens are stulti was contained within the lengthy third 
satire of this book. 30 More important, however, than these 
possible examples of Horatian wit is an acceptable explanation 
along Stoic lines of the joke which is made by Horace in vv. 
14-15 : 
14-15 pingue pecus domino facias et cetera praeter 
ingenium, utque soles custos mihi maximus adsis. 
Rudd recognises the literary humour of this brief prayer with 
its antecedents in Callimachus, Aetia 1.23.24 and Virgil, 
Eclogues 6.4_5,31 while Lejay refers to Ovid, Met. 11.148 and 
to Petronius, Sat. 70.1. Rudd's explanation is accurate, in 
32 
so far as it gives the motive for Horace's joke correctly, . 
but does not pick up the similarity between what Horace's prayer 
asks will not happen to his own intellect and what was, 
apparently, the fate of Of ell us , intellect in Satires 2.2.3. 
Horace plays upon the desirability of fatness as an attribute 
of sheep and its unfittingness as an attribute of intellect, 
especially if the physical nature and explanations of the 
intellect given by the Stoics, and discussed in the context of 
29 E.g. Cic. Fin. 5.1.3 and N.D. 1.33.93. 
30 See in discussion of satires 2.3 above, pp.39-l45~ 
31 Rudd, p.305, n.3. 
32 Rudd, p.244, "The slight inconsistency in the prayer for 
wealth is muffled by the introductory si quod adest gratum 
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satires 2.2.3 above, are borne in mind, as inevitably they must 
be after the introduction into the antecedent lines of ratio, 
vitium and stultus and the memory of Stoic attitudes towards 
prayer expressed in Satires 2.3. That the ambiguities of pinguis 
had an abiding attraction for Horace, especially when intent upon 
the materi'alistic philosophies, is clear also from Epistles 
1.4.15-16: 
me pinguem et nitidum bene curata cute vises 
cum ridere voles Epicuri de grege porcum. 
where a similarly self-derogatory tone is present. 
B 
HORACE'S URBAN TOILS: VV.16-59 
The transition to the discussion of the troubles 
attending upon Horace as he fulfills his duties to Maecenas in 
the city is managed economically in vv.16-l9. 33 While in his 
country retreat, where he loves to compose his poems,34 he is 
free from the dangers and discomforts of the city.35 Of great 
importance to Horace is the fact that it is only while he is in 
the country that he can consider himself to be his own master. 
The irony is that that independence and freedom, which he may 
from time to time enjoy there, is dependent upon the continuing 
demands which his proximity and indebtedness to Maecenas lay 
iuvat, and is then blown away completely in the joke which 
follows. II 
33 See Rudd's discussion of this transition, p.244. 
34 If we are to believe the beginning of Sat. 2.3, the country 
was where he found peace and time enough for composition. 
35 Compare Davus' comments at Sat. 2.7.28-42. 
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him open to. It is interesting to note the emphasis upon 
Horace's lack of freedom of action in the picture of his life 
in the city. After invoking Matutinus as the prosaic muse of 
his prosaic verse, Horace describes that deity as the god who 
marks the beginning of a day of toil: 
20-23 Matutine pater, seu "Iane" libentius audis, 
un de homines operum primos vitaeque labores 
institituunt, sic dis placitum, tu carminis esto 
principium. 
Horace's anticipation of a day devoted to opera and vitae labores 
is not disappointed: Matutinus himself arouses the poet and 
in vv.23-39 we are treated to a bustling description of the 
different aspects of that obligation, the nature and origin of 
which has already been identified and which Horace feels 
compelled to discharge in order to repay Maecenas. We are also 
made aware of the ill-feeling to which Horace is subjected. 
who overestimate his influence with the powers that be. It is, 
of course, a continuing complaint in Horace's Satires that the 
poet's artistic motives and social position are quite mis-
understood. 37 Even so, one feels that the picture here of the 
behaviour and treatment to which Horace is subjected is an 
accurate one which contrasts effectively with the description of 
t ' t t t f f f I' h 1 b t d 'k' 38 rus 1C con en men, ree even 0 00 1S ru es a ou r1n 1ng, 
of the noctes cenaeque deum (65) enjoyed away from the company 
36 E.g. the derisive cry of "Fortunae filius" at v.49. 
37 Two characters who misunderstand Horace's artistic aims and 
methods are specifically Damasippus in Sat. 2.3 and Davus 
in 2.7. Unknown detractors are taken to task in the 
literary poems 1.10 and 2.1, while Horace's social position 
is misinterpreted especially by the pest in 1.9. 
38 Vv.67-70, esp."solutus/ legibus insanis.~ 
298 
of the urban deities such as Maecenas and Octavian. However, 
before discussing the true nature of divine status and happiness, 
it would be as well to follow through the depic"tion of compulsion 
in Horace's journey through the day at Rome. For the concept 
of duty and compulsion is present in officio in v.24: the 
specific meaning attached to the word here is of the early 
morning greeting rendered to patron by his client and which is 
described so virulently by Juvenal at Satires 5.19-23. The word 
officium also implies the general obligations of client to 
39 patron and even embraces those duties of each citizen to the 
state and of the corporate state to the gods, which are embraced 
themselves under the general concept of pietas. 40 At the same 
time officium, as a technical. Stoic term translating -r;() 
C>. ~ 4 1. 1 . hi' th h h' R d uuvnuov, lmp les t at Horace s Journey roug lS oman ay 
parallels the lengthy and arduous journey of the proficiens 
towards the distant goal of virtue in and through wisdom which 
is the summum bonum of the Stoics. 42 Horace's case is more 
severe than that of the proficiens, since not only is Horace's 
journey not voluntary, but he also knows that escape is possible 
by making an actual journey to his country retreat, "in montes 
et in arcem ex urbe" (16). This escape is not made, within the 
39 Seneca at Ben. 3.18.1 makes the useful distinction between 
an officiu~rendered to one whose claim to it is recognised, 
and a beneficium which is a service or kindness rendered 
where there is no claim: "officium esse filii, uxoris, 
earum personarum quas necessitudo suscitat et ferre opem 
iubet." 
40 On pietas seen in terms of the fulfilment of officia see 
introduction, pp.xvii-xxvii. 
41 See Cic. Off. 1. 3. 8f., "perfectum officium rectum opinor 
vocemus quod Graeci uu-r;op{7wuu: hoc autem commune uu{7nuov 
vocant." On the essential role played by officia in all 
aspects of Roman life as understood by Cicero see Off. 
1.2.4f. 
42 Lejay discusses Horace's use of the day and day's journey as 
a symbol of life's pilgrimage at p.513, and also in his n. 
on 1.6.128. 
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fiction of the poem, however, until v.60 and, in the meantime, 
the imperative urge, put into the mouth of Matutinus in v.24, 
speaks of compulsion, as do necesse est in v. 26 and luc"tandum 
and facienda in v.28. The sense of pressure is maintained by 
urget in v.29 and by pulses in v.30. I would also suggest 
that the impersonal ventum est in v.33 adds to the impression 
that Horace is not master of his own soul while in Rome. It 
also seems a supreme irony that Horace, who vividly demonstrates 
in this way his own lack of freedom, becomes himself the object 
of prayers and supplications and of importunate "clients". 
First Roscius (35) begs for his attention, although orabat 
reads almost as a euphemism for "demands", the scribae (36) 
follow suit and finally an anonymous, but persistent, suitor in 
v.38 assails him: this final instance, before the interlude 
of vv.40-48, has in cura both an imperative, which is suitably 
peremptory in tone and sound, and a word which in its sUbstantive 
form sums up much of the idea of the load which Horace feels 
falls upon his shoulders as he shifts from status of country 
gentleman to urban slave. One may compare the ambiguity of 
verum which is exploited by Horace in Satires 2.2.7 and 8. 
For it is clear that this is the position which Horace suggests 
he holds when in Rome or with Maecenas. It still gives him 
pleasure, but his position is by no means as grand as those who 
like to look upon the circle of Octavian as gods would seem to 
believe. 
The quiet and even trivial informality of vv.40-48, 
although they end in an outraged invidiae noster, form an island 
of calm reality in the surging race of life at Rome. Horace 
is too honest it seems to preen himself merely because of his 
propinqui ty to the great u For Horace's fa"(lours are not 
sought after for his own sake: 
Sl-S3 o bone, nam te 
scire, deos quoniam propius contingis, aportet, 
numquid de Dacis audisti? 
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Maecenas and his pmrlerful friends are "gods"; so far as Horace 
too is concerned they are "gods", since they have the power to 
send him back to the country, where he feels that he belongs, 
and, as his bitter rejoinder in vv.S4-S5 suggests, because they 
have the power to punish any indiscretions, had the knowledge 
sufficient for him to be able to commit any: 
54-55 at orones di exagitent me 
si quicquam. 
The stress here seems to be on the orones in the phrase orones 
die These are the somewhat nebulous group of gods whom we have 
already come across and whose anonymity has given Horace the 
opportunity to compliment Maecenas and also refer to the house-
hold of Octavian as gods. This is in v.4 and in v.22, also in 
v.52; they reappear in a specifically Epicurean guise at v.6S. 
The individual gods who, apart from Mercury and Matutinus who 
have already been discussed, help to keep the concept of 
divinity alive in the reader's mind are Hercules in v.13, 
Libitina in v.19 and Fortuna in v.49, while it is also a 
temptation to give rumor in v.SO a capital letter, so that as 
a personification it would parallel Virgil's Fama in Aeneid 
4.l73ff. and Petronius' Fama in his Bellum Civile, v.2ll in the 
Satyricon, 123. One should also mention in this context the 
phrase ante Larem in v.66. By his use of mortalem in v.58 
Horace also emphasises that mere propinquity to the great does 
not confer divinity. The only "divine" happiness, which a man 
of Horace's capabiliti~s and pretensions can ~spire to, is to be 
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found away from the toils of the city, since: 
59 perditur haec inter misero lux non sine votis. 
There is in non sine votis, I believe, a hint not only of the 
silent prayers which Horace makes for release, but also of those 
not so silent prayers which are directed at him as a functionary 
of Maecenas. 
C 
ESCAPE TO THE COUNTRY: VV.60-76 
It is consistent with Horace's beliefs regarding the. 
most effective means of satirical composition and with his 
frequent use of himself as a target, and therefore a medium, 
for satirical comment that he eases the transition between the 
attack upon the city's toils to the praise of country bliss by 
making gentle fun of himself and enjoying a joke at the expense 
of the pythagoreans. For vv.60-62 seem to anticipate Davus' 
comments, misguided though they may be, at Satires 2.7.111-115, 
and are also reminiscent of the equally misguided comments put 
into the mouth of Damasippus at the start of Satires 2.3, 
especially in vv.3-4 and vv.1l-l6. There is further evidence 
of Horace's skill in maintaining the thematic and structural 
continuity and unity of his poems in the way in which morta1em 
in v.58 is picked up both by citae iucunda vitae which 
occurring at v.62 anticipates itself vv.93-97 of the urbane 
mouse's speech in the tailpiece, and also the joke at the 
expense of the beliefs of the Pythagoreans. Further there is 
here a case of continuity by contrast, which may explain why 
Horace introduces the devotees of Pythagoras at all at this 
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stage of his poem. Whatever the reason for abstaining from 
beans,43 what is certain about the doctrines of the Pythagoreans 
is that they adhered to a belief in the immortality of the soul, 
in metempsychosis and, therefore, in the necessity of 
cultivating the soul during its terrestrial sojourn in a human 
44 body. The obligations, which this belief puts upon the human 
being who, as it were, temporarily leases the immortal soul, 
are quite at odds with the popular Epicurean view expressed by 
the town mouse at vv.93-97, and which are implied by Horace's 
own picture of Epicurean friendship in the banquet and good 
conversation of vv.65-76. It may also be that Horace has in 
mind the views on the immortality of the soul which were crudely 
expressed by Ofellus in Satires 2.2, where, as was indicated 
above, there were specific and ironical references to the 
theories ridiculed by Plato in the Phaedo. 
Since, however, one of the major themes of the poem is 
the true nature of divinity and which, if any, of mortals can 
aspire to such a status, it might be of use at this juncture 
to consider the views of the Epicureans and Stoics, to see if 
they can throw any light upon the problem as it exists within 
the poem, especially since the gods make their last overt 
appearance within the satire at v.65, where, as has been stated 
above, the aura is Epicurean: 
65-67 o noctes cenaeque deum quibus ipse meique 
ante Larem proprium vescorvernasqueprocaces 
pasco libatis dapibus. 
The aura is Epicurean especially in the sense that the gatherings 
43 See Lejay's note ad loco for a discussion of the ancient 
views on this particular taboo. 
44 On the influence of Pythagorean views on Plato, see Bluck's 
Meno (Cambridge, 1964) pp.61-75. 
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of Horace, his slaves and his friends, who are all freed from 
all care and restraint, reflect the life of ease and perpetual 
contentment, of secure a~apa~~a, which was the prerequisite of 
the gods as conceived of by the Epicureans,~5 the almost Homeric 
picture of which is presented to us by Lucretius at De Rerum 
Natura 5.1169-1193. The security of Horace is suggested by the 
word proprium in v.66 and it seems that Horace is already 
anticipating a successful outcome for his request to Mercury 
in v.5. The parallel with the blissful state of the gods of 
Epicurus is especially emphasised also, since Horace and his 
friends have no concerns with the affairs of other mortals, even 
. f' 1 46 d . 1 d' t . t f . ln a rlVO ous sense an certaln y no eSlre 0 ln er ere ln 
47 them. Horace and his friends appear to utilise, if that is 
not too strong a word, the gods of the Epicureans as they were 
intended to be utilised by the master himself, that is as 
models of a perfection of eternal bliss. No positive material 
benefits (or damage) was to be derived from them and, therefore, 
no obligation, other than the pleasant one of imitation, was 
due. As models of a perfection towards which humans could but 
aspire unsuccessfully they were elements in what Bailey 
describes as "a fine conception of religion and far more 
exalted than the traditional beliefs which Lucretius decries.1I4~ 
However, such an ideal view of life and religion, 
abstracted from the cares of contemporary life, is not permanently 
tenable by a man whose duty to his actual benefactor keeps him 
45 On problems of Epicurus' gods see, e.g. Bailey, The Greek 
Atomists and Epicurus (Oxford, 1928), pp.438-48l: the major 
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at times in the city and whose enjoyment of those noctes 
cenaeque deum is the fruit of that service. Also, the life of 
Epicurean withdrawal, however amenable it may be, takes on the 
complexion of the parasitic, if the proper officia, which are 
the ultimate prerequisites of that existence, are not performed. 
The life of the Epicurean community, which appears mirrored in 
the society of Horace and his neighbours, is only tenable if 
security is provided by a stable government. Stable government 
and the rigours of city life, which are the inseparable 
concomitants of stable government, demand a philosophy which 
is made of sterner stuff. Thus it is that Syme writes, "This 
Epicurean man appeared to surrender to a Roman passion for 
frugality and virtue, a fervent sympathy with martial and 
imperial ideals.,,49 Part of Horace's willingness to endure the 
discomforts of city life sprang from a clear sighted recognition 
that a compromise between aspirations and realities was 
required, if the aspirations and ideals were even temporarily 
to be enjoyed. It was equally the result of Horace's clearness 
of vision, which is, after all, not out of place in a satirist, 
that he recognised that the exclusive and abrasive idealism 
of the Stoics, as pilloried in Satires 2.3 and 2.7, was also 
unsatisfactory as an exclusive answer to the complex practical 
problems involved in surviving contemporary society. Cicero 
in the De Officiis was well aware too of the need to adjust the 
rigour of Stoicism to the demands of political and social 
expediency. The views put into the mouth of Ofellus in Satires 
2.2 were equally unsatisfactory as an exclusive guide to the 
good life, if such a single concept was even itself viable. For 
49 Syme, The Roman Revolution, p.416f. 
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it is clear that, if we take Horace as an example and employ 
the satirist's own technique, he was himself required to 
function on different levels in different environments, only 
some of which were congenial to him. Even as Horace's descriptive 
satires, such as 1.5; 1.9; 2.4 and 2.8, mirror the variegated 
nature of the life he enjoyed, and alternately endured, and 
also the diverse environments within which he lived it, so it 
seems that the satires of "moral dialectic", such as 2.2; 2.3; 
2.6 and 2.7, display, often in an ironical manner, since that 
is an essential element of Horatian satire, the different types 
of moral philosophical theory, exotic and indigenous, through 
the knowledge and sifting of all of which Horace suggests he. 
is enabled to survive the demands of life in an increasingly 
complex society. 
Horace's own intimate knowledge of exotic philosophies 
also enabled him to rationalise, often ironically, the attitudes 
of others less gifted than himself to his own patron Maecenas 
and to Octavian. It also enabled Horace to investigate 
rationally his own feelings towards Maecenas in the light of 
discussions upon friendship which were an essential part of 
both Epicurean and Stoic ethical theory. The treatment of the 
circle of Octavian in Satires 2.6 as "gods" by the importunate 
nuisances who assail Horace is an example of ironic comment 
and rationalisation on the poet's part, a comment which holds 
the views of the Epicureans and stoics firmly in mind. For, if 
we take the Epicureans first, it was the habit of later 
Epicureans to treat as a god the founder of the school himself. 
This was because of the benefits which he had showered upon 
ordinary mortals, who were therefore indebted to him, and 
despite the fact that Epicurean physics denied any possibility 
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of survival for the human soul as an independent and intelligent 
entity. The famous apostrophisation of Epicurus as a god by 
Lucretius in De Rerum Natura 5.8-12: 
dicendum est deus ille fuit deus,inclute Memmi, 
qui princeps vitae rationem invenit earn quae 
nunc appellatur sapientia, quique per artem 
fluctibus e tantis vitam tantisque tenebris 
in tam tranquillo et tam clara luce locavit. 
is the most famous example of this attitude towards a great 
human benefactor; while it is also reflected, in a sense, in the 
description of those whose services had qualified them for a 
life in Elysium in Aeneid 6. 50 Epicurus himself made clear 
that men who lived according to his doctrines also were like 
the gods, in everything except presumably their immortality. 
This sentiment is recorded at Epistle to Menoecus, 135, ~naE~~ 
OE w~ 8EO~ EV av8pwTIo~~, which seems to be an anticipation of 
v.55 in this poem. 
More important, however, for our present purpose is 
the attitude of the Stoics towards those who might be described 
as gods, although their basic, and unshakable, belief was 
pantheistic rather than either polytheistic or monotheistic. 
The whole cosmos is an intelligent living creature endowed with 
life and intelligence by the interpenetration of the divine 
~ "\.! 11 d' l' t' p' d t' 51 d TIVEU~a or AUyO~ ca e 1n atln ra 10 or rOVl en la, an 
thought of as benevolent. However, the stoics found it 
convenient to employ the language of conventional religion with 
50 Virgil, Aeneid 6.660-665; Virgil clearly thought that 
Octavian merited the title deus, at least in poetry, at 
Ecl. 1. 6-8. 
51 E.g. Cicero, N.D. 2.22, "nihil quod animi quodque rationis 
est expers id generare ex se potest animantem compotemque 
rationis. mundus autem generat animantes compotesque 
ra tionis an.:uTtans est igi tur mundus composque ra tionis. " 
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d t 'th d'ff t t f d' , 't 52 d regar 0 namlng e 1 eren aspec s 0 lVlnl y an, on 
occasion, their devotional li·terature, for example Cleanthes U 
Hymn to Zeus, matches the genuine religious enthusiasm of 
Aeschylean tragic lyric. Their reverence for the sapiens,53 in 
whom the divine spark burned most brightly, and their generally 
anthropocentric view of the cosmos, which they conceived of as 
54 being created for the sake of gods and men, naturally led 
them to develop an idea of the divinity of such persons who 
had conferred great benefits upon humanity. It would certainly 
seem from the thought put into the problem by the Roman Stoic 
and pontifex maximus, Q. Mucius Scaevola, consul in 95 B.C., 
that the conflict between Stoic views on the gods and popular 
views was a cause of some concern. He overcame "the difficulty 
about the popular religion by distinguishing on Stoic lines 
three classes of deities, (i) mythical deities, celebrated by 
poets with incredible and "nT.l.7f"'\,....-t-l-\"(7 1"'\.::l "V""""!l of-'; r'\'t"'\ Ct 0 _ ........ -- _ ...... .1 ...... __ ........... _ ..... _ .. .a._ I 
phical deities, better suited for the schools than for the 
market place; (iii) civic deities, whose ceremonies it is the 
duty of state officials to maintain, interpreting them so as 
to agree with the philosophers rather than with the poets.,,55 
In addition to this group of three, and relevant to our study of 
52 E.g. Minucius Felix Octavo ,19.10, "idem (Zeno) interpretando 
Iunonem aera, Iovem caelum, Neptunum mare, ignem esse 
Vulcanum, et ceteros similiter vUlgi deos elementa esse 
monstrando, pUblicum arguit graviter et revincit errorem." 
53 As demonstrated esp. by Cic. Fin. 3.75. 
54 E.g. Stobaeus, Ecl. 1, p.184.8 W, xoa~ov 0' ELvaL ~na~v 0 
xpua~nnos auaLn~a EE oupavou xat yns xat LWV EV LOULO~S 
~uaEwv· n LO EX 3EWV xat av3pwnwv auaLn~a xat EX LWV EVExa 
LOULWV YEYOVOLWV. For a humorous comment on this aspect of 
Stoic teleology see Cic. Fin. 5.38, "ut non inscite illud 
dictum videatur in sue, animum illi pecudi datum pro sale, 
ne putisceret"; cf. also Cic. Fin. 3.64. 
55 Arnold, Roman Stoicism p.384; the source'quoted is Aug. 
Civ. Dei. 4.21 and 6.5; the authority is Varro. 
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Horace's attitudes and those of the plebeians in Satires 2.6, 
we may cite Cicero, De Natura Deorum 1.38: 
At Persaeus, eiusdem Zenonis auditor, eos dicit esse 
habitos deos a quibus magna utilitas ad vitae cultum 
esset inventa, ipsasque res utiles et salutares deorum 
esse vocabulis nuncupatas, ut ne hoc quidem diceret, 
ilIa inventa esse deorum, sed ipsa divina. 
Maecenas was certainly a person from whom Horace had received 
magna utilitas ad vitae cultum, which would qualify him, if 
ironically, for divinity according to the StoicPersaeus, while 
in providing Horace with the means by which IIfluctibus a tantis 
vitam tantisque tenebris / in tam tranquillo et tam clara luce 
locavit", he was at least as deserving of the title deus as was 
Epicurushimself. Octavian also, by now divi filius, could be 
thought of as deu~ in these terms,because of his services to 
Rome and Italy, and because of the obligations which the people 
of Rome and Italy owed to him. Part of the humour of this 
situation lies in the fact that, while it is possible for the 
naive and philosophically ignorant to think of the circle 
around Octavian as godlike, if only because of their personal 
power, wealth and, possibly because of their vaunted services 
to Italy, it was surely not possible for Horace to take any 
such notions seriously, although he was aware, as no doubt were 
Octavian and Maecenas, of the philosophical rationalisation 
capable of giving a degree of intellectual strength to such a 
theory. After all, Horace had accompanied Maecenas in a journey 
across Italy which was to culminate in Octavian officially 
employing the title divi filius,56 a journey during which 
56 Octavian assumed the title of divi filius in 40 B.C. after 
the Treaty of Brundisium, the ourney which meeting with 
Antony is described in Satires 1.5, which also explains 
the sarcastic attitude adopted towards Fonteius Capito, 
"ad unguem / factus homo", 1. 5.32-33. 
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Maecenas at least had shown human interests 57 in keeping with 
the frivolities in which Horace was allowed to participate 
according to the authority of the poet's disclaimer in vv. 
40-46 of this poem, e.g.: 
42-45 quem tollere raeda 
vellet iter faciens et cui concredere nugas 
hoc genus 'hora quota est? Thraex est Gallina 
Syro par? 
matutina parum cantos iam frigora mordent.' 
These comments on Maecenas prompt a further, perhaps 
ironical, question: is it possible to be on friendly terms with 
a god, outside of the poetical world of conventional epic, a 
world into which Horace was unwilling to venture? For, if the 
nature of prayer and of those beings who may be considered as 
justifiable objects of veneration, is a major theme within this 
poem, Horace is also interested from an intensely personal 
Doint of view in the wav in which his relationship with Maecenas 
should be handled, since not only is Maecenas seen as a divine 
benefactor, within the humorous fiction of this poem, but he is 
also Horace's friend, though not apparently as close a friend, 
according to Horace, as some would choose to believe. The two 
themes of prayer and friendship are related and they throw into 
sharp focus the central question of concern both to Stoics and 
to Epicureans regarding friendship: is it motivated by self-
interest or disinterested affection. If disinterested affection 
is impossible, because of the giving and receiving of benefit 
and service, is friendship doomed? This is the point of the 
extremely serious and personally relevant question in v.75: 
75 qui due ad amicitias usus rectumne trahat nos? 
57 E.g. "lusum it Maecenas ..• ", 1.5.48. 
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Friendship had long been a topic of philosophical 
discussion from the time of Plato's Lysis and the eighth and 
ninth books of the Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle, while Cicero's 
De Amicitia or Laelius seems to reflect the work on the topic 
of the Peripatetic Theophrastus, according to Diogenes Laertius 
and Aulus Gellius. A major concern was to distinguish between 
sexual passion, which often was thought of as destructive, and 
friendship which, by contrast, contributed to the E66a~~ovCa 
of the individual. The Stoics too were interested in discussions 
on the nature, motivation and standing of friendship, as can 
be seen from the fact that titles to this effect (ITEPL ~~ACaG) 
'b d b h 1 h d Ch' 58 are attr~ ute ot to C eant es an rys~ppus. On occasion 
the Stoics went so far as to declare that friendship was 
something per se colenda, placing it in company with, for 
example, the exalted virtue of justice. 59 On the whole, how-
ever, the Stoics were concerned with the concept of ami~!tia in 
relation to the sapiens, since they recognised that "friends" 
chosen mistakenly were potentially dangerous to the moral health 
of the proficiens, and the identification of "friends" had 
been recognised as problematic in philosophical circles since 
at least the time of Plato. 60 The risk to the proficiens is 
spelled out vividly by Epictetus in Discourses, 3.16.3, "It 
is impossible that a man can keep company with one who is 
covered in soot without being a partaker of the soot himself." 
Accordingly, one only chooses one's friends with great care, 
61 
although a true friend becomes an alter ego, while a §apiens 
58 See SVF. 1. Cl. 1.107.34 and Chr. 3.204.27. 
59 E.g. Cic. Leg. 1.18.49. 
60 E.g. Plato, ReE. 334. 
61 Diogo T.;'lprt-; 11<:::_ 
----- -~----, 7.23~ 
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was naturally the amicus of all other sapientes, since, as 
Cicero writes at De Natura Deorum 1.44.121, "nihil est enim 
virtute amabilius." Such exclusive and extreme views, typical 
of the intransigence of the Stoa, are of only limited relevance 
to Horace's discussion of his relationship with Maecenas in 
Satires 2.6. 
The same kind of denial cannot, however, be made with 
regard to the views of the Epicureans on this topic, since the 
Epicurean views and even controversies regarding the nature, 
motivation and advantages of friendship do seem accurately to be 
mirrored in Horace's own thoughts and questionings as expressed 
in this poem. For one of the most interesting results to come 
from examining this satire in detail is that Horace appears to 
be intimately acquainted with the internal disputes of the 
Epicurean school regarding the basis of friendship and with 
those diveraenceR of oninion. r<'lre <'lmona F.n;cllrp<'lnR hpC<'ll1Re nf 
J .&. r oJ .&. - - - - -
the authority of the Master, which are discussed by Cicero at 
De Finibus 1.65-70 and 2.82. These same divergences of opinion 
were probably occasioned themselves by misguided attempts among 
the later Epicureans to account for apparently contradictory 
statements in the Vatican Sayings of Epicurus. The twenty third 
of these Vatican Sayings is a useful example, since it declares 
both that the basis of friendship is, in common with the basis 
of justice, self-interest and also that "it is desirable for its 
own sake." The potential ambiguities in such a statement have 
been compounded rather than clarified by such modern scholars 
as Cyril Bailey who writes, following Torquatus' description of 
unorthodox Epicureans responding to criticism of the Academy 
at De Finibus 1. 69, that" it is probably safer to suppose that 
Epicurus did, as usual, found his advocacy of friendship on the 
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purely utilitarian motive of personal advantage in protection 
and the pleasures of intercourse, but on that foundation grew 
a true sense of the more unselfish enjoyment of friendship for 
its own sake.,,62 The mo~e objective approach of J.M. Rist63 
is more helpful, however, in any attempt to gain a clearer 
understanding of the various elements in the original Epicurean 
concept of friendship. The basic point at issue in the Epicurean 
debate ~s also put by Horace in v.75: are we drawn into the 
bonds of friendship by expediency, or are (or should) our motives 
be altruistic? Closely related is the question of loyalty to 
friends. If the basis of friendship is indeed self-interest, 
then, "if my own interests clash with those of my friend, do I 
simply set aside the interests of my friend?,,64 This must be 
the death of genuine friendship, especially if one's friend took 
the necessary initiative in forming the friendship, since "it 
will only occur if one of the parties takes the initiative and 
first bestows benefits on the other. These benefits, if returned 
in kind, begin a friendship which will help us to obtain that 
65 quietness of mind and body which is the supreme pleasure." 
Indeed "without friendship a man cannot live a secure and tranquil 
l 'f ,,66 1. e. 
The problem revolves around the precise meaning of the 
62 Bailey, The Greek Atomists and Epicurus, p.520. 
63 Much of the following discussion is indebted to the chapter, 
"The problem of friendship", in Rist's Epicurus: an 
Introduction (Carob. 1972) pp.127-l39. 
64 Rist, p.129. 
65 Rist, p.129. 
66 F. Copleston, A History of Philosophy (Maryland, 1962) 
Vol.l, pt.2, p.154. 
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phrase OLD SaULnV atpcLn and we should not be distracted by 
the occasionally lyrical language of Epicurus when writing on 
f · d h' 67 . . 68 h h t b r1en s 1p. As R1St p01nts out, t e p rase appears 0 e 
closely parallel to the Stoic npOnY~EVOV; even as La npOnY~Eva 
are chosen by the Stoic proficiens, because they will help to 
form an ultimately ideal character, so friendship is described 
by Epicurus as OLD saULnv atpcLn, since it is an immediate and 
unqualified means to the desired aim of an enduring aLapaECa. 
, 6 
As was noted above, 9 the Stoics were willing to describe 
amicitia as per se colenda and to link it with justice; even 
so the Epicureans linked friendship with justice and the other 
virtues as different means to the end of pleasure which was the 
summum bonum of their philosophy. 
One would now be justj,fied in questioning the relevance 
of this discussion to the interpretation of Horace, Satires 2.6 
and to HOrFl0.p' R own I'lredicCl.ment :t.'!hich is described i~ it. Fo::::' 
I take issue here with Brink's comment that the poem is not 
essentially autobiographical. 70 Take from the satire the 
obvious conclusion that the turmoil of life at Rome disrupts 
that aLapaECa, which Horace indicates that he can only achieve 
in those noctes cenaeque deum of rustic withdrawal. A less 
obvious reason than the traumatic effects of ambition and 
pressures of duties as to why the Epicurean should avoid the 
city is described by Rist, "In the public life of the polis we 
are not only risking the everyday dangers which will arise from 
67 Long, Hellenistic Philosophy, p.72f. makes this point, in 
company with Bailey, Lucretius, proleg. to v.l, p.6S. 
68 Rist, p.130. 
69 See above, n.S9. 
I 
70 Brink, p.12; see above,pp.284f. 
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the hostility of our enemies, but even more seriously, we face 
losing our,friends.,,7l Friendship, as we have seen, depends on 
benefits given, received and reciprocated. If Horace reciprocates 
to the benefits of Maecenas, as Maecenas would have him 
reciprocate, by rendering service in the city, Horace puts at 
risk not only his own a~apaE(a, but also the ultimate source of 
that a~apaECa, his friendship with Maecenas, and also, and 
perhaps most importantly, his prospects for an enduring a~apaECa. 
It is hardly surprising that his prayer to Mercury is for security 
in his happiness,72 that he mentions the fate of the dispossessed 
in the context of urban strife,73 that the satire ends on the 
same note, as the country mouse twitters: 
116-117 me silva cavusque 
tutus ab insidiis tenui solabitur ervo. 
It seems to me that Horace asks the following question in this 
poem, at least by implication: should he treat Maecenas as a 
friend, with all the ties and dangers which that involves, and 
then live at times a life that would inevitably place a 
potentially disastarous strain upon that friendship, or, to 
return to an earlier theme, should he treat Maecenas as a patron 
merely, almost as a benevolent deity? The latter course would 
be the safer. Horace could enjoy the benefits of his association, 
repay formally by discharging duties in town and so securely 
anticipate the pleasures of less demanding friendships with his 
country neighbours, with whom he could agreeably discuss the 
nature of friendship. As has been indicated already the concept 
of security in friendship is of prime importance and not only 
71 Rist, p.128f. 
72 Vv.5 and also 15. J 
73 Vv.S5-S6. 
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for present peace of mind. The pleasure of anticipation is a 
very real one for the Epicurean, even as the memory of a friend 
long dead can give pleasure. Rist puts it as follows: 
Epicurus does not tqlk about receiving; that he implies 
would be mere bartering (xannAEUE~). Rather he thinks 
about our expectations for the future. Yet although 
friendship provides such advantages, we must not rush 
into it - the risks of betrayal are too great - nor must 
we accept into our friendship those who are too eager 
for it. They are as unsatisfactory as those who are 
too ready to avoid friendship altogether. 1I74 
At risk of labouring the obvious: Horace would not barter with 
a friend. Such behaviour would smack too much of the political 
amicitia of the republican period, and would expose a promising 
relationship to the dangers of degeneration into the type of 
75 
amoral and mercenary trave~sty so hated by Juvenal. We can 
also see from Satires 1.6.70, carus amicis that Horace himself 
,...,......1"\ ...... __ _ 
"""''''''''''''4 '-"\""'&".LA. own 
relationship with his friends. It was preferable, then, to 
treat Maecenas and Octavian as benevolent deities, more distant 
than friends, not quite so impersonal as mercenary patrons. It 
seems to me that these comments satisfactorily unite the two 
major themes of the satire without undue strain, because of the 
general philosophical awareness which Horace demanded of his 
74 Rist, p.134f.: Horace anticipates country pleasures in vv. 
60-64: 0 rus, quando ego te aspiciam? quando licebit 
nunc veterum libris, nunc somno et inertibus horis, 
ducere sollicitae iucunda oblivia vitae? 
o quando faba pythagorae cognata simulque 
uncta satis pingui ponentur holuscula lardo? 
75 Juvenal's disgust at Domitian's treatment of his cabinet 
in Sat. 4 is matched by his horror at the similar way in 
which Virro treats his dinner guests in Sat. 5; the point 
here is that Juvenal considers the imperial household a 
model which is aped in its manners by the disreputable. Horace 
recognises the potentially deleterious effect upon givers and 
receivers of the pa.tron,/client~ relcttionship.. The relationship 




readers, an awareness which would ensure that they knew of the 
various attitudes to divinity, discussed in the context of 
Horace's prayer to Mercury, and also of the Epicurean concept 
of friendship. If this interpretation of the bulk of the poem, 
which is spoken propria persona by Horace, confirms suspicions 
regarding its Epicurean tone, what ~re we to make of the tale 
of the town mouse and his rustic friend, the fable with which 
the satire closes? 
D 
MYTH: VV.77-ll7 
Mention has already been made of Rudd's comment on the 
fact that th~ fable of the two mice sums up much of what the 
satire is about, is serious in tone and, in common with the 
remainder of the poem, is predominantly Epicurean in spirit. 76 
It will be the intention of this discussion to show briefly how 
the fable summarises the remainder of the poem by deft repetitions 
and word play and also what aspects are particularly Epicurean 
in the way that the "escape to the country" and the emphasis 
upon friendship reflected yery real Epicurean preoccupations. 
I will also suggest in conclusion a way of treating the fable as 
an integral part of the total edifice of the satire. 
The conflict of loyalties and interests between life in 
the town and in the country is immediately made clear by 
Horace's careful arrangement of the word order at the opening 
of the fable: 
76 Rudd, p.245; see above, p.289. 
79-81 olim 
rusticus urbanum murem mus paupere fertur 
accepisse cavo, veterem vetus hospes amicum .• e' 
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The almost crudely ostentatious and repeated use of chiasmus 
in rusticus urbanum murem mus (80), in paupere fetur accepisse 
~ (80-81) and in veterem vetus hospes amicum (81) immediately 
advertises the themes of town and country and all that entails, 
of poverty and wealth and the obligations, finally, of friendship, 
as exemplified in the ramifications of hospes (81). However 
"careful" (asper et attentus quaesitis) the country mouse may 
be, he is yet nevertheless willing to entertain his friend as 
lavishly as his modest means will allow. The situation 
immediately answers v.75. The meal which he provides is 
reminiscent of Horace's anticipations of future pleasures in 
vv.63-70 of this poem, but also is reminiscent of satires 
2.2.66-69 and 118-125, especially when one bears in mind the 
longum post tempus venerat hospes of the latter passage. In terms 
of repetition as a means of achieving continuity of theme and 
content within Satires 2.6 itself, one should compare vv.63-64 
with vv.85-86. An irony within the developing poem and fable 
is that, in his attempts to provide an easeful environment for 
his friend, an environment parallel to that anticipated in 
vv.60-62 by Horace in the city, an environment within which a 
pleasant philosophical discussion can take place, parallel to 
that anticipated by Horace in vv.70-76, the country mouse 
provokes an outburst of what may with justice be called distorted 
Epicureanism on the part of the town friend. The Epicureanism 
is distorted by the pressures and unnatural and unnecessary 
pleasures associated with life in the city. In fact, it seems 
that Horace is taking to task that very ecl~cticism and 
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philosophical or ethical opportunism to which he is himself 
occasionally prone. For, although the town mouse implies an 
authentic version of Epicurean belief regarding the brevity of 
human life as the basis of his urge towards hedonistic indulgence, 
that excessive hedonism, which brings risk in its train, is 
diametrically opposed to the demands of that uLapaELa which it 
was the purpose of the hedonic calculus to obtain: 
93-97 "carpe viam, mihi crede, comes; terrestria quando 
mortalis animas vivunt sortita, neque ulla est 
aut magno aut parvo leti fuga: quo, bone, circa, 
dum licet in rebus iucundis vive beatus; 
vive memor, quam sis aevi brevis." 
Horace criticises this "philosophy" by ensuring that it is first 
contrasted with his own experience of town and country. This 
he achieves by the verbal echoes between mortalem (58) and 
mortalis (94), iucunda oblivia vitae (62) and in rebus iucundis 
vive beatus (96), while quid te iuvat of v.90 may be an echo of 
v.13 and si quod adest gratum iuvat. Certa~nly the conflict 
between the opinions of the mouse and those of Horace, as 
expressed in the earlier sections of the poem, again mirrors 
the questions which are discussed by Horace and his friends and 
which are listed in vv.72-76, especially perhaps the topic out-
lined in v.74, which echoes itself the opening of satires 2.2, 
showing again the close relationship between these two poems. 
The topic is: 
73-74 utrumne 
divitiis homines an sint virtute beat!. 
Apart from the implication that money and virtue are incompat-
ible, the most interesting thing to note is that the desira-
bility of happiness is not in question, only the means to that 
end. As may be seen beati in v.74 also anticipates v.96, vive 
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beatus. Further, the discussion, implying the denial of an 
afterlife as an individually surviving and intelligent entity 
capable of punishment or reward, echoes the joke in v.63 and 
references already commented upon to Plato's Phaedo in Satires 
2.2. It also seems likely that the "neque ulla est / aut magno 
aut parvo leti fuga" of vv.94-95 is intended to revivify in the 
reader's mind the contrast between the status of Horace and his 
powerful benefactors which is a major theme, especially in vv. 
29-59. 
The country mouse is persuaded to accompany his friend 
surreptitiously and by night into the city. The mock epic tone 
intimates the insignificance of the two mice both physically 
and intellectually. The new host officiously entertains his 
guest on other people's leavings. However, the happy evening 
amidst these deceptive "goods" (110-111) is disrupted by the 
irruption of humans, noise and giant dogs. The "goods" of town 
life are specious and almost fatal, magisque / examines (113-114). 
That which was to make brief life worth living almost curtails 
life entirely. 
Even this brief discussion of the fable of the two mice 
shows how it reflects themes which are drawn from every 
different section of the poem and treats them now as parts of 
a coherent and vivid whole, as indeed they are, but in a 
slightly larger context, in the satire as a whole. It is I 
think clear from what has been said that a knowledge of the 
philosophical views on the nature of the gods, prayer, friend-
ship and the various "true goods" stands the reader in good 
stead in his attempts to see the satire as a unity. Brink, in 
fact, talked of the "moral dialectic" of the poem, Rudd of its 
Epicurean spirit, while Fraenkel, to a lesser extent, and also 
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Lejay, acknowledge its moral earnestness. The "moral dialectic" 
is, in fact, consciously related to the formal philosophical 
discussion or dialogue both by the references to Plato's Republic 
in vv.6-7 already mentioned and also the catalogue of topics at 
vv.69-76, which immediately anticipates the content of the fable, 
even as it summarises the themes of vv.I-76. I would suggest 
that the fable of the two mice plays a role within the miniature 
dialogue of the satire which parallels the role of the Platonic 
myth at the culmination of such dialogues as the Gorgias, the 
Phaedo and the Republic. The practice was also adopted by 
Cicero in the Somnium Scipionis at the end of his De Republica. 
Indeed, it may be a consciously ironical stroke on Horace's 
part to deny such beatitude to the statesman after the virtual 
apotheosis of Scipio in Cicero's myth. However that may be, 
even as Plato's myths draw together the dialectical threads into 
a consciously beautiful pattern in which logical necessities 
are transcended, even so the mock-myth of the two mice 
"transcends" the demands of dialectical necessity to summarise 
and illustrate in a remarkably vivid and memorable manner all 
the themes dealt with by Horace in a more prosaic fashion in 
the earlier sections of the poem. One should stress that, as 
in a Platonic myth or allegory it is naturally impossible to 
draw a one to one relationship between elements of the myth and 
elements of the dialectic, so in Horace's myth the parallelism 
between the mice and the protagonists in the earlier portion of 
the poem is not exact. However, it is zeasonable to suggest 
that Horace's position vis a vis the ideal life of the country 
is reflected, in its modesty of aspiration and emphasis upon 
peace of mind, by the life style of the country mouse, while 
the urban life advocated by the mus urbanus, although having 
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undeniable attractions for Horace as a literary artist, also 
reflects the discomfort and dangers of service in Rome. There 
is a further parallel with Platonic thought: although a great 
artist and literary creator in his own right, Plato bans the 
artist from the ideal state, because of potential dangers that 
true reality may become distorted. Horace, in this poem, seems 
to declare that the benefits of living away from his discriminating 
literary audience at Rome outweighi the disadvantages. This is 
the final message of the poem. However, as we realise from the 
Epistles and the existence of the Odes, the artist was 
ultimately willing enough to risk his friendship and his calm in 
the quest for literary perfection. In fact, the one officium 
which Horace was obliged to discharge for his patron and which 
was in tune with his natural inclination was the composition of 
poetry, which, according to Horace, was best done in the peace 




It has sometimes seemed impossible to comprehend, 
when reading Horace's Satires in the kind of detail which a 
study of this nature has necessitated, how any single poet 
could have absorbed and unostentatiously utilized so much of 
what was best in the literary and philosophical traditions of 
Greece and Rome. For it is not merely the extent of Horace's 
reading which inspires amazement, but also the lightness of 
touch with which the poet is able to organise and dispose his 
material. In coalescing, selecting and moulding to his purpose 
this vast array of disparate material, it is not surprising that 
his rate of progress appeared to such of the uninitiated as 
Damasippus to be painfully slow. Horace has shown himself to 
be intimately acquainted not only with such admitted sources 
as the writers of Old Comedy and also Lucilius, but to have a 
deep knowledge also of Attic tragedy, of the epics of Homer 
and the didactic poems of Hesiod. Equally important in the 
creation of the Satires have been the contributions of Plautus 
and Terence. References have been made to all of these authors 
in the course of the preced~ng discussions of but a proportion 
of Horace's satirical works. Horace has also been shown to 
have been intimately aware of the doctrines not only of Plato 
and the Academy, of Aristotle and the Peripatetics, but also 
of Epicureans, Cynics, Cyrenaics and Stoics. Horace's 
knowledge has extended to the manner in which the various 
philosophical schools propagated their ideas and this knowledge 
has on occasion had a formative influence in the composition of 
his poems. Platonic influences are evident, as has been pointed 
out, on the structure of Satires 2.6. This poem is 
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significantly influenced in its content also by Epicurean 
views on friendship and by stoic views on the concept of duty 
and also on the nature of the gods. In fact, of all the 
various philosophical persuasions the one which has had the most 
pervasive influence in various ways, not least upon the content 
of Horace's longest satirical effort Satires 2.3, is the 
philosophy of the Stoics. It is not particularly difficult to 
understand why. 
One reason, adumbrated in the Introduction and enlarged 
upon in the body of the thesis, is historical. At a time when 
, 
Octavian and his circle were formulating policy with the 
"restoration of the republic" in mind, the now established fact 
that the ethics of the Stoa, as developed by Panaetius, formed 
a rational supplement to the mores maiorum carried considerable 
weight. Also the concept of the imperium Romanum paralleling 
the Stoic cosmopolis must have had a considerable pull for a 
man as alive to the possibilities of propaganda as was Octavian. 
As a member of the circle o·f octavian through his connection 
with Maecenas Horace was well aware of the political necessities 
and advantages of adopting and adapting Stoicism as a further 
means by which Octavian couJd achieve his political ends. 
Although it is clear from Horace's own words that he was not a 
devotee of any particular school, nevertheless Syme's "Epicurean 
man" seems quite apposite. Horace was also proud to be an 
Italian and proud of the moral stature of his freedman father. 
It becomes clear, however, from his attack upon Ofellus in 
Satires 2.2 and his own inner tensions betrayed in Satires 2.6 
that he recognised the futility of thinking that any single way 
of thinking, philosophical or not, whether native or alien, 
could serve as a unique modus vivendi amid the complexities of 
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life as they challenged Horace and his contemporaries. It is 
also clear that very many of the aspects of the Stoic philosophy, 
and certainly of certain stoic practitioners, were repugnant 
to him. Accordingly he attacks their extremism and exclusiveness 
of approach in such poems as Satires 2.3 and 2.7: but, despite 
these attacks, it is clear, as has been made clear in the 
discussions of these poems, that Horace was aware of much that 
was of value in the ethical theories of the Stoics. At the very 
least, the Stoic ethical stance was yet another which, adopted 
by a character within a poem, could provide Horace with another 
platform from which to observe, describe and instruct humanity. 
Neither should one ignore the challenge to the poet as an 
innovator to produce an artistically viable end product from 
such relatively intractable material as the Stoic and Cynic 
diatribe. On the other hand, poetically intractable as the 
diatribe may have been, Horace se~ms to have recognised the 
uniquely persuasive techniques of the diatribe as being 
suitable for exploitation in the propagation of material which 
is not essentially Stoic. It may be said with some justification 
that Satires 2.2 and 2.6, although they do not have the same 
exclusively Stoic aura, naturally, as Satires 2.3 and 2.7, 
nevertheless exploit the diatribe form, as well, of course, as 
exploiting comic and Platonic influence. It is not perhaps 
surprising that the most eclectic of the Hellenistic philoso-
phical schools should prove of use in these various ways to 
the most eclectic of Rome's moralising poets. For even though 
Stoic doctrine could be and, indeed, often was extreme, as was 
the expression of doctrine, the Stoa was always willing to 
adapt and to adopt. This adaptability, perhaps more accurately 
to be described as opportunism, made Stoicism an ideal tool or 
325 
butt in the hands of Horace. So much so that it is again 
perhaps more accurate to talk of the interaction between Horace 
and the stoa than the influence of one upon the other. 
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